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This thesis concerns the theoretical issues that arise in the application of the 
constitutional model known as the plurinational state, developed through the 
experience of such Western liberal democratic states as Canada, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, to non-Western contexts of national pluralism through the case 
study of Sri Lanka. There are two closely intertwined and complementary objectives 
to the thesis. Firstly, to provide a fresh analytical and prescriptive framework of 
understanding and potential solutions to the constitutionally unresolved problem of 
national pluralism in Sri Lanka that has so far only generated protracted conflict. 
Secondly and more importantly, to contribute in more general terms to the theoretical 
literature on plurinational constitutionalism by way of the comparative insights 
generated through applying the model to an empirical context that is fundamentally 
different in a number of ways to that from which it originally emerged. In this latter, 
comparative, exercise, there are three key empirical grounds of difference that are 
identified in the thesis. Firstly, the difference between the sociological character of 
nationalisms in the two contexts, defined at the most basic level by the civic-ethnic 
dichotomy; secondly, the different meanings of democratic modernity in the present, 
determined by colonial modernity and post-colonial ethnocracy; and thirdly, the 
differences in the substantive content of democracy as between liberal and non-
liberal democracies. The thesis argues that the plurinational state may be adapted to 
have a role and relevance beyond Western conditions, by addressing the theoretical 
issues that arise from these divergences. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate that 
ethnic forms of nationalism are not necessarily inconsistent with the plurinational 
logic of accommodation; that an exploration of pre-colonial history reveals 
indigenous forms of the state that are more consistent with plurinational ideals than 
the classical modernist Westphalian nation-state introduced by nineteenth century 
colonialism; and that plurinational constitutions may be based on a broader 
conception of democracy than political liberalism. Building on these discussions, the 
principal normative contribution of the thesis is the development of a constitutional 
theory for the accommodation of national pluralism that is based on the norm of 
asymmetry, as distinct from equality, between multiple nations within the territorial 
and historical space of the state. 
“Every  generation  must  reinvent  the  wheel.” 
- Walker Connor (1994) Ethnonationalism  
 
“Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and 
speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of 
representative government,  cannot  exist.”   
- John Stuart Mill (1861) Considerations on Representative Government 
 
 “The  greatest  adversary  of  the  rights  of  nationality  is  the  modern  theory  of  
nationality. By making the state and the nation commensurate with each other in 
theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be 
within  the  boundary.”   
- Lord Acton (1862) Nationality 
 
“For  centuries  the  Sinhalese  and  the  Tamils  have  lived  together  in  peace  and  amity.  
We have been governed by their kings  and  they  by  ours  …  I  put  this  question  bluntly  
to my Tamil friends. Do you want to be governed by London or do you want, as 
Ceylonese, to help govern Ceylon? Shall the most ancient of our civilisations sink 
into the level of a dull and dreary negation? We all know and admire their special 
qualities. They are essential to the welfare of this Island, and I ask them to come over 
and  help  us.”   
- The Rt. Hon. D.S. Senanayake (1945), Leader of the State Council, later first 
Prime Minister of independent Ceylon, moving a resolution of the State 
Council accepting the Soulbury Constitution  
 
“  The  British,  with  their  short-sighted policy, brought the two nations that existed for 
centuries together for the sake of trouble-free colonial rule. However, the nations 
resisted assimilation. They had the idea that like the English, Scots and the Welsh, in 
Ceylon also there would be a new nation-state at the expense of one or the other. 
That  did  not  happen.  They  didn’t  have  any  idea  other  than  the  unitary  system.  They  
did not think at all whether it would be suitable to a country where, unlike in the 
United  Kingdom,  the  divisions  are  based  on  much  [more]  distinctive  identities.” 
- S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C., M.P. (1951), presidential address to the first 
national convention of the Tamil Federal Party 
 
“There  is  a  growing  tendency  among  political  commentators  to  reject  the  idea  of  the  
United Kingdom as a unitary state, archetype of a nation-state. Instead, it is portrayed 
as  a  ‘union  state’,  emerging  from  prior  unions  of  distinct  kingdoms.” 
- Professor Sir Neil MacCormick (1999) Questioning Sovereignty  
 
“Nationalism  springs,  as  often  as  not,  from  a  wounded  or  outraged  sense  of  human  
dignity,  the  desire  for  recognition.” 
- Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin (1996) The Sense of Reality    
  
“Nationalism  reminds  us  that  individuals  fear  being  stateless;;  liberalism  tells  us  that  
they  ought  to  fear  the  state  they  have  created.” 
- Yael Tamir (1997) The Land of the Fearful and the Free 
1 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 3 
1.1 The Research Problem: National Pluralism and its Constitutional 
Accommodation 
4 
1.2 The  Case  Study:  Sri  Lanka’s  Constitutionally Unresolved 
Condition of National Pluralism  
8 
2. Research Questions and Potential Scope of Original Contribution 9 
3. Methodology and Framework Theory: Constitutional Theory as 
Functional Normativity 
15 
4. The Structure of the Thesis 19 
 
CHAPTER 2 – THE SRI LANKAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM DEBATE: A 
TYPOLOGY OF POSITIONS 
 
1. Introduction 24 
2. The Unitary State Perspective 25 
2.1 Sinhala-Buddhist Nationalism and the Unitary State 29 
2.2 The Jacobin Variant 49 
3. The Federal State Perspective 50 
3.1 The Sub-State Tamil National Challenge 50 
3.2 The Liberal Variant 63 
4. Concluding Remarks 66 
 
CHAPTER 3 – NATIONAL PLURALISM BEYOND THE LIBERAL 
PARADIGM: PLURINATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SRI LANKA 
 
1. Introduction 67 
1.1 Departures from the Liberal Paradigm: Three Grounds of 
Divergence 
68 
2. The Liberal Plurinational State: A Brief Introduction to its Theoretical 
and Constitutional Concerns 
76 
3. Sri Lanka: Plurinational Constitutionalism as a New Framework of 
Constitutional Self-Understanding 
79 
3.1 The Role and Relevance of Historiography 80 
3.2 The Monistic Demos Thesis and Host State Societal Dominance 88 
3.3 Relational  Sovereignty  and  the  ‘Hard  State’ 94 
3.4 The Disaggregation of Nation and State 102 
4. Concluding Remarks 105 
 
CHAPTER 4 – BRIDGING TRADITION AND MODERNITY: PERFORMATIVE 
NATIONALISM AND PLURINATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
1. Introduction 107 
2. The Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy: Myths and Realities 116 
2 
 
3. Theoretical Approaches to Nationalism in Sri Lanka   129 
3.1 The Nation of the State? The Post-Orientalist and Ethnicist 
Accounts of the Sinhala-Buddhist Nation 
130 
3.2 The Sub-State National Challenge:  The  ‘Instrumental  
Primordialism’  of  Tamil  Nationalism 
145 
4. An Analytical Framework for National Pluralism: Performative 
Nationalism and Plurinational Constitutionalism  
158 
5. Concluding Remarks 164 
 
CHAPTER 5 – THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF NATIONAL 
PLURALISM AND THE SRI LANKAN STATE: RE-APPRAISING 
DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTS 
 
1. Introduction 166 
2. Problematising the Post-Colonial Democratic State 173 
2.1 Colonial Modernity and Post-Colonial Nation-State Building: 
Difference and Exception  
174 
2.2 The Shift from Monistic Demos to Hegemonic Ethnos: The 
Process of Ethnocratic State Formation 
181 
3. The Plurinational State and Sri Lanka: Exploratory Propositions for a 
Plurinational Democracy 
197 
3.1 From Liberal Democracy to Comprehensive Pluralism 197 
3.2 From Plurinational Union State to Plurinational State-Nation 208 
4. Concluding Remarks 212 
 
CHAPTER 6 – NATIONAL PLURALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
ASYMMETRY 
 
1. Introduction 213 
2. The Idea of Constitutional Asymmetry: A Short Conceptual Outline  224 
3. The Meta-Constitutional Foundations of a Plurinational Sri Lanka: 
Asymmetrical Pluralism v. Constitutional Equality  
227 
3.1 Asymmetrical National Histories, Democracy and Contemporary 
Constitutional Form 
228 
3.2 Plural Nations, Asymmetrical and Relational Sovereignties 235 
3.3 Institutional Asymmetry: Guiding Principles 247 
4. Concluding Remarks 252 
 













1.1 The Research Problem: National Pluralism and its Constitutional 
Accommodation 
1.2 The  Case  Study:  Sri  Lanka’s  Constitutionally  Unresolved  Condition  
of National Pluralism  
2. Research Questions and Potential Scope of Original Contribution 
3. Methodology and Technique  
4. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
For comparative constitutional lawyers, ours is the age of pluralism.1 No sooner had 
the consolidation of democratic nation-states reached maturity in the modern era that 
political and legal theorists began questioning the civic homogeneity that was the 
defining characteristic of modernity and the basis of its forms of power and 
authority.  From  Isaiah  Berlin’s  theory  of  value  pluralism  to  Robert  Dahl’s  theory  of  
interest   group   pluralism,   from   Seymour   Martin   Lipset’s   concept   of   crosscutting  
cleavages  to  John  Rawls’  and  Michel  Rosenfeld’s  notions  of  plural  comprehensive  
conceptions   of   the   good,   from  Charles   Taylor’s   Liberalism   II   to  Will  Kymlicka’s  
conception   of   multicultural   citizenship,   from   Neil   MacCormick’s   theory   of  
institutional   normative  order   to  Neil  Walker’s   idea  of   constitutional   pluralism,   the  
post-World War II period has seen a gradual but steady shift of emphasis from 
monistic conceptions of key concepts like society, nation, state, and sovereignty, as 
well as institutional forms of political organisation, towards the embracement of the 
democratic value of pluralism in all its diverse manifestations.  
 
                                                 
1 A. Marmor (2007) Law in the Age of Pluralism (Oxford: OUP): p.vii. 
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Repudiating any single conception of truth and justice, in the age of pluralism, not 
only is the existence of multiple conceptions of the good and the just celebrated as a 
good in itself, but also that the reasonable disagreements arising from these 
competing visions demand engagement rather than rejection, accommodation rather 
than suppression. As new conceptions of institutional and normative order within 
and beyond the traditional nation-state emerge in response to new empirical contexts 
of deep, abiding and growing diversity, we observe constitutionalism itself evolving 
in hitherto unanticipated directions. It is not an overstatement therefore to say that 
the central question for constitutionalism today is the issue of pluralism, and that 
constitutionalism itself is increasingly being understood as an inherently pluralistic 
discipline.2 These re-articulations of constitutionalism and its central aims and tasks 
pose new theoretical and practical challenges across the whole range of normative, 
functional, institutional and symbolic issues that constitutions have traditionally 
been concerned with, forcing constitutional law into an unprecedented engagement 
methodologically and substantively with theory as well as other disciplines and 
activities such as history, politics, sociology and philosophy.  
 
 
1.1 The Research Problem: National Pluralism and its Constitutional 
Accommodation 
 
In this thesis, I am concerned with an important aspect of this general movement 
towards pluralist constitutionalism, 3  which questions one of the most strikingly 
monistic of modernist macro-concepts: that of the unitary nation-state. The 
condition   of   ‘national   pluralism’, which denotes the existence of more than one 
group claiming a national identity within the territory and space of a state, and the 
accompanying rights claims asserted by these groups as nations, raise fundamental 
                                                 
2 See e.g., M. Rosenfeld (2010) The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, 
Culture, and Community (Abingdon: Routledge): Ch.1. 
3 As  distinct  from  ‘constitutional  pluralism,’  which  is  a  more  specific  concept:  see  N.  Walker,  
‘Rosenfeld’s Plural Constitutionalism’  (2010)  International Journal of Constitutional Law 8(3): 
pp.677-684 at p.678. 
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questions for established conceptual categories of law and politics in relation to 
nationality and statehood.4  
 
The constitutional claims that flow from the assertion of national status by 
territorially based and historically defined groups (whose collective identities may 
be expressed in either ethno-cultural or more civic-modernist terms), are both 
different from and more difficult to address through conventional concepts of 
democratic constitutionalism than are claims to recognition and representation made 
by   ‘minority’   groups.5 Comparative constitutional law and international law and 
practice, as well as liberal political theory and philosophy, have addressed the 
question of minority rights and multiculturalism with relatively little disruption to 
established categories of democracy and the nation-state.6 From the development of 
the normative content of democracy to structural innovations with constitutional 
forms, a rich variety of means and methods of securing the rights of minorities and 
multicultural citizenship are reflected in a voluminous literature as well as in a body 
of comparative practice developed during the post-war era, and in particular in the 
aftermath of the ‘Third  Wave’  of  democratisation  that  followed  the  end  of  the  Cold  
War. 7  It is, however, the condition of national pluralism that poses the more 
fundamental challenges for the democratic nation-state and its traditional 
constitutional structures and doctrines, demanding more radical responses from both 
                                                 
4 For a critical view, see N. Stojanović,  ‘Mononational and Multinational States: A Valid 
Dichotomy?’,  paper  for  conference  on  Legal  Reasoning  and  European Law: The Perspective of Neil 
MacCormick, European University Institute, 21st May 2010. 
5 S. Tierney (2006) Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford: OUP): pp.4-5; M. Keating 
(2001) Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford: OUP): pp.3-
6; W. Kymlicka (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: 
OUP):  Ch.2;;  A.D.  Smith,  ‘Nations in Decline? The Erosion and Persistence of Modern National 
Identities’  in  M.  Young,  E.  Zuelow  &  A.  Sturm (Eds.) (2007) Nationalism in a Global Era: The 
Persistence of Nations (London: Routledge): Ch.2. 
6 For e.g., see H. Catt & M. Murphy (2002) Sub-State Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of 
Institutional Design (London: Routledge); M. Burgess & J. Pinder (Eds.) (2007) Multinational 
Federations (London: Routledge); J. Hopkins (2002) Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and 
evolved Government in the European Union (London: Cavendish); M. Weller & B. Metzger (2008) 
Settling Self-Determination Disputes through Complex Power-Sharing (Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff); T. Benedikter (Ed.) (2009) Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self-Government 
(Bozen/Bolzano: EURAC); C.R. Sunstein (2001) Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 
(Oxford: OUP): Ch.4; C. Kukathas (2003) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and 
Freedom (Oxford:  OUP):  Ch.5.  Cf.  W.  Kymlicka,  ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures: A Reply to 
Kukathas’  (1992)  Political Theory 20(1): pp.140-46. 
7 S. Huntington (1993) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Oklahoma City: Univ. of Oklahoma Press). 
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constitutional theory and law in accommodating this socio-politically distinctive 
type of polity.8 
 
These issues have come to the forefront of political and constitutional reform 
agendas in a number of Western liberal democracies such as Belgium, Canada, 
Spain and the United Kingdom in recent decades. This has generated a substantial 
body of work in the fields of sociology, political science and philosophy, and in 
constitutional law and theory, of which the interest of the present project is on the 
theoretical challenges posed by politico-constitutional claims of plural sub-state 
nations and nationalisms, and on the constitutional arrangements employed for their 
accommodation; in particular, the analytical, normative and institutional 
underpinnings   of   the   theoretical   construct   called   the   ‘plurinational   state’. 9  The 
preponderance of the academic literature relating to national pluralism and its 
politico-constitutional accommodation within the plurinational state arises from the 
experiences of the established liberal democracies mentioned above, and 
consequently,  the  plurinational  state  has  so  far  been  mainly  theorised  as  a  ‘discrete  
category of multilevel   polity’ 10  within the discourse of liberal democratic 
constitutionalism.11 
 
                                                 
8 In relation to Western plurinational states with substantial immigrant ethnic communities, Will 
Kymlicka has drawn a distinction between multinationalism and multiculturalism: W. Kymlicka, 
‘Immigrant Integration and Minority Nationalism’  in  M.  Keating  &  J.  McGarry  (Eds.)  (2001)  
Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (Oxford: OUP): pp.61-83. See for a 
critique,  S.  Choudhry,  ‘National Minorities and Ethnic Immigrants:  Liberalism’s  Political  Sociology’  
(2002) Journal of Political Philosophy 10: pp.54-78.     
9 Two key works heavily relied upon throughout this thesis will be Tierney (2006), a seminal 
treatment of the theoretical and substantive issues of plurinational constitutionalism, and Keating 
(2001), a pioneering exploration of the history and practice of plurinational democracy. 
10 Tierney (2006): p.4 
11 ‘Sub-state  nation’  and  its  cognate  expressions  will  be  used  here  to  describe  the  entities  which  
Tierney (2006)  terms  ‘sub-state  national  societies’;;  Keating  (2001):  ‘stateless  nations’;;  Montserrat  
Guibernau  ‘nations  without  states’  in  M.  Guibernau  (1996)  Nationalisms: The Nation-State and 
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Polity Press): Ch.5 and M. Guibernau (1999) 
Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global Age (Cambridge: Polity Press); and Will 
Kymlicka:  ‘national  minorities’  and  ‘minority  nationalisms’  in,  respectively,  W.  Kymlicka  (1995)  
Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: OUP),  and  W.  Kymlicka,  ‘Liberal Multiculturalism: Western 
Models, Global Trends, and Asian Debates’  in  W.  Kymlicka  &  Baogang  He  (Eds.)  (2006)  
Multiculturalism in Asia (Oxford: OUP): Ch.2. For a list of other terms used in the literature, see 
Tierney (2006): p.4, fn.5 
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Nevertheless, the condition of national pluralism itself is not a phenomenon that is 
unique to the Western world. 12  In fact, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural 
diversity is arguably far more profound in states and societies outside the West, and 
especially in several countries in Asia and Africa, sub-state groups mobilising in 
distinctively nationalist terms do so along similar, although not identical, empirical 
(historical and territorial) bases to those of their Western counterparts, and make 
similar normative (political and legal) claims. 13 However, the experience with 
constitutional accommodation of national pluralism in the non-Western contexts has 
generally been less than ideal. There has also been comparatively little scholarly 
investigation of how the theoretical developments in the directions suggested by 
Western plurinational constitutionalism may have application in the different 
historical, socio-political and constitutional contexts in Asian and African 
countries. 14  Yet the need for exploring how constitutional law, theory and 
instruments can be employed in the better organisation of plurinational polities is 
arguably more acute in these countries, if only for the reason that unresolved 
anomalies between the constitutional form of states and their essentially pluralistic 
                                                 
12 According  to  one  account,  ‘90  per  cent  or  more’  of  existing  states  cannot  be  considered  mono-
national nation-states:  P.  van  den  Berghe,  ‘Ethnies and Nations: Genealogy Indeed’  in  A.  Ichijo  &  G.  
Uzelac (Eds.) (2006) When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism 
(London: Routledge): Ch.3.3  
13 Based on Minorities at Risk (MAR) data, Jacques Bertrand and André Laliberté calculate that there 
are  126  ethnic  groups  in  23  countries  in  Asia,  out  of  which  15  are  classified  as  ‘sub-state national 
groups’;;  362  ethnic  groups  in  43  countries  in  Sub-Saharan Africa, out of which 4 are sub-state 
national groups; and 74 ethnic groups in 19 countries in North Africa and the Middle East, out of 
which 4 are sub-state national groups. This means that there are sub-state national groups in 39% of 
countries in Asia, 9% of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 21% of countries in North Africa and 
the Middle East: J. Bertrand & A. Laliberté (Eds.) (2010) Multination States in Asia: 
Accommodation of Resistance? (Cambridge: CUP): pp.10, 11.  
14 This is not to deny the importance of much useful work in this area, but merely to underscore the 
fact that much of it is normatively from multiculturalism theory and institutionally of the federal 
variety, which are analytical and theoretical perspectives that share similar (liberal) concerns but are 
distinct to those of plurinational constitutionalism. See e.g., Y. Ghai (Ed.) (2000) Autonomy and 
Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States (Cambridge: CUP); B. Berman, D. 
Eyoh & W. Kymlicka (Eds.) (2004) Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Ohio: Ohio UP); Kymlicka 
& Baogang He (2006); Baogang He, B. Galligan & T. Inoguchi (Eds.) (2007) Federalism in Asia 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar); S. Choudhry (Ed.) (2008) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: 
Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford: OUP); Bertrand & Laliberté (2010); Y. Ghai & S. 
Woodman (Eds.) (2013) Practicing Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous 
Regions (Cambridge: CUP). 
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polities have had a tendency to generate protracted conflict, and descend into 
sustained and intense violence.15 
 
 
1.2 The   Case   Study:   Sri   Lanka’s   Constitutionally Unresolved 
Condition of National Pluralism 
 
Sri Lanka is a salutary, indeed, cautionary, example of an Asian state characterised 
by rich ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism in which the post-colonial process of 
nation-building failed to construct an inclusive, civic conception of Sri Lankan 
national identity transcending older ethnic cleavages. Since achieving independence 
from Britain in 1948, Sri Lanka has also demonstrated a persistent inability to 
fashion a form of state that is constitutionally congruent with its richly plural polity, 
with serious consequences for both peace and stability. As a result, the entirety of 
Sri  Lanka’s  post-colonial history has been characterised by serious ethnic tensions, 
including a long period of armed   conflict   between   the   island’s   two  major   ethno-
cultural communities, the majority Sinhala-Buddhists and the principal minority, the 
Tamils. Institutionally, the majoritarian form of Sri Lankan democracy has helped 
the Sinhala-Buddhists to consolidate their numerical dominance over the polity and 
to reap the benefits of controlling the state. In the absence of efficacious counter-
majoritarian minority protection safeguards, the ascendancy of post-colonial 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism alienated minorities and especially the Tamils from 
the state.   
 
Since immediately after independence, inter-ethnic political relations between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils increasingly became one of competing nationalisms. The 
                                                 
15 See e.g., R. Premdas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe & A. Anderson (Eds.) (1990) Secessionist 
Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter); M.E. Brown (Ed.) (1993) Ethnic Conflict 
and International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP); T.R. Gurr & B. Harff (1994) Ethnic 
Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press); R. Stavenhagen (1996) Ethnic 
Conflicts and the Nation State (New York: St. Martin Press); J. Hutchinson & A.D. Smith (Eds.) 
(1996) Ethnicity (Oxford OUP): Part VII; P. Harris & B. Reilly (Eds.) (1998) Democracy and Deep-
rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Stockholm: International IDEA); M.E. Brown, O.R. Coté, 
Jr., S.M. Lynn-Jones & S.E. Miller (Eds.) (2001) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Rev. Ed.) 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press); M. Kaldor (2007) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a 
Global Era (2nd Ed.) (Stanford: Stanford UP).  
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majority Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, drawing upon a powerful historiography of 
dominance over the island from ancient times, succeeded first in overshadowing the 
terms of democratic and electoral competition, and then in recreating the post-
colonial state in its own image. The three major elements of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism’s   constitutional   agenda   – the recognition of a special place for 
Buddhism and the Sinhala language, and a centralised unitary state – were 
constitutionally entrenched when the country became a republic in 1972. For their 
part, the Tamils articulated a sense of their own national consciousness based on a 
common language, culture and history, and made a territorial claim to the north-
eastern parts of the island. In constitutional terms, Tamil nationalism demanded 
power-sharing and territorial autonomy in a federal constitution, and when that was 
rejected, set about the establishment of a separate state through armed struggle. 
Active conflict ended with the comprehensive military defeat of the armed 
secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan state in 
2009, but the deeper constitutional anomalies and grievances remain not only wholly 
unaddressed, but also aggravated by the triumphalist and intolerant Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist regime that won the war and controls the state. 
 
 
2. Research Questions and Potential Scope of Original 
Contribution 
 
There are two closely intertwined and complementary objectives to this thesis. First, 
to provide a fresh analytical and prescriptive framework of understanding and 
potential solutions to the constitutionally unresolved problem of national pluralism 
in Sri Lanka that has so far only generated protracted conflict. Second, to contribute 
in more general terms to the theoretical literature on plurinational constitutionalism 
by way of the comparative insights generated through applying the model to an 
empirical context that is fundamentally different in a number of ways to that from 




For this latter, comparative, exercise, there are three key empirical grounds of 
difference that are identified in the thesis as providing the basis of analysis. Firstly, 
the difference between the sociological character of nations and nationalisms in the 
two contexts, defined at the most basic level by the civic-ethnic dichotomy; 
secondly, the different meanings of politico-constitutional modernity, determined by 
colonialism and post-colonial constitutional development; and thirdly, the 
differences in the substantive content of democracy as between liberal and non-
liberal democracies. The thesis argues that the plurinational state may be adapted to 
have a role and relevance beyond Western conditions by addressing the theoretical 
issues that arise from these divergences. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate that 
ethnic forms of the nation are not necessarily inconsistent with the plurinational 
logic of accommodation; that an exploration of pre-colonial history reveals 
indigenous forms of the state that are more consistent with plurinational ideals than 
the classical modernist Westphalian nation-state introduced by nineteenth century 
colonialism; and that plurinational constitutions may be based on a broader 
conception of democracy than political liberalism. Building on these discussions, it 
is envisaged that the principal normative contribution of the thesis is the 
development of a constitutional theory for the accommodation of national pluralism 
that is based on the norm of asymmetry, as distinct from equality, between multiple 
nations within the territorial and historical space of the state. 
 
The exercise in comparativism envisaged in the thesis between the Western 
plurinational state and the Sri Lankan case should not be a matter of the mechanical 
application of the former, understood as an ideal-type, to the latter. Rather, the 
critical, explanatory, and normative theses of plurinational constitutionalism will be 
understood as providing new analytical tools for a fresh understanding of Sri 
Lanka’s  national  pluralism  and  its  failures  of  constitutional  accommodation.  On  the 
other hand, using these analytical tools in an exploration of the Sri Lankan case, 
empirically so different from the Western liberal democracies on which the 
plurinational state has thus far been theorised, also enables a further refinement of 
those tools themselves. It allows, or so I claim, a potential expansion of the 
theoretical scope of the plurinational state from one that is currently an ideologically 
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liberal concept, confined in application to Western liberal democracies that have 
fully evolved as modern states, to a more broadly applicable constitutional model 
that can have application to contexts in which the process of democratic modernity 
is itself incomplete, or at least states which have not followed the teleological path 
expected by modernist theory.  
 
The thesis is a work of constitutional theory, an approach that is partly dependent on 
the theoretical character of plurinational constitutionalism, and partly determined by 
the nature of constitutional discourse in the case study. The constitutional reform 
debate in Sri Lanka that reaches back to the early 1900s has three striking features.16 
The first is the richness of intellectual imagination in ideas for institutional reform 
that have been proposed for enduring problems of constitutional democracy and 
ethno-cultural pluralism.17 The second is the failure of those ideas to find traction 
and implementation in the realm of the political, whereby ethnicised 
majoritarianism, partisan political interests of the government in power, and 
executive convenience have either dominated or hijacked every major attempt at 
constitutional change, especially in the post-independence era.18 The third is the near 
complete absence of theory in this debate.  
 
Reformist arguments for the institutional restructuring of the Sri Lankan state in 
appreciation of societal pluralism or in furtherance of constitutional democracy have 
                                                 
16 See R. Edrisinha, M. Gomez, V.T. Thamilmaran & A. Welikala (Eds.) (2008) Power-Sharing in 
Sri Lanka: Political and Constitutional Documents, 1926-2008 (Colombo: CPA); A.J. Wilson 
(1988) The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Co.); L. 
Marasinghe (2007) The Evolution of Constitutional Governance in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Vijitha 
Yapa); N. Wickramasinghe (2006) Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities 
(Colombo:  Vijitha  Yapa);;  M.  Roberts,  ‘Introduction: Elites, Nationalisms, and the Nationalist 
Movement in British Ceylon’  in  M.  Roberts  (Ed.)  (1977)  Documents of the Ceylon National 
Congress and Nationalist Politics in Ceylon, Vol.1 (Colombo: Dept. of National Archives): 
pp.xxvii-ccxxii.  
17 Illustrated in the documents in Edrisinha et al (2008). 
18 Except perhaps two: viz., the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the 1978 Constitution, 
which introduced, respectively, a scheme of provincial devolution and a framework for the de-
politicisation of key public services. See generally R. Amarasinghe, A. Gunawardena, J. 
Wickramaratne & A.M. Navaratne-Bandara (2010) Twenty Two Years of Devolution: An 
Evaluation of the Working of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka (Colombo: ICS); L. Marasinghe & 
J. Wickramaratne (Eds.) (2010) 13th Amendment: Essays on Practice (Colombo: ICS); R. Edrisinha 
& A. Jayakody (Eds.) (2011) The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution: Substance and 
Process (Colombo: CPA). 
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been richly informed by constitutional comparativism.19 They have also no doubt 
been influenced by various analytical and normative perspectives, including those 
provided by liberalism and liberal constitutionalism, 20  socialism and 
republicanism.21 Yet, in the main, these institutionalist responses have not been 
adequately theorised and contextualised to the empirical conditions of the Sri 
Lankan case, and have followed the dictum articulated by Neelan Tiruchelvam that,  
 
“The quest for a political resolution [of the ethno-national conflict] within a 
united   Sri   Lanka   must   …   relate to the substantive issues relating to the 
exercise of political power rather than more abstract formulations of political 
identity.”22  
 
This absence of theory has had several consequences, especially for liberal 
constitutionalism. 23  The lack of descriptive theory has meant that the fullest 
implications of key political dynamics and empirical factors, including sociological 
and historical implications of phenomena like nationalism and ethnicity, have not 
been taken into account in proposing institutional solutions. 24  Liberals have 
therefore consistently underestimated the power of the past, and by extension, the 
                                                 
19 Edrisinha et al (2008); S. Bastian (Ed.) (2006) Sri Lanka: The Devolution Debate (6th Ed.) 
(Colombo: ICES); S. Bastian & R. Luckham (Eds.) (2003) Can Democracy Be Designed? The 
Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies (London: Zed Books). 
20 R.  Edrisinha,  ‘Sri Lanka: Constitutions without Constitutionalism, A Tale of Three and a Half 
Constitutions’  in  R.  Edrisinha  &  A.  Welikala  (Eds.)  (2008)  Essays on Federalism in Sri Lanka 
(Colombo:  CPA):  Ch.1;;  N.  Tiruchelvam,  ‘The Politics of Federalism and Diversity in Sri Lanka’  in  
Y. Ghai (Ed.) (2000) Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic 
States (Cambridge: CUP): Ch.9. 
21 K.  David,  ‘The Left and the 1972 Constitution: Marxism and State Power’  in  A.  Welikala  (Ed.)  
The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections on Constitutional History, Theory and Practice 
(Colombo: CPA): Ch.8. 
22 Tiruchelvam (2000): p.216. 
23 Elsewhere, Mark Tushnet has identified the problem of ‘bricolage’  in  comparative  constitutional  
scholarship, which is similar to the criticism I articulate here in relation to Sri Lankan constitutional 
practice  and  discourse.  See  M.V.  Tushnet,  ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’  
(1999) Yale Law Journal 108: p.1225.  
24 Notable  exceptions  include  C.R.  de  Silva,  ‘Decentralisation, Devolution or Federalism in Sri 
Lanka: Some Theoretical and Historical Considerations’  in  C.  Amaratunga  (Ed.)  (1990)  Ideas for 
Constitutional Reform (Colombo: CLD); M. Roberts,  ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Sinhalese 
Perspectives: Barriers to Accommodation’  (1978)  Modern Asian Studies 12: pp.353-76; N. DeVotta 
(2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka 
(Stanford: Stanford UP); Wickramasinghe (2006); J. Uyangoda (Ed.) (2013) State Reform in Sri 
Lanka: Issues, Directions and Perspectives (Colombo: SSA). Note that there are three historians and 
two political scientist in this list; there are no constitutional lawyers.  
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deep legitimacy of majoritarian ethnic nationalism, however repugnant to the liberal 
values of choice, tolerance, and pluralism that ethnonationalist majoritarianism 
might be. Their general critique of ethnic nationalism on civic-rationalist grounds 
has also been seen as a selective critique of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, because 
the liberal commitment to minority accommodation favours the Tamil claim to 
territorial autonomy, even though Tamil nationalism is as ethnic-communal and 
ought to be as unacceptable to liberal values as its counterpart. Flowing from this, 
the failure to contextualise the normative principles underpinning institutional 
reform proposals, by means of historical, sociological, or other theoretical 
arguments, has entailed their easy rejection by nativist nationalists, on the ground 
that especially liberal democratic norms are ethnocentric Western values, which 
have as much place in contemporary Sri Lanka as colonial rule.  
 
Nowhere is this   manifested   more   clearly   than   in   the   liberals’   advocacy   of  
federalism. As Shivaji Felix observed, 
 
“The word  ‘federalism’ is greeted with a great deal of hostility by many in 
this country for more than one reason. Many of those who argue the case 
against federalism are guilty of the logical fallacy best expressed by the Latin 
phrase ignoratio elenchi. It essentially involves apparently refuting an 
opponent while actually disproving something not asserted; it refers to any 
argument which is irrelevant to its professed purpose.”25 
 
That anti-federalists and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists have distorted the notion of 
federalism into something that is virtually a synonym for separatism in the public 
imagination is indubitable. But it is equally clear that the methodological 
weaknesses identified above have contributed significantly to the proliferation of 
these misrepresentations.  
 
On the other hand, the mechanical comparativism that has characterised institutional 
reformism so far, together with its undiscriminating adoption of norms developed on 
                                                 
25 S.  Felix,  ‘Timely Aid to Constitutional Debate’,  The Ceylon Daily News, 20th August 2004.  
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the basis of radically different empirical conditions elsewhere, has also meant that 
the Sri Lankan debates have added very little to comparative constitutional law or 
global constitutionalism. Thus both constitutional reform and reform resistance have 
been conducted as competing and antagonistic projects of ideological advocacy, 
with very little light shed on the deeper conceptual implications of how to 
understand   Sri   Lanka’s   constitutional   problems   of   communal   pluralism   or   on   the  
norms that ought to inform their resolution. As noted above, the distinctive features 
of the Sri Lankan case as a multinational polity require the re-conceptualisation of 
several key assumptions and organisational principles of the modern nation-state at a 
deeper and more general level than mere reform of the state’s   institutional  
framework. One of the main aims of this thesis is therefore to approach the 
constitutional problem of national pluralism in Sri Lanka from a specifically 
theoretical rather than an institutional standpoint, and to offer both an explanatory 
account of it and a possible normative framework in resolving it. It is my hope that 
this attempt at clearing the theoretical ground would in some measure clarify both 
the empirical and the normative contexts of constitutional reform, so that future 
debates   about   what   institutional   structures   are   best   suited   for   Sri   Lanka’s  
multinational and communally plural polity are better informed and better 
contextualised than they have been in the past.  
 
More generally, the exploration of ethnonationalism, the pre-colonial state form and 
non-liberal democracy is intended to expand the scope of the explanatory, normative 
and substantive theses of Western plurinational constitutionalism in the ways 
outlined above. I will articulate these lessons in a series of constitutional principles 
that can form the basis of a wider re-conceptualisation of the plurinational state, so 
that its application and value as a constitutional model for dealing with national 
pluralism may be extended beyond Western liberal democracies, at least to cases 







3. Methodology and Technique  
 
The assertion that the discussion to follow is concerned with comparative 
constitutional law and constitutional theory rather than merely the constitutional 
problems of Sri Lanka begs the question of method and of technique. As is clear 
from the foregoing, my technique uses a case study to test the propositions of a 
theoretical model and to generate new understandings within the case study. With 
regard to methodology, my approach combines aspects of the historical, normative, 
functional, and contextual types of methodological approach set out in Vicki 
Jackson’s  scheme.26 More  precisely,  it  relies  heavily  on  Sujit  Choudhry’s  metaphor  
of ‘the  migration  of   constitutional   ideas’27 as the general approach that frames the 
enterprise   as   a   whole,   and   more   specifically   on   Stephen   Tierney’s   method   of  
theorising within plurinational constitutionalism, which he has described as 
‘functional  normativity.’28  
 
Conceived as a response to the inadequacies of earlier similes such as 
‘transplantation’,  ‘borrowing’  and  ‘cross-fertilisation’  in  comparative  constitutional  
law,29 the metaphor of migration is a much more useful way of understanding the 
reciprocal influences that characterise the comparative exercise, and is central to the 
way in which the relationship between the plurinational state and Sri Lanka is 
envisaged in this thesis. As explained above, the application of a theoretical model 
to a concrete case   is   intended   to   yield   ‘dialogical’   lessons   for   both.30 I hope to 
demonstrate both the migratory potential of the plurinational state as well as the 
benefits of normative comparativism for Sri Lankan constitutional law. In doing so I 
draw from another recent   metaphor:   Cheryl   Saunders’   notion   of   a   ‘global  
                                                 
26 V.C.  Jackson,  ‘Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies’  in  M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajó 
(2013) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: OUP): Ch.2. 
27 S.  Choudhry,  ‘Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law’  in  S.  Choudhry  
(Ed.) (2006) The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: CUP): Ch.1. 
28 S. Tierney (2012) Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican 
Deliberation (Oxford: OUP): p.2. See also P. Oliver and S. Tierney, Book 
Review/Response, ‘Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican 
Deliberation’, I.CONnect Blog, 25th February 2014. 
29 Choudhry (2006): pp.13-19.  
30 Ibid: pp.19-25. 
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constitutional   gene   pool.’ 31  Saunders has critiqued the North American and 
European focus and preoccupations of comparative constitutional law, and stressed 
the contribution that studies of Asian countries in particular could make for our 
general concerns in the discipline. This echoes the point I have made above 
concerning the global character of the problem of national pluralism, and suggesting 
the potential for the expansion of the application of plurinational constitutionalism.  
 
Tierney’s  methodological   approach,  which   incorporates  both   functions   and  norms,  
permeates plurinational constitutionalism as a body of constitutional theory, and 
encompasses the legal within the political and the historical contexts within which 
constitutions operate, whilst being constantly attentive also to the philosophical 
principles that articulate the ideals that constitutions strive to achieve. As he 
observes, 
 
“Constitutional  theory  is  both  immanent  and  functionalist  in  its focus  …  As  
a way of thinking, constitutional theory differs from political philosophy in 
that it is not an exercise in ideal theorizing from first, abstract principles. 
Rather, it is an attempt both to understand constitutionalism as a form of 
political practice, and to frame evaluations of how this practice works against 
its  own  internal  logic.”32  
 
The fact that constitutional theory is not primarily or exclusively focussed on 
abstract   first   principles   “does   not   imply   that   it   operates   in   a   normative   vacuum, 
detached  from  morally  informed  political  debate”.33 On the contrary, 
 
“It   is   the   very   contingency   of   constitutional   theory,   and   the   centrality   of  
political practice to its essence, that makes inoculation of constitutional 
analysis from value judgement impossible  …  By   [functional  normativity   is  
therefore] meant a constitutionalist analysis which accepts that even in 
                                                 
31 C.  Saunders,  ‘Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool’  (2009)  National Taiwan University 
Law Review 4(3): pp.1-38. 




functional terms any account of constitutional law must recognize that 
normative presuppositions are inherent within any exercise of constitutional 
creation,  reform,  or  practice.”34 
 
This normatively informed functionalist approach to constitutionalism, or in other 
words, an approach that is concerned with actual politico-constitutional practice and 
overarching normative perspectives simultaneously, deliberately fuses two quite 
distinct   ‘styles’   of   public   law   that  Martin   Loughlin   had   established   previously   in  
relation to the common law tradition.35 The normativist style (within which there are 
two broad conservative and liberal variants), according to Loughlin, 
 
“is  rooted  in  a  belief  in  the  ideal  of  the  separation  of  powers  and  in  the  need  
to   subordinate   the   government   to   law.   This   style   highlights   law’s  
adjudicative and control functions and therefore its rule orientation and its 
conceptual nature. Normativism essentially reflects an ideal of the autonomy 
of  law.”36 
 
By contrast, the functionalist style, 
 
“views  law  as  a  part  of  the  apparatus  of  government.  Its  focus  is  upon  law’s  
regulatory and facilitative functions and therefore is orientated to aims and 
objectives and adopts an instrumentalist social policy approach. 
Functionalism  reflects  an  ideal  of  progressive  evolutionary  change.”37 
 
Loughlin’s   aims   in   constructing   these   two   ideal-types were of course entirely 
analytical and explicatory, whereas the use to which I put theory in this thesis is 
more   in   line  with   Tierney’s   concerns.   Thus   constitutional   theory   here   serves   four  
distinct yet interrelated purposes: first, to explain a particular constitutional problem 
in terms of a concrete experience of functional politico-constitutional practice (i.e., 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 M. Loughlin (1992) Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: OUP): Ch.4. 




constitutionally unresolved national pluralism in Sri Lanka); second, to evaluate it 
from a particular normative conception of the good (i.e., plurinational democracy); 
third, to articulate theoretically defensible principles of constitutional change 
discovered by the application of the plurinational normative model to the functional 
reality of the case study; finally, and conversely to the last point, to suggest what 
changes the model itself must undergo in order to be applicable to the empirical  
category of cases represented in this thesis by Sri Lanka.   
 
It will be noted that the first element of this methodology relates to descriptive 
analysis of the case study, the second to evaluation, and the third and the fourth 
elements concern the distinct substantive normativity of plurinational 
constitutionalism itself. In respect of each of these tasks, constitutional theory can be 
further distinguished from constitutional law simpliciter in terms of its broader 
empirical focus and its interdisciplinary character, as opposed to the institutionalist 
and doctrinal focus and the analytical positivism that characterises the latter 
discipline, particularly in traditional accounts of Sri Lankan constitutional law. 
Consequently, the discussion in this thesis traverses disciplinary boundaries quite 
freely, and in particular, engages historical anthropology and political sociology (in 
relation to nationalism and the pre-colonial state) and political geography (in 
relation to the post-colonial state), in addition to sub-disciplines of political 
philosophy (in this case, democracy theory) that are more conventionally to the 
concerns of constitutional theory. Given the centrality of ethno-culture in places like 
Sri Lanka (an issue that, rightly or wrongly, Western constitutional lawyers can get 
away with paying little attention to), functionalism therefore also demands a 
strongly contextualist and hermeneutic approach in this project. By this I hope to 
avoid the methodological and substantive weaknesses that I have identified in Sri 
Lankan liberal constitutionalism, above.   
 
Finally, while the functionalism of this method pays close heed to the historical and 
socio-political realities of Sri Lanka – and my substantive argument rests on the 
fundamental conviction that a plurinational constitutional settlement is demanded by 
requirements of both political justice (fairness) as well as political management 
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(efficiency) – I am not concerned with the political viability of what is proposed 
here in immediate terms. Indeed, in the current political context of that country, even 
much less radical proposals for the accommodation of ethnic and religious pluralism 
seem to find little acceptance. Neither am I concerned with suggesting strategic, 
tactical, or substantive change for nationalist actors both Sinhala and Tamil. Put 
another way, therefore, the thesis is an academic exercise of constitutional theorising 
that may inform future attempts at addressing the issue of national pluralism, but it 
is not a liberal manifesto for constitutional reform, which means that it does not 
provide a political programme, or an advocacy strategy, or a process roadmap, or an 
institutional blueprint for constitutional change. Those remain separate projects. 
 
 
4. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The argument proceeds according to the following chapter structure. Before getting 
into the merits of plurinational constitutionalism and its relevance to Sri Lanka, an 
elucidation of the main positions of ideology and ethno-political interest in the 
current constitutional reform debate seems necessary. While setting out the basic 
narrative background to the theoretical discussions to follow, Chapter 2 delineates 
four major positions according to a typology based on the traditional unitary/federal 
dichotomy, which is the frame within which constitutional reform debates have 
generally been conducted in post-colonial Sri Lanka. These are: the Sinhala-
Buddhist and Tamil nationalist positions vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state representing 
the dominant nation in control of the state and the sub-state national challenge; and 
two variant positions informed by modernist Jacobinism and traditional liberal 
federalism. For the first time in nearly four decades, following the military defeat of 
the Tamil Tigers in 2009, this does not include an explicitly secessionist position. 
Since the two dominant positions with regard to the constitutional form of the state 
on the unitary-federal axis are associated with the two major ethnic nationalisms, a 
fuller appreciation of the unitary state and federalist positions, and the monistic and 
pluralist discourses that underpin those positions, can only be had through an 
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understanding of the ethno-cultural, historical, and territorial claims asserted by 
these two nationalisms.  
 
A further word on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and its conception of the post-
colonial state is needed. In addition to a new theoretical reconstruction of the Sri 
Lankan conception of the unitary state, I also discuss the form and nature of the pre-
colonial Sinhala-Buddhist state at some length in Chapter 2. At an earlier stage of 
work on this thesis, I had intended to address the pre-colonial state in a separate 
chapter, taking a methodological cue from plurinational constitutionalism in re-
grounding contemporary constitutional responses to national pluralism in more 
pluralistic historic constitutional forms that came before the homogenisation and the 
centralisation of the modern (colonial) state. Although well known to historical 
anthropology  as  the  ‘galactic  polity’  or  the  ‘mandala-state’,  the  potential  of  this  state  
form to provide a more conducive historical context to pluralistic constitutional 
reform arguments of the present has never been explored in Sri Lankan 
constitutional law. But an important step in this direction has now been taken by the 
recent  publication  of  Roshan  de  Silva  Wijeyeratne’s Nation, Constitutionalism and 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka (2014). 38  While still heavily a work of historical 
anthropology, it makes a serious attempt to introduce and resituate the issues of pre-
colonial history, state form and collective identity in contemporary constitutional 
discourse. Substantively, it serves to expose a major fallacy of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist arguments in favour of the ethnocratic centralisation of power in the 
unitary state. The unitary state and constitutional centralisation are relatively recent 
products of colonialism, whereas the pre-colonial state form, with a much longer 
pedigree, was by contrast highly devolutionary and asymmetric. My task in this 
thesis therefore is to apply these insights to a distinctively plurinational re-
conceptualisation of the Sri Lankan state. 
 
                                                 
38 R. De S. Wijeyeratne (2014) Nation, Constitutionalism and Buddhism in Sri Lanka (London: 
Routledge). The book itself is the product of a lengthy process of gestation and refinement. See e.g., 
R.  De  S.  Wijeyeratne,  ‘Galactic Polities and the Decentralisation of Administration in Sri Lanka: 
The Buddha Does Not Always Have to Return to the Centre’  (2003)  Griffiths Law Review 12: p.215; 
R.  De  S.  Wijeyeratne,  ‘Buddhism, the Asokan Persona and the Galactic Polity: Re-Thinking Sri 
Lanka’s  Constitutional  Present’  (2007)  Social Analysis 51(1): pp.156–178. 
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Both the unitary and federal perspectives are also supported in Sri Lankan 
constitutional discourse on grounds other than ethnonationalism, but because they 
are  politically   less  dominant,   they  are   included   in   the   typology  as   ‘variants’   to   the  
dominant positions. While the two major ethnic nationalisms are the main focus of 
this thesis, not only would the typology be incomplete without the inclusion of the 
variant positions, but they also represent certain modernist perspectives with regard 
to the nation and the state that I assert need to be rethought in the context of national 
pluralism. Later in the discussion (in Chapter 5) I argue that all except the 
ethnocratic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist position, which accept some form of 
pluralism as the basis of constitutional order, however conceptually opposed to each 
other they may seem, are united by a common subscription to the type of normative 
order associated with the traditional Westphalian nation-state. I argue further that 
this model of internal constitutional organisation is inadequate to the task of 
addressing the national pluralism of Sri   Lanka’s   polity, although if meaningfully 
implemented, it might be perfectly adequate for addressing less fundamental forms 
of communal pluralism. In the context of the consistent tendency since 
independence of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority to construct an ethnocratic state that 
excludes and subordinates the minority nation and other minority communities, and 
the equally consistent assertion of a nationality claim by the Tamils of the north and 
east at every election since 1956, it is clear that classical modernist post-colonial 
nation-state building has been an historic failure in Sri Lanka. The main question I 
therefore ask is: what is the utility of continued subscription to this model, when 
other models of state have emerged that may provide better answers in terms of both 
norms and structures to the central constitutional problem of national pluralism in 
Sri Lanka?  
 
Based on the typology of major constitutional perspectives set out in Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3 outlines the alternative approach drawing upon the principles of 
plurinational constitutionalism, relating these to the Sri Lankan case in two ways. 
First, it offers a new analytical understanding of the sociological nature of the Sri 
Lankan polity as one characterised by national pluralism, rather than one of mere 
ethno-cultural pluralism, which while attentive to the three grounds of empirical 
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divergence   mentioned   above,   applies   plurinational   constitutionalism’s  
methodological attention to history and historiography to the Sri Lankan case. 
Second, it articulates the normative propositions that must inform constitutional 
approaches to national pluralism, in particular to expose the conceptual inadequacy 
of the monistic conception of the nation in the modern nation-state, the pluralisation 
of sovereignty into a more relational understanding, and the need to disaggregate the 
nation from the state. This chapter therefore sets out the substantive theoretical 
framework of plurinational constitutionalism that forms the basis for the chapters to 
follow, in which each of these issues will be explored in detail.  
 
Chapter 4 takes up the narrative account of the two nationalisms in Chapter 2, to 
explore their theoretical implications at more depth. In relation to nationalism 
theory, it discusses the civic/ethnic and tradition/modernity dichotomies, the 
distinction between nations and nationalisms, and the performative theory of 
nationalism and nationalist mobilisation, as well as more specific theoretical 
explanations of the Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil nationalisms, in establishing the 
proposition that ethnically defined national pluralism could be made susceptible to 
the plurinational logic of constitutional accommodation.  
 
Chapter 5 continues this argument in the closely related issues surrounding the form 
and content of democracy in a post-colonial state. It identifies the distinct set of 
constitutional issues in regard to democracy in (British) post-colonial states that 
makes the Sri Lankan case distinguishable from Western states, and seeks to 
articulate an analytical understanding of it as redefined by Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism   as   a   specific   instance   of   an   ‘ethnocracy’,   a   form   of   state   that   is  
distinguishable from the modernist nation-state by virtue of the dominance of 
ethnicised democracy. It then establishes an alternative theoretical framework for 
democracy,   drawing   on   the   concept   of   ‘comprehensive   pluralism’   rather   than   the  
norms of political liberalism that inform Western plurinational constitutionalism, 
which can meet the normative challenge of the constitutional reordering necessitated 
by national pluralism. It also sets out a scheme for the accommodation of multiple 
conceptions of the nation within the overall context of ethnic and religious 
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pluralism, by drawing upon the concept  of  the  ‘state-nation’  in  a  way  that  allows  the  
co-existence of the two major ethnic nations together with the other minority non-
national   communities,   within   an   overall   civic   conception   of   a   ‘Sri   Lankan’   statal  
nation.     
 
Chapter 6 develops the norm of asymmetry through which this re-conceptualisation 
of multiple national spaces within the state can be accommodated in a constitutional 
hierarchy that meets the normative requirements of pluralism, tempered by the 
constraints of constitutional history and political reality. This represents a departure 
from a central feature of Western plurinational constitutionalism, where the major 
concern is to accommodate multiple nations on a footing of equality. It concludes by 
proposing a set of principles for the structural organisation of the Sri Lankan state, 
including the principles of autonomy, recognition, representation, and reciprocity, 
that are necessary to the constitutional accommodation of national pluralism 
according to a specifically plurinational logic within a united state. These principles 
are also important in that they describe the ways in which the principles of Western 
plurinational constitutionalism would require change and re-articulation, if they are 
to apply to the Sri Lankan context, and to similar cases. Conclusions are set out in 
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In what has become something of an aphorism in Sri Lankan debates, the historian 
K.M. de Silva once remarked   that   the   Sinhalese   are   ‘a   majority   with   a   minority 
complex’  while  the  Tamils  are  ‘a  minority  with  a  majority  complex.’1 As the social 
psychologist Gustav Ichheiser had observed earlier, such popular beliefs are 
oversimplifications coloured by prejudice, but they do often reflect a kernel of truth.2 
In the Sri Lankan case, it underlines what time and again seems a fundamental 
incommensurability between the political worldviews of the two communities that 
has  rendered  Sri  Lanka’s  national  pluralism  such  a  vexed  constitutional  problem.  For  
the Sinhala-Buddhists hedged in by millions of Tamils in South India, the little island 
is their only home and refuge in the world, which in turn justifies their claims to 
                                                 
1 K.M. de Silva (1986) Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985 
(Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America): p.368. See also, A.J. Wilson (2000) Sri Lankan Tamil 
Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New Delhi: Penguin): 
p.55; T.J. Bartholomeusz (2005) In Defense of Dharma: Just War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka 
(London: Routledge): pp.96-7; A. Bandarage (2008) The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: 
Terrorism, Ethnicity and Political Economy (London: Routledge): p.22; K.N.O. Dharmadasa (1992) 
Language, Religion and Ethnic Assertiveness: The Growth of Sinhalese Nationalism in Sri Lanka 
(Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press): p.141; S.J. Tambiah (1986) Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and 
the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: Chicago UP): pp.58, 92-3. 
2 G.  Ichheiser,  ‘Misunderstandings in Human Relations: A Study in False Social Perception’  (1949)  
American Journal of Sociology LV: pp.1-70. 
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constitutional supremacy.3 The Tamils, on the other hand, see themselves as nothing 
less   than   “equal partners in   [the]   island   polity”, 4  a claim that inflames Sinhala 
insecurities and self-perception  as  a   ‘threatened  majority.’  As  Arjun  Appadurai  has  
noted,  “This  kind  of  mobilization  is  the  key  step  in   turning  a  benign  social   identity  
into a predatory identity.”5  
 
In this chapter, I provide a descriptive overview of the main positions or approaches 
to the constitutional organisation of the island, set out in terms of the classificatory 
scheme of the unitary/federal dichotomy. This is both convenient and follows the 
taxonomy that is most often used in the Sri Lankan literature. The unitary state 
perspective is represented dominantly by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, whereas the 
federal state perspective is reflected mainly by Tamil nationalism. Either perspective 
with regard to the form of the state is also defended by approaches other than ethnic 
nationalism – respectively by modernist or Jacobin nation-statists and liberal 
federalists – but because these are conspicuously less dominant in political life, I 
refer   to   them   here   as   ‘variants.’ 6  The chapter is intended to serve as the basic 
narrative of the two competing nations and nationalisms as they relate to the 
constitutional form of the state, and matters highlighted here in relation to the 
specific constitutional problem of national pluralism will be taken up in succeeding 
chapters.   
 
 
2. The Unitary State Perspective 
 
When Ceylon, as Sri Lanka was then called, gained independence from the British 
Empire in 1948, it was, together with India, Pakistan and Burma, in the first wave of 
Asian colonies that inaugurated the global process of decolonisation that would 
                                                 
3 See  U.  Gammanpila,  ‘The Constitutional Form of the First Republic: The Sinhala-Buddhist 
Perspective’  in  A. Welikala (Ed.) (2012) The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections on 
Constitutional History, Theory and Practice (Colombo: CPA): Ch.23. 
4 Wilson (2000): p.55. Emphasis in original. 
5 A. Appadurai (2006) Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger (Durham, NC: 
Duke UP): p.51. 




radically change the shape of the international order over the next three decades. 
Within these newly independent polities in Asia and Africa, the legal establishment 
of the state in the image of the Westphalian model having preceded the construction 
of   a   ‘nation’   to   bind   the   polity   and   territory   together,   ‘nation-building’   would  
become the major post-independence concern of governments and political elites.7 In 
an era when the model of the Westphalian nation-state was unquestioned as the 
harbinger of modernity, progress and development to post-colonial societies, nation-
building constituted the highest aspiration of the nationalist elites that succeeded to 
the government of these newly independent states. Key among the political and 
conceptual dilemmas that had to be resolved in many of these nation-building efforts 
was   the   need   to   reconcile   the   ‘nation   of   intent’ 8  – the modern, territory-based 
national polity defined by normative values of citizenship – with pre-colonial ethnic 
identities and collective loyalties that enjoyed greater cultural resonance within these 
polities. As Anthony D. Smith observed in relation to elite-led post-colonial nation-
building projects in Asia and Africa, 
 
“…standing  in  blatant  opposition  to  the  pretensions  of  the  territorial  state  and  
its panoply of administrative organs, are the serried ranks of ethnic 
communities  and  nations  that  compose  it.  There  is  no  ‘nation’  that  is,  in  any  
way, co-extensive with the state’s  boundaries,   or   congruent  with   the   state’s  
culture. Such a congruent and co-extensive nation is a mere project today, a 
‘nation   of   intent’   to   be   forged   out   of   the   territorial   state.   As   in   Western  
Europe, African [and Asian] rulers and intelligentsia aim to create such 
nations, and merge the political culture of the state with the several ethnic 
cultures of the peoples that compose it. But, unlike their Western absolutist 
counterparts, they are handicapped not only by the time factor, but by the 
later historical period in which they must act, a democratic era in which the 
                                                 
7 S.  Arasaratnam,  ‘History, Nationalism and Nation Building: The Asian Dilemma’  an  Inaugural  
Lecture at the University of New England, Armidale, cited in M. Roberts (1994) Exploring 
Confrontation. Sri Lanka: Politics, Culture and History (Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers): 
p.249. 
8 R.  Rotberg,  ‘African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion?’  (1967)  Journal of Modern African 
Studies IV: pp.33-46. 
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twin ideals of national dignity and development must be reconciled and 
attained.”9  
 
By  ‘Western  absolutism’  Smith  was  referring  to  the processes of state consolidation 
– usually following military conquest and preceding the age of mass democracy – in 
Western European and European settler polities in North America and Australia, in 
which the construction of modern and cohesive statal nations entailed, in effect, the 
imposition of the societal culture of one dominant nation over the unified territory as 
a whole. In Ceylon, independence brought about a de jure territorial state, but a 
cohesive nation congruent with the territorial state was at best an elitist aspiration. 
Amidst an increasing sub-state challenge from the minority Tamil nationalism, a 
dynamic of sectional hegemony was set in motion by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 
through a nation-building process combining procedural majoritarianism with a 
potent ethno-religious historiography.10 This paradoxical combination of advanced 
democracy and atavistic nationalism made the Sri Lankan experience distinctive 
from African and Middle Eastern post-colonial states in which nation-building was 
attempted through military-bureaucratic authoritarianism,11 or from examples such as 
India, where a self-consciously modernist nation-building process was undertaken 
through the constitutional enshrinement of secular and pluralist values combined 
with the stabilising intermediation of a de facto single party democratic system.12  
 
The transfer of power in Ceylon was seen at the time as a model process.13 The 
transition was smooth, peaceful and entirely constitutionally negotiated between the 
imperial power and a Ceylonese political elite, in a polity that had enjoyed adult 
                                                 
9 A.D. Smith (1983) State and Nation in the Third World (London: Wheatsheaf): pp.125-6. See also 
H.  Alavi,  ‘The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’,  (1972)  New Left Review 
No.74: pp.145-173;;  J.  Uyangoda,  ‘The United Front Regime of 1970 and the Post-Colonial State of 
Sri Lanka’  in  T.  Jayatilaka  (Ed.)  (2010)  Sirimavo:  Honouring  the  World’s  First  Woman  Prime  
Minister (Colombo: The Bandaranaike Museum Committee): pp.31-34  
10 This process is described further below, and is more deeply theorised in Chapter 6, infra. 
11 Smith (1983): Ch.7 
12 G. Austin (2004) The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New Delhi: OUP): Chs.1,2; 
P.R. Brass (1991) The Politics of India Since Independence (2nd Ed.) (Cambridge: CUP): Ch.3; A. 
Stepan, J.J. Linz & Y. Yadav (2011) Crafting State-Nations: India and other Multinational 
Democracies (Baltimore: JHU Press): Ch.2. 
13 J. Darwin (1988) Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World 
(London: Macmillan): pp.101-6. 
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universal franchise and a substantial measure of representative democracy and self-
government since 1931. 14 It created an independent Dominion within the 
Commonwealth with a Westminster-type constitution that was economically 
prosperous and politically literate. 15  Implicit in this elite-led process, and the 
constitution that was granted just prior to independence, was a vision of a unifying 
‘Ceylonese’   nation   transcending   subliminal   divisions   based   on   ascriptive   factors  
such as ethnicity, religion,   caste,   and   geographic   region.   In   K.M.   de   Silva’s  
description, this conception of civic nationalism, 
 
“…emphasised   the   common   interests   of   the   island’s   various   ethnic   and  
religious groups. It had as its basis an acceptance of the reality of a plural 
society and sought the reconciliation of the legitimate interests of the 
majority and minorities within the context of an all-island  polity…In  1948,  
this version of nationalism seemed to be a viable alternative to the narrower 
[ethnic]  sectionalisms…and  held out the prospect of peace and stability in the 
vital first phase of independence. It was based on a double compromise: the 
softening of Sinhalese dominance by the establishment of an equilibrium of 
political forces, the keynote of which was moderation, and an emphasis on 
secularism, a refusal to mix state power and politics with religion, even 
though the concept of a special responsibility for Buddhism was tacitly 
accepted.”16  
 
The constitutionalist, civic nationalist elite was represented in the United National 
Party (UNP) led by D.S. Senanayake that succeeded the imperial power in 1948. The 
political viewpoint broadly represented in the UNP was one that was previously 
represented by the Ceylon National Congress (CNC), and the Ceylon Reform 
                                                 
14 H. Kumarasingham (2013) A Political Legacy of the British Empire: Power and the 
Parliamentary System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka (London: I.B. Tauris): Ch.5. 
15 A.  Welikala,  ‘The  Failure  of  Jennings’  Constitutional  Experiment  in  Ceylon:  How  ‘Procedural  
Entrenchment’  led  to  Constitutional  Revolution’  in  Welikala  (2012):  Ch.3;;  H.  Kumarasingham,  ‘The 
‘Tropical  Dominions’:  The  Appeal  of  Dominions  Status  in  the  Decolonisation  of  India,  Pakistan  and  
Sri Lanka’  (2013a)  Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 23: pp.223-45 at pp.242-45. 
16 K.M. de Silva (2005) A History of Sri Lanka (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa): p.609. See also 
Kumarasingham (2013): Ch.7. 
29 
 
League.17 Indirectly, it was a school of thought that could be traced back to the 
‘Young Ceylon’ movement of the mid-nineteenth century, which first articulated a 
modernist, secular Ceylonese nationalism in line with contemporaneous political 
thought and intellectual currents in Europe.18 Members of this elite belonged to the 
English-educated, professional and landowning upper classes, and were broadly 
committed to gradual and constitutional methods of securing political representation, 
first, in the institutions of the colonial state, and later, in the progress towards 
independence through incremental self-government.  
 
However, as de Silva observed,  “This  Sri  Lankan  nationalism  had  a  crucial  flaw.  It  
was basically elitist in conception and it had little popular support extending beyond 
the   political   establishment.”19 Beneath the secular and civic-national constitutional 
façade of independence in Ceylon was a powerful Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
movement, which would become more politically organised and compelling as a 
democratic force within a decade of independence, and completely unravel both the 




2.1 Sinhala-Buddhist Nationalism and the Unitary State 
 
As a political movement, the form of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that was 
beginning to emerge at the time of independence and which from the 1950s onwards 
would come to dominate electoral politics and constitutional discourse, had its 
origins in the religious, linguistic and cultural revivalist movements of the late 
                                                 
17 M.  Roberts,  ‘Introduction’,  in  M.  Roberts  (Ed.)  (1977)  Documents of the Ceylon National 
Congress and Nationalist Politics in Ceylon, 1929-1950 (Colombo: Dept. of National Archives): 
pp.xxvii-ccxxii 
18 H.  Candidus,  ‘A Desultory Conversation between Two Young Aristocratic Ceylonese’  in  M.  Roberts  
(Ed.) (1998) Collective Identities Revisited, Vol.2 (Colombo: Marga): Ch.1; M. Roberts, I. Raheem & 
P. Colin-Thomé (1989) People In-between: The Burghers and the Middle Class in the 
Transformations within Sri Lanka, 1790s-1960s (Colombo: Sarvodaya): p.147 et seq. 
19 De Silva (2005): p.609.  See  also  H.  Kumarasingham,  ‘A Democratic Paradox: The 
Communalisation of Politics, 1911-1948’  (2006)  Asian Affairs 37(3): pp.342-352. 
20 H.  Kumarasingham,  ‘The  Jewel  of  the  East  yet  has  its  Flaws’:  The  Deceptive  Tranquillity  
surrounding Sri Lankan Independence’  (2013b)  Working  Paper  No.72,  Heidelberg  Papers  in  South  
Asian and Comparative Politics (Heidelberg: Univ. of Heidelberg). 
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nineteenth century. As I will discuss later in this thesis, this revival itself tapped into 
a nascent collective Sinhala-Buddhist consciousness from the pre-colonial past that 
approximated to a statal nationalism in modern terms.21 The Buddhist revival of the 
nineteenth century was a response in particular to aggressive Christian missionary 
activities under the auspices of the colonial dispensation. Within the broader context 
of the Sinhalese encounter with British colonialism, it also served as a catalyst for a 
resurgence in Sinhala consciousness in distinctively anti-colonial nationalist terms.22 
The Buddhist revival inaugurated the tradition of a politically engaged Buddhism 
and monkhood in the modern era, by reinterpreting both traditional Buddhist doctrine 
and historical legends of Sinhala historiography in the light of anti-British and anti-
Christian protest. This movement and its doctrinal, cultural, socio-economic and 
political  dimensions  have  been  theorised  as  ‘Buddhist  Modernism’  (‘Buddhistischer 
Modernismus’)  by  Heiz  Bechert  and  as  ‘Protestant  Buddhism’  by  Richard  Gombrich  
and Gananath Obeyesekera. 23 The originators of Protestant Buddhism were 
charismatic monks who took on Christian missionaries in public theological debates, 
and the movement was given an institutional form for some time by the Buddhist 
Theosophical Society, but it reached its height in the life and work of Anagarica 
Dharmapala (1864-1933) at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This 
tradition was resuscitated in the approach to independence in the 1940s and in the 
early post-colonial period, by the radical monks of the Vidyalankara and Vidyodaya 
Pirivenas, and through such polemical tracts as The Heritage of the Bhikkhu and The 
Revolt in the Temple.24  
 
The political nature of this Buddhism has two aspects, both of which constitute a 
robust repudiation of the secular separation between the political and religious 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 4, infra.  
22 Tambiah (1992): Ch.2 
23 H. Bechert (1966-1972) Buddhismus, Staat und Gessellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada 
Buddhismus, Vol.1 (1966) (Frankfurt and Berlin: Alfred Metzner), Vol.2 (1967) (Wiesbaden), Vol.3 
(1973) (Wiesbaden); R. Gombrich & G. Obeysekera (1988) Buddhism Transformed: Religious 
Change in Sri Lanka (Princeton: Princeton UP): Chs.1, 6. Cf. for a recent critique of these scholars, 
A.M. Blackburn (2010) Locations of Buddhism: Colonialism and Modernity in Sri Lanka (Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press): pp.xi-xiv, Ch.6. 
24 W. Rahula (1974) The Heritage of the Bhikkhu: A Short History of the Bhikkhu in the 
Educational, Cultural, Social, and Political Life (New York: Grove Press), originally published in 
Sinhalese as Bhikshuvage Urumaya in 1946; D.C. Vijayawardhana (1953) Dharma Vijaya, or the 
Revolt in the Temple (Colombo: Sinha Publications). 
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spheres. The first aspect envisions Buddhism not merely as a religion and therefore 
an essentially individual concern of the private sphere, but as a rational philosophy 
that provides a comprehensive normative system for the government of a Buddhist 
society. As the Sinhala Commission recently argued,  
 
“The   re-ordering of human consciousness and the re-ordering of human 
society  were  the  two  complementary  aspects  of  the  Buddha’s  teaching.  If  in  
the Pali Canon, it is the re-ordering of human consciousness which receives 
greater emphasis and has the greater amount of teaching devoted to it, this is 
because it was the primary concern of the enlightened ruler, acting in 
accordance   with   the   general   principles   of   Buddha’s   teachings,   and   in   co-
operation with the Sangha in order to promote what can be called a 
Buddhistic society.”25  
 
The Sinhala-Buddhist historical chronicles add powerful force to this quasi-
theocratic approach to political organisation through the religio-cultural myth in 
which the Buddha is said to have observed upon his deathbed that his teachings in 
the purest Theravada form would be preserved in the island of Lanka. Consequently, 
Sri Lanka in Sinhala-Buddhist   historiography   is   not   only   the   ‘Sihaladeepa’   (the  
island  of   the  Sinhalese),  but  also   the   ‘Dhammadeepa’   (the island of the dharma).26 
Michael   Roberts   has   pointed   out   how   this   cohering   “…notion   of   the   island   as  
Dhammadeepa-cum-Sinhaladeepa, that is, an island for the Buddhist doctrine and its 
carriers,  the  Sinhalese”,  buttressed  the  development  of  the  Sinhala  consciousness in 
opposition to Western imperial intrusions.27 
                                                 
25 Report of an Independent and Representative Committee (2003) A Case against a Federal 
Constitution for Sri Lanka (Colombo: National Joint Committee): pp.147-8, emphasis added. This 
document  is  better  known  as  the  ‘Sinhala  Commission  Report’,  and  is  discussed  in  Edrisinha  et  al  
(2008): Ch.26.  
26 According to the legend, the Buddha in a final dying injunction to Sakra, the head of the Indic 
pantheon  of  gods,  said,  “In  Lanka,  O  Lord  of  the  gods,  will  my  religion  be  established…”:  see  B. 
Kapferer (1988) Legends of the People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture 
in Sri Lanka and Australia (Washington: Smithsonian Institution): pp.53-57. See also B.L. Smith. 
‘Kingship, the Sangha, and the Process of Legitimation in Anuradhapura Ceylon’  and  R.T.  Clifford,  
‘The Dhammadipa Tradition in Sri Lanka: Three Models within the Sinhalese Chronicles’  in  B.L.  
Smith (1978) Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka (Chambersburg, Penn.: Anima 
Books) Sinhala Commission (2003): pp.73-95, 36-47;  
27 M. Roberts (2004a) Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period 1590s to 1815 (Colombo: 




The  ‘Buddhist  modernism’  characterised  by  these  two  factors  has  several  paradoxical  
consequences for constitutional discourse. It collapses the modernist separation of 
church and state in advancing Buddhism as a secular philosophy with a temporal role 
and in positing the Buddhist monkhood as a social institution with a political role. 
The ethno-religious nationalist identity it seeks to promote through these two devices 
is moreover one that looks backward to past glories of blood and soil rather than 
forward to modernist objectives of individualism, secularism and pluralism.   
 
As noted, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century revival reached its apogee 
in   the   person   of   the   ‘model   Protestant   Buddhist’ 28  Anagarica Dharmapala, a 
Sinhalese Buddhist activist who, as a polemicist, ideologue, pamphleteer and 
propagandist, had an enormous historical influence in articulating the ideological 
contours of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism throughout the twentieth century and up to 
the present.29 In addition to drawing from what he saw as the scientific and rational 
progress   of   European   thought,   Dharmapala’s   writings   borrowed   from  
contemporaneous European racial theory, which was one of the bases of the claim 
that the Sinhalese are an Aryan race, in contradistinction to the Tamils, who were 
regarded  as  a  Dravidian  race.  The  most  important  element  of  Dharmapala’s  revivalist  
ideology   was,   as   Stanley   Tambiah   has   noted,   “…an   appeal   to   the   past   glories   of  
Buddhism and Sinhalese civilisation celebrated in the Mahavamsa and other 
chronicles as a way of infusing the Sinhalese with a new nationalist identity and self-
respect in the face of humiliation and restrictions suffered under British rule and 
Christian missionary influence.” 30  Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist renditions of 
                                                                                                                                          
(1970) Comparative Studies in Society and History 12(4): pp.434-441; K. Malalgoda (1976) 
Buddhism in Sinhalese Society (Berkeley:  California  UP);;  K.  Malalgoda,  ‘Concept and 
Confrontations: A Case Study of Agama’  in  M.  Roberts  (Ed.)  (1997)  Sri Lanka: Collective Identities 
Revisited, Vol.1 (Colombo: Marga): pp.55-78; H.L. Seneviratne (1999) The Work of Kings: The New 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago: Chicago UP).  
28 Gombrich & Obeysekera (1988): p.11. 
29 Ibid:  Chs.6,7;;  G.  Obeysekera,  ‘Personal Identity and Cultural Crisis: The Case of Anagarika 
Dharmapala of Sri Lanka’  in  F.  Reynolds  &  D.  Capps  (Eds.)  (1976)  The Biographical Process (The 
Hague: Mouton & Co.): pp.221-252.  
30 S.J. Tambiah (1992) Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: 
Chicago UP): p.7. 
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‘Sinhala-ness’  even  today  replicate  Dharmapala’s  romantic  and  historicist  vision  of  a  
people and an island with a proud past and ancient civilisation.31 
 
In addition to an intertwinement of ancient myths and memories with modern 
categories of nation and state, this nationalism then has certain key ideological 
elements, including the conflation of the identity of the entire island and its 
inhabitants with the nationalist identity and historiography of the Sinhala-Buddhists, 
and   the   claim   that   the   Sinhalese   are   a   biological   ‘race’,   which   shares   a   common  
language, Sinhala, and religion, Buddhism. This is a reiteration of the central thesis 
of the Mahavamsa, the Great Chronicle of the Sinhala people, which   is,   “That   the  
island of Sri Lanka is in its entirety the land of the Sinhala and of Buddhism: it is the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nation. The biological people, its language, religion, culture and 
territory   are   all   intimately   linked.” 32  This totalising and hegemonic approach to 
culture, territory, polity and the state serves as the foundational basis of the 
constitutional worldview of modern Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.  
 
While this revivalist nationalism was conceived in opposition primarily to British 
colonialism in the nineteenth century, from the outset its exclusive ethno-religious 
character contained hostile sentiments towards other groups such as Muslims, and 
from  the  early  twentieth  century  onwards,  the  Tamils  became  the  principal  ‘other’  to  
be regarded in antagonistic terms to the Sinhala-Buddhist nation. After 
independence, and the removal of the British from the political landscape as the 
focus of discontent, the antagonism with Tamils would become the main driver of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism to the extent that Tamil nationalist and territorial 
claims directly challenged the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist vision of independent 
statehood. This hostility finds legitimisation once again in the Mahavamsa. 
 
The Mahavamsa is the primary text, of a corpus of historiographical chronicles of the 
vamsa tradition written by monks in the Pali language, which provides the 
ideological foundations of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, by uniting the people, the 
                                                 
31 For a recent restatement of this position, see Sinhala Commission (2003): p.138.  
32 E.  Nissan  &  R.L.  Stirrat,  ‘The Generation of Communal Identities’  in  J.  Spencer (Ed.) (1990) Sri 
Lanka: The History and Roots of Conflict (London: Routledge): Ch.2 at pp.30-31. 
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religion, the territory, and the kingly state in one historical grand narrative.33 It was 
composed by Buddhist monks of the Mahavihara fraternity around the fifth century 
B.C., and elaborates two major mytho-historical legends, that of the founding Vijaya 
myth, and the renaissance Dutugemunu legend. 34  As Tambiah says, it 
“…simultaneously   presents   the   dual   destiny   of   the   Sinhalese   people   to   conquer,  
unite, and rule the island of Lanka for the preservation and glory of the Buddhist 
religion, and the necessary expulsion of the Tamil invaders who had (temporarily) 
taken possession   of   the   north.”35 The Dutugemunu legend in particular, in which 
these elements find expression, has been brought into service to provide the modern 
antagonism towards Tamil nationalism with a historical basis and legitimacy, to 
attack Tamil claims to territorial autonomy as historically baseless, and to reinforce 
Sinhala-Buddhist supremacy in Sri Lanka. What is also important to remember is 
that the Mahavamsa and other Sinhalese historical chronicles were written as 
instrumental histories with a political purpose in the context of their times. As 
Bechert observed, 
 
“The  origination  of  historical  literature  in  Ceylon  in  the  existing  form  was  an  
intentional act of political relevance. Its object was the propagation of a 
concept of national identity clearly connected with a religious tradition, i.e., 
the  identity  of  the  Sinhalese  Buddhists…without  the  impact  of  this  idea,  the  
remarkable continuity of the cultural as well as the political traditions in spite 
of  the  vicissitudes  in  the  history  of  the  island  would  be  impossible.”36  
 
One of the striking characteristics of contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism as 
an ideology is its employment of a powerful idiom of centralisation of state power, 
through an interpolation of the glorious historical paradigm of the ancient Sinhalese 
monarchy, patron of the people and protector of the faith, onto the institutions of 
                                                 
33 J.  Spencer,  ‘Introduction: The Power of the Past’  in  Spencer  (1990):  Ch.1  at  pp.5-6; S. Kemper 
(1991) The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics and Culture in Sinhala Life (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell UP).  
34 Kapferer (1988): pp.53-65. 
35 S. J. Tambiah (1986) Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: 
Chicago  UP):  p.70;;  S.  Kemper,  ‘J.R. Jayewardene: Righteousness and Realpolitik’  in Spencer (1990): 
Ch.9 at pp.70-71. 
36 H.  Bechert,  ‘The Beginnings of Buddhist Historiography: Mahavamsa and Political Thinking’  in  
Smith (1978): pp.1-12 at p.7. See Tambiah (1986): pp.70-71. Cf. Tambiah (1992): p.129.  
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representative democracy and political independence. According to the Mahavamsa 
legend, reflecting both the empirical and allegorical dimensions of the nationalist 
ideal-type state order, King Dutugemunu was the heroic Sinhala warrior-king who 
routed the Tamil King Elara, thereby restoring three things: the territorial integrity of 
the   island   ruptured   by   Elara’s   Tamil   occupation;;   the   Sinhala   monarchy   to   over-
lordship over the whole island; and the rightful place of Buddhism as the politico-
moral basis of society. It is in this way that centralised unity tied to territorial 
integrity becomes axiomatic in the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist perspective on the 
unitary constitutional form of the sovereign state, and explains its resonance in the 
modern nationalist hostility to any sort of political decentralisation. 37 
Decentralisation, devolution, federalism, power-sharing, and autonomy, particularly 
in   relation   to   the   historical   ‘other’,   the   Tamils,   are   seen   as   precursors   of   an  
unthinkable certainty, the territorial division of the island, and in total violation of 
the historic ethos of the island as a Sinhala-Buddhist state.  
 
These legends – the  ideologically  instrumental  ‘myths  and  memories  of  the  nation’38 
– elaborate not only a particular constitutional worldview in terms of the ideal-type 
kingship as the unifier of the island, protector of the race, and defender of the faith, 
but also establishes the Tamils, portrayed variously as non-Buddhist, Dravidian, 
South   Indian   interlopers,   invaders   and   devils,   as   the   principal   ‘other’   or   historic  
enemy in opposition to whom the uniqueness of the Sinhala-Buddhists, and indeed 
their island state, is most sharply defined. As Michael Roberts has noted, the 
“…oversimplified  oppositions  inscribed  within  the  original  Mahavamsa in the sixth 
century”  have  been  reproduced  in  other,  later Pali and Sinhala texts and in traditions 
of oral history within Sinhala culture in their depiction of later historical events in the 
same  “Manichean  terms  of  the  Bad  versus  the  Good.”39 
 
Roshan   de   Silva   Wijeyeratne   has   argued   persuasively   that,   “Sinhalese   Buddhist 
nationalism   is   contingent   on   its   very   modernity.”   The   nationalist   movement   that  
                                                 
37 J.  Uyangoda,  ‘The State and the Process of Devolution in Sri Lanka’ in S. Bastian (Ed.) (1994) 
Devolution and Development in Sri Lanka (Colombo: ICES): pp. 69-70. 
38 A.D. Smith (1999) Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford: OUP). 
39 Roberts (2004a): p.9. 
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began   with   Dharmapala’s   revivalism   drew   upon   “a   European   colonial  
historiography”   to   efface   the   devolutionary   and   pluralistic   dimensions   of   the   pre-
colonial order grounded  on  the  fissiparous  cosmology  of  Buddhism,  and  “driven  by  a  
modern   epistemology”,   to   articulate   a   new,   modernist      and      “non-cosmological 
understanding of space-cum-territory, race and an Orientalized Sinhalese 
Buddhism.”  As  he  also  says,  “It  is  this  horizon that has informed the institutional and 
constitutional   history   of   the   island   since   independence.”40 Sri Lanka registered a 
deepening post-independence democratic culture when it changed governments 
peacefully through the electoral process in the general elections of 1956. This 
achievement, however, was also a portent of the conflicts to come, in that the 
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), which won a resounding victory, was a coalition 
of Sinhala-Buddhist forces committed to restoring their nationalist ideal of the 
state. 41  Among a host of other measures designed to restore Sinhala-Buddhist 
primacy was the centrepiece of policy of ‘Sinhala  Only’:  the  enactment  of  Sinhala  as  
the official language. The Tamil protests against this legislation were a watershed in 
the deterioration of ethnic relations in succeeding years, although the severity of the 
‘Sinhala  Only’  policy  was  ameliorated  by  later  allowance  for  the  reasonable  usage  of  
Tamil.  
 
Nonetheless, when the first republican constitution was promulgated in 1972, only 
Sinhala was recognised by the constitution as an official language.42 The recognition 
of a special status for Buddhism was also a cherished Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
demand that evolved and permutated throughout the initial post-colonial years, until 
it too found constitutional expression in the 1972 constitution. The drafters of the 
first republican constitution sought to introduce a provision that recognised a 
‘foremost   place’   for   Buddhism   and   established   a   duty   of   the   state   to   protect   and  
foster Buddhism, while assuring to all other religions more conventional civil rights 
                                                 
40 R. de Silva Wijeyeratne (2014) Nation, Constitutionalism and Buddhism in Sri Lanka (London: 
Routledge): p.xv. 
41 A.J. Wilson (1979) Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1979 (2nd Ed.) (London: Macmillan): pp.14-22; K. 
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37 
 
to the freedom of religion.43 This arrangement has been continued in the second 
republican constitution of 1978.44 But above all, the constitutional idea that was 
fundamental to ensuring that Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism became the identity of the 
republican state was the concept of the unitary state.45 Its inclusion in the republican 
constitutions denoted not merely a divisively symbolic rejection of the Tamil 
demand for federalism, but also in substantive terms, the entrenchment of a source of 
centralising norms for constitutional adjudication and implementation that would 
foreclose power-sharing options and restrict the scope of devolution in the future.46  
 
 
The Sri Lankan Conception of the Unitary State 
 
While the decisive influence of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism on the constitutional 
character and behaviour of the Sri Lankan state can easily be observed, we still need 
a coherent theoretical account of the link between this dominant nationalism and the 
unitary state. In seeking to escape its strictures in the search for a constitutional 
settlement of ethno-religious pluralism, some liberals have downplayed its 
significance as a legal principle. In one oft-quoted description, it is dismissed as an 
“impetuous,  ill-considered,  wholly  unnecessary  embellishment”.47 The problem with 
such   a  minimalist   view   is   that   it   cannot   account   for   the   ‘everyday   plebiscite’48 of 
Sinhala-Buddhist  nationalism  in  Sri  Lankan  politics,  and  the  strength  of  the  latter’s  
holistic politico-constitutional commitment to the unitary state. Once Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism succeeded in entrenching the unitary state in the republican 
constitutional order, the principle has also compelled political, administrative and 
judicial implementation of those constitutions in a unitary spirit.49 For example, in 
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the   Supreme   Court’s   pre-enactment review determination of the constitutional 
amendment introducing provincial devolution, a distinctively Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist interpretation of the unitary principle was transparent in the dissenting 
judgments.50  
 
A different approach to explaining the unitary state is therefore needed, and it is 
useful here  to  adopt  a  comparative  approach.  I  rely  on  aspects  of  Neil  Walker’s  work  
on the unitary conception of the UK constitution to suggest a number of analytical 
distinctions that are needed, of which, the initial step is to draw an explicit distinction 
between the legal and political discourses of unitary order. Considering these two 
types of discourse separately has a useful theoretical purpose, in that it allows us to 
distinguish, firstly, between the different types of power associated with each 
discourse, and secondly, to analyse more sharply the conceptual opposites within 
each discourse as between unitary and pluralist conceptions of constitutional order.51  
 
In the UK legal discourse, unitary order and authority is of the type Walker 
associates with Neil MacCormick’s   theory  of ‘institutional  normative  order’.52 It is 
the purely formal and non-substantive, and therefore flexible, nature of the legal 
principle of unitarism reflected in the British constitution that makes it compatible 
with institutional pluralism under devolution, multiculturalism and traditional 
competitive and pluralist democracy, and which prevents the authoritarianism 
associated with politically unitary conceptions of order and authority. 53  The Sri 
Lankan legal discourse of unitary order is rather different, due to the presence of 
written constitutional provisions that serve not only the classificatory function, but 
also to reinforce the formal principle with substantive provisions centralising legal 
                                                                                                                                          
Reform in Sri Lanka (London: Anthem Press): Ch.2; Q. Ismail (2005) Abiding by Sri Lanka: On 
Peace, Place and Postcoloniality (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press): Ch.2. 
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53 Walker (2012): pp.450, 456-7. 
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authority. 54  Political unitarism on the other   hand,   concerns   “…de   facto   political  
power in all its forms and manifestations and the type of order that may be produced 
through  the  operation  of  that  power”.55 Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is clearly such 
a politically unitary discourse which contextualises its argument for a unitary 
constitutional form of legal authority on the basis of a culturally monist 
historiography, and which gains and exercises power through an exclusionary form 
of ethnicised democratic majoritarianism.  
 
In both British and Sri Lankan legal discourse, the conceptual opposite to the unitary 
state is the federal state (this is to simplify and stylise the formal conceptual 
opposites).56 Conceptually, the pure formalism of the UK unitary state only excludes 
formal federalism, and is thereby able to accommodate a wide diversity of political 
discourses including an extraordinary degree of territorial devolution, so long as, 
formally, ultimate authority rests with the UK Parliament. Sri Lankan legal discourse 
similarly counter-poses federalism as the conceptual opposite of the unitary state, but 
here, the unitary state is not merely formal, but is also substantive. The scope for 
pluralist legal discourses within this unitary order are therefore restricted in 
proportion to the substantive reach of the unitary state provisions of the constitution 
(the scope of which are not confined to the interpretational possibilities of concrete 
textual provisions, and may include meta-constitutional meanings).57   
 
In political discourse,   the   “unitary   conception   of   political   authority…like   its   legal  
counterpart,   identifies   and/or   advocates   one   dominant   centre   of   political   power”,58 
and   its   conceptual   opposites   are   the   various   pluralist   conceptions:   “Pluralism is a 
broad umbrella covering both any explanatory thesis which accounts for the political 
order in terms of a diversity of authorities and influences and any normative thesis 
which advocates a diffusion of power between different groups, mechanisms or sites 
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of authority”. 59  Sri Lankan political discourse includes a variety of pluralist 
discourses, including the Tamil national challenge, other minority claims such as 
those of the Indian Tamils, Muslims and Christians, and ideologically liberal 
approaches to federalism. 60  But the comparative difference is that, under the 
dominant influence of the politically unitary discourse of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism in the form of an ethnocratic state, the space for pluralist discourses 
(both explanatory and normative) is commensurately restricted.61  
 
We can thus sum up these insights as follows. The   unitary   state   in   Sri   Lanka’s  
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism dominated constitutional discourse (both legal and 
political) must be understood as both a formal as well as a substantive concept, going 
beyond its usual function in positivist constitutional law as a formalistic 
classificatory concept. Its classificatory and descriptive function is important in 
symbolic terms and as such it finds textual expression in the constitution, but the 
unitary state is also given substantive legal meaning in provisions of the constitution 
that centralise legislative, executive and judicial powers. Below (or perhaps above) 
the legal realm, the political force of the unitary state derives from its linkage to the 
normative claims with regard to the state order inhering in Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism. The positivist unitary state in its most literal sense, as one in which all 
power within the territorial state is concentrated in a single, unitary authority, is thus 
transmuted by the hegemonic monism of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in relation to 
territory, polity and power into both a descriptive assertion about the nature of the 
state as well as denoting a specific institutional and normative understanding of its 
structure. This tendency to centralisation is seen both in the antipathy to territorial 
devolution and in the reproduction of the ancient kingship in modern forms of 
monarchical presidentialism. 62 By virtue of its historiographically and ethno-
religiously contextualised nature through its enmeshment with Sinhala-Buddhist 
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nationalism, the unitary state is thus more deeply resonant than, and its performative 
meaning extends beyond, mere words on the paper constitution. 
 
 
The Historical Fallacy of the Unitary State: The Pre-Colonial Sinhala-Buddhist 
State Reconsidered 
 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist historiographical arguments typically focus on the 
encompassing and hierarchical aspects of the pre-colonial monarchical state, with a 
view to investing the unitary character of the modern nation-state with the substance 
of  historical  continuity:  “In Sri Lanka, we never had separate states – we only have 
had  Sri  Lanka.  Therefore,  the  state  has  to  be  unitary.”63  In denouncing a very limited 
decentralisation measure introduced by the government in response to Tamil 
demands in the early 1980s,64 Siri Perera, Q.C., made the following observation 
which typifies the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist argumentum ad antiquitatem in terms 
of asserting a particular historical view of the state and the perceived consequences 
that are feared if the state is unmoored from that view.   
 
“Since  time  immemorial  this  country  has  had  a  unitary  system  of  government  
and   the   people   [have]   all   along   regarded   this   [as]   one   country,   and   […]   a  
Buddhist country. If these development councils are set up, the Buddhists 
have great fears not only as to the loss of their rights and privileges as 
citizens  of  the  land,  [but]  also  for  their  survival.”65  
 
                                                 
63 An unnamed Buddhist monk cited in I. Frydenlund (2005) The Sangha and its Relation to the 
Peace Process in Sri Lanka (Oslo: PRIO): p.21.  
64 See for a discussion of the District Development Councils Act, No.35 of 1980, R. Edrisinha, M. 
Gomez, V.T. Thamilmaran & A. Welikala (Eds.) (2008) Power Sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional 
and Political Documents, 1926-2008 (Colombo: CPA): Ch.14. 
65 Cited in H.J. Whall (1995) The Right to Self-Determination: The Sri Lankan Tamil National 
Question (London: TIC): p.168. For other views in the same vein, see e.g., K.H.J Wijayadasa (2005) 
The Betrayal of the Sinhala Nation (Colombo: Dayawansa Jayakody): Ch.3; Madihe Pannaseeha 
(1979) Eelam – The Truth, being a Memorandum by the Ven. Madihe Pannaseeha Maha Nayaka 
Thero submitted to the Sansoni Commission (Colombo: Swastika Press); Ministry of State (1983) Sri 
Lanka – Who Wants a Separate State? (Colombo: Dept. of Information); A. Sivanandan & H. 
Waters,  ‘The Mathew Doctrine’  (1984)  Race & Class XXVI:1, 129-138.  
42 
 
In making these claims, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists either disregard, or actively 
reject, two important dimensions that require acknowledgement in considering pre-
colonial history in the context of contemporary national pluralism. Empirically, the 
evidence relating to the existence of autonomous Tamil-speaking entities at various 
historical junctures during the pre-colonial past is ignored. This included an 
independent Tamil kingdom at Jaffna between the thirteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, 66  and less exceptionally but equally importantly, extended periods in 
which Tamil chieftaincies in the Vanni67 functioned with relative autonomy from the 
monarchical centre of the Sinhala-Buddhist state, albeit under the overall suzerainty 
of the Sinhala king acknowledged in elaborate – but in a material sense, not 
especially exacting – rituals, customs and practices.  
 
It is this latter aspect of the ancient to early modern history in particular that raises 
the normative questions of political organisation that are relevant to contemporary 
constitutional questions. While in these pre-colonial polities the notions of 
encompassment and hierarchy were central in ideational terms, an ideologically 
unprejudiced account would also note the complex, fissiparous and asymmetric 
process of involution between moments of centralisation and decentralisation that 
was the hallmark of the governmental ethos of the Sinhala-Buddhist kingdoms. As 
Ronald Inden remarks, this type of South Asian polities   comprised  of   “continually  
reconstructed and reconstructing agents with both dispersed  and  unitary  moments.”68 
This   ‘pulsating’  mode  of  operation  allowed  an  autonomous  sphere  at   the  periphery  
that is incongruent with the rigid organisational principles that are generally 
associated with the modern unitary state. 69  De   Silva   Wijeyeratne’s re-
conceptualisation of the nature of the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist constitutional 
worldview – one that places an appropriate emphasis on the dynamic relationship 
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between the modern and the pre-modern in this worldview – is particularly useful 
here. 
 
“The imaginary of modern Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism is mediated 
through the horizon of premodern Sinhalese Buddhism, as revealed in much 
of the Pali and Sinhala vamsa literature. However, the myth and the 
consciousness of the premodern undergo revaluation through a radical 
remythologization initiated by the bureaucratic state in the late colonial and 
postcolonial periods. Such remythologization reveals its dynamic force in the 
constitutional  imaginary  of  the  postcolonial  bureaucratic  state.”70    
 
It is this process that enables Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism to be pre-modern and 
modern at the same time. It therefore selectively appropriates the centralising and 
homogenising aspects of the modern nation-state, as well as the hierarchical and 
encompassing aspects of the pre-colonial state, while discarding the civic and 
egalitarian character of the former, and the devolutionary and pluralistic nature of the 
latter.   I  will  discuss  plurinational  constitutionalism’s  critique  of   the  modern  nation-
state as inadequate to the task of accommodating national pluralism later in this 
thesis,71 but here my contention is that we need to rebalance our understanding of the 
pre-colonial state in contradistinction to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist historiography, 
so that we might both dispute these historical claims in favour of the unitary state, 
and restore the pluralistic aspect of the pre-colonial past to the task of meeting the 
constitutional challenges of national pluralism in the present. If modern Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism can draw on the pre-colonial   state’s   centralising   aspects   in  
justifying unitary order in the present, then an attempt to re-historicise its pluralistic 
potential is at least equally methodologically valid, and indeed is normatively 
superior in that it is meant to historically reinforce the modern values of democratic 
pluralism (in this case, a specific argument for plurinational democracy).  
 
The type of state that prevailed in the ancient Sinhala-Buddhist kingdoms (until the 
last such Kingdom of Kandy was ceded to British sovereignty in 1815) has been 
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extensively theorised in historical anthropology and performance studies, 
commencing   with   Stanley   Tambiah’s   seminal   articulation   of   the   concept   of   the  
‘galactic  polity’  (also  known  as  the  ‘mandala-state’).72 This dominant pre-European 
state form that existed in large parts of South and Southeast Asia in the countries 
around the Bay of Bengal is the subject of a substantial literature, with robust debates 
on such matters as its conception of collective identity and territorial space, its 
economic model, the relative extents of centralisation and decentralisation that it 
permitted, the nature of its sovereignty and model of kingship, and the role of 
religion and cosmology. I do not intend to rehearse these debates, except to briefly 
summarise issues salient to the present discussion as follows. 
 
To  the  extent  categories  like  ‘nation’  and  ‘state’  had  relevance  in  this  kind  of  polity,  
there was a conflation of nation and state in the institution of the righteous monarch, 
which was seen as the fount of authority and order in the temporal realm, as well as 
the personification of the collective identity of the people. This paradigm of 
Theravada Buddhist kingship is encapsulated in the analytical construct known as the 
‘Asokan   Persona’. 73  The legitimacy of this type of political order was secured 
through the subscription of both rulers and ruled to the religio-moral injunctions of 
Buddhism (i.e., pre-modernist Buddhism), and political sovereignty was exercised 
through ritual   and   performance:   “It   was   the   rituals   of   state   that   functioned   as   the  
symbolic capital which not only held the centre, periphery and semi-periphery of the 
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(1997) The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of 
Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750-1900 (Basingstoke: Macmillan); T. Day (2002) Fluid Iron: State 
Formation in Southeast Asia (Honolulu:  Univ.  of  Hawai’i  Press);;  V.  Lieberman  (2003)  Strange 
Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800-1830 (New York: CUP). 
73 Tambiah (1976): Ch.5; Roberts (1994): Ch.3; De Silva Wijeyeratne (2014): Ch.2. 
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Kandyan polity together, but also provided the virtual nature of galactic sovereignty 
with its performative structure.” 74  This notion of sovereignty – variously 
conceptualised   as   the   ‘rites   of   däkum’, 75  ‘ritual   sovereignty’, 76  ‘tributary  
overlordship’,77  and   ‘virtual   sovereignty’ 78  – is fundamentally different from the 
absolute potestas of the sovereign ruler that emerged in early modern Europe (and 
has subsequently informed doctrines of the Westphalian nation-state and global 
order).79   
 
In Tambiah’s  conceptualisation, these Buddhist polities were modelled  “on  the  basis  
of parallelism between the suprahuman macrocosmos and the human 
microcosmos.”80 In   this  way,   “The   kingdom  was   a  miniature   representation   of   the  
cosmos, with the palace at the centre being iconic of Mount Meru, the pillar of the 
universe, and the king, his princes, and ruling chiefs representing   the  hierarchy”  of  
the pantheon of gods. 81  This mirroring of the cosmos by mandala-type states 
occasioned a particular topographical form for such states, in which power radiated 
in  “a  scheme  of  activation  from  the  centre   to   the  periphery   in  successive  waves.”82 
Such a cosmo-topographical approach to state form has certain implications for 
conceptions of territory and jurisdiction, implications which assume even greater 
significance by the apparent distance between them and modernist understandings of 
those concepts within the paradigm of a unitary nation-state. The fulcrum of the 
geometric design underlying mandala-states is the capital, the location of the 
cakkavatti court,  which  Tambiah  describes  as  “centre-oriented space (as opposed to 
bounded  space).”83 This implies that the exemplary importance in prestige accorded 
to the centre was synecdochical, and was not, as in the modern logic of the unitary 
state, synonymous in practical terms with territorial or jurisdictional control over the 
                                                 
74 De Silva Wijeyeratne (2014): p.72. Emphasis in original. 
75 G. Obeyesekere (1967) Land Tenure in Village Ceylon (Cambridge: CUP): p.216. 
76 C.R. De Silva, ‘Sri Lanka in the Early 16th Century: Political Conditions’  in  K.M.  De  Silva  (Ed.)  
(1995) University of Peradeniya History of Sri Lanka, Vol.II (Colombo: Sridevi): p.11. See also N. 
Dirks (1987) The Hollow Crown: An Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom (New York: CUP). 
77 Roberts (2004a): p.59-63, 75-84. 
78 De Silva Wijeyeratne (2014): pp.69-74. 
79 M. Loughlin (2010) Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP): p.184. 
80 Tambiah (1976): p.109. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, p.111. 
83 Ibid: p.112; Duncan (1990). 
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peripheries:   “This concept of territory as a variable sphere of influence that 
diminishes as royal power radiates from a centre is integral to the characterisation of 
the traditional polity as a mandala composed  of  concentric  circles.”84  
 
Typically, there were three such concentric circles, representing centre-periphery 
relations, although there could be more in larger polities. At the centre was the 
Asokan cakkavatti (ruling the capital region directly); then the polities of lesser 
princes or governors, and in the outer circle   were   “more   or   less   independent  
‘tributary’   polities.” 85  The capital itself was physically ordered according to the 
mandala arrangement, with the royal palace at the centre; and so was each polity in 
each undulating concentric circle, so that despite differences in size, power and 
prestige,  the  lesser  unit  was  a  “reproduction  and  imitation”  of  the  larger.86 Relations 
between the units within a mandala-type state, and indeed between neighbouring 
polities organised in a similar way, were constantly changing according to vagaries 
of political and economic power and battlefield fortunes.87 Tambiah portrays a vivid 
image of this type of polity: 
 
“Thus  we  have  before  us  a  galactic  picture  of  a  central  planet  surrounded  by  
differentiated satellites, which are more  or  less  ‘autonomous’  entities  held  in  
orbit and within the sphere of influence of the centre. Now if we introduce at 
the margin other similar competing central principalities and their satellites, 
we shall be able to appreciate the logic of a system that is a hierarchy of 
central points continually subject to the dynamics of pulsation and changing 
spheres  of  influence.”88  
 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.  De  Silva  Wijeyeratne  refers  to  this  as  ‘semi-periphery’  and  ‘periphery’:  De  Silva  Wijeyeratne  
(2007):  p.170.  In  a  Marxist  sociological  analysis  of  the  ‘Kandyan  social  formation,’  Newton  
Gunasinghe seems to have the same distinction in mind when he speaks  of  ‘core-land’  and  ‘peripheral  
area’:  N.  Gunasinghe  (1990)  Changing Socio-economic Relations in the Kandyan Countryside 
(Colombo: SSA): pp.33-35; see also Roberts (2004a): p.40, n.3. 
86 Tambiah (1976): p.113; Duncan (1990); De Silva Wijeyeratne (2007): pp.166-172. 
87 Tambiah (1976): pp.121-131. 
88 Ibid: p.113. 
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These   frequently   “expanding   and   shrinking”89 organisational arrangements and the 
‘pulsating’   process   of   intra-state and inter-state political relations they framed, 
mirrors the Buddhist cosmological ethos of constant and perpetual movement 
between order, fragmentation and reordering. In mundane terms, within the 
possibilities and constraints of everyday politics, different rulers within these 
systems   made   different   uses   of   their   ‘potentialities’:   “The   galactic   polity   was   no  
effective cybernetic system; it lacked finely fashioned regulative and feedback 
mechanisms  that  produced  homeostasis  and  balance.”90 This therefore is the system 
that allowed substantial autonomy at the periphery, including the Tamil-speaking 
periphery in especially the north of the island.91  
 
Notwithstanding this, the notion of Sinhalē – which was a categorically Sinhalese 
and Buddhist, and not a modern or egalitarian collective consciousness – served as a 
real and meaningful form of ideational coherence within a state form that did not 
derive its integrity from the norm of bounded territory.92 Tamil-speaking residents of 
the physically remote, autonomous chieftaincies in the northern Vanni region might 
not have subscribed to the idea of Sinhalē, but did acknowledge Sinhala suzerainty 
by paying homage and tribute (although Tamil-speaking communities in the eastern 
seaboard of the island did both). But the more important point for present purposes is 
that the dynamism of the galactic polity allowed for such spatial autonomy at the 
periphery as a quotidian reality, and with none of the conceptual constraints 
associated with the centralised, bureaucratised, modern unitary nation-state.  
 
In sum then, the pre-colonial Sinhala-Buddhist state was hierarchical and 
encompassing in intent, but pulsating, fissiparous and asymmetrical in practice, as 
ordained by the principles of Buddhist cosmology. This cosmic tension was reflected 
in the mandala-type organisation of the pre-British monarchical polities of Sri 
Lanka, in which the principles of hierarchy and encompassment reflected in the 
rituals of Buddhist kingship and in the idea of Sinhalē were countervailed, not only 
                                                 
89 Ibid: p.112. 
90 Tambiah (1976): p.123. 
91 Cf. esp. Roberts (2004a): Ch.5. 
92 Ibid: Ch.4. Sinhalē  is one of the terms for the Sinhala-Buddhist collective consciousness that 
Roberts argues approximated to a state-nationalism in Kandyan kingdom.  
48 
 
by the decentralised structures and practices of government dictated by the galactic 
logic of the mandala, but by practical constraints of mobility, communications, 
geography and realpolitik. This not only makes for a radical contrast between the 
pre-colonial state form and post-colonial ethnocratic nation-state, but also negates 
the alleged provenance of the unitary state in the pre-colonial history of the island. 
The resulting position is one in which Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is able to 
enforce its commitment to the unitary state and attendant refusal to countenance 
Tamil autonomy through the power and populist politics of democratic 
majoritarianism, but it cannot legitimate its historiographical justifications in favour 
of the unitary state through deliberative historiographical arguments. 
 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the operational reality of peripheral autonomy, 
what also emerges from this picture is the predominant influence of the Sinhala-
Buddhists throughout the history of the island. The Tamils can demonstrate their 
presence and their de facto autonomy (and for a brief period even an independent 
Jaffna kingdom), but in the larger scheme of this particular island story, their 
situation cannot be compared to the strengths of the historical and territorial claims 
that sub-state nations like the Scots, the Catalans, or the Quebecois are able to 
plausibly present against their host states.93 This is a crucial difference between the 
Western plurinational states and Sri Lanka, which must be at the heart of any 
realistic attempt at conceptualising a plurinational constitutional dispensation for Sri 
Lanka. It is thus the critical historical fact that informs both the normative 
foundations and the organisational principles for a Sri Lankan plurinational 
constitution that I propose, respectively, in Chapters 5 and 6, which foreground a 
norm   of   ‘asymmetric   pluralism’   rather   than   equality   between   the   majority   and  






                                                 
93 See further, Section 3.1 and Chapter 4, infra. 
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2.2 The Jacobin Variant  
 
The unitary state is also defended by a position in the constitutional reform debate 
that is opposed to Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and is instead grounded in the 
political theory and philosophy of modernism, secularism, and civic nationalism, 
albeit with a strong emphasis on state sovereignty, non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs of states, and  ‘Third  World’  solidarity.  For  our  purposes,  this  can be described 
as   a   ‘Jacobin’ position because its view of the republican nation-state elides the 
nation and the state in a unitary discourse of national identity and institutional form 
(notwithstanding commitments to devolution within the unitary state). The Jacobin 
variant builds upon the conventional discourse of post-colonial nation-building to 
promote a modern Sri Lankan political community that is synonymous with the Sri 
Lankan state. It concedes that in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious polity, some 
concessions may have to be made to cultural particularity. Thus the traditional 
Jacobin commitment to strict state ethnic and religious neutrality is mitigated by an 
openness to policies of multiculturalism, official multilingualism, affirmative action, 
and even a measure of territorial devolution, to the extent devolution is consistent 
with the centralisation of political power and legal authority in the unitary state and 
the mono-national identity of the state. Exponents of this view would therefore 
support the structural framework of the current Sri Lankan constitution together with 
its level of provincial devolution, while critiquing the ethnocratisation of the state by 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. Its attitude to the competing claims of ethno-cultural 
pluralism moreover is governed by structural realism both in terms of internal 
political management as well as external relations, rather than by any strong a priori 
normative commitments to the recognition of pluralism. As Dayan Jayatilleka notes: 
 
Sovereignty cannot be successfully defended by a state acting as a mono-
ethnic   straightjacket   on   the   country’s   stubbornly   diverse,   irreducible   and  
colliding identities. It is best defended by a Sri Lankan state which represents 
all its peoples, acts as neutral umpire providing and guaranteeing adequate 
space for all ethnicities on the island. Sovereignty is secured by a Sri Lankan 
identity  which  accommodates  all  the  country’s  communities,  paving  the  way  
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for a broadly shared sense of a multi-ethnic yet single Sri Lankan 
nationhood.94      
 
Quite clearly therefore, this vision of the nation-state accommodates pluralism to the 
extent that minority claims do not seriously challenge the overarching unitary 
conception of state, nation, and sovereignty. Its accommodative capacity 
categorically does not extend to the recognition of any sub-state national claims. 
Furthermore, Jacobins would justify the use of force to suppress such sub-state 
national movements, a fundamental threat to unitary order, as consistent with their 
conception of the sovereign state. I will return to the critique of all these orthodox 
nostrums of the nation-state in ensuing chapters.   
 
 
3. The Federal State Perspective  
 
Opposing the unitary conception of the state in Sri Lankan constitutional debates are 
the various federalist discourses, of which by far the most prominent is the claim to 
federal autonomy made by the sub-state nation of Sri Lankan Tamils. Federalism is 
also advocated by liberals, as a means of meeting the Tamil demand for territorial 
autonomy as well as on broader non-ethnic rationales such as democratisation. These 
positions are discussed below.    
 
 
3.1 The Sub-State Tamil National Challenge 
 
In constitutional debates prior to independence, Tamil political leaders were focused 
on communal representation. Neither federal autonomy nor a nationality claim was 
made in this period, although both were asserted very soon after independence, and 
have thenceforth remained the basis on which Tamils seek to share power in the Sri 
Lankan state. Tamil nationalist scholars have retrospectively portrayed the growth of 
Tamil collective consciousness as an incremental process from the mid-nineteenth 
                                                 




century onwards in response to changing political and constitutional challenges, with 
the nationality claim as the culmination of that progression. The deeper theoretical 
implications of these accounts will be further discussed in Chapter 4, but here I 
critically discuss the central politico-legal claims of Tamil nationalism. The basic 
tenets of Tamil nationalism have remained generally consistent since the late 1940s, 
and as embodied in the statement subscribed to by a large number of Tamil 
nationalist parties and militant groups  known  as  the  ‘Thimpu  Principles’,95 there are 
three such fundamental claims: that the Sri Lankan Tamils constitute a nation, with a 
traditional homeland, on the basis of which they are entitled to the right to self-
determination. In what follows, these three aspects are considered in closer detail. 
 
 
The Claim to Nationhood 
 
The political articulation of Tamil ethnic consciousness as a distinct nation, together 
with the territorial and self-determination claims, occurred with the formation of the 
Federal Party in 1949. 96  The   first   extended   exposition   of   the   Federal   Party’s  
conception of the Tamil nation and the means of its constitutional expression were 
set out in the resolutions of its first convention in 1951. Amongst invocations of 
history, culture and a desire for self-government in these resolutions, the defining 
characteristic of Tamil nationhood was the Tamil language, embodied in the 
formulation  ‘Tamil-speaking  people  of  Ceylon’  which  sought  to  encapsulate  at  least  
three different groups: the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Muslims and the Indian Tamils;97 
discounting for the moment the intra-community distinctions within the category of 
Sri   Lankan   Tamils   as   between   ‘Northern   Tamils’   and   ‘Eastern   Tamils’ 98  or the 
complex spatial relationship between the residents of the Jaffna Peninsula as the 
                                                 
95 Reproduced and discussed in Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch.15. 
96 E.M.V.  Naganathan  &  V.  Navaratnam  (Eds.),  ‘Presidential Address of Mr S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, 
K.C., Member of Parliament, Ceylon, delivered at The Inaugural and First Business Meeting of The 
Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (The Federal Freedom Party of the Tamil-speaking People of Ceylon) on 
18th December 1949 at the G.C.S.U. Hall, Colombo’  (1949)  ITAK  Booklet  Series  No.1.     
97 Resolution No.3, in Edrisinha et al (2008): p.213. 
98 See esp. D. Hellmann-Rajanayagam  (1990b)  ‘The  Concept  of  a  ‘Tamil  Homeland’  in  Sri  Lanka  – 
Its Meaning and Development’,  South Asia 13(2): p.79.  
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political, cultural and historical heartland of Sri Lankan Tamil identity, and Tamils 
elsewhere in the island.99    
 
While the purpose of adopting this formulation was to unite the major non-Sinhala 
communities around a platform of resistance to imminent Sinhala majoritarian 
hegemony in the post-independence era, the notion that the three broad groups of 
Tamil-speaking people could be conceived in terms of an inclusive linguistic 
homogeneity, and even more so with the high degree of communal unity implied in 
the idea of a distinct nation, was and remains wishful at best.100 Even by that time, 
the Muslim community (itself a heterogeneous category with a number of internal 
sub-divisions101), while mostly Tamil-speaking, regarded themselves as an entity 
separate from the Sri Lankan Tamils, and this is a schism that has only widened 
subsequently to the extent that some commentators even regard the Muslims as 
having a separate nationalism.102 The Indian Tamil community, which comprised 
indentured labourers brought down from southern India by British companies to 
work on tea and coffee plantations from the nineteenth century onwards, was almost 
entirely located in the central hill country at the time. Their historical and cultural 
links with the Sri Lankan Tamils were tenuous, and crucially, they had no territorial 
contiguity with the northern and eastern parts of the island.103  
                                                 
99 Wilson (2000): Ch.2. Following the comprehensive military defeat of the armed secessionist 
movement within the island in 2009, an increasingly prominent arena of developments is the 
transnational space within which the Tamil diaspora engages in nationalist activism. This dimension, 
while important, is beyond the scope of this thesis. See L. Vimalarajah & R. Cheran (2012) 
‘Empowering Diasporas: The Dynamics of Post-War Transnational Tamil Politics’,  Berghof  
Occasional Paper No.31 (Berlin: Berghof Foundation). 
100 For  a  trenchant  critique  of  the  Federal  Party’s  notion  of  a  Tamil-speaking people, see H.L. de Silva 
(2008) Sri Lanka A Nation in Conflict: Threats to Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Democratic 
Governance and Peace (Colombo: Visidunu Prakashakayo): pp.331-334. 
101 A.R.M.  Imtiyaz  &  S.  R.H.  Hoole  (2011)  ‘Some Critical Notes on the Non-Tamil Identity of the 
Muslims of Sri Lanka, and on Tamil–Muslim Relations’,  South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 
34(2):  p.208;;  D.B.  McGilvray  &  M.  Raheem  (2007)  ‘Muslims Perspectives on the Sri Lankan 
Conflict’,  Policy  Studies  41  (Washington:  East-West Centre); D.B. McGilvray (2008) Crucible of 
Conflict: Tamil and Muslim Society in the East Coast of Sri Lanka (Durham, NC: Duke UP). 
102 Even though politically the Muslims (Sri Lankan Moors) certainly assert a distinctive collective 
identity, which sometimes includes territorial claims, they have not, (except on one occasion in the 
‘Oluvil Declaration’  of  2003,  the  extent  of  support  for  which  is  doubtful  at  best),  asserted  a  claim  that  
the Muslims of Sri Lanka constituted a separate nation. See Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch.31. However, 
some scholars have recently spoken of a Muslim nationalism, if not a nation. See Z. Ahmad (2012) 
‘Contours of Muslim Nationalism in Sri Lanka’,  South Asian History and Culture 3(2): p.269.  
103 P.  Devaraj,  ‘Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka – Identity Stabilisation and Inter-Ethnic Interaction’  in  




In  short,  the  Federal  Party’s  attempt  to  expand  the  membership  of  the  Tamil  nation  
beyond the core Jaffna Tamil identity through the adoption of language as the 
criterion of inclusion was politically problematic from the outset because the 
intended constituent sub-groups would not fully subscribe to, or be made to fit 
within,  an  ‘objectively’  defined  linguistic  community. Indeed, in the first resolution 
passed at the first national convention of the Federal Party in 1951, this is apparent 
from   its   language   itself.  The  explication  of   ‘Tamil-speaking  people’   in   terms  of   its  
historical and territorial dimensions seemed to exemplify the situation of the Sri 
Lankan Tamils of the north and east, rather than that of either the Muslims or the 
Indian Tamils. Even though Tamil nationalists continue to loosely use the term 
‘Tamil-speaking   people’   (or   the   pluralised   ‘Tamil-speaking peoples’),   this   is   a  
formulation that was both empirically untenable and conceptually incoherent, and in 
the context of the more assertive articulation of the Muslim identity in particular, one 
that makes little sense nowadays. As Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out, the attempt to 
set  out  an  “‘objective’  definition”  of  the  nation  in  Resolution  No.1,  while  “unusually  
convenient for propagandist and programmatic, as distinct from descriptive 
purposes”,  was  “fuzzy,  shifting  and  ambiguous,  and  as  useless  for  the  purposes of the 
traveller’s  orientation  as  cloud-shapes  are  compared  to  landmarks.”104 
 
The  conceptual  contradictions  of  the  Federal  Party’s  formulation  were  the  result  of  a  
political and electoral calculation aimed at encompassing as large a demographic 
                                                                                                                                          
also asserted in some quarters, but this is extremely tenuous: A. Lawrence (2011) Malayaha Tamils: 
Power-sharing and Local Democracy in Sri Lanka (Colombo: SSA): Chs.3,4,8.   
104 E. Hobsbawm (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
(Cambridge: CUP): pp.6-7  at  p.6.  Hobsbawm’s  criticism  of  Resolution  No.1  is  an  illustration  of  his  
broader argument about the futility of attempting objective criteria for defining the concept of the 
nation,  but  as  he  also  concedes,  “patently  propagandist  manifestos  should  not  be  scrutinised  as  though  
they  were  contributions  to  the  social  sciences”:  p.7.  On  the  whole,  however,  Hobsbawm’s  excessively  
critical view says as much about the limitations of his own analytical framework as about the Federal 
Party’s  formulation,  because  it  seems  to  be  a  textual  critique  of  a  section  of  Resolution  No.1  based  on  
Marxian theoretical assumptions, and without the fullest possible regard to either the Ceylonese 
political context in and to which the formulation was addressed, or indeed the more culturally 
contextualised scholarship that has developed in relation to South Asian nationalisms subsequently. 
The principal Sri Lankan authorities on whom he relies upon for corroboration are likewise Marxist 
scholars.  More  broadly,  it  is  in  any  case  instructive  to  keep  Rogers  Brubaker’s  observation  that  
“‘Nation’  is  a  category  of  ‘practice’,  not  (in  the  first  instance)  a  category  of  analysis”  in  mind:  R.  
Brubaker (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: CUP): p.10. 
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group as possible, especially within the Northern and Eastern Provinces claimed as 
the territorial unit for federal autonomy where Tamil-speakers (i.e., Tamils as well as 
Muslims) constituted a majority. In the Eastern Province, Tamil-speakers would be a 
majority only if the Muslims associated themselves with the Tamil nation. In the 
Northern Province, there were substantial Muslim communities interspersed amongst 
Sri Lankan Tamils. If therefore the Muslims excluded themselves from the Tamil 
nation, there would be major consequences for both the territorial extent and the 
territorial contiguity of the region claimed as a Tamil traditional homeland.  
 
While the broader conception of a Tamil-speaking people might not thus have been 
an entirely coherent proposition, the claims articulated by the Federal Party with 
regard to history, territory and ethno-linguistic culture as constituting the foundations 
of a distinct Tamil nation, have found clear and consistent resonance amongst the 
core group to whom these arguments are addressed: the Sri Lankan Tamils. This is 
evidenced in repeated electoral affirmations of these basic principles in every general 
election since 1956, including, it is important to note, in all state-wide, provincial 
and local government elections which have been held since the conclusion of the war 
in May 2009 with the devastating military defeat of the armed secessionist 
movement.  
 
For present purposes, what is important to note is that the essential elements of Tamil 
nationalist ideology have found demonstrable support within the in-group, in such a 
way as to amount credibly to a sub-state national challenge, over and beyond a claim 
for minority rights.105 This has analytical, normative and structural implications for 
the constitutional theory and law of the Sri Lankan state. Analytically, the Tamil sub-
state challenge calls for the acknowledgement of a sociological reality of national 
pluralism within the island polity. Moreover, in the light of the preceding discussion 
on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and the unitary state, it shows that the present Sri 
Lankan constitutional order is inadequate to the tasks required of it in a plural 
                                                 
105 Tierney (2006): p.4, even though the Tamil claim to a distinct nationhood may not fit entirely with 
theoretical frameworks combining objective and subjective elements worked out for Western sub-state 
nations: see Tierney: pp.32-44. This is primarily because Western sub-state nations are projected as 
civic nationalisms, whereas Tamil nationalism is an ethnic nationalism. In Chapter 4, infra, I contend 
however that the challenge of the civic-ethnic dichotomy is not insurmountable.  
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democratic society. Beyond practical policy considerations of stability and peace, the 
anomalous relationship between the sociological character of the polity and the 
constitutional form of the state in turn raises fundamental normative questions of 
democracy and pluralism as well as questions of alternative constitutional 
structures.106    
 
 
The Claim to Territory 
 
Among all the claims associated with the Tamil sub-state national challenge, none 
has caused greater controversy or attracted more virulent resistance than the claim to 
a  ‘Tamil  traditional  homeland’  in  the  north  and  east  of  the  island.  The  opposition  to  
the territorial claim concerns both the historiographical arguments adduced in its 
favour as well as its purported physical boundaries, and extends beyond predictable 
objections from Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists to those who see in it the makings of 
an ethnic enclave, and as such, an anti-modern threat to the cohesion of the Sri 
Lankan nation-state.107  
 
Intertwined with the territorial claim is a particularly disputatious debate about the 
demography of the north and especially the east. One of the original planks of the 
Federal  Party’s  political  programme  was  the  opposition  to  Sinhalese  ‘colonisation’  of  
the east through state-aided programmes of agricultural resettlement, on the grounds 
that this served to alter the established demographic pattern of the area claimed as 
part of the traditional homeland to the detriment of Tamil-speaking people. Tamil 
nationalists have seen in colonisation an insidious attempt to consolidate Sinhala-
Buddhist hegemony over the whole island by demographic engineering of the north 
and east so as to render Tamils a minority in Tamil areas as well. Considerable 
credence can be attached to this claim after the watershed of 1956 when colonisation 
became a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideological issue. It is less clear, however, 
whether such ideological motivations formed part of the rationales for the 
colonisation policy at its inception in the early twentieth century by the British 
                                                 
106 These issues will be dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6, infra. 
107 For e.g., see de Silva (2008); Jayatilleka (2013). 
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colonial administration, and later by Ceylonese politicians and civil servants under 
the Donoughmore dispensation.108 As originally conceived, colonisation was meant 
to develop sparsely populated agricultural lands, and by resettling Sinhala peasants in 
those areas, to ease the pressure for agricultural land in the southwest and central 
areas.109 For (Sinhalese) critics of the homeland argument who stress the economic 
imperatives of land settlement, population redistribution and agricultural production 
as the material basis of the colonisation policy, such as the historian K.M. de Silva 
and the geographer G.H. Peiris, it is a clear case of Tamil nationalist myth-making 
based on spurious historical authorities and manipulated demographic statistics.110 
 
I will return to the historiographical debates concerning competing conceptions of 
territoriality among the Sinhalese and the Tamils in the pre-British era in Chapter 5 
at some length, because these ideas inform ways in which contemporary 
constitutional law and theory can respond to the challenges of national pluralism in 
the present. In this section, the focus is on how the territorial claim was articulated 
(and contested) in the post-independence dynamics of Tamil nationalism, although 
we need to look slightly further to the debates over communal and territorial 
representation during the colonial era in order to fully understand the origins of what 
became a territorial claim on behalf of a distinct nation. In this, there are two facets 
to the issue that require attention: on the one hand, what is it that Tamil nationalists 
mean  by  the  concept  of  a  homeland  when  they  deploy  the  phrase  ‘Tamil  traditional  
homeland’   (or   its   cognate   variants);;   and   on   the   other,   what   are the physical 
boundaries of this homeland?  
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Dagmar Hellmann-Rajayanagam,   who   notes   that   the   term   ‘homeland’   is   “used  
loosely   and   is  nowhere  defined   in   the   literature”,111 dates its occurrence in English 
language discourse to legislative debates and memoranda of the 1930s. She suggests 
that  it  is  an  English  “translation  of  a  term  widely  used  in  the  Tamil  writings”  which  
literally  means   “Regions  where   Tamil-speaking people have traditionally (or from 
generation   to   generation)   lived.”112 From the evidence Hellmann-Rajanayagam and 
others have offered, it seems therefore that the idea of a traditional homeland, even 
though its exact boundaries were amorphous, was a politically resonant and 
commonly accepted notion among Tamils, and critically, one that preceded the 
Federal   Party’s   presentation   of   Tamil   politico-constitutional claims in terms of a 
distinct nation from 1949 onwards.113 Moreover, Sinhalese opposition to a Tamil 
traditional homeland appears to have intensified only once it was asserted as part of a 
Tamil national claim. As Hellmann-Rajanayagam has pointed out, in the debates 
over territorial and communal representation in the early twentieth century, the 
notion that the north and east were not merely areas where Tamil-speakers were a 
majority,  but  were  ‘Tamil homelands,’  seems  to  have  been  assumed  by  Tamils  and  
Sinhalese alike. Indeed, as she further points out, Sinhalese leaders (and their British 
constitutional advisors like Sir Ivor Jennings 114 ) met the Tamil demands for 
communal representation as an institutional protection against Sinhalese dominance 
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with the argument that they would obtain sufficient representation under territorial 
democracy because of their preponderance in the north and east.115 
 
Notwithstanding its political resonance among Tamils, however, the absence of 
precisely demarcated boundaries to the homeland has created difficulties for the 
territorial claim understood in terms of a legal and constitutional proposition. This is 
evidenced in shifts in the way in which the Federal Party and its successors in the 
leadership of Tamil nationalism have presented the territorial claim. In its founding 
manifesto  in  1949,  the  Federal  Party  merely  stated,  “The  Eelam  Tamils  are  a  nation  
of  their  own,  they  have  a  homeland  of  their  own.”116 In its First National Convention 
in  1951,  Resolution  No.1,  while   asserting  Tamils’  “territorial  habitation  of  definite  
areas which constitute over one-third   of   this   Island,”   nevertheless   called   for   “a  
plebiscite  to  determine  the  boundaries  of  the  linguistic  states”  of  the  future federation 
of Ceylon.117 The Federal Party was more specific in the Memorandum and Model 
Constitution which it submitted to the Constituent Assembly in 1971, then drafting 
what became the first republican constitution of Sri Lanka in 1972. In this document, 
which set out a federal scheme for the putative republican constitution, the Federal 
Party   proposed   that,   “The   Northern   Province   and   the   Trincomalee   and   Batticaloa  
Districts of the Eastern Province will form one Unit. This will be a Tamil majority 
State. The Amparai District [in the southern end of the Eastern Province] will form a 
Muslim  majority  State.”118 In the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976, which registered 
Tamil   nationalism’s   paradigm   shift   from   federalism   to   secessionism,   the   Tamil  
United Liberation Front (TULF) identified the Northern and Eastern Provinces as the 
territory of the future state of Tamil Eelam. Since then, Tamil nationalists have 
generally put forward the Northern and Eastern Provinces as the territorial extent of 
the Tamil homeland, although more maximalist claims have been made both as to the 
territorial extent of the Tamil homeland in the north and east, as well as the argument 
that at some points in the ancient period, Tamil kings ruled the whole of the island.119 
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However, while it is generally conceded by all except the most recalcitrant Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists that the Jaffna Peninsula and the northern parts of the Northern 
Province are areas of historic Tamil habitation, it is the Tamil claim to historic 
habitation in the rest of the area comprising the Northern and Eastern Provinces that 
has been constantly challenged.120 To be more specific, the territorial disputes have 
been concentrated on the areas to the interior of the Eastern littoral and the interior 
areas between the North-Central Province and the southern end of the Northern 
Province. This vast area, the whole of which was once known as the Vanni, was until 
the  1930s  universally   regarded  as   a   “wild   country…covered   in   jungle,   full   of  wild  
animals…and   malaria-infested   swamps.” 121  Notwithstanding this, however, the 
transition from communal to territorial representation brought home to the Tamils 
the realisation that, rather than being one of the two founding races in the island as 
they had hitherto regarded themselves, they too were now a minority in a Sinhala-
majority polity. 122  This realisation strengthened the need to preserve the Tamil 
homeland and to prevent incursions into it, which was the context in which 
colonisation, even before it became invested with a Sinhala-Buddhist ideological 
mission to negate Tamil claims to the territory, came to be so strongly resisted. Even 
though therefore large parts of the area claimed as a homeland were sparsely 
populated and undeveloped, spatial possession of such a homeland assumed 
fundamental significance to the Tamil identity and sense of dignity.123  
 
While historiographical arguments have been used to contextualise and vindicate a 
Tamil homeland tradition within the island, territorial control over the Tamil areas 
has assumed an added measure of political significance and immediacy in the context 
of the ascendancy of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist control over the Sri Lankan state, 
and the consequential deterioration of ethnic relations and descent into armed 
conflict. Territorial control in this sense is seen as important to ensuring the physical 
security of Tamils, in addition to the preservation of Tamil language, culture and 
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national consciousness. The constitutional forms that have been advocated since 
independence for ensuring Tamil control over the Tamil homeland have fallen 
broadly into two types: either federal-type autonomy within a united Ceylon / Sri 
Lanka, or a separate state, but at their heart is the assertion of the legal right to self-
determination for the Tamil sub-state nation within its territorial homeland.     
 
 
The Claim to Self-Determination 
 
If the politico-historical claims of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism with regard to 
nationhood and territory are both contestable and contested, the legal claim made on 
those bases to the right to self-determination is no less heavily contested. However, 
the conceptual framework of the claim is relatively straightforward, being articulated 
in conventional international law terms in the dominant narrative of Tamil 
nationalism. While the liberal discourse of international law characterises 
contemporary Tamil nationalist ideology, during the 1970s and 80s, virtually all 
Tamil militant groups that had superseded the Tamil parliamentary parties in 
pursuing an armed struggle against the state closely associated themselves with 
various strands of Marxist thought. In this period therefore we see the concept of 
self-determination expressed in terms of socialist doctrine: articulating the Tamil 
national question as the Tamil social formation’s   right   to   self-determination and 
secession, due to intolerable oppression by the chauvinistic Sinhala nation within the 
bourgeois unitary state, consistent with the class struggle and proletarian 
internationalism within the theoretical framework of historical materialism.124 
 
The principle of self-determination has been at the heart of Tamil nationalism in both 
its federalist and secessionist forms. It was invoked by the Federal Party from the 
inception as the normative foundation for federal autonomy, and once the 
transformation took place to a secessionist position in the 1970s, self-determination 
became all the more relevant to the way in which the central collective right of the 
Tamil nation was expressed. This transformation originated in the complete rejection 
                                                 




of   the  Federal   Party’s   constitutional   proposals   by   the  Constituent  Assembly  which  
drafted the first republican constitution of 1972.125 In the Amirthalingam Trial-at-Bar 
in 1976 an innovative constitutional argument, which sought to question the very 
validity of the 1972 Constitution was presented on behalf of the defendant, 
Appapillai Amirthalingam, a Tamil nationalist politician. The 1972 Constitution had 
been enacted by recourse to an extra-constitutional legal revolution so as to 
demonstrate the autochthonous nature of the new republic. 126  As part of this 
argument, it was submitted that, 
 
“...once  there  is  a  break  in  legal  continuity  the  sovereignties  of  the  inhabitants  
of the Island until then under eclipse, so to speak, appear once again. Hence 
the sovereignty of the Tamil Nation which was ethnically, geographically and 
linguistically  separately  identifiable  and  distinct,  revived.”127 
 
This argument about a restoration and reconstitution of a dormant Tamil sovereignty 
had also been made in the historic Vaddukoddai Resolution a few months earlier.128 
As Helena J. Whall has described it, what was being sought was a revival or 
restoration of  
 
“…the  status  of  which  they  were  forcibly  deprived  when  the  Tamil  kingdom  
was first occupied by colonial forces in the early seventeenth century. Thus, 
the theoretical basis upon which the Tamils assert their right to self-
determination, is that when the legal ties with the United Kingdom were 
severed, both the Tamil nation and the Sinhalese nation, should have their 
sovereign  rights  restored.”129 
 
Predictably, such arguments did not find favour with Sri Lankan courts, and since the 
early 1990s, Tamil nationalists have articulated the self-determination claim in more 
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orthodox international law terms. This proceeds on the assumption that international 
law   guarantees   to   ‘all   peoples’   the   right   to   self-determination, and although it is 
conceded that this does not extend as of right to ethnic minorities within independent 
states, reliance is placed on the development of the distinction between the internal 
and external limbs of the principle of self-determination to assert that the denial of 
internal self-determination would trigger a right to external self-determination.130 
Within this framework, the argument that Tamil nationalists seek to advance is that 
at first instance, international law entitles the Tamil nation to internal constitutional 
guarantees of democratic self-government and meaningful political participation 
within the host-state. The Sri Lankan state has not fulfilled these requirements in its 
internal constitutional arrangements so far, and if this denial of democratic 
aspirations continues, they hold that the Tamil nation is imminently entitled to 
exercise the option of external self-determination.131  
 
This was the framework within which the LTTE agreed with the government to the 
set of principles embodied in the Oslo Communiqué in December 2002 during the 
peace process of 2002-2006, which set out the following basis for further 
constitutional negotiations: 
 
“…the   parties   agreed   to   explore   a   solution   founded   on   the   principle   of  
internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-
speaking  people,  based  on  a  federal  structure  within  a  united  Sri  Lanka.”132   
 
Following   the   collapse   of   the   peace   process   and   the  LTTE’s   defeat   in   the   ensuing  
final phase of the war, the leadership of Tamil nationalism has devolved back onto 
the Tamil parliamentary parties, many of which function under the umbrella of the 
Tamil National Alliance (TNA), and within which the Federal Party is the dominant 
party. The TNA has repeatedly reaffirmed the basic claims of nationhood, homeland 
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and self-determination, albeit within the framework of a united state in line with the 
principles of the Oslo Communiqué.133 
   
 
3.2 The Liberal Variant 
 
The liberal variant of the federalist perspective on the Sri Lankan state shares much 
in common with the Jacobins in relation to the normative precepts that underpin the 
modern nation-state – chief among them the preference for demos over ethnos – 
although they reject the centralisation immanent in the unitary state on both 
democratic and pluralist grounds. They would typically subscribe to the classical 
liberal views on consent and popular sovereignty as constitutive of both the nation as 
a political community of shared values, and the state as a contractarian instrument of 
self-government. The commitment to federalism as an institutional form of the state 
stems from this liberal ideal of the relationship between the political community and 
government, rather than as an institutional response to the claims of ethnic minorities 
per se. Thus Chanaka Amaratunga advocated a federal constitution for Sri Lanka, 
“not so much as a means of resolution of the Tamil problem / ethnic conflict but for 
its intrinsic merits and as a means of strengthening the liberal democratic process in 
Sri Lanka.”134 The intrinsic merits he speaks of are the orthodox liberal propositions 
of the constitutional entrenchment of individual rights and the division and sharing of 
sovereignty. Moreover, Amaratunga argues that,  
 
“…while   the   rights   of   all   individuals   including   those   of   minority   ethnic  
groups should be respected, the principal motivation for any constitutional 
arrangement should not be the political promotion of ethnic consciousness 
but rather its diminution by the creation of a truly free and individualist 
political  order.”135  
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Liberal federalists therefore make the distinction, in both descriptive and normative 
terms, between civic nations that foster values such as individual liberty, the rule of 
law, limited government, and economic freedom, and ethnic nations, in which 
ascriptive attributes of the community take centre stage and both the identity and the 
rights of the individual are determined by the community rather than vice versa. Thus 
their willingness to contemplate federal forms of minority accommodation are 
justified by traditional liberal arguments of counter-majoritarianism, but above all, 
by the argument that any concession to ethno-territorial autonomy is balanced by the 
commitment to the overarching civic national identity of the state and rights-based 
common citizenship.  
 
Amaratunga stakes out the distinctive liberal-federalist position in opposition to both 
majoritarian and minoritarian perspectives in the following terms: 
 
…the  successful  operation  of  a  federal  constitution  leads  not, as the advocates 
of the pure unitary state assume, to the establishment of separate states in all 
but name and eventually, perhaps even to formal separation and not, as the 
ethno-political advocates of federalism believe to the permanent creation of 
ethnic political units but to the decline of ethnic consciousness and the 
promotion of national unity in the context of diversity.136  
 
Thus this type of liberal envisages a functional compromise with ethnicity by 
accommodating ethno-territorial demands through the expedient of federal 
autonomy, while promoting demotic nation-building at the level of the state, and 
urging ethnonationalists to recognise individuals’   capacity   for   multiple   identities.  
The accommodation-as-relegation strategy is built upon the hope that primordial and 
even anti-modern attachments to ethnic identity will recede in the progressive 
environment for individual self-development secured by the liberal democratic state, 
and that federal autonomy would diminish the political force of sub-state ethnic 
nationalism as a mobilising ideology.   
                                                 




Many of these assumptions and prescriptions can be shown to be flawed, and worse, 
inconsistent with the liberal virtues that liberal-federalists claim to uphold. The 
principal problem here in the context of multiple nations is not so much the 
normative preference for the civic demos, as the definition of the nation in monistic 
terms – an infringement of the liberal norm of pluralism. Especially in the formalistic 
way in which Sri Lankan liberals have tended to deploy it, the problem with 
federalism as a form of territorial autonomy in particular is that classical conceptions 
of federalism offer no scope for the accommodation of plural nationhood or 
nationality; that is, federalism might offer extensive territorial autonomy (self-rule) 
and representation in central institutions (shared-rule) for sub-state nations, but its 
accommodative capacity does not usually extend to the recognition of plural national 
identities. 137  Thus federalism could provide the constitutional form for a 
plurinational polity, but only if it follows the deeper interrogation of the normative 
and organisational precepts of the modern state suggested by plurinational 
constitutionalism.   
 
The assumption that in a state based on liberal values there can be only one demos 
(or nation), answers to neither the sociologically ethnic character of collective 
identity that all but the liberals seem to regard as their primary referent in Sri Lanka, 
nor does it answer to the fact that the Tamil claim to autonomy is premised, not as an 
internal minority or a regional identity, but on a distinctive claim to nationhood. If 
we are to address this nationality claim without creating a separate state, it would 
appear that liberalism must meet the challenge of national pluralism with a 
fundamental re-conceptualisation of its own normative foundations. It would be both 
theoretically inadequate, and indeed, decidedly illiberal to present an either/or 
response to this challenge, on the blunt assertion that the liberal conception of the 
good is ineluctably superior to ethnic forms of collective identity.138 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The preceding overview provides an indication of the kind of competing 
constitutional  claims  at  stake  in  a  consideration  of  Sri  Lanka’s  unresolved  problem  of  
national pluralism. Particularly noteworthy issues include the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism’s   conflation of its own collective identity with that of the Sri Lankan 
state as a whole; the substantive (although not incurable) defects of Tamil nationalist 
claims; the seemingly essentialist and therefore irreconcilable character of the 
competing claims; the role of colonial and post-colonial modernism in informing the 
non-ethnonationalist Jacobin and liberal approaches, and how this impedes even 
these otherwise progressive approaches in meeting the challenge of national 
pluralism; and how procedural democracy lends itself to the consolidation of 
majoritarian nationalism, and therefore to conflict in the context of national 
pluralism. All of these issues are taken up in the chapters to follow, commencing 
with Chapter 3 in which I consider more closely how the analytical and prescriptive 
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Chapter 2 gave an account of the competing nationalisms that make Sri Lanka a 
sociologically multinational polity. This chapter sets out the conceptual issues that are 
engaged in applying the principles and insights of plurinational constitutionalism to 
this case. This excludes certain debates within plurinational constitutionalism, for 
example, those concerning normative debates of political liberalism on issues of 
collective and individual identity, or those concerning sub-state nationalism in the 
context of late-sovereign European states, because these have little relevance to the 
types of collective identity and nation-state that characterise the case study. Reference 
will therefore be made only briefly to these issues, and then mainly to distinguish the 
Sri Lankan situation from the empirical circumstances upon which the norms and 
structures of the liberal plurinational state have so far been theorised.  
 
Moreover, it will be noticed that throughout this thesis, even though the impetus for 
considering the plurinational state as a constitutional model stems from the fact of the 
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sub-state Tamil nationality claim, there is a substantial and even predominant concern 
with the majority Sinhala-Buddhist nation and on the Sri Lankan state. This is 
markedly unlike the literature on the Western plurinational state, where scholars are 
able to focus on the sub-state dimension more fully in the light of the fully evolved 
liberal democratic modernity that characterises the Western host state. In our case, the 
state and majority nation need to be considered alongside the sub-state nation with 
equal emphasis, insofar as plurinational constitutional modernity demands major 
transformations across all three entities.    
 
With those preliminary points in mind, we need a basic restatement of the concept of 
the plurinational state as well as the plurinationalist critiques of traditional democratic 
constitutionalism to serve as the basis for the discussions to follow. Providing this 
conceptual overview is the purpose of this chapter, commencing with a discussion of 
the three grounds on which I argue that the case study diverges from the liberal model. 
These divergences have significance not only for reformulating plurinational 
principles to non-Western cases like Sri Lanka, but also in highlighting those aspects 
of the plurinational state that require adaptation and change if it is to serve as a more 
globally relevant model.        
  
 
1.1 Departures from the Liberal Paradigm: Three Grounds of 
Divergence 
 
Civic-Societal Nationalism versus Ethnic-Communal Nationalism 
 
The first key difference relates to the sociological character of nationalism. 
Nationalisms in the Western liberal democracies at both state and sub-state levels 
represent   ‘civic-societal’   models   of   nationalism,   which   are   held   to   have   outgrown  
their pre-modern   ‘ethnic-communal’   origins   through   processes   of   post-industrial 
modernity and civic nation-building.1 By contrast, nationalisms in the Sri Lankan 
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context as we have seen retain their ascriptive character, their ethno-cultural attributes 
playing a more visible role in both ordinary and constitutional politics than in 
Western plurinational polities. The comparative question that arises then is the extent 
to which the plurinational state, as a liberal constitutionalist model built on the 
foundation   of   open   and   inclusive   ‘national   societies,’ 2  is compatible with such 
conceptions of collective consciousness that are necessarily more exclusivist by 
nature because membership is determined by birth rather than agency. 
 
I will deal with the civic-ethnic dichotomy at length, and suggest ways in which it can 
be overcome in reconceptualising the plurinational model to the Sri Lankan case, in 
Chapter 4. But what is important to underscore at this stage is that ethnic nationalisms 
and forms of the nation, whatever their historical provenance, today co-exist within 
and alongside the Westphalian nation-state – the standard state form of the 
contemporary world order – and are more often than not articulated through its 
doctrines (such as sovereignty and self-determination) and institutional processes 
(such as periodic elections). While this is true of both majority and minority 
nationalisms, it is  the  former’s  access  to  and  control  of  the  state  through  democratic  
majoritarianism that has prevented the accommodation of sub-state demands for 
recognition, representation and autonomy, and led to conflict and instability. The 
relationship between ethnic-communal models of nationalism and the purported 
ethnic neutrality of the Westphalian nation-state therefore requires very close 
consideration in approaching the constitutional accommodation of national pluralism 
in non-Western contexts.3 
 
The   ‘ethnic-communal’   characterisation   is   often   accompanied   by   pejorative  
connotations of primordialism, essentialism and anti-modernity, not to mention 
“…the   implicit   and   often   self-serving Eurocentric bias of [the civic-ethnic] 
                                                                                                                                           
(Oxford: OUP): p.15; see also J. Pfaff-Czarnecka & D. Rajasingham-Senanayake,  ‘Introduction’ in J. 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, D. Rajasingham-Senanayake, A. Nandy & E.T. Gomez (1999) Ethnic Futures: The 
State and Identity Politics in Asia (New Delhi: Sage): Ch.1. 
2 Tierney (2006): pp.32-44. 
3 J.  Coakley,  ‘National Majorities in New States: Managing the Challenge of Diversity’  in  A-G. 
Gagnon, A. Lecours & G. Nootens (Eds.) (2011) Contemporary Majority Nationalism (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s  UP):  Ch.5. 
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dichotomy.” 4  Such disapproving views on ethno-cultural nationalism, however, 
derive from a particular theoretical approach to nationalism – the  ‘classical  modernist’  
account – one of the defining features of which is the conjoining of nationality, 
nationhood and national identity, apparently divested of ethnicity and reconstructed 
as equal citizenship, exclusively with the modern state.5 The critique of this account 
of state-centred nationalism, derived from the sociological and politico-philosophical 
discourse   of   ‘liberal   nationalism,’ 6  is a central concern of plurinational 
constitutionalism. Notwithstanding the civic-societal commitments of liberal 
nationalism itself, which distinguishes it discursively from the dominant models of 
nationalisms in places like Sri Lanka, these critical perspectives – in particular the 
Westphalian nation-state’s  pretence  to  cultural  neutrality,  its  hegemonic  potential  and  
monistic promotion of homogeneity – are particularly useful as analytical tools in 
reviewing the Sri Lankan case study in terms of deconstructing the homogeneous 
nation-state and in suggesting the theoretical and constitutional alternatives to its 
hegemonic potential in multinational polities.   
 
Moreover, moving beyond the assumption that the modernist vision of the nation-
state is the only possible path to progress allows a less prejudiced engagement with 
the pre-modern, or what is in Sri Lanka the same thing, pre-British history.7 This 
enables the consideration of historico-anthropological accounts of collective identity 
centred around ritual or performative practices that provide not only better 
                                                 
4 Ibid: p.103; M. Ottaway (1994) Democratization and Ethnic Nationalism: African and Eastern 
European Experiences (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council); M. Ignatieff (1998) The 
Warrior’s  Honor:  Ethnic  War  and  the  Modern  Conscience (New York: Metropolitan Books); M. 
Walzer,  ‘The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem’  in  R.  Beiner  (Ed.)  (1999)  Theorizing 
Nationalism (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press); T.M.  Franck,  ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the 
Right to Secession’  in  C.  Brölmann, R. Lefeber & M. Zieck (Eds.) (1993) Peoples and Minorities in 
International Law (Dordrecht:  Martinus  Nijhoff).  See  also,  S.  Tierney,  ‘The Search for a New 
Normativity: Thomas Franck, Post-modern Neo-tribalism and the Law of Self-Determination’  (2002)  
European Journal of International Law 13: pp.941-960 at pp.951-955.  
5 A.D. Smith (1998) Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations 
and Nationalism (London: Routledge): Ch.1. 
6 Tierney (2006): p.20, fn.1. 
7 The  term  ‘pre-modern’  is  used  very  loosely  here  to  denote the ancient Sinhala-Buddhist monarchical 
state that survived until 1815, and contrast it with the colonial modernity that was introduced by the 
British, especially following the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 1833. The independent Tamil-Hindu 
kingdom, which came into being in the early thirteenth century, had succumbed to European 
colonialism earlier, in the early seventeenth century. For a specialist consideration of the issues of 
periodisation, see R.A.L.H. Gunawardana (2008) Periodization in Sri Lankan History: Some 
Reflections with Special Emphasis on the Development of the State (Colombo: SSA). 
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explanations of the contemporary dynamics of multiple nationalisms, but also the 
rediscovery of syncretic traditions of pluralism embedded in pre-colonial state forms 
that could potentially suggest new avenues for constitutional theorising in the 
present. 8  The pre-colonial   ‘galactic’   state   has   been   discussed   in   some   detail   in  
Chapter 2, and I take up these issues again in Chapter 4.   
 
Western Modernity versus Colonial Modernity  
 
The second ground of divergence between the Western and non-Western contexts of 
national pluralism concerns the historical differences in the formation of the modern 
state in these experiences. Modernity in the West is the product of organic historical 
evolution, with causally connected social, cultural, political, economic, and ideational 
developments providing a necessary bridge of progression between pre-modern forms 
of political organisation and modern nation-statehood. 9  This holds true whether 
modernity has arrived through a revolutionary event or through an evolutionary 
process of change.10 Moreover, in the West, this trajectory of political development 
has continued throughout the modern era, with the Western state and its characteristic 
elements such as sovereignty being continuously redefined in tandem with the 
creation of parallel sites of political power and legal authority both above and below 
the state.11  
 
By contrast, as I discuss at more length in Chapters 4 and 5, the institutional 
apparatus and constitutional doctrines of the modern state and its underlying physical 
infrastructure were transplanted in societies colonised by the West, which therefore 
                                                 
8 M. Roberts (2004a) Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period: 1590s to 1815 (Colombo: 
Vijitha Yapa): Ch.4.  
9 D. Ziblatt (2008) Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of 
Federalism (Princeton: Princeton UP): Ch.1; J.  Loughlin,  ‘The Transformation of the Democratic 
State in Western Europe’  in  F.  Requejo  &  M.  Caminal  (Eds.)  (2011)  Political Liberalism and 
Plurinational Democracies (London: Routledge): Ch.4 at pp.44-47; M.  Roberts,  ‘Ethnic Conflict in 
Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Perspectives: Barriers to Accommodation’  (1978)  Modern Asian Studies 
12(3): pp.353-376. 
10 M. Loughlin (2013) The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP): Ch.1; see 
also  C.  Bell,  ‘Constitutional Transitions: The Peculiarities of the British Constitution and the Politics 
of Comparison’  (2014)  Public Law, July 2014: pp.446-471. 
11 Loughlin (2011); M. Keating (2001) Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-
Sovereignty Era (Oxford: OUP): Chs.3,5; Tierney (2006): pp.82-91. 
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have not in most cases experienced similar processes of historical evolution before or 
after colonialism. 12  Neither the colonial state nor its post-colonial successors 
notionally anchored in modernist concepts of national identity have as a result 
enjoyed much social resonance or commanded spontaneous patrimonial loyalty 
among the people (or peoples) whose collective selfhood the nation-state is supposed 
to reflect. Some pluralistic states have managed to build upon what were merely 
‘nations  of  intent’13 on the cusp of independence into socially resonant conceptions of 
state-national identity better than others, but many others have failed.14 Nevertheless, 
classical modernist orthodoxies with regard to homogeneous and unitary conceptions 
of nation and state have proved to be remarkably resilient in the post-colonial world. 
In conditions of national pluralism, they have served to provide a convenient set of 
doctrinal and institutional devices for the advancement of the vested interests of 
majority or otherwise dominant groups, and to conceal ethnic majoritarian or 
hegemonic projects of state-capture behind a veneer of positivist constitutional 
universalism, to the disadvantage and exclusion of minority nations. In the resulting 
conflicts over minority national self-government within and sometimes outwith the 
state,   the  dominant  group’s  commitment  to   the  ‘hard  state’  has  only  become further 
entrenched.15 
 
Substantive Constitutional Democracy versus Procedural Majoritarian Democracy 
 
Thirdly, whereas the political practices and constitutional cultures of Western 
plurinational states are normatively defined by liberal democracy, the substantive 
content of the political and electoral cultures of non-Western multinational polities 
tend to be informed by ideological discourses that are far removed from liberalism. 
                                                 
12 P.  Saravanamuttu,  ‘Governance and Plural Societies: Sri Lanka’  in  P.R.  Chari  (Ed.)  (2001)  Security 
and Governance in South Asia (Colombo: RCSS): Ch.6 at pp.130-4;;  P.  Saravanamuttu,  ‘Sri Lanka: 
The Intractability of Ethnic Conflict’  in  J.  Darby  &  R.  MacGinty  (Eds.)  (2000)  The Management of 
Peace Processes (London: Macmillan): pp.195-227; P. Robb (2007) Empire, Identity and India: 
Liberalism, Modernity and the Nation (Oxford: OUP).  
13 R.  Rotberg,  ‘African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion?’  (1967)  Journal of Modern African 
Studies IV: pp.33-46. 
14 J.  Bertrand  &  A.  Laliberté,  ‘Introduction’  and  ‘Conclusion’  in  J.  Bertrand  &  A.  Laliberté  (Eds.)  
(2010) Multination States in Asia: Accommodation of Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press): Chs.1,11; A. Stepan, J.J. Linz & Y. Yadav (2011) Crafting State-Nations: India and other 
Multinational Democracies (Baltimore: JHU Press): Ch.1. 
15 These issues are further discussed in Section 3.3, infra. 
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This is certainly the case in Sri Lanka. The deep-seated commitment to political 
liberalism provides not only a shared language of political intercourse and 
constitutional negotiation between the state and sub-state levels in the West, but also 
a liberal tendency to accommodation and compromise. Indeed, the limits placed on 
the sphere of the state in liberal societies promote civic life, including sub-state 
nation-building and social interrelationships between multiple national societies 
within the plurinational state, in ways that have not been possible in many Asian and 
African contexts where the state is omnipresent in civil society.  
 
In Sri Lanka, while traditions of procedural democracy are deeply entrenched, the 
substantive content of democracy is informed by dominant discourses of ethnic 
nationalism, as seen in Chapter 2, or by state-led and state-oriented ideologies such as 
socialist developmentalism in the 1970s, both of which run counter to liberal 
democratic approaches to the constitutional management of pluralism, as well as to 
the tolerance of non-state civic or ethnic social spaces. 16  The   ‘overdeveloped’ 17 
character of the state politicises many forms of ethnic relations that would otherwise 
belong in the private sphere (e.g., ownership and transfer of land), at the same time as 
the underdeveloped nature of a civic statal nation transforms even routine processes 
of normal politics into fraught negotiations between ethnicised collectivisms.  
 
While these issues await more extensive treatment in Chapter 5, it is perhaps useful to 
make clear what I mean when I make a distinction between  ‘liberal  democracy’  and  
‘democracy’  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis.  Circumventing  major  normative  debates  
within democratic theory, I proceed on a purely functional basis. If   ‘democracy’   is  
understood as purely a procedural concept, and without the substantive limitations on 
majoritarianism through the rule of law, civil and political rights, and crucially, the 
                                                 
16 G.  Gunatilleke,  N.  Tiruchelvam  &  R.  Coomaraswamy,  ‘Violence and Development in Sri Lanka: 
Conceptual Issues’  in  G.  Gunatilleke,  N.  Tiruchelvam  &  R.  Coomaraswamy  (Eds.)  (1983)  Ethical 
Dilemmas of Development in Asia (Lexington,  Mass.:  Lexington  Books):  Ch.5;;  J.  Uyangoda,  ‘The 
United Front Regime of 1970 and the Post-Colonial State of Sri Lanka’  in  T.  Jayatilaka  (Ed.)  (2010)  
Sirimavo:  Honouring  the  World’s  First  Woman  Prime  Minister (Colombo: The Bandaranaike 
Museum Committee): pp.31-34; R. Edrisinha, M. Gomez, V.T. Thamilmaran & A. Welikala (Eds.) 
(2008) Power Sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents, 1926-2008 (Colombo: 
CPA): Ch.11 at pp.235-36. 




principle of minority protection (all values associated with liberalism), it would seem 
that the kind of constitutional arguments to be canvassed in this thesis would fall on 
rather infertile ground. This therefore cannot be the definition of democracy on which 
we can proceed. However, notwithstanding the provenance of human rights norms 
and  the  rule  of  law  in  classical  liberalism,  ‘democracy’  is  now  widely  understood  and  
reflected in United Nations and international practice as unequivocally including 
these substantive values, without at the same time invoking the ideological adjective 
‘liberal’. 18  It is this wider conception of democracy that I deploy for analytical, 
evaluative and prescriptive purposes in relation to the Sri Lankan state. Moreover, 
when we speak of liberalism in relation to the current theoretical work in 
plurinational constitutionalism, the reference is also to the reliance   on   ‘liberal  
nationalist’  accounts  of  national   identity   and   to   the  normative  arguments  conducted  
within liberal theory regarding the obligations of the host state in the context of 
national pluralism. One of the aims of this thesis is to widen the theoretical scope of 
these debates, to include performative models of nationalism, and democratic states 




The response of states to national pluralism dictated by these divergent circumstances 
in Asia and Africa have demonstrated a vehemence of resistance to sub-state national 
constitutional claims that is largely absent in the experience of Western plurinational 
polities.19 As a multinational post-colonial Asian state, the foregoing observations are 
                                                 
18 See for e.g., E. Newman & R. Rich (Eds.) (2004) The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between 
Ideals and Reality (Tokyo: UN Univ. Press); G. Fox & B. Roth (Eds.) (2000) Democratic 
Governance and International Law (Cambridge:  CUP);;  T.  Franck,  ‘The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance’  (1992)  American Journal of International Law 86(1): p.46; S. Marks 
(2000) The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology 
(Oxford: OUP).  
19 For e.g., in the UK, even before devolution formally established a sub-state level of governance, 
sub-state national identities were informally acknowledged in a variety of political and constitutional 
practices,  enabled  by  ‘a federalism  of  political  management’:  N.  MacCormick  (1999)  Questioning 
Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: OUP): p.60, and a 
governmental  culture  of  ‘pragmatic  empiricism’:  C.  McCrudden,  ‘Northern Ireland and the British 
Constitution’  in  J.  Jowell  &  D.  Oliver  (Eds.)  (1994)  The Changing Constitution (3rd Ed.) (Oxford: 
OUP): p.326. Compared to other Western plurinational state, the UK is also adept at the ‘politics  of  
symbols’:  Keating  (2001):  pp.104-7.  See  also,  N.  Walker,  ‘Beyond the Unitary Conception of the 
United Kingdom Constitution’  (2000)  Public Law: p.384.  
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amply borne out in the experience of our case study, as we have seen in the 
discussion in preceding chapters. To be sure, even in the West, plurinational 
reinterpretations of dominant constitutional self-understandings have begun to be 
taken seriously only recently. However, it is now increasingly clear that the 
explanatory, normative and substantive constitutional arguments presented by sub-
state nations are becoming instantiated within the mainstream theory and practice of 
liberal constitutionalism in Western plurinational democracies. It seems a worthwhile 
enquiry therefore to explore how the benefits of plurinational constitutional ideas 
could be gained for non-Western contexts as well through the case study of Sri 
Lanka; and conversely, what insights the extension of the model beyond the liberal 
paradigm would yield for its existing theoretical foundations. Key among the latter 
set of issues would be questions like whether the plurinational state can accommodate 
performative, as opposed to liberal nationalist, models of nationalism, and whether it 
is capable of taking root in cultures of democracy that do not necessarily derive their 
substantive content from political liberalism.  
 
The rest of this chapter comprises two substantive sections, and a final section of 
concluding remarks. In the next section, a brief outline is given of the liberal 
plurinational state as a theoretical construct. There is a sophisticated and growing 
literature on this constitutional model and there is neither the need nor the space to 
regurgitate that work here, but it is useful to have an articulation of its main concerns 
and rationales at the outset. In the following section, some of the specific critiques 
and claims associated with plurinational constitutionalism against traditional 
constitutional law and liberal democracy are explored in greater detail, in the context 
of how these constitutional propositions can be understood in application to the Sri 
Lankan case. The main purpose of this chapter therefore is to lay the introductory 
groundwork for the chapters to follow, which deal with the issues of historiography 
and pre-modernist state form, nationalism, democracy and the state, and finally the 
prescriptive constitutional principles necessitated by a plurinational approach to the 





2. The Liberal Plurinational State: A Brief Introduction to its 
Theoretical and Constitutional Concerns 
 
The   term   ‘plurinational   state’   derives   from   the   Spanish   (Castilian)   estado 
plurinacional and has been adopted by English-language  theorists  “…in  place  of  the  
more  common  ‘multinational’  in  order  to  express  the  plurality  not  merely  of  nations,  
but conceptions   of   nationality   itself.” 20  Likewise, Ferran Requejo and Miquel 
Caminal explain the preference in the following terms:  
 
“First,   ‘plurinational’   refers   both   to   the   descriptive   side   of   the   concept   (the  
fact that some democracies include different national societies within them) 
and to the prescriptive side of the concept (the claim for recognition and 
protection of plurination in liberal democracies – national pluralism in this 
case).  In  contrast,  the  term  ‘multinational’  only  covers  the  descriptive  side  of  
the  concept.”21 
 
The plurinational state is thus a model of constitutional accommodation in contexts in 
which there is more than one claim to nationhood, and more than one conception of 
nationality – ‘national  pluralism’  – within the territorial space of an existing state. It 
is distinct from other models of pluralism such as the discourses of multiculturalism 
and minority rights, or the movement of decentralisation or regionalism in liberal 
democracies, in terms of the political phenomenon that it seeks constitutionally to 
accommodate. The sub-state challenge is one conceived in specifically nationalist 
terms, which is to say that assertions of socio-cultural identity, or perhaps more 
accurately in relation to contemporary liberal democratic sub-state nations, assertions 
of societal distinctiveness, 22  grounded   on   a   ‘historically   contextualised   territorial  
space,’   carry   with   them   normative   claims   to   recognition, autonomy and 
representation   that   are   more   fundamental   than   claims   made   by   ‘minority’   groups.  
These stateless nations seek the expression of those claims in the constitutional order 
                                                 
20 Keating (2001): p.x. 
21 F. Requejo  &  M.  Caminal,  ‘Liberal Democracies, National Pluralism and Federalism’  in  Requejo  
& Caminal (2011): Ch.1 at p.1, n.1. 
22 Tierney (2006): p.4, fn.6. 
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and governing arrangements of the state within which they are located, and indeed 
within broader supra-state or international orders.  
 
Although sub-state nations in plurinational states actively address themselves to legal 
and political orders over and above the state, they are distinct from traditional 
separatist models of nationalism in that there is no necessary teleological 
commitment to secession per se, understood in orthodox international law terms. As 
in the democratic process of statal polities, political discourse within sub-state 
national  spaces  also  feature  the  full  range  of  opinions  which  may  include  ‘separatist’  
voices, but despite the fact that the language of independence features heavily in the 
rhetoric of sub-state nationalist political actors, what is important to note is that in 
terms of concrete constitutional claims, their agendas are more complex and nuanced 
than a straightforward commitment to secession and the establishment of a separate 
sovereign state.23 More generally, as Michael Keating has put it, 
 
“The   argument   is   that   we   cannot   resolve   nationality   issues   by   giving   each  
nation its own state, but neither can, nor should we seek to eliminate 
nationality as a basis for political order. Rather we need to embrace the 
concept of plural nationalities and shape political practices and institutions 
accordingly.”24 
 
Theorists of the plurinational state thus widely agree that sub-state nationalism is not 
synonymous   with   separatism   and,   that   “…from   a   legal   perspective,   constitutional  
accommodation within the plurinational state in fact raises more interesting questions 
on   the  nature  of  sovereignty  and   its  potential   for  divisibility   than  does  secession.”25 
Plurinational state theory accordingly contains both descriptive and normative 
dimensions, and in both senses it presents fundamental critiques of the theoretical 
foundations, political practices and constitutional arrangements of the nation-state, 
which is traditionally conceived in unitary terms with regard to national identity even 
                                                 
23 Ibid: pp.92-98. 
24 Keating (2001): p.ix. 
25 Tierney (2006): pp.18-19, 18, fn.52. 
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in federal states.26 In suggesting alternatives to dominant narratives of constitutional 
self-understanding in the light of those critiques, plurinational constitutionalism is 
concerned with both the reinterpretation of existing constitutional arrangements of the 
host   state   as   well   as   in   their   structural   amendment,   in   appreciation   of   the   state’s  
plurinational character.  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the plurinational state has so far been theorised  as  a  ‘discrete  
category   of   multilevel   polity’   within   the   discourse   of   liberal   democratic  
constitutionalism, from the empirical experience of national pluralism in Western 
industrialised states, chiefly Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom, in relation to the 
sub-state nations of Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland. It is worth noting again that 
these host states are all politically stable, established democracies with entrenched 
liberal political and social traditions, enjoying the highest levels of economic 
development and human security in the world. Having already undergone modernist 
processes of state-formation, nation-building, and constitutional development, they 
are   also   entering   upon   a   phase   of   ‘late   sovereignty’ 27  in which governmental 
functions traditionally associated exclusively with the nation-state are being 
transferred to alternative sites of authority,28 at the same time that governance is 
becoming a more diffuse and less statist activity.29 Again as noted before, the sub-
state nations and nationalisms in these contexts are themselves no less liberal or 
modern than their host states, and the normative and constitutional debates 
engendered by their claims are therefore debates that are conducted within the broad 
frame of liberal democratic constitutional discourse.30  
 
                                                 
26 Although of course there is now a growing body of work on multinational federations and 
federalisms. See e.g., W. Norman (2006) Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-Building, Federalism and 
Secession in the Multinational State (Oxford: OUP); M. Burgess & J. Pinder (Eds.) (2007) 
Multinational Federations (London: Routledge); A-G. Gagnon & J. Tully (Eds.) (2001) 
Multinational Democracies (Cambridge: CUP). 
27 N. Walker,  ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’  (2001)  European  Forum  Discussion  Paper  
(Florence:  EUI).  ‘Late  sovereignty’  or  indeed  ‘post-sovereignty’  (Keating (2001); MacCormick 
(1999)) are particularly relevant for European plurinational states than elsewhere, due to their location 
in the unique context of the supranational legal order of the European Union.  
28 Tierney (2006): pp.83-84. 
29 Loughlin (2011). 
30 Tierney (2006): p.9, Chs.2,3; Keating (2001): pp.vii-ix. 
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Notwithstanding their liberal modernity and constitutionalist character, the political 
aspirations, discursive traditions and constitutional agendas of the sub-state nations of 
Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia are deeply rooted in their own national 
historiographies as well as the constitutional history of their host states, and 
theoretical generalisations must have careful regard to these differences of historical 
sociology in understanding each of these plurinational states in its own terms. 
Bearing those specificities in mind, however, recent theorisations of the plurinational 
state have attempted to articulate the common issues of disaffection these sub-state 
nations entertain with regard to their respective host states, and the common 
normative and politico-constitutional claims they present for the better 
accommodation of their aspirations. Thus in contributions to this debate from the 
perspective of constitutional theory, there are a number of specific conceptual, 
normative and institutional propositions that could be identified as defining attributes 
of the current theory concerning the plurinational state. In the next section, the main 
theses of plurinational constitutionalism as they relate to the Sri Lankan case are 
identified and discussed in the context of that case. 
 
 
3. Sri Lanka: Plurinational Constitutionalism as a New Framework of 
Constitutional Self-Understanding 
 
Constitutional reform debates generated by the competing claims of ethnic pluralism 
stretch back to the early 1900s in Sri Lanka, if not before. In the absence of a viable 
constitutional settlement, it is a debate that continues unabated today. Given the 
longevity of the constitutional problems of pluralism, it is unsurprising that there is a 
sizable social science literature on these issues as well as a long, if largely 
unsuccessful, record of policy, legislative and constitutional responses. 31  While 
                                                 
31 Edrisinha et al (2008); J.C. Holt (Ed.) (2011) The Sri Lanka Reader: History, Culture, Politics 
(Durham, NC: Duke UP); M. Roberts (1994) Exploring Confrontation (Chur: Harwood Academic 
Publishers); M. Roberts (Ed.) (1997) Sri Lanka: Collective Identities Revisited, Vols.1, 2 (Colombo: 
Marga Institute); S.J. Tambiah (1986) Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of 
Democracy (Chicago: Chicago UP); C. Amaratunga (Ed.) (1989) Ideas for Constitutional Reform 
(Colombo: CLD); A.J. Wilson (1988) The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict 
(London: Hurst); N. Wickramasinghe (2006) Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested 
Identities (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa).  
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constitutional concepts such as federalism and devolution, and international law 
doctrines such as self-determination feature prominently in this discourse together 
with the resilience of the unitary state, the combination of critical theses, normative 
precepts and constitutional principles that constitute plurinational constitutionalism 
has never been applied in relation to Sri Lanka as either an analytical or prescriptive 
framework. Indeed, the analytical characterisation of the Sri Lankan polity as one of 
‘national   pluralism’   is   itself   a   novel   suggestion,   even   though   historians,  
anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists and constitutional lawyers have been 
addressing ethno-national conflict, and its causes, dynamics and potential solutions, 
for decades. 32 The application of the analytical and prescriptive precepts of 
plurinational constitutionalism therefore represents a fresh approach to constitutional 
self-understanding in Sri Lanka, both with regard to a clearer understanding of the 
sociological character of the polity, and as a potential normative and constitutional 
framework that affords a more sustainable foundation for the Sri Lankan state.  
 
 
3.1 The Role and Relevance of History and Historiography 
 
The most visible aspect of sub-state nations and nationalisms in Scotland, Catalonia 
and Quebec is the demand necessitated by their presence for a major renegotiation of 
the existing constitutional arrangements of their respective host states, particularly in 
relation to institutional frameworks of territorial autonomy, and at a more abstract 
level, the location of sovereignty within the state. In addition to these normative and 
constitutional clams, the reality of national pluralism as represented in a plurality of 
historiographical narratives also pose a number of major theoretical challenges to 
conventional assumptions, categories and analytical approaches of liberal 
constitutionalism apropos the classical modernist nation-state.  
 
                                                 
32 N. DeVotta (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in 
Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford UP); D. Rampton (2010) Deeper Hegemony: The Populist Politics of 
Sinhala Nationalist Discontent and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in Sri Lanka, PhD Thesis, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (unpublished); S.J. Tambiah (1992) 
Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: Chicago UP); J. 
Spencer (Ed.) (1990) Sri Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict (London: Routledge); Roberts (1978). 
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The historiographies advanced by sub-state nations attest not merely to the existence 
of alternative accounts of the constitutional history of the host state, but also that that 
history, to the extent it is relied upon as the foundation for dominant visions of 
constitutional self-understanding in the host state, is essentially contested. Sub-state 
national historiographies stress the founding moment of the host state by the coming 
together of different national groups, but in which they retained their sense of discrete 
identity according to constitutional terms agreed at the time. Statal depictions of the 
same events would typically render such agreements as acts of incorporation into a 
broader state national society.33 In this rendition of state constitutional history, the 
incorporation or consolidation of previously independent or autonomous national 
groups into a (singular) new nation merely describes the process of modern state-
formation in common with most Western polities in the early modern era. The sub-
state nationalist account by contrast repudiates the purported assimilation of their 
national, societal and institutional distinctiveness by the process of state-formation, 
and emphasises the notion of union at the fundament of the entire constitutional 
edifice of the host state. The idea that the plurinational statal polity is constitutionally 
a  ‘union  state’34 is both a factual assertion with regard to state-formation as well as a 
more abstract conceptual assertion with regard to constitutional self-understanding, 
requiring the host state to respect, on a continuing basis, sub-state national identities, 
the plurinational character of the statal polity, specific commitments with regard to 
the preservation of sub-state societal distinctiveness and institutional structures, and 
the  recognition  of  these  conditions  in  the  state’s  constitution  and  political  practices.   
 
One of the major empirical distinctions between Western plurinational union states, 
exemplified in the Anglo-Scottish Union within the United Kingdom, and the Sri 
Lankan case is that there is no comparable, historically ascertainable, precise 
‘constitutional  moment’35 of a union between the historic nations in Sri Lanka. Tamil 
                                                 
33 For an illuminating account of this with regard to the parliamentary union of Scotland and England 
in the formation of Great Britain, see MacCormick (1999): Ch.4. 
34 S.  Rokkan  &  D.  Urwin,  ‘Introduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe’  in  S.  Rokkan  &  
D. Urwin (Eds.) (1982) The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism 
(London: Sage): p.11; see also Walker (2000): p.398; N. Walker (2010) Final Appellate Jurisdiction 
in the Scottish Legal System (Edinburgh: The Scottish Government): Ch.2; Tierney (2006): p.7, fn.16. 




claims to a withdrawal of their sovereign consent to be part of the Sri Lankan state 
occur when Tamil nationalism decides upon a secessionist course in the 1970s 
following decades of discrimination and the failure to secure regional autonomy 
within Sri Lanka.36 This claim is sustained by the argument that the independent 
Tamil Kingdom of Jaffna was only extinguished following its conquest by the first of 
the European colonial powers, the Portuguese. When the British eventually granted 
independence in 1948, it is claimed, the Tamils were not only not consulted as to 
their constitutional future, but were left to the mercy of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority 
within the framework of a unitary state.37 There is, however, a degree of presentist 
casuistry involved in this type of argument, and it is in any case the  kind  of  ‘otiose’  
historical debate that plurinational constitutionalists try to avoid.38 Nonetheless, the 
absence of a historical union moment ought not in itself be fatal to the Tamil claim to 
autonomy, given that Tamils of the north and east have reaffirmed the nationality 
claim  in  every  election  since  1956  (i.e.,  virtually  for   the  whole  of  Sri  Lanka’s  post-
colonial existence). We need rather to anchor plurinational accommodation on a 
different basis, taking into account the different historical dynamics of state-
formation in Sri Lanka.  
 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the majority Sinhala-Buddhist nation locates itself in a 
position of primacy with regard to both the national identity and the constitutional 
form of the state on the strength of a powerfully resonant mytho-historical narrative. 
This has denuded even the limited inclusionary potential of the modernist conception 
of the ideal post-colonial nation-state. 39  The permeation of the nation-state by 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism entails not merely the subordination of minority groups, 
but also a specific tendency to regard the Tamil view of themselves as a distinct 
nation, with an equally long and celebrated history in the island, as a fundamental 
threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sri Lankan state. In the 
development of Tamil nationalism, on the other hand, Tamils considered themselves 
as  one  of  the  ‘founding  peoples’  of  the  island  polity  together  with  the  Sinhalese,  and  
                                                 
36 See Chapter 2, supra.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Tierney (2006): p.111. 
39 See Section 3.2, infra. 
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they desired this self-perception to be institutionalised in the post-colonial state in the 
form of a federal union.40 For Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism committed to the post-
independence re-establishment of the pre-colonial Sinhala-Buddhist state, to 
countenance such a bi-national conception of the island polity was and is completely 
impossible.  
 
This unbridgeable divergence in the constitutional worldviews of the two historic 
ethnic   nations   on   the   island   encapsulates   the   essence   of   Sri   Lanka’s   dilemma   of  
national pluralism. The inability to plausibly reposition constitutional discourse on a 
more   ‘pactist’   footing   was   demonstrated   recently   in   the   failure   of   a   major  
constitutional reform effort. In one of the proposals published during constitutional 
reform attempts of  President  Chandrika  Bandaranaike  Kumaratunga’s  administration 
(1995-2000), the   ‘Draft Provisions of the Constitution containing the Proposals of 
the Government of Sri Lanka relating to Devolution of Power’  of  1996,  envisaged in 
Article 1 that ‘The   Republic   of   Sri   Lanka   shall   be   an   indissoluble   Union   of  
Regions.’41 The intent here was to pluralise the institutional form of the state (Union 
of Regions) whilst assuaging Sinhalese fears by foreclosing any prospect of legal 
secession by a region in the union (indissoluble Union of Regions), and for the same 
reason,   to   avoid   reference   to   the   term   ‘federal’   while   providing   for   a   federal-type 
distribution of powers between the centre and regions. The drafters also clearly 
avoided  any   reference   to  ‘nations,’  preferring   instead   the  more   innocuous  ‘regions.’  
Despite these conscious concessions to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist sentiment, this 
formulation attracted such vehement opposition that the Kumaratunga government 
withdrew it in subsequent drafts in 1997 and 2000.42 The failure of this elite-level 
attempt (amongst many others) to rearticulate the fundamental character of the state 
in acknowledgement of its plural polity – attempted reform from above, resisted 
successfully from below, as it were – illustrates not merely the limitations of that 
particular strategy and method of constitutional reform, but for us more importantly, 
                                                 
40 See Chapter 2, supra, and Chapter 4, infra. 
41 According to Neelan Tiruchelvam, one of the drafters of the various constitutional schemes of this 
period, the formulation drew on the language of the Indian and Australian constitutions: N. 
Tiruchelvam,  ‘The Politics of Federalism and Diversity in Sri Lanka’  in  Y.  Ghai  (Ed.)  (2000)  
Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States (Cambridge: CUP): 
Ch.9 at p.211. 
42 Edrisinha et at (2008): Ch.23. 
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the need for a deeper and more theoretically sophisticated approach to the problem in 
Sri Lanka.43  
 
Thus while the Tamil sub-state national challenge continues to assert its claims, 
rendering the Sri Lankan polity one of plural nations as a matter of socio-political fact, 
it has thus far proved impossible to constitutionally reflect that reality in terms of a 
union state norm in the structure of the state. At the theoretical level, this resistance to 
accommodation raises two sets of questions. It necessitates, firstly, a need to 
investigate the historiographical foundations of Sinhala-Buddhist   nationalism’s  
commitment to the unitary state, the constitutional postulate that obstructs the 
accommodation of sub-state nationalism because of its conceptual dictates of 
centralisation and homogeneity. These questions were explored in detail in Chapter 2. 
Secondly, it demands a deeper theoretical defence of plurinational accommodation 
that goes beyond the institutional tinkering that has so far characterised Sri Lankan 
constitutional reform attempts (illustrated in the example above). This raises 
significant normative questions for democracy, in the context of the tension between 
a dominant democratic culture of permanent, institutionalised, ethnicised, 
majoritarianism (‘ethnocracy’44) against the reality of a polity that is bi-national in 
sociological fact. I address these questions in Chapter 5.  
 
The historicist conception of the state as a plurinational union is also salient in 
distinguishing between other models of territorial autonomy prevalent in Western 
liberal democracies, including classical federalism, and the wide variety of 
institutional innovations  falling  within  the  broad  ambit  of  ‘regionalism.’45 History is 
                                                 
43 D.  Rampton  &  A.  Welikala,  ‘The Politics of the South’  in  J.  Goodhand  &  B.  Klem  (Eds.) (2005) Sri 
Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessment, 2000 – 2005, Vol. III (Colombo: The Asia Foundation). 
44 J.  Uyangoda,  ‘Travails of State Reform in the Context of Protracted Civil War in Sri Lanka’  in  K.  
Stokke & J. Uyangoda (Eds.) (2011) Liberal Peace in Question: Politics of State and Market Reform 
in Sri Lanka (London: Anthem Press): Ch.2, esp. pp.52-58. Uyangoda draws upon the conceptual 
model  of  ethnocracy  developed  by  Oren  Yiftachel:  O.  Yiftachel,  ‘“Ethnocracy”  and  its  Discontents:  
Minorities, Protests and the Israeli Polity’  (2000)  Critical Inquiry 26(4): pp.725-56; O. Yiftachel 
(2006) Ethnocracy: Law and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia, PA: Univ. of 
Pennsylvania Press). See also A. Harel-Shalev (2010) The Challenge of Sustaining Democracy in 
Deeply Divided Societies: Citizenship, Rights and Ethnic Conflicts in India and Israel (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books). 
45 J. Hopkins (2002) Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the 
European Union (London: Cavendish). 
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therefore drawn upon in the argument sub-state nations advance that the plurinational 
union   state   is   a   ‘discrete   category   of   multilevel   polity’   that   does   not   fit   within  
standard categories of traditional constitutional law, especially the binary 
classification of constitutions as either unitary or federal. This is not only because of 
the uniqueness of the formative dynamics of each plurinational union, but also 
because, reflecting those dynamics, the asymmetrical and heterogeneous nature of its 
institutional structures and political practices make the constitution and constitutional 
culture of the plurinational state a complex conceptual category of its own, in relation 
to which the formalist classifications of unitary and federal make little sense. While 
in formal terms the conventional constitutional self-description of host states may be 
as unitary (as in the UK) or federal (as in Canada), in practice the plurinational state 
functions in ways that bear little resemblance to the conceptual dictates of those 
categories.46  
 
The distinction with federalism as a form of territorial autonomy in particular is that 
classical conceptions of federalism offer no scope for the accommodation of plural 
nationhood or nationality; that is, federalism might offer extensive territorial 
autonomy (self-rule) and representation in central institutions (shared-rule) for sub-
state nations, but its accommodative capacity does not usually extend to the 
recognition of plural national identities. 47  In other words, federalist autonomy, 
representation and recognition of territorial sub-state collective identities are wholly 
dependent on the monistic notion that nationhood and national identity are 
exclusively associated with the state: there can be only one demos within the state, 
and not plural demoi as in the plurinational conception.48 This is also the reason why 
the constitutional claims of sub-state nations are fundamentally different from other 
non-federal models of regionalism and decentralisation. The rationales for 
regionalism and decentralisation in democratic states are numerous, stretching from 
                                                 
46 Keating  (2001):  Ch.4;;  see  also  S.  Ratnapala,  ‘Foedus  Pacificum:  A Response to Ethnic Regionalism 
within Nation States’  in  G.  Appleby,  N.  Aroney  &  T.  John  (Eds.)  (2012)  The Future of Australian 
Federalism (Cambridge: CUP): pp.250-271.  
47 Norman (2006): Chs.3,4,5,6.  See  also  S.  Tierney,  ‘Beyond the Ontological Question: Liberal 
Nationalism and the Task of Constitution-Building’  (2008)  European Law Journal 14(1): pp.128-37. 
48 Or  to  use  a  term  familiar  to  students  of  the  European  Union,  ‘demoicracy’:  see  for e.g., F. Cheneval 
&  F.  Schimmelfennig,  ‘The Case for Demoicracy in the EU’  (2011)  EUSA  Conference,  Boston  
(unpublished);;  K.  Nicolaidis,  ‘Germany as Europe: How the Constitutional Court Unwittingly 
Embraced EU Demoicracy’  (2011)  International Journal of Constitutional Law 9(3): pp.786-92.  
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administrative efficiency to the accommodation of regional collective identity. 49 
However, the devolution involved in these models of territorial autonomy is never 
intended to question the monistic conception of the statal demos as a single, unitary 
entity.  
 
Beyond its secessionist strain, the constitutional default position of Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalism has been the demand for federal autonomy for the north and east, 
sometimes enhanced by an asymmetric claim to the right to internal self-
determination for the Tamil nation. However, the relationship between federalism and 
the claim to nationhood is not entirely clear in Tamil nationalist political postures, to 
the extent that in its institutionalist focus on federalism, it has failed to engage at a 
more general level with the conceptual issues arising from its sub-state national claim, 
including issues such as the monistic demos reflected in the nation-state paradigm. In 
terms  of   the  ‘reactive’  or  ‘defensive’  account  offered  by   leading  exegetists   it   seems  
implicit that Tamil nationalism would have been willing to participate in a post-
colonial – and now post-war – ‘Sri Lankan’   nation-building process provided 
regional autonomy was granted. This seems to suggest a trade off between the claim 
to nationhood and federalism, or in other words, an eschewal of a plurinational 
conception of the state in exchange for a commitment to a unitary demos, provided 
federal autonomy is granted. However, in these same accounts, it is far from clear if 
this is a settled position within Tamil nationalist politics, which then leaves a number 
of theoretical questions unanswered as to the precise relationship between the Tamil 
nation and the Sri Lankan state.50 In this regard particularly, the introduction of 
plurinational theory into the Sri Lankan case has heuristic value in clarifying our 
analytical understanding of national pluralism, and thereby clearing the ground for 
more focussed normative and structural discussions with regard to its constitutional 
accommodation.51        
 
                                                 
49 Tierney (2006): p.8. 
50 The criticism of mainstream, federalist Tamil political parties by Tamil separatist voices has often 
taken  the  form  of  questioning  the  former’s  political  commitment  to  the  idea  of  a  distinct  Tamil nation, 
if mere devolutionary federalism as opposed to more fundamental forms of constitutional 
accommodation suffices to satisfy Tamil aspirations to nationhood.   
51 These issues will be taken up in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, infra. 
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History is also important to sub-state  nationalisms,   in  Michael  Keating’s  phrase,   as  
‘the   usable   past’:   sub-state nations are similar to statal nations in instrumentally 
employing historical tropes in the construction of national unity.52 We have seen this 
dynamic at work in the development of Tamil nationalism (and indeed Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism), albeit in the different model of nationalism featuring in Sri 
Lanka,   the   ‘usable   past’   is   one   element   in   the   politicisation   of   ethnicity   that  
constitutes the process of nationalist politics and nation-formation.53 In the model of 
nationalism that applies to the two Sri Lankan nationalisms under consideration here, 
ethnicity is central in both cultural and political terms, in the past as well as the 
present,   whereas   in   the  West,   individuals’   cultural   identity   including   ethnicity   and  
religion  were  ‘privatised’  in  the  historical  process  of  liberal  modernity, at the level of 
state as well as sub-state nations.54   
 
This classificatory separation between the ethnic and civic forms of nationalism has 
been one of the ways in which theorists of plurinational democracy such as Keating 
and Tierney have expressly restricted the scope of comparative application of their 
articulations of the plurinational state.55 There is of course an important normative 
dimension to this qualification inasmuch as the civic-societal conception of the nation 
is central to the open, pluralistic and individually negotiable character of national 
identities that are at the heart of the plurinational ideal. 56  But what of sub-state 
nations, like the Sri Lankan Tamils, that define themselves primarily or mainly in 
ethnic   terms,   but   are   also   “territorially concentrated, potentially self-governing and 
possessed of the desire for specific  constitutional   recognition”?57 And what of post-
colonial states, like Sri Lanka, where nation and state building in the modern era has 
followed a trajectory that does not conform to the classical modernist model (or 
indeed   to   subsequent   ‘post-sovereign’   developments),   and   where   the   culture   and  
                                                 
52 Keating (2001): Ch.1; Tierney (2006): p.6, fn.14. 
53 Chapter 2, supra; Rampton (2010).  
54 Although of course the notion of the modern nation-state’s  cultural  neutrality  is  challenged  by  liberal  
nationalists: see Section 3.2, infra.  See  also  S.  Ratnapala,  ‘Cultural Diversity and Liberal Society: A 
Case for Reprivatizing Culture’  (2005)  The Independent Review Vol.X, No.2: pp.249-71. 
55 Tierney (2006): Ch.1; Keating (2001): pp.vi-x. 
56 Tierney (2006): pp.52-58. 
57 Ibid: p.4. 
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processes of democratic politics are not animated ideologically by political 
liberalism? I attempt answers to these questions in Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
 
3.2 The Monistic Demos Thesis and Host State Societal Dominance 
 
A key ground of normative critique presented by plurinational constitutionalism 
against the Westphalian nation-state  model,  and  political  liberalism’s  attachment  to  it,  
concerns   the  ‘monistic  demos thesis,’   i.e.,   the  notion   that  operates  as  both  postulate  
and  presumption   that   the   ‘nation’   is   synonymous  with   the   ‘state.’58 In other words, 
sub-state nations, by their very existence, challenge the monistic presupposition of 
traditional  liberalism,  or  ‘Liberalism  I’  in  Charles  Taylor’s  term,  that  there  is,  or  can  
only be, one demos within the state.59 A   related   contention   is   that   regarding   ‘host  
state  societal  dominance,’  i.e.,  that  the  conceptualisation  of  the  nation  in  both  unitary  
terms and in exclusive association with the state not only prevents the fullest 
constitutional recognition of national pluralism, but also serves to privilege in effect a 
majority or otherwise dominant cultural identity to the disadvantage of minority 
nations, and in violation of fundamental principles that traditional liberalism claims to 
defend. Thus, implicit in this challenge is the question as to whether liberalism as an 
ideology has the theoretical and normative capacity to respond to the realities of 
national pluralism.  
 
The plurinational critique of traditional liberalism points to the imperviousness with 
which the existence of plural demoi within the state and their attendant claims have 
been treated, rendering sub-state   nations   ‘voiceless   and   faceless.’60 As Requejo has 
noted in relation to the work of liberal scholars such as Rawls and Habermas, national 
pluralism   “…is   a   question   that   is   not   so   much   badly   resolved   as   completely  
                                                 
58 ‘Monistic  demos thesis’  is  Tierney’s  term,  as is  ‘host  state  societal  dominance:  Tierney  (2007):  
pp.230, 128-9.  
59 C.  Taylor,  ‘The Politics of Recognition’  in  A.  Gutman  (Ed.)  (1992)  Multiculturalism and the 
Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton UP): pp.25-73. 
60 Tierney (2006): p.10. 
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unaddressed  by  the  premises,  concepts  and  normative  questions  of  these  theorists.”61 
Tierney goes further in pointing out a more insidious consequence of this deficiency 
in traditional liberalism:  
 
“What  is  particularly  debilitating  about  this  gap  in  the  conceptual  precepts  of  
traditional liberal theory is that it has led to a false assumption that the liberal 
democratic state is neutral in cultural and societal terms. Whereas in reality, as 
Requejo  contends,  ‘practically  speaking,  all  liberal  democracies  have  acted  as  
nationalising  agencies  for  specific  cultural  particularisms.’  Accordingly,  many  
of the normative prescriptions emerging from traditional liberal accounts have 
been  built  on  epistemological  error,  or  at  least,  imprecision.”62 
 
The assumption that the collective identificatory function of nationhood rests only 
with the statal nation denies the possibility of multiple conceptions of national 
identity that are commonly held by citizens of plurinational polities. By the failure to 
acknowledge this important dimension of individual identity and autonomy, 
traditional liberalism denies to individual members of sub-state national societies, for 
whom the sub-state societal space is an important means of political self-expression, 
such cardinal commitments of political liberalism as choice, equality and justice. On 
the other hand, the pretence that the state national society is a culturally neutral entity 
held together by purely normative values (sometimes accompanied by the disparaging 
implication that sub-state nations are not similarly modern, progressive and inclusive 
entities63), hides the reality that the statal identity is more often than not associated 
with a dominant societal or cultural influence within the plurinational polity. The 
failure to apprehend the homogenising consequences of this approach, it is contended 
by plurinationalist critics, signals a failure on the part of traditional liberal theory to 
fulfil fundamental liberal precepts.  
 
                                                 
61 F. Requejo,  ‘Introduction’  in  F.  Requejo  (Ed.)  (2001)  Democracy and National Pluralism (London: 
Routledge):  p.4.  See  also  Kymlicka’s  observations  on  Rawls  and  Dworkin  in  Kymlicka  (1995):  p.128. 
62 Tierney (2006): p.10. 
63 See M.  Canovan,  ‘Sleeping Dogs, Prowling Cats and Soaring Doves: Three Paradoxes in the 
Political Theory of Nationhood’  (2001)  Political Studies 49: pp.203-15 at pp.204-6. 
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Since the early 1990s, these conceptual inadequacies of traditional liberalism have 
given rise to a new school of liberal political philosophy that seeks to re-posit the 
normative values of liberalism in ways that take proper account of both nationalism 
and national pluralism. According to Wayne Norman, this theoretical work 
addressing the interstice between nationalism and traditional liberalism came in two 
waves,   the   first   of  which   attempted   to   prove   “…that it was not impossible to be a 
liberal   and   a   nationalist   at   the   same   time”   and   the   second   employed   the   insights  
produced by that work in proceeding to critique traditional liberalism and its 
conception of the state according to the monistic demos thesis. 64  The   ‘liberal  
nationalist’  theoretical  accounts  developed  in  this  second  wave  in  particular  constitute  
the   body   of   political   philosophy   that   Charles   Taylor   has   termed   ‘Liberalism   II’,  
associated prominently with the work of Taylor himself and Will Kymlicka, among 
others.65  
 
In contrast to the complacency, if not hostility, with regard to nationalism that marks 
traditional accounts, the methodology of liberal nationalist theorists places emphasis 
on the   sociological   reality   of   nationalism   in,   and   as   a   form   of,   ‘normal   politics.’66 
They recognise that sub-state nations are deliberative spaces for the participation in 
civic and political life, which play an essential intermediary role in the relationship 
between the citizen and the state. The sub-state nation rather than the statal national 
society is often the foremost vehicle of identity and agency for the individual member 
of the sub-state   nation,   and   accordingly,   “…the   value   which   he   finds   in   the  
democratic process can be more fully explained by appreciating these ties, and by 
understanding the preferences felt by this citizen for the location of his right of 
individual self-determination within the broader condition of collective self-
determination for his primary demos.”67 The most important analytical proposition of 
liberal nationalist theory therefore is that the meaningful realisation of liberal 
democratic commitments in respect of citizenship in plurinational polities requires the 
                                                 
64 Norman (2006): pp.1-9.  
65 Taylor (1992); Kymlicka (1995): Tierney (2006): pp.52-58. 
66 Keating (2001): p.viii. 
67 Tierney (2006): p.11. 
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empirical reality of national pluralism to be fully acknowledged and accommodated 
in normative and institutional terms by the plurinational state.   
 
While at the normative level these debates are conducted within liberalism in the 
current literature on the plurinational state, the broader argument about the monistic 
demos is obviously of much wider application, directed as it is to the Westphalian 
nation-state, which constitutes the foundational politico-legal concept of the 
contemporary global order. While paying pharisaic homage to the nation-state, 
particularly as a means of denying sub-state national claims, however, post-colonial 
states like Sri Lanka have actively undermined its principles. Westphalian concepts 
like the unified demos – in their original European conception, the apogee of 
progressive modernity – have as noted before been pervasively ethnicised in Sri 
Lankan constitutional  practice,  thereby  negating  the  model’s  normative  dictates,  and  
distorting its emancipatory potential as a conceptual conduit for social progress from 
ethnic hierarchy to civic equality as envisaged in the early literature on post-colonial 
nation-building.68 More particularly, ethnicisation of the nation-state has instituted a 
‘host   state   ethnic dominance,’   with   pernicious   consequences   for non-majority 
ethnicities and nations.  
 
In the decolonisation era, Westphalian doctrines, endorsed for example by the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence embodied in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 
1954,69 were seized upon by weak emerging states as safeguards as much against 
internal ethno-territorial challenges as against external interference. In this internal 
sense, Westphalian principles have become ideological tools of majoritarianism in 
ethnically plural societies such as Sri Lanka, and part of the state’s   armoury   in   the  
rejection of minority claims to territorial accommodation and pluralism.70 There is 
therefore an instrumental explanation based on majoritarian realpolitik for the 
                                                 
68 Smith (1998): Ch.1. 
69 Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and 
India, Peking, 29th April 1954, United Nations Treaty Series (1958) Vol.299, No.4307: p.57. It is 
noteworthy that the signatory states  to  this  treaty  are  in  today’s  world,  the  two  rising  global  powers  of  
Asia, with the political and economic capacity to influence the content of international law and 
practice, as discussed below.     
70 H. Rae (2002) State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples (Cambridge: CUP): Ch.1; 
Section 3.3, infra.  
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flourishing of the Westphalian model in the post-colonial world, notwithstanding the 
hollowing out of much of its liberal normative content. 71  But as Radhika 
Coomaraswamy has observed, the anti-pluralist political and constitutional practices 
engendered   by   the   homogenising   ‘pathology’ 72  of the nation-state also have a 
paradoxically  ‘progressive’  intent, arising from the unique political circumstances of 
the post-colonial condition.  
 
“For  many,  pluralism  is…an  aspect  of  ‘obscurantism’  – a strategy often used 
by colonialism to maintain outdated laws and customs which prevented the 
development of modern political, social and economic values. This scepticism 
has often led to centralisation of power in the hands of the state which then 
appropriates  responsibility  for  the  rapid  development  of  society.”73  
 
However, as she also points out,   “This   attitude   toward   pluralism   has…been  
questioned…especially  in  the  light  of  the  ethnic  factor  which  has  become  a  dominant  
factor in Asian politics, and also because the centralisation of state power has often 
led   to   repression   and   intolerance.”74 In these ways, we see that while the practical 
ramifications of the monistic demos thesis and the issue of host state societal 
dominance work out in empirically different ways as between the West and the post-
colonial world, the core conceptual problem of the homogenising and hegemonic 
potential of the Westphalian model remains the same. 75  The analytical insights 
offered by plurinational constitutionalists in respect of these two issues therefore are 
clearly applicable to any other multinational polity where the conceptual and 
                                                 
71 Cf.  A.H.Y.  Chen,  ‘Pathways of Western Liberal Constitutional Development in Asia: A 
Comparative Study of Five Major Nations’  (2010)  International Journal of Constitutional Law 8(4): 
pp.849-84. See also Bertrand and Laliberté (2010): pp.274-83; Stepan, Linz & Yadav (2011): Ch.1. 
72 Rae (2002): Ch.1. 
73 R.  Coomaraswamy,  ‘Toward an Engaged Judiciary’  in  N.  Tiruchelvam  &  R.  Coomaraswamy  (Eds.)  
(1987) The Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies (London: Frances Pinter): Ch.1 at p.6. 
74 Ibid. While it maybe that the accommodation of ethnic pluralism is a major concern within liberal 
opinion in Sri Lanka, it must be stressed that such approaches are still firmly located within the model 
of mono-national citizenship, contra the  plurinational  thesis,  as  implicit  in  Coomaraswamy’s  
observation. The subscription to this model is widespread and goes beyond constitutional elites to 
other sites of cultural production, such as language studies: H.  Rambukwella,  ‘Reconciling What? 
History, Realism and the Problem of an Inclusive Sri Lankan Identity’  (2012)  ICES  Research  Paper  
No.3 (Colombo: ICES). For illustrative examples of the grip of this model on the liberal imagination, 
see the multidisciplinary essays in G. Moonesinghe (Ed.) (2010) Nation Building: Priorities for 
Sustainability and Inclusivity (Colombo: Shramaya).  
75 Rae (2002). 
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normative dictates of the Westphalian nation-state stand in opposition to the 
constitutional demands of national pluralism.  
 
With regard to the Sri Lankan case, there are three points to note in this respect. 
Firstly, certain aspects of plurinational theory need not detain us, chief among them 
the   debate   concerning   the   issue   of   the   host   state’s   cultural   neutrality.   As   amply  
demonstrated in the consideration of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and its 
relationship with the Sri Lankan state in Chapter 2, empirical reality relieves us of the 
need to address this issue in theoretical terms, and we can safely proceed on the basis 
that the Sri Lankan state is not culturally neutral.  
 
Secondly, in addition to the analytical critique of the monistic demos thesis, a 
particularly useful normative issue that requires greater exploration in the Sri Lankan 
context concerns the liberal nationalist contentions with regard to multiple nationality 
allegiances that citizens belonging to sub-state nations might have, and specifically 
the understanding of the sub-state  nation  as   the  ‘primary  demos’   through  which   the  
individual   citizen’s   relationship   with   the   plurinational   host   state   is   mediated.76 As 
noted, in the current work this has been theorised within a liberal democratic 
framework of individual autonomy and collective self-determination. In the Sri 
Lankan case, the added complexity is the tension between democratic choice theory 
and the ethnic basis of state- and sub-state national identity. These matters are 
addressed in Chapters 4 and 6. 
 
Thirdly, as suggested consistently throughout this thesis and confirmed by 
Coomaraswamy above and others,77 there is a need for constitutional theory and 
practice to treat ethnicity seriously as well as positively, and not as some unpalatable 
primordial remnant that will, hopefully, disappear with the march of time and 
progress. This is not so much an exercise in making a virtue out of necessity as a 
realistic  appraisal  of  the  ‘social  context’  of  constitutional  law  in  Sri  Lanka, in which 
                                                 
76 That  which  Kymlicka  terms  the  ‘context  of  choice’:  Kymlicka  (1995):  Ch.5;;  S.  Tierney,  ‘Rights 
versus Democracy? The Bill of Rights on Plurinational States’  in  Harvey & A. Schwartz (2012): Ch.1 
at pp.16-17. 
77 E.g., Urmila Phadnis, cited in Coomaraswamy (1987): p.6. 
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the resilience of ethnicity as the primary referent of identity materialises from the 
total collapse of modernist expectations with regard to post-colonial nation-building 
in the six decades since independence. In any case, as I strongly argue in Chapter 4, 
while the civic-ethnic dichotomy in relation to nations and nationalisms performs a 
useful analytical purpose at a basic level, taking it too far can be shown to be 
theoretically problematic, empirically untenable, and of little use for constitutionalism 
in practice.  In other words, there seems to be little point in the dogmatic adherence to 
modernist shibboleths about the civic nation in the face of the ethnic reality, and at 
the theoretical level, the plurinational critique has shown us how the conceptually 
problematic nature of the modernist nation-state in the context of national pluralism is 
both deeper and more general than the specificities of the Sri Lankan case.78   
 
 
3.3 Relational  Sovereignty  and  the  ‘Hard  State’ 
 
A related conceptual and methodological challenge of plurinational state theory to 
traditional   constitutionalism   inheres   in   its   critique   of   ‘narrow   positivism’   on   two  
fronts:  narrow  positivism’s  promotion  of  a  unitary  model  of  legal  sovereignty,  and  its  
‘artificial   distinction’   between   legal   and   political   sovereignty,   both   of   which   it   is  
argued,   “…fit   nicely  with,   and   share   the   same   flaws   as,   unitary   conceptions   of   the  
demos.”79 The result is the close association of narrow positivism with unitary models 
of constitutional form fundamentally at odds with sub-state national aspirations 
within multinational polities. Moreover, as Tierney states, 
 
“This   notion   of   sovereignty   has   been   a   central   ideological   device   in  
legitimising the dominant, monistic vision with which the plurinational state 
has masqueraded as the nation of the state … The dominant society has been 
able to crystallise political power at the centre of the state, presenting it in the 
                                                 
78 See  also  Tierney’s  critical  comment  on  both  the  linear  teleology  and  the  normative  immutability  of  
its values that constitute the central assumptions of traditional liberalism with regard to the modern 
nation-state: Tierney (2006): p.58.  
79 Ibid: p.13. 
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guise of legal legitimacy, and hence entrenching political hegemony in 
purportedly objective  constitutional  form.”80  
 
One of the issues with narrow positivism is that it purports to offer a self-contained 
account of pristine legal sovereignty that is divorced (indeed, liberated) from politics. 
Although the validity of this claim to political neutrality is heavily disputed,81 taken 
at   face   value,   this   also   means   that   narrow   positivism   is   divorced   from   the   ‘social  
reality’82 of which legal institutions are a part, and from which flow the legitimacy of 
both institutions and power. By contrast to narrow positivism, more sophisticated 
positivist accounts call for a fuller understanding of the relationship between social 
conditions and legal institutions, and especially the relationship between political 
power and legal sovereignty. As Martin Loughlin has argued,  
 
“Sovereignty  is  essentially  an  expression  of  a  political  relationship  and,  from  
a juristic perspective, sovereignty constitutes the essence of the modern 
state…Sovereignty…is  the  name  given  to  express  the  quality  of  the  political  
relationship  that   is  formed  between  the  people  and  the  state…This  relational  
aspect  of  sovereignty  is  highlighted  by  Croce.  ‘In  the  relationship  between  the  
ruler   and   the   ruled’,   he   argues,   ‘sovereignty   belongs   to   neither   but   to   the  
relationship  itself.’”83 
 
Plurinational constitutionalists rely upon this relational conceptualisation of 
sovereignty that stresses the interrelationship between the political and the legal, 
albeit by extending this insight to the plurality of peoples or nations within the 
plurinational state.84 It follows from the application of the relational understanding of 
sovereignty to the reality of multiple national societies within the state that both the 
idea of sovereignty and the legal form of governing institutions must also be 
pluralistic. The challenge of national pluralism to liberal constitutionalism with 
                                                 
80 Ibid: p.16. 
81 Ibid: pp.13-15. 
82 MacCormick (1999): p.106. 
83 M. Loughlin (2003) The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP): p.83, citing B. Croce (1945 [1925]) 
Politics and Morals (Trans. S.J. Castiglione) (New York: Philosophical Library): p.17  
84 Tierney (2006): pp.102-4. 
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regard to the divisibility of sovereignty therefore is to develop the discursive and 
conceptual capacity to provide for plurinational institutional requirements than it has 
traditionally been able to achieve.  
 
Sri Lankan legal discourse is a classic example of its kind.85 A former British colony 
that has inherited the doctrines, concepts, and modes of thinking of nineteenth 
century English public law and jurisprudence of Austin, Bentham, Blackstone, Dicey 
and Maine, the theoretical assumptions of its legal discourse remain fossilised in the 
imperial age. This limits commensurately the parameters of its imagination on central 
constitutional concerns, and the manner in which it understands, defines, and 
responds to issues such as national identity, pluralism, sovereignty, territory, and 
devolution.86 It is important to stress the pervasive nature of this legal discourse, in 
that while its principal beneficiary in politico-constitutional terms has been Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism, it is subscribed to and perpetuated by a much broader spectrum 
of legal and political opinion.  One  of  the  unitary  state’s  most  articulate  and  influential  
defenders was the eminent constitutional lawyer H.L. de Silva, a Christian Sinhalese, 
a secularist and a proponent of individual human rights, but a trenchant opponent of 
ethno-territorial forms of devolution and especially federalism. Criticising the 
devolution proposals of the Kumaratunga government (adverted to earlier), which he 
clearly saw as a precursor to secession and disintegration, he made the following 
argument: 
 
“…in  the  Republic of Sri Lanka sovereignty is declared to be in all the People 
and to be inalienable, which means its enjoyment and operational effects are 
to remain for ever and in perpetuity and in all its plenitude without reduction 
                                                 
85 By  ‘legal  discourse’  is  meant  the  general  assumptions,  concepts  and  categories  that  lawyers use in 
discussions regarding constitutional form, norms and structures, and which constitute the very basis of 
constitutional self-understanding  among  Sri  Lanka’s  constitutional  elites.  The  constitutional  elite  
obviously comprises of lawyers, judges, politicians, civil servants and legal academics, but also, less 
obviously, the media, think tanks and rights pressure groups, and broader social science academia, in 
particular, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and indeed other exegetists of time, space and 
culture such as linguists and cultural critics. All these actors contribute to the formation of 
constitutional culture.  
86 For a critical discussion of the dominance of positivist approaches in the broader social sciences and 
in particular professional  history,  see  M.  Roberts,  ‘Sri Lanka: Intellectual Currents and Conditions in 
the Study of Nationalism’  in  M.  Roberts  (Ed.)  (1997)  Sri Lanka: Collective Identities Revisited 
(Vol.1) (Colombo: Marga Institute): Ch.1, pp.1, 5-9.  
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or diminution. Therefore, through approval at a referendum of the people 
(even though it constitutes a majority or a super majority of all the people in 
the State) one cannot lawfully and voluntarily transfer or otherwise alienate or 
disestablish any part of the sovereign power vested in the people. The people 
cannot validly alienate or deprive themselves or future generations of the 
plenary powers of government that inhere in them as a sovereign body 
through  the  exercise  of  the  franchise  or  at  a  referendum…They  cannot  bring  
about such a tectonic change in the basic structure of the State through the 
referendum process. Since the sovereignty of the people is the ultimate norm 
or the Grundnorm, no organ of the State which exercises power on behalf of 
the people can enter into any legal transaction which contradicts or derogates 
from the plenitude of sovereignty involving its alienation in a significant 
degree (which is prohibited), and all such attempts are legally null and 
void.”87    
 
In this passage we see most if not all of the key elements of Sri Lankan legal 
discourse and its constitutional self-understandings: the monistic conception of the 
nation   (or   ‘the   People’),   the   unitary   and   illimitable   conception   of   sovereignty   (and  
hence of the necessary constitutional form of the state), and the positivist legalism 
that clothes an ideologically particularistic view of the state in an apparently 
politically impartial language of legal legitimacy, objectivity and universalism. With 
regard to assumptions about legal and constitutional order, it is also an archetypical 
representation   of  what   John  Griffiths   described,   critically,   as   the   ‘ideology  of   legal  
centralism.’88   
  
                                                 
87 H.L. de Silva (2008) Sri Lanka a Nation in Conflict: Threats to Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, 
Democratic Governance and Peace (Colombo: Visidunu Prakasakayo): p.74. For the judicial 
expression of a broadly similar viewpoint, see the dissenting opinion of Wanasundera, J., In Re the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill (1987) 2 SLR 312 at 333-
383, discussed in: R. Coomaraswamy (1997) Ideology and the Constitution: Essays on Constitutional 
Jurisprudence (New Delhi: Konark): Ch.7; A. Welikala,  ‘The Sri Lankan Conception of the Unitary 
State: Theory, Practice and Historiography’  in  A.  Amarasingham  &  D.  Bass  (Eds.)  (forthcoming,  
2014) Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects (London: Hurst & Co.).  




This dominant orthodoxy is sustained by several factors: the instrumental uses of its 
postulates to majoritarian nationalists in control of the state, as we have seen in 
Chapter 2; the English legal positivism that is transmitted and reproduced even today 
through methods and modes of legal education that are largely unchanged from the 
colonial era; 89  the consequent absence of a vibrant intellectual environment of 
critique and contestation in the development of the colonial legal inheritance; and in 
this regard especially, the failure noted before on the part of Tamil nationalism to 
challenge at a fundamental level the theoretical and normative dimensions of the 
hegemonic state, as opposed to its institutional form.90  
 
In the context of the different social, political and economic considerations that 
challenge  the  law’s  enterprise  in  a  post-colonial, plural, and developing society, this 
legal discourse has been found fundamentally wanting, especially in the highest 
deliberative site of its contestation and enunciation: constitutional adjudication. 91 
Liberal critiques have pointed to the general failure of the judiciary from the 
inception of the post-colonial state to fulfil its immanent counter-majoritarian 
function in the protection of minorities and pluralism, and the role of the dominant 
narrow positivist legal discourse in this failure in the form of judicial restraint and 
deference, and in restrictive, literalist interpretative approaches to constitutional 
text.92  
 
                                                 
89 N.  Tiruchelvam,  ‘Legal Education and Development: The Role of the Law Teacher in Sri Lanka’  
(1977) Marga Quarterly Journal 4(2): p.89. 
90 Ironically, Tamil nationalists, especially those favouring a separate state, seem themselves to be 
profoundly influenced by the same tradition of positivism and English constitutional law as the Sri 
Lankan legal discourse. In what was the only concrete expression of its constitutional vision for an 
autonomous entity in the north and east (widely seen by critics such as H.L. de Silva as a prototype for 
a future independent state of Tamil Eelam), the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal of 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) reflected a highly centralised institutional structure 
exercising  ‘plenary  power.’  Thus  secessionist  Tamil  nationalism,  and  especially  that  represented  by  the  
LTTE, was a mirror image of its rival in respect of a centralising, authoritarian and hegemonic 
approach  to  constitutional  form.  See  R.  Edrisinha  &  A.  Welikala,  ‘The Interim Self Governing 
Authority Proposals: A Federalist Critique’  in  R.  Edrisinha  &  A.  Welikala  (Eds.)  (2008)  Essays on 
Federalism in Sri Lanka (Colombo: CPA): Ch.XII; De Silva (2008): Ch.24. See also Edrisinha et al 
(2008): Ch.29. 
91 N.  Tiruchelvam,  ‘Introduction’  in  Tiruchelvam  &  Coomaraswamy  (1987):  p.ix. 
92 R.  Edrisinha,  ‘Sri Lanka: Constitutions without Constitutionalism, A Tale of Three and a Half 
Constitutions’  in  Edrisinha  &  Welikala  (2008):  Ch.I;;  N.  Tiruchelvam,  ‘Introduction’;;  H.L.  de  Silva,  
‘Pluralism and the Judiciary in Sri Lanka’;;  R.  Coomaraswamy,  ‘The Sri Lankan Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights: A Realist Critique’  in  Tiruchelvam  &  Coomaraswamy (1987): p.ix; Ch.5; Ch.6. 
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However, while these pluralist critiques do attack the statist and majoritarian 
conception of sovereignty, they do not include the radical interrogation of the 
Westphalian nation-state and its conception of unitary sovereignty found in 
plurinational constitutionalism. Indeed, the general tenor of these arguments are 
directed at a reaffirmation of the original modernist values of the nation-state, based 
on popular sovereignty, de-ethnicised, right-based citizenship and minority protecting 
constitutional  democracy,  or  to  locate  them  in  Griffiths’  typology,  within the ideology 
of legal centralism. Thus in these accounts, because pluralistic modernity is 
conceived in terms of an ultimately unitary legal order, 93  popular sovereignty is 
conceived in relation to a monistic demos, fundamental rights as attaching to the 
individual citizen, and constitutional minority protections, while attentive to ethnicity, 
firmly anchored in the conventional paradigm of competitive democracy.94 This is 
unsurprising,   given   what   we   have   seen   of   traditional   liberalism’s   theoretical  
predispositions as revealed via the plurinational critique, and for the same reasons, its 
theoretical inadequacies in the task of constitutionally accommodating the sub-state 
national challenge. Therefore in addressing national pluralism from a specifically 
plurinational constitutional perspective, and in redefining the concepts of sovereignty 
and constitutional order in a less absolutist   and   towards   a   more   ‘relational’  
understanding in appreciation of national pluralism, the foregoing discussion 
underscores the formidable discursive challenge posed by the entrenched monist and 
unitary assumptions – implicit in even critical liberal positions in respect of the Sri 
Lankan state – of Sri Lankan legal discourse.95   
 
This, however, affords us an opportunity to interrogate the unitary conception not 
only of the constitutional form of the state, but also of the broader legal order. 
Juxtaposed alongside the ideology of legal centralism in public law is the empirical 
                                                 
93 Griffiths (1986): pp.2-8. 
94 S.  Choudhry,  ‘Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional 
Design in Divided Societies’  in  S.  Choudhry  (Ed.)  (2008)  Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: 
Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford: OUP): Ch.1 at p.16. For the competitive paradigm of 
democracy and the theory of cross-cutting cleavages, see: S.M. Lipset (1960) Political Man: The 
Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday); A. Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: 
A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale UP).  
95 I will return to the issue of sovereignty when I address the normative questions for democracy in 
Chapter 5, and in more concrete terms in Chapter 6, when I consider the constitutional principles of 
recognition, representation and autonomy. 
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reality   of   legal   pluralism   in   private   law   (albeit   in   the   ‘weak   sense’   as   defined   by  
Griffiths96) where eight different systems – Kandyan law, Buddhist law, Hindu law, 
Tesawalamai law, Islamic law, Mukkuvar law, Roman-Dutch law and English law – 
interrelate and govern transactions in diverse ways.97 Thus from this empirical legal 
pluralism we are in a position to demonstrate that the dominant representation of the 
legal   order   as   “a   single, unified and exclusive hierarchical normative ordering 
depending   from   the   power   of   the   state”98 to be at best an ideological claim, rather 
than the representation of an absolute truth. This analytical insight in turn enables the 
development, analogously to private law, of pluralistic norms for substantive 
constitutional law and constitutional form in response to national pluralism.99  
 
Statist conceptions of sovereignty are also relevant for another distinction between 
the Western plurinational states and Sri Lanka, and which reflects a further challenge 
in the transposition of plurinational constitutionalism into the latter case. As we have 
seen,  the  contemporary  Western  (especially  the  European)  state  is  in  a  ‘late  sovereign’  
state of development, with the state no longer representing the exclusive font of 
political power and legal authority within its territorial borders or outside them. 
While the sub-state national challenge is common to both experiences, the historical 
movement which has seen the retreat of the state in certain key sectoral jurisdictions, 
and certainly its cession of authority to a supra-state constitutional order such as the 
European Union, is nowhere to be seen in the Sri Lankan and South Asian context. 
On  the  contrary,  with  the  state’s  military  defeat  of  sub-state secessionist militancy, an 
even  more   rigid  conception  of   the  ‘hard  state’   is  being  entrenched,100 a process that 
has  been  catalysed  by  three  salient  factors.  Firstly,  the  government’s  mobilisation  of  
popular support for the final war effort involved an intensive invocation of the martial 
tropes of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist historiography, embodied in particular in the 
                                                 
96 Griffiths (1986): p.8. 
97 L.J.M. Cooray (1992) An Introduction to the Legal System of Sri Lanka (2nd Rev. Ed.) (Colombo: 
Lake House): Chs.I,IV.  
98 Griffiths (1986): p.4. 
99 These arguments will be further developed in Chapter 6. 
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Dutugemunu legend.101 In providing historiographical validity and continuity to the 
triumph of the Sinhala-Buddhist state over Tamil subversion, this has incentivised 
populist majoritarian support   for   the   state’s   resistance   to   pluralistic   reforms. 102 
Secondly, the military strategy of the government in the final stages of the war 
entailed a massive expansion of the defence establishment which, rather than 
reduction after the war, is becoming increasingly institutionalised.103 The peacetime 
‘normalisation   of   the   exception’   has   seen   the   wartime   ‘national   security   state’  
continue in the form of creeping militarisation of civil life, especially in the Tamil 
north.104  
 
Thirdly, the Sri Lankan state is increasingly associated with a foreign policy 
orientation that prioritises its relationships with states of the global south/east in 
general and with the ascendant China in particular.105 While the genesis of this policy 
orientation  lies  in  Sri  Lanka’s  role  as  a  founder-state of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), it has been facilitated by the assistance it received from these states during 
the war, in contradistinction to Western states, which in raising international concern 
with regard to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, were 
seen to be obstructing the war effort. The significance of these developments for us is 
that   the   Sri   Lankan   state’s   alignment   with   non-Western states have the effect of 
validating  the  ‘Eastphalian’  reaffirmation  of  the  hard  state,  the  concomitant  rejection  
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(Colombo: CHRD); International Crisis Group (2012) Sri  Lanka’s  North  II:  Rebuilding  under  the  
Military, Asia Report No.220, 16th March 2012.  
105 D.  Lewis,  ‘The  Failure  of  a  Liberal  Peace:  Sri  Lanka’s  Counter-Insurgency in Global Perspective’  
(2010) Conflict, Security and Development 10(5): pp.647-71. 
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of the ‘Western’   conception   of   the   international   order,   and   with   it,   rights-based 
approaches to the settlement of sub-state claims.106  
 
While these developments could be seen, rightly, as factors militating against any 
political acceptance for plurinational constitutionalism in Sri Lanka, as I have noted 
in Chapter 1, political traction is not my concern. In the context of the potential for 
conflict that remains inherent in the unresolved sub-state national question, my 
concern with the Sri Lankan dimension of this thesis lies in the theoretical and 
constitutional issues that require attention if and when a more accommodative 
environment eventuates.   
 
 
3.4 The Disaggregation of Nation and State 
 
It can thus be seen that the contemporary questions of constitutional theory engaged 
by the reality of national pluralism in certain Western constitutional democracies, and 
by attendant liberal nationalist discourses, are based on a coherent set of 
historiographical, normative and politico-constitutional claims, which present 
normative challenges to traditional liberalism, and both conceptual and substantive 
challenges to traditional constitutionalism. Taken together, they represent a major 
critique and call for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the Westphalian 
conception of the sovereign nation-state, in terms of its internal constitutional norms 
and structures, and as the established politico-legal and territorial unit of international 
order. From the perspective of constitutional law and theory, the essence of the 
plurinational  challenge  may  be  summarised  in  Tierney’s  words  as  follows: 
 
“…central   to   the   challenge   presented   by      sub-state national societies to the 
host state is a call for the disaggregation   of   the   terms   ‘state’   and   ‘nation’;;  
                                                 
106 For  the  idea  of  ‘Eastphalia,’  see:  D.P.  Fidler,  ‘Eastphalia Emerging? Asia, International Law and 
Global Governance’  (2010)  Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 17(1): pp.1-12; T. Ginsburg, 
‘Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia’  (2010)  Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 17(1): 
pp.27-45. These exploratory and predictive essays envisage more sanguine results for international law 
from the rise of the Eastphalian regime than what is demonstrated in respect of pluralism in Sri Lanka 
through its reaffirmation of Westphalian state sovereignty and non-intervention.    
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those  who  adhere   to   the   traditional  conceptualisation  of   the   ‘nation-state’  as  
one politico-constitutional territory encapsulating a unitary national society 
are charged with the task of reconceiving the plurinational state in 
appreciation  of  its  essential  societal  plurality.”107   
 
From the analytical characterisation of the Sri Lankan polity as one of national 
pluralism that is proposed in this thesis, and the normative and structural questions 
that attend such a characterisation, it is also this radical proposition with regard to the 
nation-state that I make in regard to the Sri Lankan case. While the scholarly work in 
relation to the Western plurinational state demonstrates that this is a theoretically 
viable constitutional proposition, and thus liberates us from the constraints of 
Westphalian orthodoxies in the accommodation of sub-state nationalism, the 
comparative application of the plurinational state model to the empirically distinct Sri 
Lankan case requires in some respects a different approach to the normative 
consequences that are intended to flow from the disaggregation of nation and state. 
 
Central to this proposition in Western plurinational constitutionalism is the historical 
re-conceptualisation of the plurinational polity as a union state, on the basis of which 
further claims are made for the recognition, representation and autonomy of sub-state 
nations constituting the union on a footing of equality. The same methodological 
concern with historiography has taken us in Sri Lanka into the pre-colonial era and 
the dominant state form that prevailed then. As noted in Chapter 2, there is much that 
is promising in that cosmo-topographical model in helping us historically 
contextualise constitutional responses to national pluralism in the present, insofar as it 
stands in vivid contrast to the centralising nostrums of the modern state that Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists and Jacobinist commentators alike advance in refusing to 
accommodate the sub-state challenge. This historical exploration however has taken 
us to an ontology of the state that is fundamentally different to that of the West. The 
contractarian ideal at the heart of the union state is anchored in Enlightenment 
rationalism, whereas the pluralist potential of the pre-colonial state form derives from 
the principles of Indic cosmology. While this provided for an extraordinarily 
                                                 
107 Tierney (2006): p.5. 
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heterogeneous conception of society, the political order was also governed by 
principles of hierarchy and encompassment that maintained cohesion. As it will be 
argued in Chapter 6, in contemporary terms, this appears to demand an emphasis on 
asymmetry as opposed to equality in the constitutional treatment of sub-state nations. 
Asymmetry also features in plurinational theory and has been defended on liberal 
democratic grounds, 108  but here the concern mainly has been with asymmetrical 
constitutional arrangements to reinforce the norm of equality for sub-state nations, 
notwithstanding their numerical minority. As a constitutional principle, asymmetry in 
a plurinational Sri Lanka would assume a different shape and serve a different 
normative purpose: that of democratic pluralism rather than equality, and from a 
historical point of view, in an hierarchical framework of accommodation of majority 
and minority nations rather than a relationship of absolute equality.109     
 
The disaggregation of nation and state also raises the issue as to the form and content 
of  the  statal  ‘Sri  Lankan’  national  identity  within  a  putative  plurinational  dispensation.  
A ‘thin’  conception  of the state-nation would render it a minimalist juristic identity, 
virtually  devoid  of  any  ‘national’  content,  with  the  sub-state level assuming primacy 
over the identificatory and functional roles of nationhood. While a hypothetical 
possibility, the political and historical implausibility of this model suggests that it 
would be a misleading line of theoretical enquiry, not least because of its formal 
likeness with the confederal postures associated with the erstwhile secessionist 
movement.110 In the Western context, illustrated in the debates over the prospective 
Scottish constitutional referendum, the liberal democratic host state is committed in 
policy and principle to respect the democratic wishes of the sub-state nation, either to 
effect a separation or to fundamentally renegotiate the terms of the union. Needless to 
say, such options do not form part of the empirical context on which constitutional 
                                                 
108 Keating  (2001):  Ch.4;;  M.  Keating,  ‘What’s  Wrong  With  Asymmetrical  Government?’  in  H.  Elcock  
& M. Keating (Eds.) (1998) Remaking the Union: Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s 
(London: Frank Cass): pp.195-226;;  F.  Requejo,  ‘Political Liberalism in Multinational States: The 
Legitimacy of Plural and Asymmetrical Federalism’  in  A-G. Gagnon & J. Tully (Eds.) (2001) 
Multinational Democracies (Cambridge: CUP): pp.110-32.  
109 For different reasons, plurinational theorists also critique the uniformising effect of the liberal norm 
of equality (central to international human rights law), urging instead the value of pluralism and 
difference: Tierney (2012): p.32.  
110 E.g., Bates, Wells & Braithwaite (Solicitors) (1995) A Framework for the Constitution of the Union 
of Ceylon, discussed in Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch.20. 
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theory of any solidity can be built in the Sri Lankan case. Arguments for the reform 
of the unitary state are strengthened if they are based on a clear a priori commitment 
to the unity of the state, and to this extent the theoretical limits of sub-state autonomy 
are pre-determined in the Sri Lankan case in a way that they are not in the Western 
contexts.  This  then  suggests  that  we  need  a  more  substantial,  ‘thick’  conception  of  Sri  
Lankan identity to underpin or overarch the radical pluralisation and devolution 
involved in a plurinational constitution. Again drawing from the UK experience, as 
Hugh  Kearney  has  pointed  out,  “…there  has  been  a  ‘British’  history  over  and  above  
our  ‘multi-national’  history”  and  therefore  the  answer  to  the  question,  “four  nations  or  
one?”   is   “four   nations   and   one.”111 A similar approach seems to be apposite in Sri 
Lanka, whereby an   efflorescence   of   ‘Sri   Lankan-ness’ should be encouraged 
alongside a plurinational settlement of the sub-state national question within the 
framework of a united state, wherein the loyalty of constituent nations to the state is 
secured on a basis of consent and persuasion rather than force and imposition. I deal 
with the issues more extensively in Chapter 5. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The foregoing discussion has set out in outline the claims, critiques and arguments 
that form the substance of the constitutional theory of the plurinational state, as they 
relate to the Sri Lanka, while noting the functional similarities and contextual 
differences that must be taken into account in the comparative application of the 
theoretical model to the concrete conditions of the chosen case study. I have 
identified the theoretical challenges to both the model and the case study in this 
exercise. In the following chapters, the arguments introduced here are further 
developed in relation to nationalism, democracy, history, and prescriptive principles.    
 
The exploration of these theoretical issues in the deployment of plurinational ideas is 
conceived as a constitutional strategy of holding, at first instance, the unity of 
existing multinational states together, while affording the fullest possible 
                                                 
111 H.  Kearney,  ‘Four Nations or One?’  in B. Crick (Ed.) (1991) National Identities: The Constitution 
of the United Kingdom (Oxford: Blackwell): p.4. Cf. Tierney (2006): p.164, fn.148. 
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constitutional recognition to the autonomy aspirations of sub-state nations within 
them. It may be that in some cases the creation of separate sovereign states might be 
the only morally just resolution for sub-state national claims (although in most such 
cases, this does not seem a politically feasible option in the contemporary 
‘Eastphalian’  world  order),  but   secession   is   a  category  of  constitutional   response   to  
the sub-state national challenge that goes beyond the plurinational state, and 
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The Western plurinational state, as we have seen in Chapter 3, is premised 
empirically on nationalisms that are civic-societal in nature, and normatively on the 
liberal nationalist re-conceptualisation of the modern nation at both state and sub-
state levels.1 In much of the scholarly literature on plurinational constitutionalism 
therefore, the ethnic-communal model of the nation is excluded from consideration, 
with the implication that these kinds of nationalisms are potentially incompatible 
with the liberal plurinational state. This is perhaps not so much an expression of 
disdain for ethnic nationalisms in preference for some superior form of civic 
nationalism, as a consequence of the realities within which the plurinational state has 
so far been theorised. Several factors have contributed to this sociological 
                                                 
1 S. Tierney (2004) Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford: OUP): p.6, Ch.2; M. 





understanding of sub-state nationalisms in Scotland, Quebec and Catalonia. These 
sub-state nations have undergone a process of nation-building that parallels the 
‘classical modernist’ 2  account of nation-formation in the political history of 
industrialised Western nation-states. Plurinational constitutionalism therefore relies 
upon a tradition of nations and nationalism that is nuanced towards sub-state national 
claims, but one that is nevertheless located within the historical process of 
modernity. 3 Moreover, the normative grounding of both liberal nationalism and 
plurinational constitutionalism in political liberalism, which while attentive to the 
value   and   meaning   of   ‘societal   culture’4 for individual self-expression, rejects the 
fixity of national identity that is suggested by primordialist or perennialist accounts.5 
Plurinationalist theorists have also been concerned to refute charges of ethnic 
revanchism6 or   ‘ethnic   politics’7 directed at sub-state national claims by traditional 
liberals in these established Western democracies, and have therefore emphasised the 
civic and modern nature of these sub-state nations.8  
 
In Sri Lanka by contrast, both competing nationalisms are conceived in ethnic-
communal terms, which rely on ascriptive features such as language, religion and 
ethno-culture both for their conceptual articulation and day-to-day practice. Equally 
importantly, the modern idea of the nation-state was introduced, not by a process of 
organic historical development of pre-existing collective identities and forms of 
social, political, and economic organisation, but by the foreign intervention of British 
colonialism. Consequently, the modern state preceded the modern nation at the 
moment of independence, and the post-colonial process of modernity took shape in 
                                                 
2 A.D. Smith (1998) Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations 
and Nationalism (London: Routledge): Ch.1. 
3 N.  MacCormick,  ‘Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Post-Sovereign State’  (1996)  Political Studies 
44: pp.553-67. 
4 W. Kymlicka (1995) Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: OUP): Ch.5. 
5 Tierney  (2004):  p.36;;  F.  Requejo,  ‘Shadows of the Enlightenment: Refining Pluralism in Liberal 
Democracies’  in  F.  Requejo  &  M.  Caminal  (Eds.)  (2011)  Political Liberalism and Plurinational 
Democracies (London: Routledge): Ch.2.  
6 Tierney  (2004):  Ch.3;;  S.  Tierney,  ‘‘We  the  Peoples’:  Constituent  Power  and Constitutionalism in 
Plurinational States’  in  M.  Loughlin  &  N.  Walker  (Eds.)  (2007)  The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: OUP): pp.232-3.  
7 Keating (2001): p.165. 
8 W.  Kymlicka,  ‘Misunderstanding Nationalism’  in  R.  Beiner  (Ed.)  (1999)  Theorizing Nationalism 




different ways to the West and had to address different challenges.9 While the fact 
remains therefore that frameworks of both nation and state in contemporary global 
usage are not Sri Lankan or Asian concepts, but originally British and European 
ideas,10 the role of imperialism in the formation of nations and nationalisms has been 
overstated by some post-orientalist scholars, just as much as Sinhala-Buddhist and 
Tamil nationalists exaggerate, respectively, pre-colonial unity or fragmentation in the 
furtherance of contemporary political agendas. 11  In each of these approaches 
including that of the post-orientalists, ideology has played a major role in distorting 
sociological observation as well as the construction of descriptive theory. We need 
therefore a less zealous and more nuanced understanding of pre-colonial collective 
consciousness among the Sinhalese and Tamils, as well as of how colonial modernity 
impacted on traditional identities.  
 
The conceptualisation of nations and nationalism I articulate in this chapter 
recognises the centrality of ethnicity to collective consciousness and its political 
salience for constitutional theory. 12  The sociological and historical enquiry with 
regard to nations and nationalism in this thesis accordingly is conceived as a 
consideration of whether such ethnic forms of the nation are amenable to 
constitutional accommodation in conformity with the basic tenets of the plurinational 
model. In other words, we are dealing here not with civic nation-states  and  ‘sub-state 
national   societies’,13 but   with   an   ‘ethnocratic   state’14 and sub-state ethnic nations. 
This enquiry may thus be broken down into several further questions, which are 
                                                 
9 M. Guibernau (1999) Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge:  Polity  Press):  Ch.6;;  P.  Saravanamuttu,  ‘Governance and Plural Societies: Sri Lanka’  in  
P.R. Chari (Ed.) (2001) Security and Governance in South Asia (Colombo: RCSS): Ch.6 at pp.130-
4;;  P.  Saravanamuttu,  ‘Sri Lanka: The Intractability of Ethnic Conflict’  in  J.  Darby  &  R.  MacGinty  
(Eds.) (2000) The Management of Peace Processes (London: Macmillan): pp.195-227. Both 
Guibernau  and  Saravanamuttu  use  ‘state-nation’  as  a  descriptive concept  to  denote  the  state’s  
antecedence to the nation in Third World contexts. This is fundamentally different to the normative 
concept  of  ‘state-nation’  (pace A. Stepan, J.J. Linz & Y. Yadav (2011) Crafting State-Nations: India 
and other Multinational Democracies (Baltimore: JHU Press) that I rely upon in Chapter 5, infra. 
10 A.D. Smith (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell): pp.144-5; M. Loughlin 
(2010) Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP): pp.2,6; Ch.7. 
11 These matters are discussed in Section 3, infra. See also S. Sivasundaram (2013) Islanded: Britain, 
Sri Lanka and the Bounds of an Indian Ocean Colony (Chicago: Chicago UP): Chs.1,8. 
12 J. Hutchinson & A.D. Smith (Eds.) (1996) Ethnicity (Oxford: OUP): pp.3-14 [Introduction] at pp.4-
7. 
13 Tierney (2004): pp.4-5. 




discussed in this and the next two chapters. The discussion in this chapter can be 
broadly divided into two parts. It seeks, firstly, to articulate the sociological and 
historical dimensions of nations and nationalisms in Sri Lanka in the context of more 
general questions of nationalism theory, in particular, the role and relevance of the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy.15 In the light of these discussions, secondly, the chapter sets 
out   the   island’s   condition   of   national   pluralism   within   a   framework   of   political  
analysis drawing upon the theory of performative nationalism, which can in turn 
serve as the basis for applying the plurinational model to the Sri Lankan case.16  
 
Two reservations are entered at the outset. The first is that while I actively engage in 
the theoretical questions of nations and nationalisms as they relate to issues of 
constitutional accommodation in terms of the plurinational ideal, I allow Sinhala-
Buddhist and Tamil nationalists to speak for themselves. I do not therefore intend to 
fill internal gaps and especially theoretical weaknesses of nationalist self-
representations. As already noted in Chapter 2, and will become even clearer in 
Section 3.2 below, in comparison to Western sub-state nationalisms, the 
constitutional claims of Tamil nationalism suffer from a critical absence of theory. 
These weaknesses in part necessitate the recourse to the analytical framework of 
performative nationalism, mentioned above, that I construct in the second part of the 
chapter by drawing upon the work of Charles Tilly.17 Secondly, I make no attempt to 
construct new objective definitions of concepts like ethnicity, nation, and nationalism 
(which are in any case primarily matters for historians, sociologists, and 
philosophers, rather than constitutional lawyers). Rather, a methodology akin to the 
liberal   nationalists’   “non-absolutist   approach   based   on   sociological   observation”18 
will be used to reconstruct national  histories  and  ‘myth-symbol  complexes’19 in order 
to explain the resilience of plural ethnic nations against the (notional) modernising 
and homogenising pressure of post-colonial nation-building, and to suggest ways in 
which such plural ethnic nations might be accommodated within the state 
consistently with requirements of democratic constitutionalism.  
                                                 
15 Sections 2 and 3, infra. 
16 Section 4, infra. 
17 Section 4, infra. 
18 Tierney (2004): p.36. 





In commencing with a discussion of the well-established conceptual dichotomy 
between civic and ethnic models of nationalism, one of my specific aims is to 
investigate whether the suggestion by some that ethnic nationalisms are not only the 
same everywhere, but are also always essentialist, primordial, anti-modern, and 
fundamentally intolerant of difference, is a viable assumption. 20  If ethnic 
nationalisms are no more and no better than this, then there is little scope for a model 
of democratic constitutionalism like the plurinational state to take root in an 
ethnically multinational polity like Sri Lanka. I argue, however, that such an 
undiscriminating view of ethnicity and nationalism is both unhelpful and imprecise. 
To begin with, it pays too much attention to the intolerant rhetoric, manipulative 
historiographies, and violent practices of ethnonationalist political entrepreneurs, and 
in doing so fails to make a cardinal analytical distinction between nations, as 
organisational cultures, and nationalisms, as ideological movements.21 Furthermore, 
approaching these phenomena from the standpoint of the civic-ethnic distinction can 
be analytically misleading because neither primordialists nor instrumentalists offer 
an adequate account of their complexity, of which the two nationalisms in the Sri 
Lankan case are particularly instructive examples. On the one hand, primordialist 
conceptions of ethnic nationalism, while offering a grand explanation for its 
resilience in the modern age, do not in general further our understanding of the 
dynamics of its transformation and reproduction in conditions of modernity. On the 
other hand, instrumentalist accounts of the nation do not account for the complex 
relationship between the modern state and democracy, and national identities 
informed by prior ethnic consciousness, because in this view the nation and 
nationalism are entirely products of the modern age.  
 
                                                 
20 M. Ignatieff (1993) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux); W. Pfaff (1994) The Wrath of Nations (Touchstone); B. Denitch (1994) Ethnic 
Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press); M. Viroli 
(1995) For the Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford OUP); D. 
Schnapper (1998) Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality (London: 
Transactions); G. Gibson (2000) A  Principled  Analysis  of  the  Nisga’a  Treaty, Public Policy Sources 
No.27 (Vancouver: Fraser Institute).   




Determining the theoretical validity of the civic-ethnic dichotomy – and thus its 
practical utility in situations like Sri Lanka – seems to require consideration of three 
matters. Firstly, we must bring to bear the arguments from within political theory 
itself which hold that the idea of a purely rational, contractarian, civic nation, 
founded solely on deliberately chosen (Enlightenment) values and principles, usually 
at a constitutive historical moment, is as specious as any fabricated myth that 
sustains ethnic nationalisms. 22  Secondly, we must consider the ‘ethnosymbolic’  
tradition of political sociology in the study of nationalism that has fundamentally 
questioned both primordialist and modernist assumptions underlying this conceptual 
distinction by drawing attention to the continuities between pre-modern  ‘ethnies’  and  
modern nations even in civic, liberal Western states.23 These two responses lead us to 
the conclusion that, while sometimes useful as a basic analytical tool, or perhaps as 
an extraneous source of normative or ideological critique (which is how 
cosmopolitan Sri Lankan liberals usually use it against nativist nationalists), the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy has very little value for a deeper explanatory understanding 
of the nature and functional dynamics of either ethnicity or nationalism. This is, 
thirdly, borne out by the general survey of scholarly approaches to explaining 
ethnicity and nationalism in the literature on Sri Lanka that I undertake next in this 
chapter. Neither ethnic nation can be regarded as conforming in practice with the 
essentialist purity projected by nationalist ideologues, or indeed, as demanded by 
abstract  theoretical  categories.  This  recalls  Anthony  D.  Smith’s  observation  that  “the  
most   perplexing   feature   of   …   ethnic   and   national   phenomena”   is   “the   curiously  
simultaneous  solidity  and  insubstantiality  of  ethnic  communities  and  nations.”24 It is 
to this protean and contingent history of myths, symbols and memories, both modern 
and pre-modern, that constitutional theory must look, in liberating the nation from 
the nationalists.  
 
The key point therefore is that it is in the histories of the Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil 
nations themselves that the arguments with which to challenge the essentialist and 
exclusionary ideologies of contemporary ethnic nationalists can be found. This is a 
                                                 
22 B.  Yack,  ‘The Myth of the Civic Nation’  in  Beiner  (1999):  Ch.5;;  Kymlicka  (1999). 
23 The leading exponent of which approach is Anthony D. Smith. See Smith (1998): Ch.8. 




particularly important argument with regard to the majority Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism, which controls the state and denies the minority Tamil nationality claim 
(and aspiration to recognition, representation and autonomy on that specific basis). 
Reinforcing the discussion of nations and nationalisms in this chapter is the 
preceding discussion in Chapter 2 where I explored the pre-colonial state tradition, to 
disprove the historical revisionism that has been used to buttress an ethnocratic 
unitary state-formation project in the post-colonial era. It revealed instead an historic 
state tradition, which while necessarily pre-democratic, demonstrated a capacity to 
countenance extensive territorial decentralisation and heterogeneous communal 
pluralism. Both are key elements in the argument that not only does plurinational 
constitutionalism provide most of the normative and structural principles of 
constitutional organisation that are needed to address the problem of national 
pluralism in the Sri Lanka of the present, but also that those principles can be 
contextualised and defended by reference to historical experience. 
 
At the same time, it must be conceded that this discussion also demonstrates the 
serious challenge to constitutional accommodation posed by the limitations of 
ethnonationalisms that have so far resisted important aspects of democratic 
modernisation. As noted above and in Chapter 1, recommending prescriptions in this 
regard to either Sinhala-Buddhist or Tamil nationalists is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, we cannot avoid addressing the question of the overarching national 
identity that is associated with the state, for two reasons. Firstly, a reconceptualised 
statal nation is imperative to provide the basic foundation of democratic modernity 
within which a plurinational solution to sub-state ethnic national pluralism can be 
grounded and pursued; and secondly, an inclusively defined statal nation is one of 
the non-coercive appeals to the unity of the state that can balance the radical sub-
state national autonomy contemplated by a putative plurinational constitution, 
without the need for autonomy-limiting constitutional measures such as, in extremis, 
prohibitions on secession.  
 
In short, ethnicity-based plurinational autonomy at the sub-state level requires a 




can dismiss some of the more simplistic descriptive conclusions with regard to the 
ethnos to which some traditional liberals are led as a result of applying the civic-
ethnic dichotomy, I do not reject the democratic normative vision of the demos they 
endorse. The argument rather is that democratic consent as well as cultural 
inheritance define the nation, or more precisely in the plurinational context, the 
nations. In the Sri Lankan case, therefore, a plurinational dispensation should reflect 
a plurality of both civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation: by an accommodation 
of the reality of plural ethnic nations at the sub-state level (self-rule) that is held 
together by an overarching civic nation at the level of the state (shared-rule).25   
 
If the civic-ethnic dichotomy is undermined theoretically and empirically in the ways 
outlined above, what is the better alternative that we may use to analytically frame 
the competing nationalisms in Sri Lanka in a way that is more conducive to a 
plurinational constitutional logic? Performative theories of nationalism become 
useful in this second part of the chapter in two complementary ways. In its 
anthropological strain, performative practice constitutes an important element of 
explanatory accounts of collective identities and political institutions in Sri Lanka, in 
which rituals  of  kingship  and  sovereignty  that  determined  both  ‘we-feeling’  and  the  
bounds  of   the  state’s  authority   in   the  pre-colonial era continue to animate ethnicity 
and nationalism as salient forms of political mobilisation even within the framework 
of the modern territorial state.26 In its sociological strain, performative nationalism 
also helps explain the dynamics of conflict between competing nationalisms in 
multinational polities, understood as a species of ‘social  movement’   engaged   in   a  
type  of   ‘contentious politics’ framed by the dictates of the modern state.27 In other 
words, it explains the political motivations that encourage both majority and minority 
groups  to  engage  in  ‘We  are  a  Nation’  performances,  with  the  potential  ownership  of  
a nation-state as the ultimate prize. In both these ways, performative nationalism 
combined with the insights of ethnosymbolism constitute a more useful analytical 
                                                 
25 These issues are taken up in Chapter 6, infra. 
26 H.L. Seneviratne (1978) Rituals of the Kandyan State (Cambridge: CUP); M. Roberts (1994) 
Exploring Confrontation. Sri Lanka: Politics, Culture and History (Chur: Harwood Academic 
Publishers): Ch.5. Some of these issues have already been discussed in Chapter 2, supra. 
27 S. Tarrow (2011) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (3rd Rev. Ed) 





basis for reframing the multinational dynamic in Sri Lanka, explaining both the 
traditional roots of contemporary ethnic nationalisms as well as their reformation and 
practice according to forms of politics and constitutional categories established by 
the modern state order.  
 
This approach meets   the   challenge   posed   by   “the   legacy   of   two   distinct   types   of  
modernity” in Sri Lanka that Roshan de Silva Wijeyeratne has described in the 
following   terms:   “The   first   is   the   liberal   rational   bureaucratic   state   and   its   legal  
infrastructure that the British developed, while the second is the domain of the gods, 
which also brings both the elites and the subalterns into a series of hierarchical 
relationships.” 28  Put another way, this means that in Sri Lanka, contrary to the 
classical modernist account of nationalism in particular, tradition and modernity in 
relation to political community must be understood not as two counterposed 
elements separated by time and distinctive spatial concepts, but as coeval, 
coterminous and coexisting elements of a longer story of historical evolution. In this 
pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial continuum, the colonial instantiation of the 
modern state transformed, but did not create, nation-type collective identity.29 As we 
shall see, this is perhaps more true of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation than the Tamil 
nation, but the former dominates the politico-historical space of the state in the island 
so decisively that it becomes the primary focus for any exercise in constitutional 
theorising and reform. In this regard, as de Silva Wijeyeratne suggests, the principle 
of hierarchy is an important one in both traditional and modern terms, and I will 
explore how this can be rendered into a democratic constitutional norm of 
asymmetry within the framework of a plurinational constitution in Chapter 6.  
 
In proposing some form of the plurinational state as one of the institutional responses 
that can be presented in resolving the problem of unstable and conflict-prone national 
pluralism, it becomes necessary for this thesis to examine the substantive adaptations 
that the model itself must undergo in order to be applicable to cases like Sri Lanka. 
The main argument in this respect – that the plurinational state in non-Western 
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Routledge): p.1. 




contexts must draw normative sustenance from a wider and ideologically more 
neutral conception of democracy than political liberalism – is continued in Chapter 5, 
where I consider the issue of post-colonial state-formation and democracy in the 
context of national pluralism. But the issues regarding the sociology and history of 
plural nations and nationalisms must be dealt with first, and it is to this that the rest 
of this chapter is devoted. 
 
 
2. The Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy: Myths and Realities 
 
In   everyday   usage,   the   word   ‘nation’   encapsulates   both   the   cultural   and   political  
dimensions of the concept to denote the cultural origins of a particular community as 
well as its legitimacy as a community to assert certain normative claims to some 
form of self-government. The classificatory purpose of the civic-ethnic dichotomy 
has been to separate these two dimensions of the nation, to serve both descriptive and 
normative aims. Thus it seeks to describe forms of the nation that draw a close 
connection between ethno-culture and political community as ethnic nationalism, 
whereas the civic nation is a political community made up of individuals freely 
associating or contracting to achieve self-government according to certain 
fundamental values of common subscription. For traditional liberals in particular, the 
distinction also serves the important normative purpose of distinguishing between 
political communities that foster values such as individual liberty, the rule of law, 
limited government and economic freedom – civic nations that are built upon the 
thought and values of the European Enlightenment – and those others – ethnic 
nations – in which ascriptive attributes of the community take centre-stage and both 
the identity and the rights of the individual are determined by the community rather 
than vice versa.  
 
The impetus for the contemporary revival of the civic-ethnic dichotomy in liberal 
thought (in both descriptive and normative senses) arose from the explosion of 




Cold War, especially in the wars in the former Yugoslavia,30 although it draws from 
and builds upon earlier attempts at classification of nations, such as between Eastern 
and Western nationalism,31 ethnos and demos,32 cultural and political states,33 the 
German and the French conceptions of the nation-state,34 and civic-territorial and 
ethnic-genealogical nationhood.35  
 
Indeed, it is the same distinction that found expression in the ‘modernity against 
tradition’ teleology of the post-colonial nation-building literature of the 1950s and 
60s.36 The canonical status of this once widely accepted school of thought has been 
eroded   by   scholars   who   have   pointed   to   the   ‘modernity   of   tradition’.37 It has also 
been attacked for its Western ethnocentrism,38 and its claims to the universalism of 
Enlightenment thought widely rejected. Both these points have been made by Sarath 
Amunugama:   “Two   assumptions   underlie   this   approach.   Firstly,   that   all   societies  
evolve in unilinear fashion towards the Western ideal. Modernisation, in short, is 
                                                 
30 That even a scholar like Michael Walzer who is associated with Liberalism II, and presumably 
therefore more sympathetic to cultural claims than classical liberals, would describe the emergence of 
a  ‘New  Tribalism’  is  reflective  of  the  disquiet  that this ethnnonationalist resurgence and the brutal 
violence  it  unleashed  generated  among  liberals:  M.  Walzer,  ‘The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult 
Problem’  in  Beiner  (1999):  Ch.11. 
31 J.  Plamenatz,  ‘Two Types of Nationalism’  in  E.  Kamenka  (Ed.)  (1973)  Nationalism (Canberra: 
ANU Press): Ch.2; H. Kohn (1967) The Idea of Nationalism (2nd Ed.) (New York: Collier 
Macmillan): Ch.5. 
32 E. Francis (1965) Ethnos und Demos: Soziologie Beiträge zur Volkstheorie (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot). 
33 F. Meinecke (1970) Cosmopolitanism and the National State (Princeton: Princeton UP). 
34 E.  Renan,  ‘What is a Nation?’  in  H.  Bhabha  (Ed.)  (1990)  Nation and Narration (London: 
Routledge): Ch.2; L. Dumont (1994) German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back 
(Chicago: Chicago UP). 
35 Smith (1986): Ch.6. 
36 Standard works of post-colonial nation-building include D. Lerner (1958) The Passing of 
Traditional Society (New York: Free Press); K. Deutsch & W. Foltz (Eds.) (1963) Nation-Building 
(New York: Atherton); K. Deutsch (1966) Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.I.T. Press); R. Bendix (1978) Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: 
California UP). For an example of how this theoretical approach has been applied in relation to early 
post-colonial  Sri  Lanka,  see  R.  Kearney,  ‘Nationalism, Modernisation and Political Mobilisation in a 
Plural Society’,  in  M.  Roberts  (Ed.)  (1979)  Collective Identities, Nationalisms and Protest in a 
Plural Society (Colombo: Marga Institute): pp.440-461; see also R. Kearney (1967) Communalism 
and Language in the Politics of Ceylon (Durham, N.C.: Duke UP); B.H. Farmer (1963) Ceylon: A 
Divided Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
37 L.I. Rudolph & S.H. Rudolph (1984) The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India 
(Chicago: Chicago UP);;  de  Silva  Wijeyeratne  (2014);;  M.  Roberts,  ‘Sri Lanka: Intellectual Currents 
and Conditions in the Study of Nationalism’  in  M.  Roberts  (Ed.)  (1997)  Sri Lanka: Collective 
Identities Revisited, Vol.1 (Colombo: Marga Institute): Ch.1 at p.6. 
38 J.  Coakley,  ‘National Majorities in New States: Managing the Challenge of Diversity’  in  A-G. 
Gagnon, A. Lecours & G. Nootens (Eds.) (2011) Contemporary Majority Nationalism (Montreal & 




Westernisation.   Secondly,   traditionalism   is   the   polar   opposite   of   modernity.”39 By 
contrast, Amunugama   discerns   “a   dialectical   relationship   between   tradition   and  
modernity”  in  the  Sri  Lankan  context,  illustrating  the  “powers  of  tradition  to  evolve  
creatively   in   a   new   environment.”40 Some of these criticisms of modernisation as 
westernisation are infected by culturally relativist perspectives, such as in Sri Lanka, 
the Jathika Chinthanaya movement, in which cultural authenticity is a fig leaf for 
ethnic majoritarian authoritarianism.41 For our purposes, what is more important is 
the plurinationalist   critique  of   the   ‘monistic  demos   thesis’, discussed in Chapter 3, 
that is the lynchpin of the post-colonial nation-building discourse.  
 
One of the celebrated contributions to the classical liberal critique of 
ethnonationalism in the 1990s was that of Michael Ignatieff, who defined the civic 
nation   as   “a   community   of   equal,   rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic 
attachment   to   a   shared   set   of   political   practices   and   values.”   In   this   view,   rational  
individuals exercise the freedoms of thought, expression, association and choice to 
establish   a   political   community   in  which   “national   belonging   is   a   form   of   rational  
attachment.”   In  ethnic  nations  by  contrast,  “an  individual’s  deepest  attachments  are  
inherited,  not  chosen”  and  “it  is  the  national  community that defines the individual, 
not  the  individuals  who  define  the  national  community.”42  
 
Responding to this interpretation of civic and ethnic nationalisms, Bernard Yack 
makes   the   point   that,   although   “Designed   to   protect   us   from   the   dangers   of  
ethnocentric politics, the civic/ethnic distinction itself reflects a considerable dose of 
ethnocentrism…a   mixture   of   self-congratulation   and   wishful   thinking.” 43  Yack 
argues that while it may seem reasonable to distinguish between nations based on 
political principles   and   those   conceived   on   ethnic   origins,   it   is   “unreasonable   and  
unrealistic”   to   interpret   this   as   a   distinction   between   “the   rational   attachment   to  
                                                 
39 S.  Amunugama,  ‘Ideology  and  Class  Interest  in  One  of  Piyadasa  Sirisena’s  Novels:  The  New  Image  
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40 Ibid. 
41 D. Rampton (2010) Deeper Hegemony: The Populist Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Discontent 
and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in Sri Lanka, PhD Thesis, SOAS, University of London 
(unpublished):  pp.225,  231;;  K.  Senaratne,  ‘Jathika Chinthanaya and the Executive Presidency’  
(forthcoming). 
42 Ignatieff (1993): pp.7-8; see also esp. Kymlicka (1999). 




principle   and   the   emotional   celebration   of   inherited   culture.”   Echoing   a   central  
argument of liberal nationalism,  he  observes  that,  “In  order  to  characterise  ‘national  
belonging [as] a form   of   rational   attachment,’   one   must   ignore   the   contingent  
inheritance of distinctive experiences and cultural memories that is an inseparable 
part of every national political identity.”44 Yack extends his critique to two related 
traditional liberal postulates of civic nation-formation: the idea of consent at the heart 
of political community and the idea of popular sovereignty.  
 
With regard to consent, Yack notes that Ernest Renan’s  description  of  the  nation  as  a  
‘daily   plebiscite’   is   frequently   cited   by   defenders   of   the   civic   nation   because   “it  
seems  to  point  to  individual  consent  as  the  source  of  national  identity.”  However,  as  
he  points  out,  traditional  liberals  “rarely  note  that this phrase represents only half of 
Renan’s  definition  of  the  nation.”45 Renan held that, 
 
 “Two   things   constitute   the   nation.   One   lies   in   the   past,   the   other   in   the  
present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories, the 
other is present day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate 
the   value   of   the   heritage   that   one   has   received   in   an   undivided   form…The  
nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, 
sacrifice,  and  devotion.”46  
 
In Yack’s  view,  while  the  nation  may  be  a  daily  plebiscite,  the  substance  of  the  ideas  
and  symbols  that  is  debated  and  tested  by  that  plebiscite  is  provided  by  the  nation’s  
cultural   inheritance:   “Without   ‘a   rich   legacy   of  memories’   there   are   no   communal  
loyalties  to  be  tested  by  consent.”47 Yack extends this critique to Jürgen  Habermas’s  
influential  idea  of  ‘constitutional  patriotism,’48 which was originally developed as a 
conception of German identity in the wake of the reunification of East and West 
Germany. Habermas   urged   that   the   ‘social-liberal’   democratic   values   of   the  
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constitutional state founded by the post-war Grundgesetz should form the basis of the 
unified   German   identity,   rather   than   a   restoration   of   the   “pre-political unity of a 
community  which  a  shared  historical  destiny”  that  had  characterised  militaristic  and  
expansionist German nationalism before.49 Given   the   “terrible   history”   of   German  
nationalism,  Yack  appreciates  Habermas’s  concern   to  provide  a  civic   interpretation  
to the post-unification   German   nation,   but,   as   he   asks,   “How   can   one   explain  
[German reunification] without invoking the prepolitical community of shared 
memory   and  history   that   tied  West   to  East  Germans…?”50 He points out that even 
Habermas tacitly accepts that constitutional patriotism is a way of locating universal 
liberal  principles  “in  the  horizon  of  the  history  of  the  nation,”  which  “clearly  implies 
that the audience for arguments about the focus of political loyalty is not some 
random association of individuals united only by allegiance to shared principles, but 
a   prepolitical   community   with   its   own   cultural   ‘horizon’   of   shared  memories   and  
historical  experiences.”51 
 
Moreover, according to Yack, the tendency of liberalism itself to encourage people 
to think of themselves as members of pre-political communities is particularly visible 
in the theory of popular sovereignty that is central to the civic conception of the 
nation:   “Popular   sovereignty   arguments   encourage   modern   citizens   to   think   of  
themselves as organised into communities that are logically and historically prior to 
the communities created by their shared political institutions.”52  In other words, 
logically  and  historically,  there  must  exist  a  ‘We,  the  People’  that  can  promulgate  a  
constitution, or otherwise create the state, before such political institutions can come 
into   existence.   As   Yack   points   out,   this   is   what   Locke   and   others   “variously 
described as the community, the civil society, or the people (in contrast to the 
commonwealth   or   political   society).”53 Thus even though traditional liberals reject 
the notion of a pre-political cultural community that constitutes the political 
community (the  civic  nation),  without  an  acceptance  of   such  “contingencies  of  our  
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historical  experience”54 as existed before, the liberal doctrine of popular sovereignty 
makes no sense. We can thus surely agree with Jeffrey Friedman that the civic-ethnic 
dichotomy, 
 
 “…is merely a taxonomic device whose value is a function of its usefulness 
in classifying regimes. It does no ethical work, at least in principle; and its 
employment certainly does not commit the scholar to endorsing the 
pretensions entailed by either civic  or  ethnic  nationalism.”55     
 
Yack’s   critique  of  “the  myth  of   the  civic  nation”   in  debates  within   liberal  political  
theory parallels the arguments made by the school of liberal nationalism about the 
importance   of   ‘the   context   of   choice’56 in the exercise of individual freedom; and 
which   plurinational   constitutional   theory   extends   to   the   critique   of   the   ‘monistic  
demos   thesis’   and   for   pluralising   both   constitutive   and   constituted   power   in   the  
plurinational state.57 Yet this latter body of work, concerned only with civic-societal 
nations, is largely irrelevant to a study of national pluralism in Sri Lanka, and we 
need therefore to shift the focus of the argument from political theory to political 
sociology in considering the issue of ethnicity more closely. Here I draw upon the 
‘ethnosymbolic’  theory of nationalism represented in the work of Anthony D. Smith, 
which stresses not only the ethnic origins of modern nations, but also the persistent 
presence of an ethnic core in the modern nation.58 As Eric Kaufmann and Oliver 
Zimmer note, 
 
“…  Smith   successfully   disembeds   ethnicity   from   the   ideologically-charged, 
anglo-centric discourse of ethnic relations and places it in historical context. 
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Critics (Oxford: Blackwell); A.S. Leoussi & S. Grosby (Eds.) (2007) Nationalism and 
Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations (Edinburgh: 




Ethnic groups are no longer defined by their exoticism or marginality, but 
rather by characteristics (i.e., popular name, myth of shared ancestry, concept 
of homeland, ethno-history) which are attributable to oppressors and 
oppressed  alike.”59  
 
Smith’s  work   is   too  well   known   to   require   summarisation   here,   but   the   following  
arguments and observations are particularly helpful to the present discussion. 
Smith’s   theory   draws   upon   the   insights   offered   by   both,   primordialist   and  
perennialist, as well as modernist and instrumentalist accounts of nation-formation, 
but is distinct from either school by offering an account which reveals each nation to 
have a core ethnic identity, the ethnie, which sets the parameters of its change and 
evolution over time.60 Thus,  “Ethnie and nations are not fixed and immutable entities 
‘out   there’   (not   even   the nationalists thought so); but neither are they completely 
malleable and fluid processes and attitudes, at the mercy of every outside force.”61 
Smith argues that the variety, complexity, recurrence and persistence of ethnic 
phenomena and sentiments cannot be adequately captured by either the primordialist 
or modernist theories. The former treats markers of identity like religion and 
language as immutable and timeless; the latter treats ethnic and national phenomena 
as purely instrumental and short-term devices of other, more important, political and 
economic   forces.   Smith’s   approach,   by   contrast,   focuses   on   the   ‘myth-symbol 
complexes’   that   unite   and   divide   populations   and   explain   their   attitudes   and  
sentiments. In his words, 
 
“…by  eschewing  [the  primordialist and modernist] alternatives and attending 
to the complex of myths, symbols, memories and values that are handed 
down the generations of collectivities and which define them to themselves 
and those outside, we can treat ethnie as mutable and durable at the same 
time,  and  ethnicity  as  both  fluctuating  and  recurrent  in  history…The  study  of  
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ethnicity through ethnic myths, symbols, memories and values allows us to 
grasp the dynamic and expressive character of ethnic identity, and its long-
term influence on human affairs, while allowing for its changing content and 
meanings.”62 
 
This ethnosymbolic approach with its strong historical emphasis leads to a 
delineation of five major characteristics of the nation, all of which are germane to the 
present discussion, but two of which are pivotal to it. 63  These relate to his 
observations on the process of nation-formation and the ethnic core of every nation. 
In  the  first  respect,  Smith  notes  how  nations  are  not  static  entities,  “attained  once-for-
all”,   but   must   be   understood as long-term   processes   of   “mobilisation,   inclusion,  
territorialisation,  politicisation  and  autarchy”   that  “are  never   concluded  and  always  
subject to redefinition   in   each   generation.”64 Because of their constantly evolving 
nature,  “they  presume  a  ‘national  past’  against  which  advances  can  be  measured  and  
back-slidings  corrected.  Nations  do  not  exist  in  a  timeless  present.”65 This perpetual 
evolution   has   “definite   limits.   Hence   the   ‘modernity’   of   any   nation   is   being  
continually qualified by its historical roots and its accretions   in   each   generation.”  
Secondly,  Smith  is  blunt  in  his  assertion  that,  “nations  require  ethnic  cores  if  they  are  
to   survive.   If   they   lack   one,   they  must   ‘re-invent’   one.   That  means   discovering   a  
suitable and convincing past which can be reconstructed and re-presented to 
members   and   outsiders.”66 Supported by historical evidence of nation-formation in 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Sub-
Saharan  Africa,   Smith   argues   that   there   is   an   ‘antiquity   of  modern   nations’  which  
signifies   “their   rootedness   in   a   past   that   their   members,   or   significant   sections   of  
them, presume to be distinctively theirs, one that  expresses  their  uniqueness.”67 This 
affirms the Janus-faced nature of nationalism, but in a more fundamental way than 
liberal nationalists would allow: 
 
                                                 
62 Ibid: pp.211-212. 
63 See ibid: pp.212-214. 
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“Not  only  in  spirit  but  in  structure,  modern  nations  and  not  only  nationalism,  
turn out to be Janus-headed – and this is necessary. If there was no model of 
past ethnicity, and no pre-existent ethnie, there could be neither nations nor 
nationalism. There would only be states and étatisme imposed from above, a 
very  different  phenomenon.”68 
 
Smith’s  account,  with  its  vast  historical  and  global  sweep,  is  undoubtedly  persuasive  
as a general explanatory theory of nations and nationalism, and is acutely resonant in 
the   Sri   Lankan   case.   As   Michael   Roberts   observes,   “To   the   Sinhalese   literati,  
nurtured as they were in the Dhammadipa and Sihadipa concepts, there could be no 
nation that was distinct from  a  race  or  an  ethnie.”69 Given the reification of language 
and culture so central to Tamil ethnic consciousness (tamilpparru70), it is surely an 
observation that can be extended to the Tamils.    
 
In addition to its value in interpreting the contemporary practice of both ethnic 
nationalisms in the Sri Lankan case, Smith also maintains that colonial state-builders 
had  an  “ethnic  model  in  mind”71 when establishing the institutional framework of the 
modern state in Asian, Middle Eastern and African colonies. However, he contends, 
“here   it   proved   much   harder   to   select   the   ethnie which could provide the socio-
cultural base  of   the  new  colonial  state.”72 Historians of colonial Ceylon have noted 
the role of such institutions as the Royal Asiatic Society and of colonial officials and 
scholars such as Davy, Forbes, Ferguson, Geiger, Knighton, Skinner, Tennant and 
Turnour in resurrecting the Mahavamsa and the glories of the ancient Sinhala-
Buddhist civilisation in the heyday of nineteenth century Orientalist scholarship.73 
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The equation of the history of the island as an exclusively or mainly Sinhala-
Buddhist  narrative  in  this  tradition  of  ‘positivistic  historiography’74 would haunt later 
attempts  at  colonial  constructions  of  a  civic  ‘Ceylonese’  demos,75 but it demonstrates 
Smith’s   point   about   the   ethnic   assumptions   of   nationhood   that   underlay   the   civic  
rhetoric of liberal imperialism.76 He   also   notes   that,   “In   south-east Asia, the new 
‘plural  society’   that  evolved  soon   tended   to   favour  a  dominant  ethnie, as in Burma 
and Indonesia, with ensuing secessionist tendencies in outlying ethnic communities 
like   the   Karen   and   Achinese”77; an observation that, mutatis mutandis, perfectly 
describes the post-colonial history of Sri Lanka. In relation to post-colonial Africa, 
however, Smith notes that in most countries,  
 
“…the  ethnic  balance  is  too  even  or  too  complex  to  allow  any  one  ethnie to 
furnish the basis of the state. The result is that African states are likely to face 
serious  problems  in  trying  to  create  ‘territorial  nations’  without  the  benefit  of  
ethnic  cores  and  a  common  historical  mythology.”78      
 
Here we encounter an aspect of his work that needs qualification when applied to 
multinational contexts from a specifically plurinationalist perspective. In this 
statement he seems to be indirectly upholding the modernist principle that equates or 
conflates the nation and the state, or at least the leading role of the state in post-
colonial nation-building; whereas, as noted in Chapter 3, it is one of the central 
postulates of plurinational constitutionalism that these two concepts require 
disaggregation if the reality of national pluralism is to be adequately reflected in the 
constitutional architecture of the host-state.79 Within nationalism theory from the 
perspective of stateless nations, it is critique that is trenchantly made by Montserrat 
Guibernau,  who   argues   that,   “the  most   fundamental   flaw   in  Smith’s   theory,  which  
contains significant repercussions for his approach to national identity, stems from 
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conflation  of  nation  and  state.”80 Among  other  arguments  concerning  Smith’s  views  
on the mass character of public culture and a common economy, she points out that 
the sharing of common rights and duties among its members that Smith posits as one 
of the elements of a nation is flawed, because  “Smith  was  simply  attributing  to  the  
nation  one  of  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  state.”  In  her  view,  the  provision  
of  legal  rights  is  “not  what  one  should  expect  from  a  cultural  community,  such  as  a  
nation”  but  is  “a  function  of  the  state,  the political institution that regulates the lives 
of  people  within  its  territory.”81  
 
While  attentive  to  Guibernau’s  critique,   this  weakness  in  Smith’s  view  seems  to  be  
more of a lapse than one of its fundamental features. Unlike in the case of certain 
instrumentalist theories (such as post-colonial nation-building), there is no reason 
why the state should be regarded as the driving mechanism of nation-formation in 
Smith’s  account.   Indeed,  what   is   important   to   this  account   is  not   the  modern  state,  
but   the   ‘mythomoteur’   (i.e.,   the   constitutive   political   myth)   derived   from   the  
historical   ‘myth-symbol   complex’  of the given nation.82 Smith himself underscores 
this  when  he  makes  a  clear  distinction  between   the  nation  and  “states  and  étatisme 
imposed from above, a very   different   phenomenon.” 83  Consequently, we can 
plausibly   continue   to   make   use   of   Smith’s   account   as   an   explanatory theory of 
nations and nationalism in ethnically multinational contexts, while disaggregating the 
nation from the state as a constitutional requirement in such situations.  
 
I now come to a point outlined at the outset, that any plurinational settlement in Sri 
Lanka must seek to also address the statal nation in addition to sub-state autonomy, 
and   specifically   to   remedy   the   distorted   ‘modernity’   produced   by   the   hegemonic  
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project of ethnocratic state-building that Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has 
relentlessly pursued since independence. The constitutional concepts and strategies 
that may be deployed to this end awaits fuller consideration in following chapters, 
but at this stage of the argument, it is important to reiterate that Smith also 
anticipates this constitutional problem faced by many post-colonial Asian and 
African states, and to which he proposes a radical solution: the invention of 
tradition.84 To the constitutional problem of a dominant ethnie appropriating the 
power, ownership and resources of the post-colonial state against the competing 
claims of plural ethnies,  Smith’s  solution  is  as  follows: 
 
“The   alternative   strategy   is   to   construct   a   new   ‘political   culture’   out   of   the  
various ethnic traditions within the territorial state, by combining myths and 
symbols, seeking common denominators (colonial, racial discrimination) and 
even   inventing   a   distant   common   origin   or   ‘age   of   heroism’   such as other 
nationalisms have admired. In effect, this means that the new territorial 
nation-to-be must acquire ethnic dimensions and characteristics, if it lacks 
them;;  in  Rousseau’s  words,  it  must  be  given  a  ‘national  character’.”85 
 
From a plurinational perspective, the problem with this monistic approach is again 
immediately apparent. Smith in effect advocates the same procedure championed by 
the older theorists of post-colonial nation-building in promoting the construction of a 
unitary demos, albeit one that draws sustenance from (where necessary, invented) 
common ethnic myths, memories and symbols rather than purely civic nationalist 
ideals. In short, in addressing the demotic question of post-colonial   ‘states without 
nations’,86 he ignores and even unwittingly invalidates the empirical and normative 
claims to specifically national autonomy   made   by   ‘nations without states’ 87  in 
multinational – as opposed to merely communally plural – post-colonial polities. 
Now it may seem to follow from this that a work of plurinational constitutional 
theory  should   instantly   reject  Smith’s  prescribed  solution   to   this   issue,  and  yet,  we  
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find that he cannot be dismissed outright. To the extent that a plurinational 
constitution in Sri Lanka ought to be equally concerned about the unity of the state as 
it is with sub-state autonomy, and to the extent that the rational attachments of some 
form of constitutional patriotism are inadequate for this purpose (for the reasons 
discussed above), then it would appear that a carefully calibrated  adoption  of  Smith’s  
views with regard to the statal nation becomes a necessity. And even if Smith does 
not seem to envisage the process in quite the same way, it seems possible at least in 
theory   to   contemplate   an   ‘invention’   of   a  mythomoteur and myth-symbol complex 
for the putative statal nation of a plurinational dispensation which stresses unifying 
myths,   memories,   symbols   and   values   between   all   of   Sri   Lanka’s   nations   and  
communities, while simultaneously taking full account of the distinctive socio-
political challenges of national pluralism and the normative dictates of democratic 
plurinationalism.  
 
The  challenge  here  of  course  is  whether  the  island’s  history  yields  the  resources  and  
precedents necessary for such reinterpretations. As we shall shortly see, an earlier 
attempt by a post-orientalist school of scholars in Sri Lanka to reimagine a pre-
modern history facilitative of present-day pluralism and accommodation met with 
substantial failure in both practical and theoretical terms. This is a salutary, although 
not prohibitive, caution about the parameters of what is possible, and in this regard, 
Michael   Roberts’   admonition   that   “Theory   must   be   constrained   by   the   empirical  
material, so that any questionings must be through specific Sri Lankan material 
pertinent   to   specific   temporalities”   is   apposite.88 We need therefore to revisit the 
theoretical battlefield of nationalism studies in Sri Lanka to see if a new and more 
plausible approach to the resolution of these issues is possible. While any definitive 
conclusions can only follow the consideration of the Sri Lankan material, it might be 
provisionally asserted at this stage of the argument that, in the light of the preceding 
discussion about how we understand ethnicity and nationalism, there seems to be 
nothing about these phenomena that is inherently repugnant to the basic logic of 
plurinational accommodation, even though the character of the nationalisms 
determined by these empirical conditions do point to the need for philosophical 
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alternatives to political liberalism in articulating the pluralistic normative 
foundations of such a constitutional order.   
 
 
3. Theoretical Approaches to Nations and Nationalisms in Sri Lanka 
 
There is a rich and substantial theoretical literature on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, 
much less so in relation to Tamil nationalism. In the former category, I focus on the 
central   scholarly   debate   between   the   ‘post-orientalists’   who   have   characterised  
modern nationalism as artificially constructed and historically contingent on 
colonialism’s  impact  in  the  formation  of  national identities,  and  the  ‘ethnicists’  who  
have responded to this position by reasserting the existence of nation-type 
conceptions of collective identity among the Sinhalese long before nineteenth 
century European ideas on nations and nationalism were adopted by indigenous 
elites. For the sake of brevity, I narrow this down still further to a seminal article by 
Elizabeth Nissan and R.L. Stirrat and an equally seminal monograph by Michael 
Roberts, in which the major claims on either side of this debate emerge with the 
greatest clarity. More recently published historical work reflect significant critiques 
and extensions of these older debates, but the post-orientalist and ethnicist dichotomy 
is still the implicit frame within which opposing positions in Sri Lankan 
constitutional disputes on the nationalities question take shape, hence my focus on 
it.89  
 
The   term   ‘post-orientalist’   is   used   here   in   the   same   sense   it  was   used   by   John  D.  
Rogers   to   describe   the   ‘new   sociology   of   knowledge’   influenced   by   the   work   of  
Edward Said and Michel Foucault. 90  This is also the sense in which Roberts 
describes post-orientalist  work   as   “characterised   by   its   anti-nationalist leanings, its 
emphasis on the circumstantialist shaping of ethnic identity and the force of systems 
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of  knowledge  in  the  implantation  of  collectivised  identities.”91  The  term  ‘ethnicist’  
is used as a distilled label of convenience to characterise scholars who have opposed 
the post-orientalist thesis on the history and sociology of the nation and nationalism 
in Sri Lanka. Adopting an emic rather than etic approach,92 they emphasise the 
importance of subjective meanings of categories of collective identity within 
particular cultures in a particular historical setting. Roberts has described this 
approach   as   “a   contextualised   hermeneutic   approach   weighted   towards   culture.”93 
This approach is very similar to the types of theory Anthony D. Smith characterised 
as   ‘perennialism’.94 Again drawing from Smith, the sharper descriptive term within 
this   tradition   is   ‘ethnicism’,   which   captures   all   the   various   forms   of   collective  
activity in defence of the ethnie.95 
 
 
3.1 The Nation of the State? The Post-Orientalist and Ethnicist 
Approaches to the Sinhala-Buddhist Nation 
 
Intense and highly partisan intellectual debates are part of the dynamics of intra-state 
ethnonationalist conflict, and these seemingly irreconcilable disagreements parallel 
the violence that are the physical manifestations of these conflicts. In Sri Lanka by 
the 1980s, part of what had become a full-blown ethnic conflict were the 
historiographical claims and counter-claims made on behalf of the two nationalisms, 
at various levels of intellectual abstraction. As   Jonathan   Spencer   noted,   “The  war  
which has been fought between the armed Tamil separatists and the Sinhala-
dominated government has been accompanied by rhetorical wars fought over 
archaeological sites, place-name etymologies, and the interpretation of ancient 
inscriptions.” 96  An implicit commonality in an otherwise bitterly divided and 
divisive debate, however, was the notion shared by both sides that the conflicts of the 
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present could only be explained by reference to the past. Thus competing nationalist 
historiographies, often reformulated for inflicting maximum political damage on the 
opposing group rather than with any notion of historical veracity or scholarly 
objectivity, further entrenched the spiralling dynamics of conflict.  
 
 
The Post-Orientalist Account 
 
The body of scholarship that I refer  here   to  as   ‘post-orientalist’  was   a   response  by  
liberal and left-leaning scholars to this excessive politicisation of history, in which 
they sought to present arguments against the ideological constructs relied upon by 
the extreme chauvinist versions of historiography.97 Although they were concerned 
with Tamil as well as Sinhala chauvinism, there is in this body of work a greater 
concentration on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, due to the fact that this was the 
politically dominant nationalism in control of the state.  
 
In introducing a collection of influential essays in this vein, Spencer set out their aim 
as  being  “to  expose  the  inadequacy  of  explaining  conflicts  like  those  in  Sri  Lanka  as  
the inevitable working out of immanent – ‘primordial’  – cultural forces. Rather, the 
historical arguments so often heard in Sri Lankan politics have themselves to be 
understood   as   products   of   their   own  peculiar   history.”98 In   demonstrating   that   “the  
crisis itself has been made by the actions of particular men and women, and is not the 
outcome  of  inherited  destiny”,  or  “the  inevitable  outcome  of  centuries  of  hostility”99 
as the nationalist antagonists tended to present the conflict, post-orientalists sought to 
change both the frames of reference and the content of the historical debate in 
relation to nationalism and conflict. The post-orientalist counterargument to the 
essentialist  and  primordialist  historiographies  of  the  nationalists,  in  Spencer’s  words,  
was that, 
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“In  simple  terms,  Sinhala-Tamil conflict is a product of modern politics. To 
interpret the history of the pre-colonial  kingdoms  in  terms  of  ‘nationalism’  – 
a distinctive ideology of the modern nation-state – is anachronistic and 
therefore  misleading…The  understanding  of  the  national  past  as  a  history  of  
warring   ‘communities’,   ‘races’,   or   ‘ethnic   groups’   is   a   product   of   colonial  
readings  of  the  available  sources  of  the  Sri  Lankan  past.”100 
 
Moreover, in reinterpreting the history of conflict as essentially a political rather than 
a cultural history, Spencer emphasised   the   ‘transactionalist’101 nature of nationalist 
historiography  in  which  “particular  cultural  resources  have  been  deployed  to  suit  the  
interests  of  key  political  actors.”102  
 
In the same collection, Elizabeth Nissan and R.L. Stirrat make a strong case for 
paying adequate attention to the influence of state forms in the formation of group 
identities   whether   as   ethnicities   or   nationalisms,   contending   that   “different   state  
forms   depend   upon,   and   generate,   different   senses   of   collective   identity.”   The  
understanding of nationalist identities and communal conflict in Sri Lanka, they 
further  argue,  “has  been  hindered  by  the  unwarranted  and  anachronistic  imposition  of  
the  dominant  political  identities  of  the  present  day  on  to  the  past.”  Pointing  out  that  
there is a “need  to  examine  the  processes  by  which  a  nation-state was created in Sri 
Lanka out of the kingdoms of the past in order to understand the nature of present-
day   political   identities”,   and   that   “Too   often   kingdoms   and   nation-states are 
conflated in both popular  and  academic  literature  on  this  subject”,103 they emphasise 
the influence of the modern European state form, transmitted through British 
colonialism, on the formation of modern Sri Lankan nationalisms. 
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In the context of the confrontation of crude oppositional caricatures of each other 
that the intercourse between Sinhala and Tamil nationalists had by then descended 
to, this kind of fresh perspective promised more constructive avenues for 
historiographical debate. Using inscriptional, archaeological and other empirical 
examples,  Nissan  and  Stirrat  attempt  to  separate  the  “very  muddled”  nature  of  ethnic  
relations in pre-colonial  and  most  of  colonial  history  from  “the  ideal  congruence  of  
race, language, religion and political territory assumed in nationalist   discourse”104 
from the nineteenth century onwards. On this evidence they argue that pre-colonial 
history does not support the picture of two opposed nations portrayed by Sinhala and 
Tamil rhetoricians. In doing so, they make two further observations which are 
important.  The   first   is   that   “For   long  periods   of   time  groups  which  would   now  be  
characterised in terms of the Sinhala-Tamil divide lived more or less at peace with 
one another. There were dynastic wars; but Sinhala-Tamil communal violence dates 
from after   Independence.” 105  The characterisation of pre-colonial conflicts as 
‘dynastic   wars’   has   attracted severe criticism, to which I shall return presently. 
Nissan and Stirrat do not deny that there were differences between groups in the pre-
colonial polity, and so the second observation, which has proved to be more tenable, 
is   that   “the   point   is   simply   that   differences   of   language,   custom  and   religion  were  
made into something new by  the  devices  of  a  modern  state.”106 
 
In elaborating how pre-colonial identities ‘were  made   into   something   new’   by   the  
state form introduced through the colonial circumstance, Nissan and Stirrat draw on 
the models of the pre-modern state developed by Benedict Anderson, Earnest 
Gellner, Burton Stein and Stanley Tambiah.107 The pre-modern states in South and 
Southeast Asia were “relatively   loosely   structured   organisations   built   up   upon   the  
bases of heterogeneity, relativity, and graduality, and on the ideal of the delegation of 
power  from  the  centre.”108 This conceptualisation of the pre-colonial state and polity 
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is contrasted with the modern state and nation on the basis of the different 
organisational principles that underlie each, which in turn demands that both state 
and polity/nation have to be understood in very different terms in relation to each 
historical  period.  Firstly,  “the  pre-modern state was defined through its centre rather 
than by its boundaries. Power – often expressed in ritual idiom – radiated out from 
the   centre…By   contrast,   the  modern   state   is   territorially   defined   through ritualised 
boundaries  which  are  recognised  in  international  law.”109 Secondly,  
 
“…ethnic,  religious,  and  linguistic  differences  were  not  used  as  the  bases  for  
inclusion or exclusion from the polity. At various times groups would speak 
alternative languages, adhere to alternative religions and claim alternative 
identities. The quasi-autonomous Vanniyar kingdoms, for example, which 
stretched in a broad band across north central Sri Lanka between the 
fourteenth and eighteenth centuries often consisted of Tamil-speaking 
Hindus; yet at various times they accepted the over-lordship of the kings of 
Kandy.”110 
 
In regard to pre-modern and modern state forms considered as ideal-types, Nissan 
and Stirrat make three further observations on authority, equality and territory, and 
homogeneity, which are important to the present discussion. They observe, firstly, 
that authority in the pre-modern state was legitimated from above (i.e., divine right 
or in the case of Sri Lanka, from Buddhist cosmology), whereas in the modern 
democratic state, authority is legitimated from below, from the consent of the ruled. 
Secondly, they maintain that the pre-modern  state  “consists  of  a  series  of  dissimilar  
groups   articulated   about   the   centre,   possibly   in   dissimilar  ways”,111 whereas in the 
modern state the norm of equality governs the relationship between individuals and 
between individuals and the state. For this reason, the pre-modern state is spatially 
heterogeneous in terms of culture, politics and law, and therefore cohesion is 
achieved by sacralising the centre; whereas the modern state is culturally, politically 
and legally homogeneous, and cohesion is achieved by the stress on bounded 
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territory.  According  to  Nissan  and  Stirrat,  it  is  upon  the  extent  of  ‘homogeneity’  that  
the scope and content of the nation – and its relationship to the state – assumes 
meaning   within   modern   states.   Thus   the   ‘nation’   becomes   meaningful   only in 
association with the modern state, its territoriality, equality and homogeneity, and to 
use the nation as a category to describe groups in the pre-modern state makes no 
sense. It is in this way that the colonial intervention, through which the modern state 
was introduced to Sri Lanka, produced the dynamics in which collective identities 
began to be articulated in distinctively nationalist ways. 
 
While introducing the modern homogeneity implied in territorial unification and the 
administrative centralisation of the colonial state, however, British administrators 
recognised they had to respond to a culturally highly heterogeneous native society, 
which posed both administrative as well as conceptual problems. According to 
Nissan and Stirrat, the intellectual response to the problem of social diversity  “was  
simply dealt with by interpreting it in biological terms: different groups 
were…different   races.”112 They identify three sites of administration in which this 
critical process was at work: the legal system, native political representation, and in 
the territorial organisation of the administrative system. The legal system recognised 
custom as a source of personal laws, especially marriage and succession. From the 
beginning of such institutions following the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms in 
1833,113 communal   representation  was   the   basis   of   the   local   elite’s   involvement   in  
the political administration until the Donoughmore reforms established territorial 
democracy in 1931.114 Likewise, administrative units were territorially demarcated 
and administered in the language of the majority ethnicity of the area.  
 
Moreover, colonial historiography were deeply influenced by contemporary studies 
in  European  Indology,  linguistic  theory  and  evolutionary  theory,  by  which  “‘Aryans’  
(Sinhala) came to be opposed in absolute  terms  to  ‘Dravidians’  (Tamils)  historically.  
Language and race were conflated, so that eventually the smaller 
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‘races’…recognised  by  the  British  as  separate  entities  were  subsumed  into  the  Tamil-
Sinhala  divide.”115 Taken  together,  this  created  a  “major  paradox at the heart of the 
Sri  Lankan  polity”  by  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century:   
 
“On   the   one   hand   all   citizens   of   Sri   Lanka  were   to   be   treated   equally:   the  
island was subject to one set of rules and one set of governors; in terms of 
citizenship, all should be equal. Yet at the same time, British rule 
substantialised heterogeneity, formalising cultural difference and making it 
the  basis  for  political  representation.”116 
 
This then, according to the post-orientalist account, was the institutional and political 
context as defined by nineteenth century British colonial practices that enabled the 
formation of nationalist identities based on ideas of racial exclusivity among ethnic 
groups in Sri Lanka.117 If the post-orientalist thesis is accepted, then despite the 
totalising claims of contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist   nationalism,   and   “despite   the  
assertions made by various rulers at various times to be rulers of the whole island, it 
seems that the polity of pre-modern Sri Lanka was, at its most centralised moments, 
a series of semi-autonomous states owing certain ritual and material obligations to an 
overlord.” 118  Not only Tamil principalities at the periphery but even Tamil 
monarchic dynasties at the centre were countenanced. It is the pre-modern, 
territorially unbounded nature of the socio-political and state order, in which 
European racial categories were unheard of and ethno-cultural differences were 
politically inconsequential, that enabled these exchanges to take place peacefully.  
 
This view of the pre-colonial polity, as post-orientalists have intended, facilitates a 
more pluralistic outlook with regard to the present, in that the accommodation of 
competing multi-ethnic claims is shown to have historical antecedents contrary to 
monistic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist historiography and ideology, denuding the 
latters’   political   potency. Post-orientalist theory therefore suggests that there are 
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deeper historical resources in envisioning alternative constitutional possibilities for 
pluralism, beyond the dismal picture of either Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony, or 
perennial conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils, that is displayed in the politics 
of the present. In the scholarly response to the post-orientalist thesis, however, 
significant limitations of this approach have been highlighted. These issues are dealt 
with next.  
 
 
The Ethnicist Response  
 
In Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period (2004), the historical 
anthropologist Michael Roberts has subjected the post-orientalist thesis on 
nationalism to a sustained critique, and offered an alternative view on pre-colonial 
group identities and state form. Roberts represents an intellectual tradition, referred 
hereto as   ‘ethnicism’,   that   is   older   than   the   post-orientalist tradition in Sri Lanka. 
This   section   delineates   the   main   elements   of   Roberts’   critique   of   the   reasoning 
adopted by post-orientalist scholars on the question of collective identity, 
nationalism and state form. Before proceeding to his critique, it is useful to establish 
the points on which Roberts agrees with the post-orientalists because these 
uncontested elements in the debate constitute an important part of the empirical 
context of nations and nationalisms that constitutional law and theory must contend 
with in Sri Lanka.  
 
At a general level, Roberts welcomes the post-orientalist intervention in cautioning 
against the reading of the present unto the past and in encouraging greater focus and 
care in the use of modern analytical categories in explanations of the past.119 More 
specifically, he does not contest the post-orientalists’ caution against using modern 
categories   like   ‘nation’   and   ‘nationalism’   to   describe   pre-British kingdoms. 120 
Reinforcing my observations in Chapter 2, he also endorses the conceptualisation of 
the pre-colonial indigenous state presented by Nissan and Stirrat as  “centre-oriented 
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polities that did not define their boundaries sharply and conceived of lordship in 
ritual  idioms.”121  
 
However, in arguing that pre-colonial   conflicts  were   ‘dynastic  wars’;;   that   “ethnic,  
religious and linguistic differences were not used as the bases of inclusion or 
exclusion  from  the  polity”;;122 and  that  the  “old  kingdoms  were  indifferent  to  internal  
cultural difference”, 123  post-orientalists suggest that these categories were not 
politically significant in the pre-colonial era. It is this contention that constitutes the 
gravamen of the disagreement between the post-orientalists and the ethnicist view as 
represented by Roberts. As already noted, post-orientalists   rely   upon   Tambiah’s  
work especially in relation to their characterisation of the pre-colonial kingdom as a 
mandala-type state (or galactic polity). Territory was not the central organising 
principle in this type of state, and territorial sovereignties therefore, as Anderson 
described  it,  “faded  imperceptibly  into  one  another.”124 While agreeing with the post-
orientalist   reliance   upon   Tambiah’s   conceptualisation   of   the   pre-colonial state, 
however, for Roberts,  
 
“It   is   the  next  Andersonian   step   that   is   problematic.  They   link   the   ‘modern  
nation-state’  indelibly  to  the  egalitarian  democratic  idea,  so  that  authority  is  
seen   as   ‘legitimated   from   below’.   In   effect   they   buy   into   Anderson’s  
emphasis  on  a  ‘deep,  horizontal  comradeship’  as  a  sine qua non for nation-as-
community…[T]herefore,   the   conceptualisation   proposed   by   Nissan   and  
Stirrat is founded on a rigid distinction between the modern and pre-modern 
in ways that re-configures the modern:tradition distinction that was integral to 
modernisation  theory  and  its  determinisms.”125 
 
In support of this dichotomisation between the ‘heterogeneous pre-modern’ and the 
‘homogeneous modern’, post-orientalists present an empirical view of the pre-
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modern island in which there was considerable cultural exchange between Sri Lanka 
and the world and especially southern India. 126  Particular evidential emphasis is 
placed on the southern Indian Tamil Nayakkar dynasty that provided the last four 
kings of Kandy (1739-1815). These empirical observations concerning the 
acceptance by Sinhala-Buddhist society of Tamil-speakers and cultural and religious 
practices throughout the pre-modern period are directed at proving the argument that 
group distinctions were not politically salient (and thus a corresponding vision of 
harmony and peace) within the pre-colonial polity.127  
 
While Roberts reaffirms the evidence per se of   the   “considerable   ingress   of  
individual families, bodies of people, commodities, artefacts and deities from India 
into the island”,128 he argues that the interpretation placed by post-orientalists on 
these processes of exchange is not defensible at either an empirical level or as a 
matter of interpretative reasoning. Roberts presents extensive rebuttals and 
alternative interpretations to the post-orientalist empirical arguments, in particular in 
relation to the Nayakkar dynasty, the Tamil chieftains of the Vanni, and more 
generally on the nature of these cultural exchanges and the manner in which external 
cultural influences were received within Sinhala society, to which I will return in a 
moment.129 It is the post-orientalist reasoning in this regard – that  “wherever  there  is  
pronounced cultural exchange and fragmentary evidence on the incidence of 
boundary  crossing…[that]  there  can  be  no  differentiation  and  enmity”130 – based on 
the counterposing of oppositional conceptions of the modern (in which territorial 
boundaries   are   the   key   determinant   of   the   ‘other’   or   foreignness),   and   the   pre-
modern, (in which they are not), that Roberts finds untenable. 
 
“Behind   the   conclusion   that   Sinhala:Tamil   differentiation   was   of   little  
significance   is   the   either:or   epistemology   of   the  modern   rational   order…In  
building the principle of equality into the concept of community (as well as 
                                                 
126 See for an enumeration of post-orientalist examples, Nissan & Stirrat (1990): pp.23-24. 
127 See for e.g., N.  Gunasinghe,  ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Perceptions and Solutions’  in  H.  Alavi  
& J. Harriss (Eds.) (1985) South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press): pp.247-255. 
128 Roberts (2004a): p.11. 
129 See ibid: pp.46-48, and Ch.5. 




‘nation’),   they   extend  Anderson’s  modernist   framework   into   settings  where  
people’s   linkage   with   an   entity,   a   socio-political, king-centred entity, was 
organised on hierarchical principles that recognised the encapsulation of 
lesser  beings  by  higher  beings.”131 
 
Thus, even as they caution against it, post-orientalists read the present into the past, 
and apply a framework of reasoning to a pre-colonial socio-political order that 
cannot be understood in terms of those frameworks, and in doing so contributes to 
misleading if not revisionist understandings of nationalisms in Sri Lanka today.132 
Roberts links this approach to the influence of two intellectual currents in the social 
sciences: post-modernism   and   associated   concepts   of   ‘hybridity’   and   ‘situational  
ethnicity’  on   the  one  hand, and on the other, transactionalist theory, which stresses 
the role of individuals and elites in the formation of ethnic and national identities.133 
Underlying both post-modernism and transactionalism is an emphasis on individual 
agency that is insufficiently attentive to the cultural contexts that do not attach the 
same significance to individualism, rationalism, and egalitarianism, and in which 
ethnicity and nationalism are reproduced in places like Sri Lanka.  
 
In the theoretical understanding of ethnic identity as fluid, shifting, and ambiguous in 
the   discourse   on   ‘hybridity’   – a position originally developed in relation to 
challenges of multiculturalism and mass immigration in Western liberal democracies 
– Roberts   sees   a   clear   preference   for   “multi-cultural   mosaics”   and   “a   world   of  
contestation”.134 These   ideological  predispositions,  combined  with  an  “ignorance  of  
context”   and   limited   and   selective   consideration   of   secondary   sources,   sometimes  
leads to sweeping theoretical statements about ethnicity and  nationalism,  “within  the  
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frame  of   individual   choice   rather   than   [a]   sense   of   structured   context”135which are 
wholly asociological and ahistorical in relation to the reality.  
 
These notions of fluid identity patterns are bolstered by transactionalist theory in 
relation  to  ethnicity  and  nationalism,  which  “attaches  a  dominating  influence  to   the  
strategising  goals  of  individuals,  interest  groups  or  organised  parties.”136 The work of 
Eric  Hobsbawn  on  nationalism  and  the  ‘invention  of  tradition’,  a  source  of  authority 
for post-orientalist   scholars,   both   stresses   the   “designs   of   powerful   agents”   at   the  
same time as insisting on rigidly modernist categories of nation, state and territory in 
conceptualising   ‘tradition’   and   ‘modernity’   in   dichotomous   terms.137 The problem 
with these postmodernist-cum-transactionalist approaches to understanding the 
historical and cultural context of collective identity in Sri Lanka is that they are, 
 
 “…inadequate   when   we   explore   the   subjectivities   of   people   who   are  
immersed in their particular versions of the cosmic. The world of Sinhala-
speakers in the Kingdom of [Kandy] …   had many strands of cosmic 
evaluation – from the respectful worship of a god-king to the possible 
significance attached to a period of prolonged drought or to a comet in the 
sky  or  the  awful  mark  of  small  pox  on  a  supposedly  godly  figure.”138  
 
It is from this critical analytical standpoint that Roberts addresses the empirical 
arguments of the post-orientalist position to effect that in the pre-colonial polity 
cultural difference was politically unimportant; that cultural identities were protean 
and constantly renegotiated; and that conflicts when they did occur, were in the 
nature of dynastic disputes rather than deeper ethno-cultural ones. Roberts frames the 
central question in this way: 
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“The   issue   is   whether   the   data   on   the   ingress   of   symbols,   people   and  
commodities from the Indian subcontinent and across the Indian Ocean 
precluded differentiation between [Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors and others] in 
the referential and subjective world of the population in the [Kandyan 
kingdom].”139    
 
In   summary   form,   Roberts’   arguments   in   relation   to   the   multiplicity   of   empirical  
issues implicit in this central question are as follows. Firstly, in the absence of 
persuasive contrary evidence, cultural exchange to the extent it had a bearing on 
people changing their ethnic, religious or linguistic identities was a one-way process 
of Tamils and others becoming Sinhalese, and not a two-way process in which 
Sinhalese also become Tamils or otherwise changed their identity. 140  Roberts 
suggests   that   “issues   relating   to   the   distribution   of   power,   including   the  weight   of  
numerical  majority   and   the   advantages   attached   to   the   control   of   state  machinery”  
were  pertinent  to  this  “one  -way  traffic”  of  Sinhalisation.141 
 
Secondly, at least in the last Kingdom of Kandy, “the  spatial  centre  of  potency” was 
the Sinhala-Buddhist kingship,  and  its  potency  was  such  that  “patriotic  sentiments”  
towards it spread beyond the areas in the vicinity of the Kandy plateau, and extended 
to the indigenous Vadda community and their lands as well as to Sinhalese 
inhabitants of the coastal areas under the control of the Portuguese and later the 
Dutch  and   the  British:   “these   sentimental   attachments  were   threaded  by  notions  of  
Sinhalaness and directed towards a named entity, referred to variously as Sinhalē, 
Tunsinhalaya, Siri Lanka, uda pata rata or by other synonyms, associated with the 
king.”142 Roberts adduces evidence that even the Tamil-speaking Vanni chieftains of 
the north were “patriotically  attached”  to  the  Kandyan  order  of  kingship.143 
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Thirdly, Roberts addresses the post-orientalist argument about the heterogeneity of 
the pre-colonial state based on the evidence of extensive intercourse between the 
island and the world during the pre-colonial era, in which there was movement of 
people and cultural, linguistic and religious borrowing. Post-orientalists adduce this 
evidence in support of the proposition that ethnic differences were not politically 
significant in this heterogeneous polity, suggesting further that it was colonial 
modernity that introduced ideas of homogeneous and territorial exclusivism to 
conceptions of especially Sinhala-Buddhist identity. 144  Roberts offers a radically 
different view of the nature of pre-colonial heterogeneity, in which the category 
‘Sinhala’  encompassed ethnic plurality hierarchically, rather than one that existed as 
one among many equal group identities. 
 
“Those  who   spoke  Sinhala   and  who   saw   themselves   as  Sinhalese  were   not  
homogeneous. Sinhala society was not only girded and threaded by caste 
differentiation, it was permeated by hierarchical principles of caste distinction 
… In a word, it was structured on difference – so that the category 
“Sinhalese”  (Sihala, Sinhala) was necessarily an encompassing category that 
incorporated difference. This made it feasible for the Sinhala states of the 
pre-British era to incorporate lineages and bodies of migrants as castes or slot 
them  into  an  existing  caste  category  as  a  fraction  thereof.”145  
 
These arguments form a strong historiographical foundation for the position that a 
coherent   and   pervasive   sense   of   collective   identity   along   a   “We:They   scheme   of  
categorisation”146 was prevalent among the Sinhalese during the era of the Kandyan 
kingdom. Roberts cautions against   extending   “the   concept   of   ‘nationalism’   into  
contexts  that  may  not  support  its  usage”,147 but the manner in which this king-centred 
polity sustained the last pre-colonial Sinhala state renders it akin to a monarchical 
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state-nationalism in many ways. If, as Roberts suggests, there   are   ‘residual  
continuities’  between   this  pre-colonial collective consciousness and state form, and 
the post-colonial state-nationalism in Sri Lanka, then it is easy to see how the post-
orientalist efforts failed. The Sinhala-Buddhist  nation’s  historical,  cultural,  political,  
social,  and  territorial  dominance,  or  in  other  words,  its  ‘hierarchical  encompassment’  
of the whole island, seems complete and unassailable.  
 
I contend, however, that there are two significant ways in which this challenge can 
be met in contextualising plurinational principles to the Sri Lankan case. Firstly, the 
very  ethnicism  of  Roberts’  account  insulates  it  from  the  kind  of  nationalist attack that 
demolished the post-orientalists. Its emic theoretical strength thus enables us to add 
content   to   Anthony   D.   Smith’s   theoretical   distinction   between   the   nation   (as  
organisational culture) and nationalism (as ideological movement), and to 
differentiate the historical and sociological nature of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
conception of the nation and state, from the historiographical claims of contemporary 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. When conceived this way, the rediscovery of 
pluralistic traditions can be accomplished free from the ideology of post-orientalism 
and therefore with firmer defences against contemporary nationalist challenges. This 
in turn allows us to re-examine   elements   of   the   ‘myth-symbol   complex’   of   the  
Sinhala-Buddhist nation with a view to bringing to the fore its inclusionary and 
pluralist potential, in contradistinction to the ethnocratic mythomoteur that present-
day Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists have defined for and entrenched within the post-
colonial constitutional order.  
 
Secondly, it helps us understand the historical relationship between the Sinhala and 
Tamil ethnic collectivities, which in turn helps to determine the politico-spatial 
relationship between the two nations that requires constitutional articulation in the 
context of multinational territorial and normative claims today. At the level of 
political rhetoric and practice, it is abundantly clear that the Tamils, or significant 




community within the island.148 The Tamils are thus a minority nation in Sri Lanka 
in terms of demography and power, and in this sense, they are no different from 
minority stateless nations located within comparable types of state (i.e., a state that 
only reluctantly concedes and fitfully implements administrative devolution, and 
categorically denies any national status).149  
 
There is, however, a further layer of complications arising from certain weaknesses 
and inconsistencies in the way that Tamil nationalists have chosen to represent their 
national claims, such as, for example, the controversial inclusion of the Muslims in 
the   national   category   ‘Tamil-speaking   peoples’ and the more ambitious aspects of 
the territorial boundaries of the traditional homeland. 150  Evaluated against the 
Sinhala-Buddhist position in each of these respects as well as a rich and substantial 
literature (both supportive and critical) about the ethnicity, religion, the nation and 
nationalism of the Sinhala-Buddhists, these weaknesses exacerbate the vulnerability 
of Tamil nationality claims. While this does not vitiate the case for constitutional 
accommodation, the manifest spatiotemporal inequality between the two nations 
does suggest that plurinational autonomy is better defended theoretically on the basis 
of a norm of asymmetry than of equality. This can only be demonstrated by 
considering the Tamil nationalist historiography.  
 
 
3.2 The Sub-State   National   Challenge:   The   ‘Instrumental  
Primordialism’  of  Tamil  Nationalism 
 
Virtually every political statement of Tamil identity commences with a reaffirmation 
of the distinct Tamil culture centred on their great and ancient language. This 
‘romanticist’151 emphasis on language and culture is also often couched in timeless – 
or primordial – terms. At the same time, most ideological and historical accounts of 
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modern Tamil nationalism date the gradual formation of a politically salient 
collective consciousness amongst Sri Lankan Tamils to the nineteenth century, and 
to social and political impulsions in response to British colonialism arising within the 
Tamil community in the Jaffna peninsula particularly.152 The focus on nineteenth 
century colonial modernity – involving the infrastructural development of education, 
communications and transport networks, together with the introduction of European 
ideas of the nation and nationalism – as being the conditions from which nationalism 
evolves, arises from instrumentalist conceptual assumptions widely held among 
contemporary Tamil nationalists. 
 
These assumptions are evident in the emphasis on modernist concepts like bounded 
territory, linguistic community and state-centred self-determination as the 
constitutive elements of nationhood. These theoretical assumptions are common to 
centrist-constitutionalist as well as Marxian interpretations of Tamil nationalism. 
Thus in the former tradition, the influential political scientist Alfred Jeyaratnam 
Wilson characterised the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976, in which formerly 
federalist Tamil nationalist parties called for the establishment of a separate state of 
Tamil Eelam for the first time, as a transition   from   “quasi-nationalism to 
nationalism”,   implying   that   the   authenticity   of   a   nationalism   depended   on   its  
aspiration to a state. He goes on to say, 
 
“This   meant   unwillingness   to   live   within   the   confines   of   a   single   island  
entity…the  Ceylon   Tamils   occupy a geographically contiguous base in the 
north and east, and it is this space, strengthened by common language and 
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culture, that provides them with the drive and anxiety to maintain their 
identity  and  separateness.”153  
 
Likewise from the left, Rudramoorthy Cheran provides the following working 
definition for his account of Tamil nationalism:  
 
“Nationalism   involves   and   evolves   from   a   fusion   of   several   elements:  
language, territory and distinctions from contiguous neighbours in ways 
which  sustain  a  group’s  sense  of  ‘us’  and  ‘them’…The  concept  of  a  nation,  
together with the idea of self-determination and popular sovereignty, argue 
that  this  collectivity  must  receive  one’s  undivided  loyalty  [sic].”154 
 
This combination of a Romantic sense of collective identity together with a 
modernist   conceptualisation   of   the   nation   can   be   called   Tamil   nationalism’s  
‘instrumental   primordialism’, 155  although it must be made clear that no such 
characterisation is expressly advanced anywhere in the Tamil nationalist literature. 
On the contrary, except for the Marxist categories that permeated much Tamil 
nationalist   discourse   in   the   1970s   and   80s,   Tamil   nationalism’s   English-language 
literature is striking for its disengagement with nationalism and constitutional 
scholarship. Indeed, Wilson’s   canonical   account   begins   with   the   (essentially  
unpersuasive) complaint that, 
 
“It   has   been   difficult   and   sometimes   impossible   …   to   find   in   Western  
literature definitions relevant to the case of Ceylon/Sri Lanka for terms such 
as  ‘communalism’,  ‘artificial  states’  bequeathed  by  decolonisers,  alternatives  
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to   the   state   structure   such   as   ‘galactic   polities’,   and   a   number   of   other  
phenomena  that  beset  the  new  state  formations  in  the  Third  World.”156  
 
The governing narrative of Tamil nationalism usually commences with the Hindu 
revival of the nineteenth century. As with the rise of the Sinhala-Buddhist revivalist 
movement, the cultural influence of European rule and in particular the role of 
Christian missionary activity in the Jaffna peninsula aroused the need for a 
reaffirmation of Tamil culture and Hinduism, at the same time as European forms of 
modern education and methods of knowledge dissemination catalysed revivalist 
activity.157 In fact, the Tamil-Hindu revival begun by Arumuka Navalar (1822-1879) 
in Jaffna in the mid-nineteenth century preceded its Sinhala-Buddhist counterpart by 
a generation.158 As Wilson observes,  
 
“Navalar’s  work  uplifted  Tamil  ethnicity  and  pointed  the  way  to  a  yet-to-be 
articulated Tamil national consciousness. He was not a dominant figure like 
Anagarika [Dharmapala], but there were certain important changes which he 
sponsored or introduced himself, and which can be connected to later 
developments  in  Tamil  nationalism.”159  
 
The distinction Wilson suggests here between Dharmapala and Navalar needs to be 
underscored because it also signifies certain important differences between the two 
revivalist movements and the two ethno-cultural nationalisms that sprang from them. 
While both were public men who contributed decisively to the ethno-religious 
revival of their respective communities in the face of a shared opponent in the form 
of Christian evangelism and European imperialism, the overtly political nature of 
Dharmapala’s   activities (including in the articulation of an historically 
                                                 
156 Wilson (2000): p.5. 
157 K.  Kailasapathy,  ‘The Cultural and Linguistic Consciousness of the Tamil Community’,  Punitham  
Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture (1982), cited in Wilson (2000): p.28. See also K. Kailasapathy, 
‘Cultural and Linguistic Consciousness of the Tamil Community’  in  Social  Scientists  Association  
(1984) Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka (Colombo: SSA): pp.107-120. 
158 Cheran (2009): p.xiv. See also D. Hellmann-Rajanayagam  (1989)  ‘Arumuka Navalar: Religious 
Reformer Or National Leader of Eelam?’,  Indian Economic Social History Review 26: 235; 
P.  Schalk,  ‘Sustaining the Pre-Colonial Past: Saiva Defiance against Christian Rule in the 19th 
Century Jaffna’  in M. Bergunder, H. Frese & U. Schroder (Eds.) (2010) Ritual, Caste and Religion in 
Colonial South India (Halle: Franckesche Stifungen zu Halle). 




contextualised, state-centred Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideology of inclusion and 
exclusion),   is   to   be   contrasted   with   Navalar’s   near-complete disinterest in the 
‘political’  and  the  ‘historical’  as  understood within Western approaches to modernity 
and   nationalism.   While   Navalar’s   cultural   and   religious   activities   revived   a  
heightened sense of historical and collective selfhood among Jaffna Tamils, which in 
turn spawned an efflorescence in Tamil historical scholarship and polemics well into 
the next century, he was himself unconcerned with such cornerstone nationalist 
concepts as territory and state that feature so prominently both in Western ideas of 
the nation and nationalism as well as Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist historiography. He 
therefore reflected and represented a sense of Tamil-ness that was wholly organic, 
and in many ways unique even in the context of performative or ritual-based 
conceptions of collective consciousness among other ethnicities of South Asia.160 As 
Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam observes,  
 
“The  Tamils  do  not  need  history  to  prove  who  they  are  and  how  they  come  to  
be what they are, because they confirm their identity by other means, namely, 
religious, cultural, literary, social [means]. They are secure as Tamils, and 
Tamil  culture  and  religion  do  not  need  a  state,  they  are  timeless.”161 
 
In addition to Navalar and his religious revival, the Tamil historiographies produced 
in this period by scholars educated in the Western mould began to use the methods 
and techniques of European history-writing, and aspired to reproduce Tamil history 
according to the expectations of European conceptions of history.162 Chief among 
these objectives was the desire to portray the Tamils as a people with a particular 
type of great and distinctive history, which was a necessary precondition for their 
recognition   by   colonial   rulers   as   a   distinctive   ‘race’   and   the   political   entitlements  
from the colonial state that accrued from that recognition. 163  Tamil historical 
scholarship in this tradition thus sought to depict Sri Lankan history as either the 
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history  of  two  distinctive  peoples  or  ‘founding  races’164 or that the entire history of 
Sri Lanka was a Dravidian, Tamil history, including that of the Sinhalese in spite of 
their Aryan pretensions.165 
 
The Tamil-Hindu revival, as championed by Navalar, was therefore a Romantic 
renaissance of conservatism and traditionalism. Its insular and inward-looking 
nature, and its preoccupation with the preservation of its own culture, language and 
religion, meant that it was not concerned with the rest of the island, with the 
Sinhalese, or with the Sinhalese monarchical state in history.166 This was in sharp 
contrast to Sinhala-Buddhist  revivalism  (especially  Dharmapala’s  hegemonic  version  
of it), which was not only noticeably preoccupied with Tamil subversion and with 
incursions by the Dravidian enemy across the sea in South India, but also engaged a 
‘protestant’   critique   of   traditional   monastic   Buddhism. 167  Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism’s  central concern with the resurrection of the glorious past of the ancient 
Sinhala-Buddhist monarchical state together with its territorial tropes was in part an 
expression of hostility to outsiders. It reflected a desire to evict European colonialists 
from their island home, and to exclude, or rather to subordinate, Christians, Muslims, 
Hindus and Tamils within a state order enshrining Sinhala-Buddhist supremacy.168 
The   effect   of   Navalar’s   Saivite   Tamil   revivalism was to raise some measure of 
consciousness among Tamils about a shared religion, language, culture and 
literature,  but  “by  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  a  vibrant  Tamil  nationalism  had  
still  to  make  itself  articulate.”169 The consensus within Tamil nationalist scholarship 
about the nineteenth century revival is perhaps best summed up by Cheran:  
 
“It   is   difficult   to   assert   that   the   Hindu   revival   was   a   form   of   Tamil  
nationalism. Nationalism involves and evolves from a fusion of several 
elements: language, territory and distinctions from contiguous neighbours in 
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ways   which   sustain   a   group’s   sense   of   ‘us’   and   ‘them’.   Nationalism   as   a  
collective identity is both intersubjective and relational. The concept of a 
nation, together with the idea of self-determination and popular sovereignty, 
argue that this collectivity  must  receive  one’s  undivided  loyalty.  Understood  
thus, it can be said that there was no Tamil nationalism to speak of. However, 
there was a well-developed sense of Tamil ethnic consciousness sustained by 
a range of everyday practices as well as by caste-based practices that 
maintained  boundaries  of  exclusion  and  inclusion.”170 
 
Parallel   to   Navalar’s   revival,   however,   were   the   innovations   in   the   secular   world  
introduced by the colonial state, especially by the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 
1833. Until territorial democracy under universal franchise was introduced in 1931, 
‘communal   representation’   was   the   principal   institutional   means   by   which   the  
imperial power transacted with the colonial peoples.171 Communal representation as 
the governing principle and framework of elite native politics in the colonial period 
had a profound effect on the political development of Ceylon and the future 
trajectories of ethnic relations, especially after the imperial arbiter had left the scene 
at independence.172 For the purposes of the Tamil nationalist narrative, however, 
what was important about communal representation was that it served to reinforce 
the view held among Tamils that they together with the Sinhalese were the two 
historic majority communities of the island, with others such as the Muslims, 
Malays, Burghers and Indian Tamils being regarded as the minorities. Wilson has 
described this phenomenon thus: 
 
“…there   developed   a   sense   of   national awareness, the consciousness of 
being Sinhalese or Tamil, given weight by the perception that each of them 
were   the   island’s  ‘founding  races’,   the  major  communities,  while   the  others  
(Muslims, Indian and Burghers) were the minorities. Only with the advent of 
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territorial representation based on population in the 1920s did the Tamils 
begin to realise that they too were a minority community. The transition from 
a lower to a higher level of national consciousness then began to kindle the 
anxieties of the Tamils, who started to entertain fears of the Sinhalese 
majority.”173 
 
These fears were left unresolved at the time of independence in 1948. The well-
known history that follows after independence saw the Tamils demanding federal 
autonomy as a distinct nation, and then launch an armed struggle to secede from the 
Sri Lankan state, which concluded in 2009 with the comprehensive military defeat of 
the separatist movement.  
From the established narrative of the development of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka, 
we see that it was based at the core in a collective sense of belonging around the 
Tamil language and culture, and was driven by two factors: firstly, by social 
responses to perceptions of cultural degradation under colonialism and 
discrimination post-independence; and secondly, by political responses to changing 
institutional forms of power and representation in the colonial and postcolonial state. 
We can also see from this narrative that the articulations of the nation by Tamil 
nationalists, and the politico-legal claims made on behalf of the nation, have been 
influenced by two main ideological and discursive sources: the rights discourse of 
conventional international law relating to the self-determination of peoples, and the 
Marxist approach to nations and nationalities. The synthesis of these influences is 
seen in representations of Tamil nationalism even today, although echoing global 
trends, Marxist terminology is less apparent in Tamil nationalist rhetoric now than in 
the Cold War era.  
 
One of the consequences of this reliance by Tamil nationalists on the categories of 
international law in particular has been an absence of engagement with the political 
and constitutional theory concerning democracy and the state. In contrast therefore to 
sub-state nationalisms in Western plurinational states, which in recent decades have 
produced some of the most fundamental theoretical interrogations of liberal 
                                                 




democracy and the Westphalian nation-state,174 Tamil nationalism has not, in the 
main, concerned itself too deeply with theoretical critiques of the Sri Lankan state 
and its normative foundations. 175  Of course, in its political rhetoric, Tamil 
nationalism critiques such features of the host-state as ethnicised majoritarianism, 
discrimination and the absence of power-sharing space in the centralised unitary state 
in making its autonomy claims, either as a sub-state nation or separate state. Like 
Western sub-state nationalisms, Tamil nationalism also offers historiographical 
arguments about territorial nationhood, and in its federalist, as opposed to 
secessionist, incarnations, constitutional claims to recognition, representation and 
autonomy that necessarily involve a fundamental reorganisation of the Sri Lankan 
state  in  appreciation  of  the  island’s  bi-national character. However, the point to note 
is that these critiques and claims are generally empirical and institutional in 
character, and are more directed at issues of constitutional form than the underlying 
theoretical implications of national pluralism in a polity and constitutional order such 
as Sri Lanka.   
 
With some notable but limited exceptions such as the work of the historian Dagmar 
Hellmann-Rajanayagam and the anthropologist Stanley Tambiah, neither have Tamil 
nationalists felt the need to theorise the Tamil nation and its central claims much 
beyond the demotic language of political rhetoric.176 Aside from the projection of a 
separate ethnicity, comprising language, culture and a history of community in an 
identified territory as the basis of the nation, the politico-moral or philosophical 
arguments for its recognition rely almost entirely on grievances arising from the 
intolerance and misconduct of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, as reflected in the 
central  idea  of  Tamil  nationalism  as  a  ‘defensive’  or  ‘reactive’  concept,  exemplified  
in the influential account given by A.J. Wilson. While the host-state does not deny 
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the ethnic distinctiveness of Tamils – Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is hegemonic, 
not assimilationist 177  – the historical and territorial claims that comprise the 
foundation of Tamil nationhood, and aspirations to autonomy on that particular 
footing, are violently contested, and it is in these most vital respects that Tamil 
nationalist theory is weakest.  
 
These theoretical weaknesses are manifested in at least two important respects. It is 
both undeniable as well as unavoidable that Tamil nationalism is an ethnic-
communal model of nationalism, but as such it is susceptible to a whole range of 
normative and ideological critiques that are usually directed at this kind of 
nationalism, chief among them the liberal democratic concern with the status of the 
individual as a rights-bearer in relation to the nation that I have discussed in relation 
to the civic-ethnic dichotomy above. Tamil nationalists have not met this and many 
other critiques, and it is perhaps unsurprising that Eric Hobsbawm, from a 
Marxist/functionalist viewpoint, described the first attempt by the Tamil Federal 
Party  to  set  out  an  “‘objective’  definition”  of  the  Tamil  nation  in  1951  as  “unusually  
convenient for propagandist and programmatic, as distinct from descriptive 
purposes”,  but  “fuzzy,  shifting  and  ambiguous,  and  as  useless  for  the  purposes  of  the  
traveller’s  orientation  as  cloud-shapes  are  compared  to  landmarks.”178  
 
Similarly, the pronounced reliance on international law for the rights framework 
within which the claim to self-determination is articulated has bared Tamil 
nationalism to charges of compulsive separatism. While it is conceded that Tamil 
nationalism became a secessionist nationalism only after a sustained period of 
seeking accommodation within a united Sri Lanka and in the face of obdurate refusal 
on the part of an ethnocratic state to grant either equality or autonomy, the fact 
remains that the recourse to international law has meant the relative neglect of 
constitutional law as the means and method of mounting its sub-state challenge to the 
Sri   Lankan   state.   As   noted   above,   Tamil   nationalism’s   federal   constitutional  
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demands have confronted the unitary form of the Sri Lankan state on the plane of 
institutional (re)form, but it cannot be said that it has presented a particularly 
rigorous  challenge,  “at  a  deeper  and  more  general  level  to  the  fundamental  normative  
precepts  which  inform  contemporary  constitutional  theory  and  legal  praxis.”179 
 
Both these weaknesses have arisen from the failure of the Tamil nationalist elite 
(politicians as well as intellectuals) to produce cogent conceptual arguments to 
substantiate their constitutional claims. As Guibernau has argued, a crucial factor in 
the sustainability of nations without states, especially those within repressive host 
states,  is  “…the  existence  of  an  alternative  elite  ready  to  provide  cultural,  historical,  
political and economic arguments to foster and sustain the distinctive character of the 
stateless nation and to legitimise its will to decide upon its political future…”180 In 
the case of Tamil nationalism, however, a persistent tendency to resort to shrill and 
often unrealistic political rhetoric has not been backed up by deeper conceptual 
work. This was compounded during the dominance of the Liberation of Tigers Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), whose terrorism extended conspicuously to the Tamil intelligentsia 
and a complete intolerance of dissent and debate. Nevertheless, even in the light of 
these deficiencies, that Tamils of the north and east have repeatedly affirmed their 
nationality claim and entitlement to self-determination attests to the resonance of 
those claims, and perhaps to the futility of the repressive methods of Sinhala-
Buddhist ethnocracy.   
 
We can thus recapitulate the sociological, historical and political dimensions of Sri 
Lankan Tamil nationalism in the following terms. The scholarly and political 
literature on the origins and development of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka offers an 
account that is historically linear and remarkably ideologically consistent. It is 
possible to delineate four major features to this dominant narrative. Firstly, even 
though ancient and medieval historiographical information is marshalled in support 
of the articulation of political and legal rights claims, Tamil political consciousness 
is generally presented as an historically modern phenomenon, originating in the 
nineteenth century. Secondly, the Tamil collective identity is presented essentially as 
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a distinctive ethno-culture, based primarily on the Tamil language, its forms and 
history, and at least at the beginning, the Saiva Siddhantha form of Hinduism, 
although the emphasis on Hinduism recedes dramatically in the politics of Tamil 
nationalism especially after independence. Thirdly, there is wide consensus that the 
development of collective identity, from a culture-based   ‘group   awareness’   to   a  
politically   salient   ‘national   consciousness,’   was   a   gradual   process   occurring  
throughout the British colonial and post-colonial era, in the context of changing 
constitutional forms of political representation and broader socio-economic 
transformations. In what is a distinctive if not unique feature of Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalism as a post-colonial sub-state nationalism, fourthly, the common narrative 
advances the view that the formation of this nationalist identity, as well as the several 
political transformations of its nature and claims during the twentieth century, is 
almost entirely the result of the intolerant or perfidious actions of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism, institutionally empowered to consolidate its numerical primacy through 
territorial democracy (as opposed to communal representation in the colonial state) 
from the late colonial period onwards.  
 
Thus the major implication of this narrative seems to be that, absent the hegemonic 
influence of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism within the polity and with regard to the 
form of the state, it is possible that neither the Tamil collective identity nor Tamil 
constitutional claims would have assumed a specifically nationalist character. It is 
from  and  within   these  perspectives   that  Wilsons’s  seminal  scholarly  account  of   the  
rise  of  Tamil  nationalism  commences  with  the  observation  that  it  “evolved  gradually,  
as a defensive reaction to events”181 and has at its heart the following assertion: 
 
“…   the phenomenon of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism, [is] born of 
defensiveness and reaction to events. The phenomenon means that if the 
Sinhalese leadership were accommodating, Tamil national consciousness 
would settle for a federalised polity. But such an accommodation has not yet 
materialised.”182 
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The   notion   of   a   ‘defensive’   and   ‘reactive’   nationalism   therefore   needs   to   be  
underscored   as   the   predominant   feature   of   Tamil   nationalism’s   political   self-
representation. This has material implications for theorising Tamil nationalism as 
well as in understanding its substantive constitutional claims. In the latter respect, the 
essential nature of the constitutional claims is as a protective bulwark against 
majoritarian hegemony within the island polity. While to a greater or lesser extent, 
the counter-majoritarian impulse is true of all sub-state nations in plurinational 
contexts,  what  is  noteworthy  is  that  Tamil  nationalism’s  constitutional  claims  are  not  
generally conceived from an a priori assertion of a national status, but are 
fundamentally dependant on the behaviour of the dominant nation and the host state. 
It can therefore be argued, albeit counterfactually, that had the host state been more 
constitutionally accommodative in respect of addressing Tamil minority rights 
(including a measure of territorial devolution), it is likely that Tamil constitutional 
claims would not have been asserted in categorically nationalist terms.  
 
On the other hand, as we know, the post-colonial Sri Lankan state has been 
characterised throughout its existence not by policies of inclusion, pluralism and 
accommodation but by ethnicised majoritarianism, discrimination and exclusion. To 
the extent it has adopted constitutional and other measures towards the 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity, the state has done so under force of 
political circumstances, and then demonstrated reluctance or indifference with regard 
to their meaningful implementation.183 It has also instigated or tolerated political 
violence against minorities, with a long record of sporadic communal violence 
                                                 
183 For example, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 1987, which eventually granted 
language parity and a degree of provincial devolution, was only enacted under severe pressure of the 
Indian government. Its most important feature and rationale, territorial autonomy in the north and east, 
has never properly materialised: see R. Edrisinha, M. Gomez, V.T. Thamilmaran & A. Welikala 
(Eds.) (2008) Power Sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents, 1926-2008 
(Colombo: CPA): Chs.16,17; K. Loganathan (1996) Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolving 
Ethnic Conflict (Colombo: CEPRA): Ch.5; N. Seevaratnam (Ed.) (1989) The Tamil National 
Question and the Indo-Lanka Accord (New Delhi: Konark); R. Amarasinghe, A. Gunawardena, J. 
Wickramaratane & A.M. Navaratna-Bandara (2010) Twenty Two Years of Devolution: An 
Evaluation of the Working of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Institute for 




culminating in the manner in which the ethnic conflict was brought to an end 
involving massive civilian deaths.184   
 
It is in this insalubrious context that the Tamil electorate in the north and east of Sri 
Lanka have consistently returned political parties affirming the basic claims of Tamil 
nationhood in every general election since 1956, including several post-war elections 
between 2009 and 2013. Thus the Tamils of the north and east of the island have 
electorally endorsed a vision of distinctive nationality from virtually the beginning of 
Sri   Lanka’s   post-colonial existence, and have done so even after the armed 
secessionist movement was military defeated by the state in 2009. That is the sub-
state national challenge that renders Sri Lanka not merely a multi-ethnic but also a 
multi-national polity. It is this socio-political reality that the Sri Lankan state must, 
both normatively and structurally, fully reflect in its constitutional order if it is to be 
regarded as consistent with fundamental democratic values.  
 
Constitutional theory in Sri Lanka is thus confronted with a real case of competing 
national claims requiring accommodation in some constitutional form, but unlike in 
the case of Western sub-state nationalisms, the sub-state elite has produced little or 
no coherent theoretical foundation for their legal and political claims. As I do not 
intend to fill these internal lacunae, we need an alternative analytical basis to explain 
the dynamics of multi-nationalism.      
 
 
4. An Analytical Framework for National Pluralism: Performative 
Nationalism and Plurinational Constitutionalism 
 
In the ethnicist interpretation of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation we have glimpsed the 
ritual idiom that was so central to the nationality performances of that group in the 
pre-colonial world, and which are continued today in various forms. Noting how the 
incentives of the modern state influence the nationalist practices of the present, de 
Silva Wijeyeratne argues that,  
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“Modern Sinhalese nationalism   … has never been wholly modern. The 
epistemological moment of the 19th century [ethno-religious, anti-colonial 
revival] never effaced the continued resonance of a set of older practices that 
were ontologically grounded. Rituals that were intrinsic to the [pre-colonial 
and post-colonial] State were transformed through the imaginary of the 
bureaucratic   State,   the   cosmic   order   becoming   ‘active   in   state   processes  
towards greater centralisation, totalitarian action, and the way its agents and 
agencies react  to  events  in  the  environment  of  the  state.’”185  
 
The anthropological strain of performative nationalism has been discussed earlier in 
relation to the pre-colonial state as well as collective consciousness, from which 
historical models important lessons can be drawn for the constitutional 
accommodation of national pluralism in the present. But in this section, I turn to the 
instrumentalist version of performative nationalism exemplified in the work of 
Charles Tilly; from subjective historical and sociological accounts of nationalism to 
a structuralist explanation of why groups make specifically nationalist claims, or to 
use  Rogers  Brubaker’s  metaphor,  from  ‘supply-side’  to  ‘demand-side’  arguments.186  
 
This further step in the argument is necessitated by three factors. The first is that we 
need something more than what the literature presently offers by way of explanation 
for the emergence of the Tamil sub-state claim qua nation. We cannot of course 
assume   ‘supply-side’   arguments   are   not   there simply because of an absence of a 
cogent scholarly literature offering plausible theories of the Tamil nation and 
nationalism. Indeed, the Tamil masses have shown not merely compliance but also 
commitment   to   the   Tamil   elite’s   nationalist   project,   in   both parliamentary politics 
and armed conflict, and paid a very high human cost for that commitment.187 But it 
does mean for present purposes that we have to make use of instrumentalist 
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explanations as to why Tamil ethnicity began to be politically articulated in the 
distinctive language of nationhood in the post-independence era. Indeed, while not 
framed   in   the   language   of   performative   nationalism,   Wilson’s   ‘defensive   and  
reactive’  account  is  extremely  similar  to,  if  not  the  same  as,  Tilly’s  more  generalised  
explanation of the global rise of sub-state   nationalism.   But   Wilson’s   attempts   at  
theory are vague and imprecise and hence we can reinforce his efforts with the 
introduction of Tilly into the argument.  
 
Secondly and more broadly, the insights generated by Tilly’s   “elegant   and  
parsimonious”188 structural realism gives us a clearer picture of the macro-political 
dynamics of national pluralism beyond the subjective accounts of nationalists (or 
indeed the sociological explanations of nations) at which constitutional reform 
should be directed. As Brubaker reminds us,   Tilly’s   instrumentalism   leaves  many  
issues  unanswered:  “[Tilly]  offers  a   theory  of  nationalism  without  nationhood.  The  
theory addresses the political form of nationalist claims-making while ignoring the 
cultural content of nationalist sense-making.” 189  We have been attentive in the 
preceding discussion to both the distinction between the nation and nationalism as 
well  as  the  ‘cultural  content  of  nationalist  sense-making’  and  consequently  we  are  in  
a position   to   benefit   from   Tilly’s   insights   into   the   ‘political   forms   of   nationalist  
claims-making’  regardless  of  the  broader  deficiencies  of  his  theory.   
 
Thirdly,   Tilly’s   work,   which   developed   in   critical   response   to   the   teleological  
assumptions of post-colonial nation-building theorists, placed the state at the centre 
of his analysis of nationalism.190 This is important to us because of the continuing 
salience of the state and the traditional Westphalian state order to both majority and 
minority nationalisms for purposes articulating politico-legal claims. In this sense, it 
also marks a significant point of departure (noted in Chapter 3) with European 
plurinational constitutionalism, which assumes the retreat of the nation-state and the 
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advent  of   a   ‘post-sovereignty   era.’191 This does not describe the reality of states in 
South Asia and our treatment of plurinational constitutionalism must take account of 
this major difference.192 
 
Tilly’s   earlier   work   on   the   global   history   of   state-formation had adumbrated the 
connection between war-making and state-making   and   how   the   “heightened  
extractive appetites of militarily expansive states caused a progressive shift from 
indirect to direct rule, and this in turn generated resistance from previously insulated 
and autonomous regional power-holders   and   intermediaries.”193 In   applying  Tilly’s  
instrumentalist framework to the Sri Lankan case of competing nationalisms, his 
concepts  of  ‘top-down’  and  ‘bottom-up’  nationalisms,  and  the  relationship  of  both  to  
the concepts of direct and indirect rule, are especially important. Tilly defines top-
down   nationalism   as   “the   insistence   that   the   nation’s   collective   interest,   as  
interpreted  by  the  state’s  current  rulers,  should  take  priority  over  all  particularisms”  
which   “emerged   from   the   practices and then the doctrines that were useful in the 
state’s   combat   against   resistance   to   imposition  of  direct   rule.”194 In the Sri Lankan 
case, the British Empire constituted a form of indirect rule in which Tamils had an 
imperial protector and arbiter, but independence brought with it direct rule of the 
Sinhala-Buddhist majority which adopted the practices and doctrines of top-down 
nationalism in redefining the state. These practices and doctrines included 
“standardized   national   languages,   national   histories,   pageants, ceremonies, songs, 
banners,  museums,  schools,  and  much  more.”195 In turn, 
“Top-down nationalism generated bottom-up nationalism as its antithesis and 
mirror image. Political brokers who had strong investments in alternative 
definitions of language, history, and community rallied supporters in the 
name of oppressed and threatened nations, demanding protection from top-
down nationalizers. Having insisted on the correspondence between state and 
nation, top-down nationalizers were caught in a trap of their own devising: to 
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the extent that interlocutors for regional populations could establish that they 
constituted distinct, ancient nations, they made credible cases for political 
autonomy.”196  
This explains how Tamil claims came to be articulated in nationalist terms 
immediately after independence, although before that, Tamil politicians had used the 
terminology   of   ‘minority   community’   in   making   claims   to   constitutional  
protection.197  
 
With   regard   to   decolonisation,   Tilly   states   that   “bottom-up and top-down 
nationalisms usually combined, with advocates of independence speaking for captive 
nations but, upon arriving in power, seeking to impose their own versions of the 
national interest in the face of frequent opposition from within their own states”.198 
In both the top-down and bottom-up phases of decolonisation,  
 
“political   leaders   put   much   of   their   energy   into   organizing   public  
performances that broadcast the message: We Are a Nation. National 
performances usually included some display of military power, but they also 
frequently represented the nation in question as ancient, culturally coherent, 
unified, determined, and faithful to its self-proclaimed leaders.”199 
 
To the extent Tilly is here contemplating state-seeking nationalisms, this insight 
about anti-colonial nationalists is easily applicable to sub-state nationalists as well. 
The key point about nationalism as nationhood performances – “disciplined,  
stereotyped public demonstrations   of   nationness”200 – is that they are aimed at the 
acquisition, and framed by the doctrines of, an independent state for the nation. Thus 
Sinhala-Buddhists used top-down nationalism to consolidate control of the new state 
they had inherited from the British; whereas for the Tamils, nationhood was central 
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to winning autonomy. Once the federalism project had failed, nationhood 
performances became even more important in convincing the world beyond the Sri 
Lankan state that they had the capacity of self-government, and deserved recognition 
of a separate state of their own. These nationhood performances are clearly seen in 
Tamil nationalism throughout post-colonial   history,   from   the   Federal   Party’s   first  
assertion   of   the   claim   and   subsequent   electoral   success,   to   the   Liberation   Tigers’  
elaborate attempts to emulate stateness in territories under their control and to 
emulate   the   “visible,   prestigious,   transferable   models”   of   state-seeking nations 
elsewhere.201         
 
Beyond explaining the performative dimension of nationalist behaviour, what use 
does  Tilly’s  theory  have  for  constitutional  law  in  a  multinational  polity?  The  answer  
lies  in  Tilly  observations  on  direct  and  indirect  rule,  as  applied  to  “ethnically  defined  
populations.”202 He notes that these entities make strong claims for autonomy under 
two  conditions:   firstly,   “when  competitors  begin   to  make  claims   for   statehood that 
would  exclude  or  subordinate  the  ethnic  group  in  question”;;  and  secondly,  “when  the  
agents of the state to which the population is already subordinated begin to threaten 
a) the  group’s  distinctive  identity  or  b)  its  shared  access  to  advantageous  niches.”203 
In the Sri Lankan case, the first condition became apparent to Tamils at the point of 
independence, and Sinhala-Buddhist  nationalism’s   top-down nationalism and direct 
rule thereafter fulfilled both the second conditions. If this demand for autonomy is to 
be met without the creation of a separate state, then some form of amelioration of the 
consequences of top-down nationalism and direct rule is clearly necessary. It is 
submitted that an application of many of the principles of plurinational 
constitutionalism – in particular the disaggregation of the nation from the state, and 
the principles of autonomy, recognition and representation – would address these 
constitutional challenges in the Sri Lankan context. How this might be done is dealt 
with in the next two chapters.       
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In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate three things. Firstly, I have tried to show 
that the plurinational state as a model of constitution for multinational polities need 
not be restricted to the civic-societal nations on the basis of which it has so far been 
theorised, and that it may be usefully extended to other contexts in which competing 
nations and nationalisms are defined in ethnic-communal terms. I did so by 
demonstrating the superficiality of the civic-ethnic dichotomy in relation to a deeper 
understanding of ethnic nationalism, and by calling upon theoretical resources which 
stress the complementary rather than the either/or manner in which tradition and 
modernity interact in the contemporary reproduction of the nation and nationalism, 
especially in post-colonial contexts.  
 
Secondly, and building on the above, I discussed some of the major debates with 
regard to nation and state-formation in the Sri Lankan context, and sought to 
demonstrate that, while serious challenges persist, there is nothing about the 
historical and sociological character of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation that makes it 
categorically impervious to pluralistic accommodation of the Tamil nation and other 
minority communities, in spite of the intolerant rhetoric and the manipulated 
historiographies of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists today. As de Silva Wijeyeratne has 
stated, “the   ontological   ground   of   Sinhalese   nationalism   is   contingent   upon   its  
modernity, [but] this very same ontological ground made possible a pre-European 
State imaginary that was not centralised but thoroughly devolved or rather galactic in 
nature.”204 Thus  while   this   galactic   past  makes   a   pluralistic   reading   of   the   island’s  
history conceivable, it was apparent nevertheless in this part of the discussion that in 
spatiotemporal terms, the relationship between the Sinhala-Buddhists and Tamils in 
the island is such that any claim to an equality of status between the majority and 
minority nations within a putative plurinational dispensation would be difficult 
historicise. A normative approach that foregrounds asymmetry rather than equality as 
                                                 




the foundation of plurinational autonomy therefore suggest itself, and these questions 
will be pursued in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Finally, the eschewal of the tradition and modernity dichotomy allowed us to 
incorporate a useful instrumentalist perspective into the argument, which has given 
us a diagnostic view of the behavioural dynamics of national pluralism within the 
incentives and constraints imposed by the modern state system. It has clarified the 
political challenges of competitive nationalisms, and complemented our socio-
cultural understandings of ethnic nationalism, and in doing so provided a useful 
analytical framework within which to locate the normative and structural discussion 
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1. Introduction  
 
Building on the preceding socio-historical accounts of the Sinhala-Buddhist and 
Tamil nationalisms in the island, this chapter explores at more depth the descriptive 
and normative theoretical challenges for democratic constitutionalism that arise in 
the context of national pluralism in Sri Lanka. The principal issues in this regard, and 
the ways in which they diverge empirically and theoretically from the conditions 
from which the liberal plurinational state has so far been mainly theorised, have been 
introduced in outline Chapter 3. These include fundamental questions about the state, 
sovereignty, democracy, and pluralism, within the rubric of a post-colonial polity. 
This chapter proceeds in two steps, seeking to address both, in descriptive terms 
‘what   is,’  and   in  normative   terms  ‘what  ought   to  be,’   in   relation   to  a  constitutional 
accommodation   of   the   island’s   plurinational   character   that   is   consistent   with  




democratic dilemma of national pluralism is problematised by reference to two 
important aspects of state-formation  in  Sri  Lanka,  both  of  which  underline  a  ‘hard’  
conception  of  statehood  that  varies  dramatically  with  the  ‘soft’  liberal  Western  states  
that have so far received the attention of plurinational constitutionalism.   
 
It has been observed that one of the major empirical differences between the Western 
and Sri Lankan contexts of national pluralism is the issue of colonialism: the 
historical circumstance through which the modern state was introduced into the 
political landscape of the island in the nineteenth century.1 Consistently with the 
direction of argument I have taken in previous chapters, I am attentive to Sujit 
Sivasundaram’s  germane  observation  that,   
 
“…what  matters  is  not  an  assessment  of  whether  colonialism  was  the  agent  of  
change or continuity, but rather the idea of transition as a process which was 
ever changing and which lay in the varying and uneven interactions of people 
across the axis of colonizer-colonised, even at the moment when the state and 
its publics were being forged out of early modern conceptions of political 
sovereignty  and  lineage.”2  
 
Even so, it is undeniable that conceptions of the state, sovereignty and collective 
self-hood(s) did change fundamentally due to colonial reforms. Therefore, aside from 
distinguishing it empirically from the process of state-formation in Western 
plurinational democracies, colonialism has a number of important theoretical 
implications for the character of the state in Sri Lanka, even beyond the colonial era, 
which are central to constitutional law. Colonial modernity entailed two significant 
departures – in  the  form  of  the  ‘rule  of  difference’  and  the  ‘law  of  exception’  – from 
the egalitarian universalism of the rule of law that characterised the modern state in 
the Western experience. These two exceptions have defined the very character of 
what  is  meant  by  the  ‘modern  state’  in  Sri  Lanka  (in  common  with  other  comparable  
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former colonies of the British empire), and they have altered the meaning of 
‘modernity’   from   what   that   term   denotes in the Western world in terms of key 
principles of state organisation like equality, during both the colonial and post-
colonial eras. These contextual differences in an important phase of state-formation 
have a direct bearing on whether plurinational ideas are an appropriate constitutional 
strategy for addressing national pluralism in Sri Lanka, and if so, what the form and 
substance of such constitutional rearrangements ought to be.   
 
With the introduction of universal electoral democracy in 1931, and for the first few 
years after independence in 1948, attempts were made by the departing colonial 
power as well as the local political elite to consolidate the legitimacy of the successor 
state with the deliberate construction of an inclusive statal nation. In accordance with 
the dominant thinking of the time, this process attempted to emulate the modernity of 
Western nation-states by constitutional frameworks premised on, and aimed at the 
promotion of, a unified demos transcending ethnic and religious cleavages, mainly 
through the traditional liberal strategy of privatising cultural diversity.3 While the 
monistic demos assumption implied the rejection of any notion of multiple nations 
within the island, the liberal modernist experiment itself was short-lived, and any 
potential   it  had  as  a  viable  model  for  Sri  Lanka’s  plural  polity  was  nullified  by  the  
rise of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism laying claim to the ownership of the state, 
registered in the watershed general elections of 1956.4 Democratic proceduralism 
together with absent or ineffective constitutional protections for pluralism paved the 
way for the majoritarian ethnic nationalism to occupy the embryonic national space 
of the post-colonial state, displacing the ideal of a monistic (but internally pluralist) 
demos with the reality of a hegemonic (although not assimilationist5) ethnos, and 
thereby eclipsing the inclusionary and egalitarian potential of the traditional 
Westphalian nation-state.  
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This political process of ethnicised democracy has fundamentally coloured the nature 
and evolution of the Sri Lankan nation-state ever since, and constitutes one of the 
most important contextual features of the case study. The conflation of the majority 
Sinhala-Buddhist identity with that of the statal nation has of course long been noted 
by historians, sociologists and anthropologists.6 But this insight can be extended and 
deepened by characterising the Sri Lankan state as a specific instance of an 
‘ethnocracy,’  within  the  broader  theoretical  category  of  ‘ethnic  democracy.’  This  has  
an important theoretical purpose, inasmuch as it constitutes one of the most powerful 
rationales for a plurinational settlement of the sub-state national claim (it has further 
implications for the constitutional design of such a settlement), if on the negative 
ground that in the context of an ethnocratic regime at the level of the host-state, only 
plurinational autonomy can address the Tamil national aspiration in conformity with 
democratic norms, and without the need for the creation of a separate Tamil state.   
 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the ethnocratic trajectory of the post-colonial state 
radicalised Tamil political claims from relatively benign demands for equal treatment 
to full-blown armed secessionist nationalism. The resulting violent conflict had, in 
terms  of  the  state’s  response,  the  effect  of  entrenching  the  ‘overdeveloped  state’7 (but 
with an underdeveloped statal nation) inherited at independence into an intolerant 
and   authoritarian   ‘hard   state.’   Even   without   the   hardening effects of protracted 
conflict (including through interminable states of emergency and the recourse to 
majoritarian populism in order to legitimise the accretion of authoritarian power8), 
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however, the Sri Lankan state shares with its counterparts in the South Asian region 
a conception of Westphalian statehood that is highly literalist in relation to legal 
principles like sovereignty and non-interference. This has determined a generally 
hostile   attitude   in   terms   of   the   state’s   response   to   internal   demands for minority 
accommodation, particularly if they involve territorial autonomy and a perceived 
dilution  of  the  state’s  sovereign  authority.  When  those  demands  have  taken  the  shape  
of a sub-state national challenge, the result has been nothing less than catastrophic. 
While a comparative review of South Asian states is beyond the scope of the present 
chapter,9 placing the case study in this regional context further illustrates another key 
empirical difference with Western plurinational contexts – the absence   of   a   ‘post-
sovereign’   or   ‘late   sovereign’   supra-state environment – which again has 
implications for the way in which plurinational constitutional approaches in regard to 
Sri Lanka have to be conceptualised.   
 
Drawing on the analytical insights from the problematisations above, in the second 
step, the argument adopts a more prescriptive mode. It canvasses two main 
normative propositions that must be incorporated into a new constitutional order for 
Sri Lanka if it is to accommodate its multiple nations according to a specific and 
contextualised logic of plurinational democracy. The background to this discussion 
has already been set out at some length in Chapter 3, in particular, the extension to 
the case study of established principles of plurinational constitutionalism relating to 
the  disaggregation  of  ‘nation’  and  ‘state’  in  the  plurinational  state,  and  the  concept  of  
‘relational   sovereignty’   that   must   underpin   a   state   order   based   on   plural   demoi. 
Building on this, the present chapter develops two further conceptual and normative 
                                                                                                                                          
(2006) Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP): pp.220-227. 
9 But see generally S. Krishna (1999) Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question 
of Nationhood (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press); A. Jalal (1995) Democracy and 
Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: CUP); S. 
Baruah (Ed.) (2010) Ethnonationalism in India: A Reader (New Delhi: OUP); S. Mahmud Ali 
(1993) The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia (London: Zed Books): 
Ch.1; W. van Schendel (2005) The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia 
(London: Anthem Press): Ch.1; S. Bose & A. Jalal (Eds.) (2003) Modern South Asia: History, 
Culture and Political Economy (London: Routledge); H. Scharfe (1989) The State in Indian 
Tradition (Leiden: E.J. Brill); S. Subrahmanyam (2001) Penumbral Visions: Making Polities in 




propositions, which require more extensive justification because they involve 
substantial modifications to established plurinational principles.  
 
For reasons already set out, the reliance of liberal plurinational constitutionalism on 
the normative philosophy of liberal nationalism and liberal democracy, in its 
approaches to the sub-state and host-state levels respectively, has little use in the Sri 
Lankan context due to the different types of nationalism and state involved. Indeed, 
in a political context in which symbols and symbolism hold much political salience, 
the adoption of liberalism as a language of constitutional negotiation can be 
constraining and invite opposition in ideological terms.10 In this context, a different 
foundation of political philosophy becomes necessary in order to constitute a 
democratic normative basis for the constitutional recognition and accommodation of 
national pluralism. Here  the  idea  of  ‘comprehensive  pluralism’11 is useful as a means 
of   rendering   ‘pluralism-as-fact’   into   ‘pluralism-as-norm,’   so   that   a   more   just   and  
legitimate constitutional order may be imagined that can replace the anomalous 
unitarism-as-norm of the present. The idea of comprehensive pluralism is more 
appropriate as a philosophical foundation in the Sri Lankan case because it is not 
associated as explicitly with ideological liberalism as liberal nationalism, while at the 
same time, it concerns itself with many of the normative questions that liberal 
nationalism and liberal plurinational constitutionalism are concerned with in 
opposition to traditional liberalism, including the critique of pure individualism and 
the critique of the claim to state neutrality.     
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Likewise, with regard to constitutional form and practice, it has already been 
established that the historical antecedents with which to redefine the contemporary 
state  as  a  ‘union  state’  in  appreciation  of  the  plurinational  reality  do  not  exist  in  Sri  
Lanka, or not at least with sufficient clarity as to serve as viable bases for 
reconstituting a union state structure in the present. Similarly, the disposition of 
Western host-states to respect without recourse to military force the prospect of 
peaceful, negotiated, consent-based secession of sub-state nations in the event of a 
failure of plurinational accommodation has no resonance whatsoever in the Sri 
Lankan case.  
 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, territorial division is such an anathema to the Sinhala-
Buddhist nation that it is wholly unlikely that  a  ‘two-state  solution’  can  be  regarded  
as a remotely viable means of a stable settlement on the island. It is also unlikely that 
such  a  precedent  would  be  welcomed  by  Sri  Lanka’s  South  Asian  neighbours,  who  
have their own secessionist movements, and in particular India, which would fear the 
irredentist potential within its own large Tamil state in the south. Accordingly, Indian 
intervention in Sri Lanka, including in the 1980s by the use of considerable coercive 
power against both the Sri Lankan state and Tamil armed secessionists, has 
consistently been based on the premise of power-sharing and devolution, but never 
secession.   These   political   realities   seem   to   forcefully   indicate   that   Sri   Lanka’s  
national pluralism must find a constitutional settlement that is within the framework 
of an undivided Sri Lankan state. The cogency of constitutional theory therefore 
would be enhanced by an a priori commitment to the unity of the state, and as I have 
pointed out before, ruling out secession as an option within the parameters of the 
present project is theoretically justifiable in that the establishment of a separate state 
in the settlement of the sub-state national claim would constitute a solution that is in 
an altogether separate category from the plurinational model of constitutional 
accommodation within the state.  
 
It  was  apparent  in  a  preceding  overview  that  liberal  plurinational  constitutionalism’s  




the host-state national society was mainly a critical one. This is explicable by the fact 
that these Western host-states are long-established democracies, which reflect many 
of the inclusive institutions associated with traditional liberalism, and the function of 
constitutional theorists  in  these  contexts  is  to  address  the  ‘post-modern’  challenge  of  
plurinationalism. By contrast, the incomplete process of modernity in Sri Lanka 
changes  the  constitutional   theorist’s  frame  of  reference,  which  must  simultaneously  
address the issue of the  statal  nation’s  modernity  in  addition  to  the  issue  of  sub-state 
national autonomy. The theoretical refocusing necessitated by these contextual 
differences  is  effected  through  the  introduction  of  the  idea  of  the  ‘state-nation’  to  the  
argument as a facilitating mechanism through which, in addition to the radical sub-
state autonomy contemplated by a plurinationalist reform of the state, an equally 
profound transformation is actively advocated at the level of the statal nation. In 
other words, plurinational autonomy at the sub-state level must be accompanied by a 
reactivation of the retarded modernisation of the statal nation, and a reversal, or at 
the very least a containment, of the process of ethnocratisation, if a state-wide 
plurinational constitutional system is to succeed. 
 
The discussion of these issues in what follows, together with the historical arguments 
presented in Chapter 2 with regard to the pre-colonial state, forms the ideational 
basis for the elaboration of the constitutional norm of asymmetry (as opposed to 
equality) that must govern the accommodation of multiple nations within the state in 
polities like Sri Lanka.   
 
 
2. Problematising the Post-Colonial Democratic State 
 
This section deals with the theoretical implications of colonialism for post-colonial 
democratic statehood, and outlines the theoretical model of ethnocracy as the state 
form that best describes the Sri Lankan state. Taken together, these two aspects of Sri 
Lankan state-formation  underscores   the   ‘hard   state’   as   it   relates   to   the   sociological  
condition of national pluralism, and establishes the necessary diagnostic background 







2.1 Colonial Modernity and Post-Colonial Nation-State Building: 
Difference and Exception 
 
Unlike the development of nationalism(s) discussed elsewhere in this thesis – a 
gradual and uneven historical process over which there is much scholarly 
disagreement – the advent of the modern state can be identified with relatively more 
historical exactness. The constitutional framework established as a result of the 
Colebrooke-Cameron reforms in 1833 is uniformly regarded by political and legal 
historians as the date at which the modern state took shape within the island.12 By the 
1830s, the British had already established many basic physical elements of a modern 
state – transport and communication networks, education reforms, administrative and 
technical services, police and courts and a military – but it was   these   “radical   and  
innovative”   reforms   that   rationalised   political   structures   in   terms   of   territory   and  
institutions.13 Nira  Wickramasinghe’s  claim  that  they  “brought  a  change  in  the  life  of  
the people and their perceptions, anchoring them firmly in modernity”  is  hyperbolic,  
but it is undeniable that these reforms marked a very deliberate attempt at 
constitutional modernisation.14 The island was territorially united under the single 
sovereignty of the British Crown, new administrative provinces and an executive 
                                                 
12 A.J. Wilson (1988) The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (London: Hurst & 
Co.): Ch.1; L. Marasinghe (2007) The Evolution of Constitutional Governance in Sri Lanka 
(Colombo: Vijitha Yapa): Ch.1; J.A.L. Cooray (1995) Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri 
Lanka (Colombo: Sumathi): Ch.1; T. Nadaraja (1972) The Legal System of Ceylon in its Historical 
Setting (Leiden:  E.J.  Brill):  Ch.II.  Cf.  Sivasundaram  (2013),  who  cautions  that  “…liberal reforms 
should not be seen as a package that somehow came to Ceylon through the agency of the two men 
who  led  the  Commission  of  Inquiry:  Colebrooke  and  Cameron”:  p.284.  My  point  can  still  be  made  
while taking on-board  Sivasundaram’s  observations  about the broader context within which these 
pivotal reforms were introduced and implemented, because his focus is primarily on the press and the 
schools  system  as  ‘instruments  of  liberal  debate’  whereas  my  interest  is  in  the  legal  evolution  of  the  
state. 
13 N. Wickramasinghe (2006) Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities 
(London: Hurst & Co.): p.29. 




structure established, Executive and Legislative Councils founded, and an 
independent judiciary under a Charter of Justice instituted.15  
 
The Colebrooke-Cameron reforms were an instance of the concrete implementation 
of the abstract principles of liberal imperialism,16 “in  which  imperial  domination  was  
argued   to   be   an   effective   and   legitimate   tool   of  moral   and  material   progress”17 for 
native peoples, at the height of that model and before it gave way later in the 
nineteenth   century   to   the   ‘culturalist’ paradigm of British imperial ideology.18 In 
consciously obliterating the territorial and demographic markers of the last domestic 
kingdom of Kandy, remnants of which had survived within the British administrative 
system between the cession of Kandy in 1815 and 1833, and uprooting forever the 
galactic model of the pre-colonial state, these reforms conformed conventionally to 
the   ‘diffusionist   model’   of   colonial   state-formation. 19  While undergoing several 
subsequent constitutional reforms rearranging its institutional structures during both 
the colonial and post-colonial periods, this model of centralised state has remained 
essentially constant in the Sri Lankan state tradition ever since.20 
 
Although the territorial character and technological aspects of the European model21 
were exported throughout the British Empire, colonial constitutional modernity 
nevertheless reflected two key departures from European modernity. As Terence 
Halliday and Lucien Karpik observe, 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid: pp.40-41; G.C. Mendis (Ed.) (1956) The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers: Documents on 
British Colonial Policy in Ceylon, 1796-1833 (Oxford: Oxford University Press): Vols.1 & 2. 
16 See U.S. Mehta (1999) Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal 
Thought (Chicago: Chicago UP); J. Pitts (2005) A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Liberal Imperialism 
in Britain and France (Princeton:  Princeton  UP).  See  also  A.  Sartori,  ‘The British Empire and its 
Liberal Mission’  (2006)  Journal of Modern History 78: pp.623-43. 
17 K. Mantena (2011) Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism 
(Princeton: Princeton UP): p.1; Wickramasinghe (2006): pp.28-29. 
18 Mantena (2011), Introduction: pp.1-20. 
19 C.A. Bayly (2004) The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and 
Comparisons (Malden, MA: Blackwell): pp.254-6. 
20 See also A. Welikala,  ‘The Sri Lankan Conception of the Unitary State: Theory, Practice and 
Historiography’  in  A.  Amarasingham  &  D.  Bass  (Eds.)  (forthcoming,  2014)  Post-War Sri Lanka: 
Problems and Prospects (London: Hurst & Co.).  




“British   colonies   shared   a   fundamental   contradiction. On the one hand, 
British imperial authorities and jurists insisted that the British colonial project 
was built upon a foundation not merely of force, but of the universality of the 
rule of law. On the other side, the colonisers insisted upon two reservations to 
law’s  radical  equality  and  universality:  (a)  a  reservation  in  the  form  of  a   law 
of exception and (b) a reservation embodied in a rule of difference.”22 
 
The law of exception related to the arbitrary and dictatorial emergency powers, often 
involving the invocation of martial law, which were reserved for periodic use when 
and  if  the  authorities  apprehended  a  threat  to  the  colonial  order.  But  in  revealing  “the  
iron   fist   that   lay   behind   the   velvet   glove   of   law,”   these   occasions   “not   only  
threaten[ed] the normative foundations of the colonial order, but question[ed] the 
very  legitimacy  of  the  law’s  universality.”23 Thus, according to Nasser Hussain, the 
relationship between the rule of law and the use of emergency powers in British 
colonies represented “an   intractable   tension.”24 The difference in the application of 
exceptional powers between the colonies and within Britain was the frequency and 
extent of those powers. Likewise, the rule of difference contaminated the pristine 
ideal of the rule of law with racial discrimination in the British colony. As Halliday 
and  Karpick   argue,   “While   the   rule   of   law  was   promised   on   universality,   colonial  
rule  depended  on  particularity…at  one  and  the  same  time  [the  British]  insisted  on  a  
universality and neutrality of law  and  asserted  a  rule  of  racial  difference.”25 The rule 
of difference was manifested in an array of practices across the empire, from outright 
racial segregation and even slavery in some colonies to more subtle forms of 
differentiation in most others. Within the legal system of Ceylon, no form of 
differentiation between the colonisers and colonised was ever recognised, although 
in other realms of social, economic and political life, there were implicit divisions in 
varying forms.  
                                                 
22 T.C. Halliday  &  L.  Karpik,  ‘Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony: A Theme with Three 
Variations’  in  T.C.  Halliday,  L.  Karpik  &  M.M.  Feeley  (Eds.)  (2012)  Fates of Political Liberalism in 
the British Post-Colony: The Politics of the Legal Complex (Cambridge: Cambridge UP): pp.3-55 at 
pp.11-12. Italics in original. 
23 Ibid: pp.12-13. 
24 N. Hussain (2003) The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (Ann 
Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press): p.133. 





Replicated and expanded after independence, both these central qualifications to 
legal equality at the heart of the modern state were to have far more pernicious 
consequences than under colonialism.26 The rise of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and 
its claims to the ownership of the post-colonial state reproduced the rule of 
difference with regard to minorities, and the resulting tension and extra-institutional 
violence has necessitated recourse to the law of exception, moreover as the norm 
rather than the exception. Thus the distorted modernity introduced by the colonial 
state instantiated a state tradition that was continued after independence, due to the 
new uses to which the rule of difference and the law of exception could be put by the 
post-colonial Sinhala-Buddhist owners of the state.   In   Halliday   and   Karpik’s  
typology of British post-colonies,   this   has   made   the   Sri   Lankan   state   a   ‘despotic  
order,’27 although as will be argued below, the characterisation of the state as an 
ethnocratic regime is both more appropriate and analytically useful for our purposes.  
 
What theoretical implications does this incomplete and distorted modernity of the Sri 
Lankan nation-state have for plurinational constitutionalism? In the West, 
plurinational   constitutionalism   is  premised  on   ‘the   story  of  historical   development’  
that both the statal nation and the sub-state national societies have passed through the 
process of nation-building  and  “have  evolved  from  pre-modern community to fully 
modern   society.”28 Does this imply that, due to the retarded, or at best on-going, 
nature of that process in post-colonial states like Sri Lanka, attempts to introduce 
plurinational concepts would be premature? To borrow an apposite metaphor from 
conflict   resolution   discourse,   is   there   a   ‘ripe   moment’ 29  of constitutional 
development,  determined  by   the  extent  and  depth  of  a   society’s  modernity,  only  at  
which a sociologically plurinational polity could be deemed to be fully prepared for 
                                                 
26 Ibid: p.15; D.  Udagama,  ‘The Sri Lankan Legal Complex and the Liberal Project: Only Thus Far 
and No More’  in  Halliday,  Karpik  &  Feeley  (2012):  Ch.6.  Marxist social scientists have addressed 
this  problem  with  the  concept  of  the  ‘overdeveloped  state’:  Alavi  (1972);;  see  also  J.  Uyangoda,  ‘The 
United Front Regime of 1970 and the Post-Colonial State of Sri Lanka’  in  T.  Jayatilaka  (Ed.)  (2010)  
Sirimavo:  Honouring  the  World’s  First  Woman  Prime  Minister (Colombo: The Bandaranaike 
Museum Committee): pp.31-45. 
27 Halliday & Karpik (2012): pp.15-16, 26-35. 
28 S. Tierney (2006) Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford: OUP): p.6. 
29 I.W.  Zartman,  ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’  (2001)  




the reception of a plurinational constitution? More particularly, is the mainstream Sri 
Lankan scholarly consensus right in continuing to argue that the principal conceptual 
answer  to  Sri  Lanka’s  mismanaged  pluralism is to recommit to the course of nation-
building from which it deviated after independence? In this view, a fully modern, 
democratic  state,  synonymous  with  an  inclusive,  civic  ‘Sri  Lankan’  nation,  founded  
on the norm of equal citizenship and transcending ethnic particularity, constitutes a 
comprehensive  regime  of  ‘unity  in  diversity’  that  would  address  all  but  the  extremist  
viewpoints on either side of the ethnic divide. 30  As we saw in Chapter 2, the 
proponents of this orthodoxy view ethnic nationalism, and especially its demands for 
politico-constitutional accommodation (if not for cultural recognition, a less 
fundamental set of demands that may be addressed through policies of secularism, 
multiculturalism and minority rights within the rubric of the modern nation-state) as 
a regressive form of primordialism, the vexing persistence of which it is the task of 
post-colonial – and now post-war – nation-building to overcome. They would 
moreover likely regard the radically autonomist schema of plurinationalism as a 
dangerously fissiparous recipe for disintegration and instability in the context of 
competing ethnic nationalisms.31 
 
I counter-pose two arguments to this civic nationalist view. The first 
counterargument relates to the nation-state itself, and draws from the critique of the 
Westphalian model presented by plurinational constitutionalism. The failure to build 
a post-colonial civic statal nation, underscored by decades of violent conflict, and a 
triumphalist  victor’s  peace  post-war that has not merely reproduced the constitutional 
anomalies at the heart of the conflict but also reinforced them, seems to require not a 
rededicated commitment to the failed model of post-colonial nation-statehood, but a 
fundamental reconsideration of it. Except for the familiarity of its nostrums, there is 
                                                 
30 See e.g., Wickramasinghe (2006): pp.199;;  R.  Coomaraswamy,  ‘The Politics of Institutional Design: 
An Overview of the Case of Sri Lanka’  in  S.  Bastian  &  R.  Luckham  (Eds.)  (2003)  Can Democracy Be 
Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-torn Societies (London: Zed Books): 
Ch.5; S. Bastian (Ed.) (2006) Sri Lanka: The Devolution Debate (5th Ed.) (Colombo: ICES); G. 
Moonesinghe (Ed.) (2010) Nation Building: Priorities for Sustainability and Inclusivity (Colombo: 
Shramaya);;  H.  Rambukwella,  ‘Reconciling What? History, Realism and the Problem of an Inclusive 
Sri Lankan Identity’  (2012)  ICES  Research  Paper  No.3  (Colombo:  ICES);;  D.  Jayatilleka  (2013)  Long 
War, Cold Peace: Conflict and Crisis in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa). 
31 Jayatilleka (2013):  Ch.5.  See  also  A.  Welikala,  ‘Realist Modernism in an Age of Kulturkampf’,  




little sense in regurgitating an orthodox model of statehood that might have been 
useful at the mid-twentieth century decolonising moment, but which has 
subsequently globally demonstrated its severe limitations in respect of the 
accommodation of democratic pluralism and especially national pluralism, and 
which therefore has now been superseded by major developments in both the theory 
and practice of democratic constitutionalism. With regard to plurinational polities, 
the inadequacy of the model has been encapsulated in the critique of the monistic 
demos thesis and the unitary conception of sovereignty. As I will show below, the 
ethnocratic tendency of the Sri Lankan state under the dominating influence of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism adds a decisive, further layer of illegitimacy to 
monistic conceptions of the constitutional order, which in turn calls for more radical 
responses to the accommodation of national pluralism than anything traditional 
liberal democracy or the orthodox Westphalian nation-state have to offer. More 
insidiously, by its failure to account for the democratic aspiration to recognition as a 
distinct nation that has been registered by Tamils of the north and east in every 
election since 1956, it is not only the theoretical inadequacies of the nation-state 
model in relation to national pluralism that are apparent, but also how it serves to 
actively deny the sociological reality of multiple nations and thereby the normative 
challenge of national pluralism. While therefore the process of modernity with regard 
to both nations and the state in Sri Lanka must be encouraged, it must be seen as a 
process that is conceived in complementarity to the more pressing requirement of the 
pluralisation of the constitutional order, rather than a condition precedent to the latter 
imperative.   
 
I have addressed the issue of how the basic logic of the plurinational state could be 
extended  beyond  the  ‘civic-societal’  to  ‘ethnic-communal’  models  of  nationalism  in 
Chapter 4. However, a plurinational   dispensation   that   either   ‘essentialises   the  
fragment’32 or fosters a one-directional centrifugal dynamic at the periphery without 
                                                 
32 Wickramasinghe  (2006):  pp.199;;  see  also  the  observations  on  the  ‘issue  of  cultural  pluralism’  and  
the  ‘issue  of  fluid  identity  patterns’  in  Tierney (2006): pp.127-8. This echoes the well-known debate 
on  this  question  between  consociationalists  and  centripetalists:  see  S.  Choudhry,  ‘Bridging 
Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided 
Societies’  and  J.  McGarry,  B.  O’Leary  &  R.  Simeon,  ‘Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring 




regard to the unity of the whole33 would not be a plurinational constitution at all. The 
answers to these questions are developed below in the discussion of the ideas of 
‘comprehensive  pluralism’  and  the  plurinational  ‘state-nation.’         
 
My second counterargument against   the  monistic   ‘Sri  Lankan’  nation-statists again 
draws   from   plurinational   constitutionalism’s   use   of pre-modern or early modern 
history in looking to constitutional models that preceded the modern nation-state, as 
prototypes from which contemporary constitutional theory can learn in addressing 
the challenge of national pluralism in the present. 34  This expands the possible 
empirical resources available for theorising democratic norms for the constitutional 
accommodation of plural nations beyond the orthodox tools available within the 
standard nation-state model. Even more so than in the Western experience, the 
deployment  of  the  ‘usable  past’  has  importance  as  both  a  methodological   technique  
and as a substantive component of theorising plurinational constitutionalism in post-
colonial societies like Sri Lanka, because of the high premium accorded to 
authenticity in the light of lingering sensitivities about the experience of colonial 
domination.35 The exploration of the pre-colonial state, undertaken in Chapters 2 and 
3, revealed not only an historically organic state tradition upon which a plurinational 
constitutional order may be contextualised in and for the present, but also served the 
related and equally important purpose of counteracting the historical arguments of 
contemporary hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in favour of unitary 
constitutional order. I extend this to non-chauvinist defenders of unitary order as 
well, in reiterating that there is nothing especially sacred about the modern nation-
state that demands allegiance to this model, when it is so demonstrably inadequate to 
the central constitutional problem facing Sri Lanka.   
                                                                                                                                          
Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford: OUP): Chs.1,2. Cf. Tierney (2006): p.125, on the 
accommodation  of  plural  demoi  within  one  state.  See  also,  J.B.  Meyers,  ‘Rethinking  ‘Constitutional  
Design’  and  the  Integration/Accommodation  Dichotomy’  (2010)  Modern Law Review 73(4): pp.656-
78. 
33 See trenchant (but narrow and misdirected) critique of Ferran Requejo and Miquel Caminal in A. 
Stepan, J.J. Linz & Y. Yadav (2011) Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational 
Democracies (Baltimore: JHU Press): pp.12-13.  
34 M. Keating (2001) Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereign Era (Oxford: 
OUP): p.ix, Ch.2. 
35 Although paradoxically, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, it is precisely the indigenist ethnocratic 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists who most usually uphold constitutional ideas introduced through 






2.2 The Shift from Monistic Demos to Hegemonic Ethnos: The 
Process of Ethnocratic State Formation 
 
Mirroring the manner in which the modern state was introduced in 1833, the rights 
and institutions of universal electoral democracy were introduced by the imperial 
power in 1931 in a single act of radical reform that was expressly intended to initiate 
the next stage of modernity – the construction of a united Ceylonese demos – in the 
process towards self-government. The Donoughmore reforms were aimed at 
eradicating  the  ‘canker  of  communalism’  that  was  held  to  retard  Ceylon’s  progress,  
in   a   context   in   which   various   reformulations   of   the   basic   system   of   ‘communal  
representation’  by  which  Ceylon’s   ethnic   communities  had   found   representation in 
the colonial state during the preceding decades of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries were deemed to have failed. Ethnic relations between the Sinhalese and 
Tamils were already demonstrating the divides that would erupt in violence after 
independence, with the Sinhalese favouring an expansion of territorial representation 
and the Tamils preferring to maintain communal representation. Except for the minor 
Labour Party, moreover, not a single Sinhala or Tamil political leader advocated the 
instant introduction of the universal franchise that the Donoughmore Commission 
recommended; indeed they were opposed on mainly elitist grounds to such an 
expansion of the electorate.36 
                                                 
36 On all these issues, see J. Russell (1982) Communal Politics under the Donoughmore 
Constitution, 1931-1947 (Colombo: Tisara Prakasakayo); N. Wickramasinghe (1995) Ethnic Politics 
in Colonial Sri Lanka, 1927-1947 (New Delhi: Vikas). In light of subsequent political history, two 
fascinating aspects of the Ceylonese representations and reactions to the Donoughmore Commission 
and resulting constitution which I do not have space to discuss at length are that: firstly, the initial 
demand for a federal constitution on distinctively multinational grounds came not from the Tamils but 
from a section of the Sinhalese, the Kandyans, through the Kandyan National Assembly; and 
secondly, that the Jaffna Tamil community under the aegis of the Jaffna Youth Congress boycotted 
the first elections under universal franchise to the new State Council on the basis that the 
Donoughmore constitution did not grant full self-government to the Ceylonese nation. See 
Donoughmore Report (1928): Cmd.3131 at pp.60-62 for the Kandyan Claim (and its polite dismissal 
by  the  Commission);;  C.  Ratwatte,  ‘Federalism and the Kandyans’  (n.d.)  Rootsweb; L. Kiriella, 
‘Kandyans urged for 3 federal states in 1928 and 1947’,  The Daily News, 20th December 2002; J. 
Russell,  ‘The Dance of the Turkey Cock – The Jaffna Boycott of 1931’  in  J.C.  Holt  (Ed.)  (2011)  The 
Sri Lanka Reader: History, Culture, Politics (Durham,  NC:  Duke  UP):  p.471;;  S.  Kadirgamar,  ‘The 
Jaffna Youth Congress’  in  S.  Kadirgamar  (Ed.)  (2012)  Handy Perinbanayagam: A Memorial 





The  Donoughmore  Commission,  which  viewed  the  diversity  of  Ceylon’s  polity as a 
debilitating   source   of   racial,   religious   and   caste   divisions,   felt   that   this   “lack   of  
homogeneity   and   of   corporate   consciousness”   made   it   difficult   to   achieve   “any  
national  unity  of  purpose.”37 It therefore strongly felt that only the rapid introduction 
of universal franchise, together with the innovative model of legislative 
representation and qualified self-government that they proposed,38 could transform 
communal politics into ideological or policy-based politics, which would in turn 
facilitate “the   development   of  Ceylon   into   a   free,   united   and  democratic   nation.”39 
The  Donoughmore  proposals’  conceptual  foundations  therefore  were  reflective  of  the  
classical liberal assumptions that guided contemporary imperial ideology. While 
some later historians would regard these views about an Asian society as marred by 
Orientalist assumptions and the implied superiority of Western modernity, the 
Donoughmore Commission was certainly prescient in observing that,  
 
“It  is  almost  true  to  say  that  the  conception  of patriotism in Ceylon is as much 
racial as national, and that the best interests of the country are at times 
regarded as synonymous with the welfare of a particular section of its 
people.”40  
 
The Donoughmore framework was idealistic in conception with regard to the 
prospect of a trans-communal Ceylonese demos, and as became apparent within a 
short time of its operation, territorial democracy only facilitated the political 
institutionalisation of Sinhala dominance by virtue of their numerical majority.41 In 
                                                                                                                                          
Introduction to Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka’  in  R.  Cheran  (Ed.)  (2009)  Pathways of Dissent: 
Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Sage): pp.xvi-xix.      
37 Ceylon: Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution (1928): Cmd.3131 (Donoughmore 
Report), reproduced in R. Edrisinha, M. Gomez, V.T. Thamilmaran & A. Welikala (Eds.) (2008) 
Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents, 1926-2008 (Colombo: CPA): 
pp.60-97 at p.66.  
38 Edrisinha et al (2008): Ch.2. 
39 Ibid: p.67. As historians have noted, the Donoughmore Constitution for Ceylon was a remarkable 
experiment in constitutional innovation within the British Empire at the time: Russell (1982): pp.xviii-
xx; M. Wight (1946) The Development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945 (London: Faber & 
Faber): pp.74,78,94. 
40 Cmd. 3131: p.21. The reference here is to the Sinhala majority. 





other words, the tendency to ethnocracy in the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist claims to 
primacy within the state was clearly visible even at the moment that the universal 
franchise was introduced, if in more benign form than the more aggressive version 
which was to characterise majoritarian nationalism from the late 1940s onwards.42  
 
In the next major stage of constitutional reform, which led to the independence of 
Ceylon as a Dominion of the British Commonwealth, the Soulbury Commission was 
animated by much the same heuristic model of the nation as a democratic 
community.   Like   its   predecessor,   this   reform   commission   also   noted   the   country’s  
ethnic and religious diversity and observed,  
 
“To  these  differences,  which  need  not  in  themselves  have  led  to  friction in a 
static community, have been applied the dynamic Western conceptions of 
nationalism and democracy, which naturally tend to break up a stratified 
society. Nationalism, if it is to be a unifying force, requires the elimination of 
communalism from political  life…Democracy  in  which  ‘each  shall  count  for  
one   and   not   for   more   than   one’   demands   for   its   free   operation   a   wider  
tolerance in religion, an understanding of the conflicting claims of race and 
language and a willingness to compromise on major political issues after full 
and  free  discussion.”43  
 
These similar views on nationality and state expressed by both the Donoughmore and 
Soulbury Commissions reflected a consistent official British policy with regard to 
Ceylon in the late-colonial period. While consistent, it also reveals, however, that the 
official attitude was informed by one set of arguments in a major debate concerning 
these matters within the British intellectual tradition in which, had the counter-
position informed official policy, then a radically different trajectory of 
constitutional evolution might have occurred in Ceylon. It was, moreover, a debate 
that   commenced   during   Britain’s   colonisation   of   Ceylon   in   the   nineteenth   century  
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and was still taking place in the mid-twentieth when it was contemplating 
independence for Ceylon.  
 
As Walker Connor reminds us, John Stuart Mill had instituted the dominant liberal 
perspective on the necessary coincidence of nationality and state in 1861, when 
among other things he stated in Considerations on Representative Government that, 
“it   is   in   general   a   necessary   condition   of   free   institutions   that   the   boundaries   of  
government  should  coincide  in  the  main  with  those  of  nationality.”44 Mill’s  detractor  
was no less eminent a Victorian liberal authority. Mounting a strong defence on 
liberal grounds of multinational states in 1862, Lord Acton contended in On 
Nationality that,   “The  presence  of  different  nations  under   the   same   sovereignty  …  
provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single 
authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations and giving the subject the 
restraint   and   support   of   a   combined   opinion.”45 Connor describes how this debate 
within liberalism about the virtues of mono-national and multi-national states was 
continued by others such as Sir Ernest Barker and Alfred Cobban in the first half of 
the twentieth century.46  
 
For present purposes what is interesting about this debate is that it raises the 
tantalising counterfactual possibility that had the multinational as opposed to the 
monistic demos perspective informed British colonial policy in Ceylon, then the 
development of the colonial state, and the constitution that it bequeathed Ceylon at 
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independence, could have assumed a fundamentally different character. There may 
be many historical reasons as to why this position was not adopted, but perhaps the 
most important factor was that throughout the colonial period and certainly in 
constitutional negotiations in the run-up to independence, the Tamils were 
articulating their  claims  as  a  ‘minority  community’  in  a  plural  society  rather  than  as  a  
distinct nation.47 The nationality claim was in fact only properly articulated in 1949-
51,48 and it was only then that the top-down and bottom-up process of competing 
nationalisms, in the manner theorised by Charles Tilly, became the defining 
characteristic of both ordinary and constitutional politics.49 
 
Thus it was the Millian view that prevailed, and as K.M. de Silva has noted, that idea 
of nation-statehood was fully subscribed to by the Ceylonese leader who led the 
constitutional   negotiations   towards   independence.   D.S.   Senanayake’s   vision   of   an  
independent Ceylon, 
 
“…emphasised   the   common   interests   of   the   island’s   various   ethnic   and  
religious groups. It had as its basis an acceptance of the reality of a plural 
society and sought the reconciliation of the legitimate interests of the 
majority and minorities within the context of an all-island  polity…In  1948,  
this version of nationalism seemed to be a viable alternative to the narrower 
[ethnic]  sectionalisms…and  held  out  the  prospect  of  peace  and  stability  in  the  
vital first phase of independence.”50 
 
In these British and Ceylonese viewpoints at the moment of independence, we see 
implicit the traditional liberal critique of ethnic nationalism (communalism or 
sectionalism) and the civic conceptualisation of the demotic nation founded on 
individual liberty and tolerance. To their otherwise conventional recommendations 
on a Westminster constitutional form to underpin such a nation-state, however, the 
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Soulbury Commission concurred with a unique improvisation in the form of a 
procedurally   entrenched  constitutional  provision   that   limited  Parliament’s  power   to  
enact   legislation   having   discriminatory   effects   among   diverse   ‘communities’   and  
‘religions’  that  had  been  proposed  by  the  Ceylonese  Ministers  with  the  advice  of  Sir  
Ivor Jennings.51 While such limitations on legislative power were unusual in the 
orthodox Westminster model, Section 29 of the Independence Constitution was no 
more than a codification   of   the   liberal   normative   principle   of   the   state’s   cultural  
neutrality,  which   required   the   ‘privatisation’  of  ethnicity   and   religion,  especially   in  
plural societies.  
 
I have discussed the plurinationalist critique of this traditional liberal claim in 
Chapter 3, but for present purposes, what is important to note is that neither this 
vision of civic nationhood nor the constitutional protections for minorities designed 
to achieve it was able to withstand the intense pressure of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism post-independence.52 With the establishment of the Sri Lankan republic 
in 1971, Sinhala-Buddhist   nationalism’s   appropriation   of   the   state   was   complete,  
with its three major constitutional entitlements – the centralised unitary state and the 
constitutional privileging of the Sinhala language and Buddhism – receiving 
constitutional recognition.53 
 
In conceptual terms, this meant that the dominant model of post-colonial nation-
building in the mid-twentieth century54 was unhelpful in two key respects. Firstly, in 
promoting policies like modernisation, integration or even assimilation, 55  and 
consensus-building in relation to the challenges of pluralism including national 
pluralism, this theoretical model espoused a centripetal and unitary discourse of 
nationality, sovereignty, and statehood, almost to the point of normative dogmatism. 
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As early Tamil federalists learnt, it has been difficult to dissent from this orthodoxy 
from sub-state pluralist viewpoints without also facing allegations of ethnic 
revanchism and separatism. Secondly, the application of this model has been 
analytically misleading, in that it has served to obscure a proper appreciation of the 
ideological project of majoritarian hegemony (or ethnocracy) with regard to the state 
undertaken by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism behind relatively benign explanations 
like democratic majoritarianism, with the implication that to the extent this is 
problematic in a plural polity, it could be addressed through standard counter-
majoritarian solutions like bills of individual rights and other minority protection 
devices. On the other hand, due to its conceptual incapacity to meet the specific 
normative and constitutional challenges of national pluralism (due to the limitations 
plurinational constitutionalists have highlighted in the Westphalian nation-state 
discussed before), this model of statehood has served to consistently disallow any 
meaningful response to the claims of Sri Lankan Tamils as a distinct sub-state nation.         
 
If the rise of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (together with the Tamil nationalist 
response it generated) derailed these assumptions and expectations of post-colonial 
nation-building, what is the nature of the state that emerged under its dominant 
influence? Conventional concepts of the democratic state cannot fully account for its 
deep and pervasive influence, which extended beyond an undoubted dominance over 
electoral politics and procedural democracy, to a determining impact on the character 
of the state itself. It is here that the continuum of models  under  the  rubric  of  ‘ethnic  
democracy’  becomes  useful  in  formulating  a  theoretical  account  of  the  post-colonial 
Sri Lankan state.      
 
The concept of ethnic democracy was originally developed as a descriptive and 
explanatory theory of the divided society and state-regime of Israel. 56  Ethnic 
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democracy  sought  to  account  for  the  character  of  the  state  of  Israel  as  ‘a  Jewish  and  
democratic   state’   in   the   context   of   the   presence   of   a   large   homeland   minority   of  
Palestinian citizens (as opposed to non-citizen Palestinians now under the 
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority). The ethnic democratic state is basically 
committed to procedural democracy and extends individual civil rights to all without 
discrimination, but it constitutionally privileges one ethnic group, which constitutes 
the majority, as the absolute majority that is entitled to govern. While certain 
collective rights may even be granted to the ethnic minority, an ethnic democracy 
permits no constitutional equality, territorial autonomy or sharing of sovereignty. 
The simultaneous foregrounding of both a dominant ethnicity and democracy makes 
this a discrete type of state, distinguishable from liberal, republican or consociational 
democracies.57 The  particular  model  of  ‘ethnocracy’  that  has  been theorised by Oren 
Yiftachel from within the broader school of ethnic democracy (and by comparative 
reference inter alia to Sri Lanka) offers a number of highly salient insights for our 
comprehension of the Sri Lankan state.58 Ethnocracy is distinct from the concept of 
‘nationalising  states’  propounded  by  Rogers  Brubaker,  which  also  feature  projects  of  
ethnic hegemony, by the significant structural feature that ethnocratic regimes are 
fundamentally constructed against their minorities.59  
 
The accounts of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in relation to the post-colonial state as 
well as the sub-state response by Tamil nationalism in previous chapters correlate 
closely  with  Yiftachel’s  framework,  wherein  the  Sri  Lankan  state  represents  itself  as  
democratic, and replicates many rights and institutions associated with democratic 
states, while the dominant ethnic nation simultaneously pursues, through the capture 
and control of the state, its hegemonic ethno-cultural and political agenda. This 
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ethnicising dynamic at the heart of state-formation has in turn generated a sub-state 
challenge in ethnonationalist terms, which however, is contained (if contingently) by 
the   ethnocratic   regime   through   its   ‘selectively   open’   character,   or   ‘illiberal  
democracy’   to   use   Fareed   Zakaria’s   concept. 60  The ethnocratic regime draws 
external legitimacy from its exclusive membership in the international community of 
states, which is itself buttressed internally by a formal façade of democratic 
institutions.61 Moreover, echoing the plurinational critique of narrow positivism and 
the positivist character of Sri Lankan public law, Yiftachel observes how in 
ethnocracies   “…legalism   often   depoliticises   and   legitimises   patterns   of   ethnic  
control. Such controls are often premised on redundant, absurd, non-existent, or only 
partially functional constitutional settings. These are often presented as the law of the 
land,  and  subsequently  placed  outside   the  realm  of   legitimately  contested   issues.”62 
The dominant constitutional discourse around the unitary state is conducted precisely 
in these terms in the Sri Lankan case.63  
 
These  ‘surface  level’  democratic   features, however, must be distinguished from the 
deeper regime structure,   which   “which   facilitates   and   promotes   the   seizure   of  
territory, resources, and power  by  one  expanding  ethnos.”64 The structural elements 
of ethnocratic regimes include demographic control and manipulation,65 land and 
settlement, 66  an ethnicised military and constitutional law. 67  In his extension of 
Yiftachel’s   work   towards   developing   a   descriptive theory of the Sri Lankan 
ethnocratic state, Jayadeva Uyangoda adds a further structural dimension, which are 
“the  social  foundations  that  enable  the  production  and  reproduction  of  the  ethnocratic  
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state.”68 Uyangoda observes how in the post-colonial  period,  “the  social  ownership  
of  ethnocracy  in  Sinhalese  society”  has  shifted  from  “the  upper  stratum  of  the  social  
elite with inter-ethnic links to social groups that are relatively isolated from other 
ethnicities.”69 The ethnocratic elite is dependent on a much wider electoral support 
base  of  “an  ensemble  of  social  classes  in  the  majority  Sinhalese  society”  which  fully  
subscribes to the majoritarian ethnonationalist ideology that underpins the 
ethnocratic state-formation project. These groups together constitute a wide cross-
section of Sinhala society, from the rural peasantry to the urban bourgeoisie, 
constituting a majoritarian democratic political base to the ethnocratic state that 
further  rigidifies  its  “reform-negating and reform-resisting”  nature.70  
 
Yiftachel  also  delineates  a  number  of  ‘key  principles’  that  characterise  an  ethnocratic  
regime, of which three are especially relevant for the present discussion. Firstly, 
“Despite   declaring   the   regime   as   democratic,   ethnicity   (and   not   territorial  
citizenship) is the main determinant of the allocation of rights, powers and resources, 
and politics is characterised by constant democratic-ethnocratic   tension.”71 While at 
the level of the constitution the Sri Lankan dispensation does not reflect a principle 
of  unequivocal  Sinhala  ethnic  ownership  of  the  state  as  in  the  Israeli  principle  of  ‘a  
Jewish   and  democratic   state,’   it   does   recognise   in  Article   9   a   ‘foremost   place’   for  
Buddhism   and   the   state’s   constitutional   duty   to   ‘protect   and   foster’   it.72 The Sri 
Lankan constitution also only recognised Sinhala as the official language of the state 
until   1987,  when   it  was   provided   that   ‘Tamil   shall   also   be   an   official   language.’73 
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Sinhala ethnocratic dominance, rather, is secured through more diffuse political and 
cultural  discourses,  as  Yiftachel’s  second  principle  recognises:  “The  logic  of  ethnic  
segregation is diffused into the social and political system, enhancing 
multidirectional   processes   of   essentialising   political   ethnicisation.” 74  Thirdly, 
“Significant  (though  partial) civil and political rights are extended to members of the 
minority ethnonation, distinguishing ethnocracies from Herrenvolk (apartheid) or 
authoritarian  regimes.”75 The Sri Lankan constitution extends fundamental civil and 
political rights on the basis of territorial and individual rather than ethnic citizenship, 
but resists claims to power-sharing and territorial autonomy, and violently opposes 
any claim to distinct Tamil nationality.  
 
The mobilising power of ethnonationalism is of course the main political and 
historical force that shapes an ethnocracy. Underscoring the role of ethnonationalism 
in the formation of the Westphalian world order and its central principles of 
sovereignty and self-determination, 76  Yiftachel   observes   how   once   a   ‘homeland  
state’  is  created  for  a  group  entitled  to  self-determination,  “the  principle  is  reified  and  
issues such as territory and national survival become inseparable from ethnonational 
history   and   culture.”77 Unlike liberal democratic states that are underpinned by an 
historical process of modernity and an inclusive, civic conception of the statal nation, 
in  ethnocratic  regimes,  “the  dominance  of  the  ethnonational  concept  generates  forms  
of  ethnic  territoriality  that  perceive  control  over  ‘homeland’  territory  and  its defence 
as central to the survival of the group in question, often basing the perceptions on 
selective   and   manipulative   historical,   cultural   and   religious   interpretations.”78 The 
centrality of the vamsa tradition of historiography to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 
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by  which  the  ‘ownership’  claims  to  the  island  are  sustained,  how  that  ownership  is  
projected as being crucial to the very survival of the Sinhalese and pristine 
Theravada Buddhism, and the selective and manipulative uses of history in that 
narrative, especially in relation to the provenance of the unitary state form, have all 
been extensively discussed in preceding chapters.79  
The dominant majority’s   use   of   its   ‘institutionalised   and   politicised   religion’   is   a  
particularly resonant feature of ethnocracy in the Sri Lankan case. Yiftachel notes the 
‘reciprocal  relations’  between  ethnonationalism  and  religion:  “The  expansive  type  of  
ethnonationalism typical to ethnocracies is thus able to develop resilient forms of 
internal legitimations based on the mutual reinforcement of nationalism and 
religion.”80 Moreover,   the  corresponding  use  of   religion   is   its   role   in   ‘othering’   the  
minorities:  “Religious   logic   is   instrumental   for  most  ethnocratic   regimes  because   it  
generates a discourse of rigid political and social   boundaries…[which   are]  
commonly  justified…as  stemming  from  divine  or  ancient  roots  and  is  thus  portrayed  
as   ascriptive   and   insurmountable.”81  As we have seen in previous chapters, this 
dynamic   of   ‘internal   legitimation’   and   ‘external   othering’   is   precisely the role that 
political Buddhism has played in Sinhala nationalism and its relations with ethnic 
and religious minorities from the days of the nineteenth century anti-colonial revival 
onwards. 
Despite   the   dominance   of   the   ‘founding   charter   group,’ 82  however, ethnocratic 
nation-states   are   “far   from   stable,   as   a   pervasive   nation-building discourse and 
material reality are continually remoulding the collective identity of homeland ethnic 
minorities. Such minorities often develop a national consciousness of their own that 
destabilises political structures with campaigns for autonomy, regionalism, or 
sovereignty,  intensifying,  in  Anderson’s  words,  ‘the  impending  crisis  of  the  hyphen’  
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between  nation   and   state.”83 This dynamic is amply demonstrated in the preceding 
discussion  of  Sri  Lankan  Tamil  nationalism,  especially  the  ‘defensive  and  reactive’  
theory advanced by Tamil nationalists. 84  Uyangoda goes even further in 
characterising the counter-majoritarian sub-state nationalist response as itself 
ethnocratic. Tamil nationalism in its militant separatist phase was built upon a 
conception   of   a   separate   state   “which   [was]   the   mirror   image   of   the   Sinhalese  
ethnocratic  state.”  The  “mutually  antagonistic  war”  between  the  two  ethnocratic  state  
projects  “helped  each  other’s renewal and re-production.” 85   
Beyond the sub-state response and the conditions of armed conflict, however, the 
unstable nature of ethnocratic states is still relevant for our purpose. According to 
Yiftachel,   this   stems   from   “…the   inherent   tension   between the parallel regime 
projects  of  (ethnically  centred)  nation  building  and  (civil)  state  building.”86 
“Ethnocratic   nation   building   fully   exposes   the   tension   between   the   use   of  
ethnic and civil categories because it entails an active exclusion of 
groups…represented  as   external  by   the…dominant  nation…Yet  at   the   same  
time these groups are incorporated (often coercively) into the project of state 
building.   The   crises   emanating   from   the   process   of   ‘incorporation   without  
legitimation’…are   at   the   heart   of   the   chronic instability experienced by 
ethnocratic  regimes.”87  
 
This is a critical aspect of the ethnocratic model for the present discussion, because it 
illustrates not merely the normative unjustness of this regime-type in conditions of 
national pluralism, but also why ethnocracies face state-failure in the long term. It 
thus provides two forceful rationales for the meta-constitutional and institutional 
restructuring of the Sri Lankan state contemplated in this thesis. It underscores the 
                                                 
83 Yiftachel (2006): p.14;;  B.  Anderson,  ‘Introduction’  in  G.  Balakrishnan  (Ed.)  (1996)  Mapping the 
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84 See Chapters 2 and 4, supra. 
85 Uyangoda  (2011):  p.55.  Note  the  resonance  with  Tilly’s  account  of  competing  nationalisms  
discussed in Chapter 4, supra. See also, R.  Edrisinha  &  A.  Welikala,  ‘The Interim Self Governing 
Authority Proposals: A Federalist Critique’  in  R.  Edrisinha  &  A.  Welikala (Eds.) (2008) Essays on 
Federalism in Sri Lanka (Colombo: CPA): Ch.XII at pp.298-301. 
86 Yiftachel (2006): p.19. 
87 Ibid,  emphasis  in  original.  Reference  in  parenthesis  to  M.  Mann,  ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The 




need for a radical departure from unitary approaches to constitutional order if 
stability is to be ensured in the context of national pluralism, and, given the 
susceptibility to ethnocratisation of the conventional Westphalian state form, it also 
demonstrates the need in such an exercise of state restructuring to go beyond the 
normative and substantive dictates of the nation-state in the constitutional 
accommodation  of  national  pluralism.  In  this  regard,  Uyangoda’s  use  of  the  concept  
of ethnocracy is limited to providing a persuasive, if bleak, descriptive theory of the 
Sri  Lankan  state  and  its  ‘reform-negating and reform-resisting’  nature.88 Beyond the 
level of analysis, however, his work does not provide us with the normative tools 
with which to reconceptualise the state in view of the continued assertion of Tamil 
nationhood and attendant collective rights claims. Likewise, I have devoted 
considerable   attention   to   Yiftachel’s   conceptualisation   of   ethnocracy   because   it   is  
useful for the purpose of establishing a defined understanding of the character of the 
present Sri Lankan state order. In proceeding to the next, prescriptive, stage of the 
argument from this analytical exercise, however, two reservations with regard to 
Yiftachel’s  work  must  be  addressed.   
 
Yiftachel’s   critical   account   of   ethnocratic   regimes   is   founded   on   a   strong  
commitment to both the principle of equality and the modernist conception of the 
civic  nation   that  conceptually  underpins   the  democratic  state:  “…while  recognising  
that even in the most advanced democracies full equality can never be achieved, the 
demos forms a necessary basis for the establishment of democracy (demos-cracy). It 
forms a foundation for the most stable and legitimate form of governance known to 
human  society.”89 This is the central normative precept constituting the very basis of 
Yiftachel’s  critical  theory  in  general  and  for  one  of  his  main  analytical arguments in 
particular:   the   idea   of   the   ‘ruptured   demos.’90 The notion that in ethnocracies the 
demos  is  severely  ruptured  means  that  “…the  community  of  equal  resident  citizens  
(the   demos)   does   not   feature   high   in   the   country’s   policies,   agenda,   imagination, 
symbols,  or  resource  distribution  and  is  therefore  not  nurtured  or  facilitated.”91   
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While   for   analytical   purposes   I   have   relied   on   Yiftachel’s   descriptive   and  
explanatory account of the ethnocratic model (including the notion of the ruptured 
demos as the preceding discussion on Sri Lanka readily shows), I do not necessarily 
share his commitment either to strong equality (i.e., as between intra-state nations 
rather than individual legal equality) or the unitary demos. His ideal of the normative 
alternative  to  ethnocracy  is  articulated  exactly  in  terms  of  the  ‘monistic  demos  thesis’  
that plurinational constitutionalists have critiqued in relation to dominant discourses 
of modernist nation- and state-building, and as a critical theoretical lacuna in 
traditional liberalism in relation to plurinational societies. Both these weaknesses are 
inherent   in   Yiftachel’s   formulation,   wherein   the   demos   is   not   only   exalted   as   the  
exemplification of progressive modernity, but by virtue of being defined in monist 
terms, seems to negate at both theoretical and practical levels the possibility of the 
recognition of national pluralism in   a   ‘true’   democracy,   especially   where   such  
nationalisms are articulated in ethnic terms. Thus he shares the jaundiced view of 
ethnicity and particularly ethnic nationalism with traditional liberals, and suggests 
that civic modernity is the panacea to these undesirable forms of political 
mobilisation.     
 
Given   these   reservations,   it   becomes   necessary   to   make   use   of   Yiftachel’s  
theorisation of ethnocracy for the analytical purpose of defining the character of the 
Sri Lankan state, while rejecting his alternative monistic ideal of democracy on 
plurinational grounds. As his brief discussion of democratic theory shows, 92 
Yiftachel does not contemplate the existence or the constitutional possibilities of 
plurinational democracy as an alternative to ethnocracy in his work, although he 
makes passing mention, through references inter alios to Arend Lijphart and Will 
Kymlicka,   that   “In   multiethnic   or   multinational   polities…a   certain   parity,  
recognition, and proportionality between enduring ethnic collectivities is a 
prerequisite   for   democratic   legitimacy   and   political   stability.” 93 The influence of 
consociational rather than plurinational thinking seems redolent in this formulation. 
To  be  fair,   it  must  be  added  that  Yiftachel’s  primary  concern  is   the  descriptive  and  
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critical   theorisation   of   ethnocracy,   not   its   normative   alternatives:   “This   is   not   the  
place   to   delve   deeply   into   democratic   theory.”94 His focus is therefore not on the 
“perfect   and   complete   democracy”   in   multinational   polities   but   how   “ethnocratic  
regimes are conspicuous in breaching the spirit, purpose, and major tenets of the 
democracy  ideal.”95 
 
Taking  Yiftachel’s  work   on   these qualified terms, the concept of ethnocracy helps 
define a critical view of the Sri Lankan state. In the empirical context of national 
pluralism, it does not follow that the democratic alternative to ethnocracy lies solely 
or chiefly in   the   construction   of   a   civic   and   territorial,   but  monistic,   ‘Sri   Lankan’  
demos; which may ameliorate, but does not eliminate, the potential for majoritarian 
hegemony. More particularly, it is a model of democracy that does not answer to the 
needs of a multinational polity. Thus, as noted before, the encouragement of the 
democratisation of the presently ethnocratic nation-state is complementary to the 
radical pluralisation of the constitutional order in appreciation of national pluralism: 
the question is not either/or.       
 
On the other hand, his normative commitment to equality in divided societies, which, 
as his reliance on class categories and the concept   of   ‘ethnoclass’   demonstrates,  
springs from a left-wing ideological orientation. Setting aside a putative ideological 
debate on equality, the more important point is that equality is here defined in 
individual rather than sub-state national terms, as determined by the orthodox 
conception of the demos and thus of the democratic state. Yiftachel therefore simply 
does not consider the question of plural nations, but if his equality postulate is 
extended to a plurinational context nonetheless, it would seem that an a priori 
normative commitment to equality between multiple nations does little to advance 
plurinational accommodation in the Sri Lankan context, given the asymmetrical 
historical and spatial relationship between the two competing nations in the island. 
Indeed, it is for the same reason that the principle of equality defended on liberal 
democratic grounds in Western plurinational constitutionalism will be argued to 
require modification, or more precisely, to be replaced by a principle of 






constitutional asymmetry, in applying plurinational constitutionalism to the Sri 




3. The Plurinational State and Sri Lanka: Exploratory Propositions 
for a Plurinational Democracy 
 
The preceding discussion has established a critical and analytical basis of 
understanding  the  ‘hard  state’  in  Sri  Lanka,  in  terms  of  its  deformed  modernity  and  
its ethnocratic structure. In all these respects, the Sri Lankan state reflects a 
constitutional order that is substantially incongruent with the ethno-cultural diversity 
of its polity, and one that is categorically incapable of accommodating its 
multinational character. Beneath the stiff carapace of ethnocratic state sovereignty, 
therefore, lurks a fundamental crisis of legitimacy and chronic instability. This 
pathological crisis of the state has hitherto been addressed through ethnocratic 
strategies of intensifying control and militarisation rather than democratic reform. 
However, if both democracy and (national) pluralism are to survive on the island, 
and indeed the unity of the state and peace are to be preserved over the longue durée, 
a thoroughgoing reappraisal of the normative foundations of the state becomes 
necessary. Such an alternative account must provide a coherent theoretical basis for 
the reconstitution of the state towards a democratic and non-coercive accommodation 
of national pluralism, under a new constitutional architecture that de-ethnocratises, 
decentralises and re-territorialises the state. The next two sub-sections undertake this 
task: first, to articulate a new theory of pluralism that can generate the meta-
constitutional norms capable of meeting the democratic challenge of national 
pluralism; and second, to propose a constitutional strategy to address the problem of 
arrested modernity at the level of the statal nation.    
 
 
3.1 From Liberal Democracy to Comprehensive Pluralism 
                                                 




In Western plurinational constitutionalism, the main discursive and normative 
debates – about nationalism and constitutional norms, concepts and forms – are 
conducted within a liberal democratic framework, the basic values of which are 
broadly shared between host states and sub-state nations. Accordingly, liberal 
nationalism and plurinational constitutionalism have in common with traditional 
liberalism a conception of the good life in which the individual remains the subject 
of moral and political choice and the purpose of society is to maximise the scope for 
individual self-fulfilment, together with the commitment to overarching values such 
as liberty, equality, justice and fundamental human rights. Consistent with these 
commitments, but against most accounts of traditional liberalism, the central object 
of liberal nationalism in plurinational polities is to emphasise the importance of the 
societal context in terms of a primary (sub-state) demos within which individual 
autonomy can be best exercised, and for the constitutional structures of the 
plurinational state to better reflect the reality of multiple national spaces within 
which such contextualised individualism can be optimally expressed. That said, the 
“alternative  model  of  liberalism”  upon  which  plurinational  constitutionalism  is  built  
has  also  been  concerned,   in  Stephen  Tierney’s  words,  “in  highlighting   the  value  of  
the vernacular alongside that of the cosmopolitan, and in offering an alternative 
universalisable value – that   of   pluralism.”97 Against   the   “individualistic   uniformity  
of  classical  and  increasingly  outmoded  liberalism,”  Tierney  argues  that,   
 
“The   universal   promise   of   this   more   nuanced   model   of   liberalism   is   not 
homogenisation but the general application of the principle of difference; a 
recognition that throughout the world cultural and national diversity is to be 
valued  not  traduced,  particularity  celebrated  rather  than  assimilated.”98  
 
While wholly agreeing with these sentiments, the question that arises for the present 
enquiry   is  whether   the   ‘universalisable  value  of   pluralism’   that   is   so   central   to   the  
plurinational constitutional worldview can only be sustained through one or other 
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school of political liberalism,99 or,   in   view   of   liberalism’s   lack   of   resonance   as   a  
discourse and language of constitutional reform in the empirical context of the case 
study, whether some other philosophical basis can be used in order to construct a 
serviceable normative theory of democratic pluralism. It is here that the idea of 
‘comprehensive  pluralism’  developed  by  Michel  Rosenfeld   assumes   relevance  as   a  
theoretical foundation that could serve a plurinational constitutional framework in Sri 
Lanka more plausibly than one derived from political liberalism.100 In addition to this 
‘strategic’   advantage,   the   ceaselessly  dialectical   nature  of   comprehensive  pluralism  
also  reverberates,  as  will  be  seen,  with  the  ‘pulsating’  and  dynamic  spirit  of  the  pre-
colonial galactic state form, which I have advanced earlier as providing an historical 
grounding for a plurinational constitutional settlement in the present. While the scope 
of  Rosenfeld’s  theory  of  comprehensive  pluralism  is  extremely  ambitious  (claiming  
among   other   things   a   ‘superiority’   over   liberalism,   republicanism   and  
communitarianism as a governing philosophy for plural societies101), the essential 
features of the model as are relevant to the present discussion can be delineated as 
follows.  
 
Comprehensive   pluralism   is   a   ‘counterfactual   ideal,’   which   seeks   to   articulate   an  
encompassing norm of pluralism for societies that are pluralist in fact. It is 
“predicated  on   the  conviction   that  pluralism  is   itself  desirable  and  should   therefore  
be   endorsed   and   promoted.”102 Its central thesis is encapsulated in the idea that 
‘pluralism  as  norm  is  best  for  pluralism  in  fact.’  This  requires  an  elaboration  of  what  
is  meant  by  ‘pluralism  in  fact’  and  ‘pluralism  as  norm,’  and  the  relationship  between  
them.   Rosenfeld   defines   pluralism   in   fact   as   “societies whose members adhere 
respectively   to   a  multiplicity   of   conceptions   of   the   good.”103 A   ‘conception   of   the  
good’   in   turn   is   “a   particular   ethic   [that]   amounts   to   a   comprehensive   integrated  
perspective. A conception of the good may be primarily religious, ethnic, cultural or 
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ideological.” 104  In Sri Lanka, therefore, both ethnic nations, other ethnic and 
religious communities, Marxists, liberals and even hegemonic ethnocrats represent 
conceptions of the good, in terms of the definition that an integrated perspective 
framed by a conception of the good prescribes certain intersubjective value 
preferences as determined by the ethical norms subscribed to by the members of that 
community.105 Thus   a   society   that   is   pluralist   in   fact   is   “a   society   composed   of  
diverse ethnic, religious, cultural or ideological groups who do not see eye to eye 
concerning  at  least  some  fundamental  ethical,  legal,  and  political  issues.”106  
 
Rosenfeld’s   phenomenology   of   pluralism   extends   beyond   ‘communal   pluralism’  
defined  in  this  way  to  include  ‘individualistic  pluralism’  based  on  individuals’  values  
and objectives.107 The crucial factor here is the split between a conception of self and 
other, both in communal and individual terms. Both types of pluralism being 
incorporated   within   the   definition   of   pluralism   in   fact,   “all   contemporary 
constitutional   democracies   can   be   deemed   to   be   in   fact   pluralistic.”108 Importantly, 
the split into self and other cannot be regarded as necessarily fixed or permanent, but 
rather,  “this  split  is  multiple,  fragile,  and  context  dependent”  and  must  be  understood 
in   “relational   terms.”109 Accordingly, conceptions of the good in pluralism as fact 
settings  “are  never  likely  to  remain  rigid  or  immutable,”  but  “their  actual  degree  of  
elasticity  ultimately  depends  on  the  kind  of  polity  involved.”110 
 
“Greatest  elasticity  is  likely  to  occur  under  ‘melting  pot’  conditions  in  highly  
interactive societies typified by a broad-based intertwining of individualistic 
and communal pluralism. At the other end of the spectrum, least elasticity is 
likely to occur in societies that are predominantly communally pluralistic and 
that  experience  a  very  low  level  of  intercommunal  interpenetration.”111 
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Leaving   aside   the   question  whether   it   qualifies   as   a   ‘constitutional   democracy’   or  
not, it is clear that the Sri Lankan polity can also be characterised as pluralistic in 
fact somewhere in the middle of the continuum of elasticity, but tending towards the 
less elastic end by virtue of its predominantly communally plural character. 
However, there is a substantial measure of inter-communal interaction and territorial 
intermingling, and the legal order recognises civil and political rights of all 
individuals equally, albeit subsumed within the ethnocratic regime of majoritarian 
hegemony discussed above. In other words, pluralism in fact does not correspond to 
pluralism  as  norm,  which  in  turn  “stands  for  the  proposition  that  pluralism  in  fact  is  
good  and  that   it  ought   therefore  to  be  encouraged  and  protected.”112 In  Rosenfeld’s  
account,  
 
“Normative  pluralism  is  distinguishable  from  both  monism  – roughly defined 
as the view that there is a single conception of the good that is correct and 
that all value preferences are to be judged in terms of that conception – and 
relativism – the view that all value preferences are ultimately purely 
subjective and so contextually bound to the conception of the good from 
which they emerge that it would be meaningless to gauge them from the 
standpoint of any other perspective. In other words, against monism, 
normative pluralism holds that the good extends beyond any single 
conception of the good; against relativism that not all conceptions of the good 
are  equivalent  as  the  mere  projection  of  contingent  perspectives.”113  
 
This is a crucial normative proposition against the Sri Lankan ethnocratic regime 
inasmuch as the latter defends a simultaneously monist and relativist worldview in 
the pursuit of its hegemonic politico-constitutional agenda. It is monist in imposing 
its conception of the good on a society that is pluralist in fact, and it does so through 
relativist arguments about history and ethno-religious culture that rejects any 
universal conception of rights claims emanating from pluralism in fact. Similarly, if 
less egregiously, Sri Lankan proponents of modernist nation-building, because of 
their orthodox subscription to the monistic demos thesis, also represent an anti-
                                                 





pluralistic monism in the face of the constitutional challenge of national pluralism. 
These two dominant perspectives have combined to present a monist obstacle to 
theorising a genuinely pluralist normative order that has not been overcome by either 
pluralist liberals or sub-state nationalists so far.  
 
Before delving into the dialectics of comprehensive pluralism, however, a few 
associated sub-concepts need clarification. Firstly, comprehensive pluralism is a 
concept of substantive rather than methodological pluralism.114 As  such,  it  “embraces  
a particular conception of the good that prescribes inclusion and accommodation of 
as   large   a   plurality   of   conceptions   of   the   good   as   possible.”115 It is not therefore 
indifferent towards multiple conceptions of the good as a relativist account would be, 
but  in  asserting  a  superiority  of  the  value  of  pluralism,  it  comes  “perilously  close”  to  
a monistic account. It is saved from this fate, however, by the fact that it   “both  
acknowledges the value of other conceptions of the good and cannot dispense with 
them.”116 Secondly, in order to better grasp the dialectic of comprehensive pluralism, 
we need to understand what Rosenfeld terms first and second order norms. Second-
order norms are those emanating from comprehensive pluralism as a conception of 
the good, whereas each of the multiplicity of conceptions of the good constitutes 
first-order norms. Thus what the privileging of comprehensive pluralism as a 
conception of the good entails is a privileging of second-order norms over first-order 
norms.   The   import   of   this   becomes   clearer   when   we   consider   the   ‘two   logical  
moments’   through   which   the   dialectical   process   of   comprehensive   pluralism  
operates.  
 
Rosenfeld’s  “comprehensive pluralism confronts the status quo through a dialectical 
process that involves two distinct logical moments.”117 The first logical moment of 
the   dialectic   is   a   ‘negative’   one   in  which   comprehensive   pluralism   imposes   “strict  
equality   and   neutrality”   among   the   “multiplicity   of   first-order norms vying for 
predominance.”118 The aim of the negative moment thus is to radically equalise all 
                                                 
114 For the distinction, see ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid: p.207. 
117 Ibid: p.209; see also p.210, n.10. 




competing conceptions of the good, and eliminate any existing hierarchy of inclusion 
and exclusion in the pluralism-in-fact status quo. However, the negative moment 
carried  to  its  logical  conclusion  leads  to  comprehensive  pluralism’s  self-destruction, 
because   if   “all   first-order norms are completely neutralised through a levelling 
negation, then the very pursuit of pluralism would become meaningless. In the 
absence of a plurality of viable conceptions of the good, no first-order norms would 
remain   for   pluralism   to   protect.”119 It thus becomes necessary for comprehensive 
pluralism   to   “supplement   its   negative   moment   with   a   positive   [moment],”   the  
objective   of   which   is   to   “foster   readmittance   of   previously   levelled   and   equalised  
conceptions   of   the   good   into   the   pluralist   universe.” 120  However,   “[n]ot   all  
conceptions  of   the  good  excluded   in   the  course  of…the  negative  moment  can  gain  
readmission  in  [the]  positive  moment.”121 Thus for example, the ethnocratic version 
of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation, which represents an anti-pluralist conception of 
monistic first-order norms, would not qualify for readmission into the reconstituted 
pluralist normative order, because to do so would be to invalidate all other competing 
first-order norms, including most prominently, the conception of the good 
represented by the sub-state Tamil nation. Moreover, even those conceptions of the 
good that qualify for readmission may not automatically hope to be reinstated to the 
same position they occupied before the equalisation. 122  Accordingly, while 
comprehensive pluralism does not preclude state endorsement of a particular 
religion,123 and consequently it may be possible for Buddhism to be reinstated to the 
constitutional  ‘foremost  place’  it  occupied  before,  this  can  only  happen  to  the  extent  
that   that   status,   and   the   proponents   that   status,   pose   “no   serious   threat   to   other  
religions or to nonreligious conceptions of the good.”124  
 





123 See ibid: p.211, n.10. 
124 Ibid: p.209. This is an acutely topical issue in Sri Lanka with the rise of anti-minority, regime-
sanctioned  Buddhist  vigilante  groups:  A.  Strathern,  ‘Why Are Buddhist Monks Attacking Muslims?’,  
BBC News Magazine, 2nd May  2013;;  C.  Haviland,  ‘The Hardline Buddhists Targeting Sri  Lanka’s  





The normative order that is produced from the application and operation of this 
dialectic affords the space for the widest possible plurality of conceptions of the 
good consistent with the superior norm of comprehensive pluralism, but its major 
implication is that an equality of all such multiple conceptions of the good is 
inconsistent with the more fundamental commitment to pluralism. Given the 
centrality of this proposition to this thesis, it is worth quoting Rosenfeld in extenso 
on this point. 
 
“Because comprehensive pluralism cannot equally readmit in its positive 
moment all the conceptions of the good that it has equally excluded in its 
negative moment, it inevitably falls short of its ideal of equal accommodation 
for all conceptions of the good. At best, comprehensive pluralism can 
undertake to better approximate equality among all first-order norms without 
ever reaching its goal of providing full equality among all first order 
norms.”125 
 
Thus the inequality that is the product of comprehensive pluralism relates to those 
first-order norms that are excluded by the dialectic,126 while the first-order norms that 
are readmitted into the pluralism-as-norm order enjoy full equality.127 In the Sri 
Lankan case this implies that, with the majoritarian logic displaced in favour of 
pluralism, both majority and minority nations would enjoy equality as valid first-
order norms. The exclusion of monist ethnocracy128 and the inclusion of national 
pluralism into the new normative order of the state are both crucially necessary steps 
in the construction of a plurinational constitutional order in Sri Lanka.129  
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the first-order norms of plural nations as well as plurinationalism. 




However, it is important to bear in mind that comprehensive pluralism is a 
‘counterfactual  ideal’  of  normative  political  philosophy  that  is  aimed  at  overcoming  
the “historical   contingency   and   perspectival   partiality”   of   a   given   “spatiotemporal  
setting.” 130  Its   importance   lies   in   affording   “a   critical   ideal   that   allows   for   a  
principled determination of how a polity that happens to be pluralistic in fact might 
be better stirred   toward   the   objectives   of   substantive   pluralism.” 131  Functional 
normativist  constitutional   theory,  on   the  other  hand,  “speaks  specifically   to   the  on-
going  dynamics  of  constitutional  activity”132 and part of this context of constitutional 
practice is the relative positions of the Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil nations within the 
historical and territorial space of the island. As preceding chapters have shown, the 
former’s  dominance  is  not  merely  numerical,  but  extends  to  strong  historic  claims  to  
a dominant position, and the Tamil assertion to constitutional rights claims based on 
nationhood, while entirely democratically valid, cannot viably be addressed without 
due regard to the spatiotemporal position of the majority. There is thus a useful 
distinction made by  Rosenfeld  between  ‘limited’  and  comprehensive  pluralism  that  
needs to be brought into this account. Limited pluralism, like comprehensive 
pluralism, is a model of substantive – as opposed to merely methodological133 – 
pluralism,  but  unlike  the  latter,  it  is  “prepared  to  accept  existing  hierarchies…while  
mainly preaching tolerance of a plurality of conceptions of the good and peaceful 
coexistence.”134 As Rosenfeld helpfully concedes,  
 
“Actual   constitutions   in   established democracies tend to promote limited 
pluralism inasmuch as they make room for tolerance without dislodging 
certain deeply entrenched traditions. Comprehensive pluralism, on the other 
hand, is unlikely to be embraced in actual constitutional practice [but is an] 
apt  normative  standard  for  counterfactual  reconstruction.”135  
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133 See Rosenfeld (1998): p.206. 
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Consistently with this, what is proposed in relation to the Sri Lankan case in terms of 
limited pluralism in constitutional practice is that the historical context mentioned 
above is factored into the equation. Consequently, while in the pluralist normative 
order  that  emerges  from  the  ‘positive  moment’  the  two  first-order norms represented 
by the majority and minority nations are strictly equal, translated into constitutional 
practice, the historic element necessitates an inequality of status between them, albeit 
in a pluralism-as-norm  setting  that  did  not  exist  before  the  ‘negative  moment.’  This  
then  is  the  theoretical  norm  of  ‘unequal  pluralism’  that  constitutes  the  foundation  for  
the articulation, in the next chapter, of a constitutional principle of asymmetry that 
can guide constitutional design with regard to autonomy, recognition, representation 
and reciprocity in the accommodation of national pluralism in Sri Lanka.   
 
Before concluding this part of the argument, there is a final point to be gleaned from 
comprehensive  pluralism  in  relation  to  the  deployment  of  the  ‘usable  past’  that  this  
thesis shares with Western plurinational constitutionalism. 136  From my earlier 
account of the pre-colonial state, it will be recalled that, contrary to the centralised 
unitary state appropriated by contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism as a non-
negotiable constitutional postulate, the pre-colonial Sinhala-Buddhist galactic polity 
or mandala-state was hierarchical and encompassing in intent, but pulsating, 
fissiparous and asymmetrical in practice.137 In  Ronald  Inden’s  oft-quoted description, 
galactic polities comprised “continually reconstructed and reconstructing agents with 
both dispersed and unitary moments.”138 Or   in   de   Silva  Wijeyeratne’s  words,   they  
“…exhibited a significant degree of decentralisation that received an ontological 
impetus through a cosmic order, which, although hierarchical in intent, was 
essentially non-bounded and so resistant to a determinant  moment  of  closure.”139 In 
my view, the type of normative order envisaged by comprehensive pluralism 
functions in a strikingly similar way. As Rosenfeld notes,  
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“[C]omprehensive   pluralism,   once   unleashed,   becomes   engaged   in   a  
ceaseless dialectic marked by a constant succession of negative and positive 
moments, without ever reaching a final resting point. Indeed, since at the 
completion  of  every  positive  moment…some  first-order norms are altogether 
left out and others included but displaced, there are bound to be calls for 
greater inclusiveness and equality, and hence a need for further negative 
levelling  [and  positive  reinstatement].”140     
  
Thus   the   ‘ceaseless   dialectic’   of   comprehensive   pluralism   can   be   regarded   as  
recasting  the  ‘pulsating’  galactic logic of the pre-democratic state in a contemporary 
form. More specifically, we can draw the following relations between the two 
models. The principle of encompassment determined by Buddhist cosmology and the 
idea of Sinhalē in the pre-colonial state is replaced by the normative superiority 
claimed by the value of pluralism, which is in other words an encompassment all 
first-order norms by the second-order norms. The pre-modern principle of hierarchy, 
again determined by Buddhist cosmology and the doctrine   of   ‘tributary  
overlordship,’  while  retaining  a  residual  relevance  in  terms  of  the  politico-historical 
relationship between the two nations, re-emerges as the democratically defensible 
principle   of   ‘unequal   pluralism’   as   outlined   above.   For   these   reasons, it can 
convincingly be argued that a normative order rooted in comprehensive pluralism is 
a modern re-characterisation of the best features of the old mandala-state, and further 
that, a plurinational democratic constitutional order anchored on these two 
foundations is both normatively sound and historically grounded.  
 
I readily concede that the argument in respect of a meta-constitutional normative 
order in support of a putative plurinational constitutional order that I have just made 
is unlikely to meet with the approval of liberal nationalists and civic modernists with 
strong commitments in their different ways to the value of equality, or to federalists 
with  strong  commitments  to  the  republican  ideal  of  ‘non-domination.’141 In response 
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I reiterate the assumptions that have guided the direction of my argument in this 
thesis with respect to the historic spatiotemporal location of the two ethnic nations in 
relation to each other within the island. I have critiqued the ethnocratic dominance to 
which this unequal relationship has led, while trying to restore a more pluralistic 
interpretation to the past. In this light, it is my contention that the framework of 
comprehensive and limited pluralism outlined above provides the best possible 
normative foundation for a plurinational constitution in Sri Lanka, by foregrounding 
pluralism and asymmetry rather than an elusive and intangible equality. In addition 
to the exclusion of ethnocratic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism from this new 
normative order by the application of the dialectic of comprehensive pluralism, I 
propose a further safeguard below by actively advocating a civic modernisation of 




3.2 From Plurinational Union State to Plurinational State-Nation 
 
My final consideration in this chapter therefore is about the transformation at the 
level of the host-state that is required by the induction of plurinationalism into the Sri 
Lankan context, consistent with the overarching commitment to the unity of the state. 
While theorists of the Western plurinational state and liberal nationalism have also 
shown concern with maintaining the unity of the plurinational state and fostering the 
state national society,142 consistent with general values of liberal autonomy and the 
politics   of   ‘rational   persuasion,’ 143  this concern does not translate into an 
unequivocal normative or constitutional principle against secession. As Will 
Kymlicka observed,  
 
“A  fundamental  challenge  facing  liberal  theorists  …  is  to  identify  the  sources  
of   unity   in   a   democratic   multination   state  …  A.V.   Dicey   once   said   that   a  
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Keating (2001): pp.vi,ix; Kymlicka (1995): Ch.9. 
143 R. Dahl (1976) Modern Political Analysis (New York: Prentice-Hall): pp.45-6. See also Rawls 




stable  multination   federation   requires   ‘a  very  peculiar   sentiment’   among   its  
citizens,  since  ‘they  must  desire  union,  and  must  not  desire  unity’…  Liberal  
theory   has   not   yet   succeeded   in   clarifying   the   nature   of   this   ‘peculiar  
sentiment.’”144 
 
This may seem an over-modest statement of liberal theory in view of the 
sophisticated discussion that precedes it,145 and yet, something more than this seems 
clearly necessary in the Sri Lankan case. As already mentioned, a key empirical 
difference between a Western plurinational state and a South Asian one is that 
separatism is categorically off the constitutional agenda in the latter case ab initio. A 
pre-nation-state,   ‘union   state’   history   is   also   not   readily   discernible.   More  
specifically, due to the failure of post-colonial nation-building, the sharply-defined 
divisions determined by ethnic nationalisms, the injustice of the ethnocratic state, 
sub-state mistrust of central institutions, and the history of violent ethnonational 
conflict, there is a high probability that the radical autonomy of a plurinational 
constitution in the Sri Lankan case could lead to ethnic division and disintegration 
unless it is counterbalanced by guarantees for the integrity of the state-wide 
constitutional order that are stronger than the weak incentives contemplated by 
liberal plurinationalism. Such an eventuality would constitute a resounding failure of 
the thesis advanced in the present work, that both unity and autonomy can be secured 
by a plurinational constitution in Sri Lanka. At the same time, it is important to 
marshal those residual attachments to a united Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan identity that 
have survived protracted ethnic antagonism and conflict. As even R. Sampanthan, 
the most senior Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist politician put it recently, 
 
“If  there  is  justice  and  equality,  and  if  there  is  a  sense  of  belonging,  if  people  
are able to live in dignity and self-respect, we would all be looking towards a 
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Sri Lankan nationalism and a Sri Lankan nation, where you can be a Tamil 
but  nevertheless  a  true,  proud  Sri  Lankan.”146  
 
A fresh approach is therefore needed, and above all, this involves a critical need to 
inculcate an inclusive, shared, state national society and national identity147  that 
balances the constitutionalisation of sub-state national identity and autonomy. As 
Hugh  Kearney  pointed  out   in   the  UK  case,  “there  has  been  a   ‘British’  history  over  
and above  our  ‘multi-national’  history” and therefore the central question of national 
and  institutional  pluralism  is  not  so  much  ‘four  nations  or one’  as  ‘four  nations  and 
one.’ 148  Transposed to the Sri Lankan case, this approach can be articulated as 
recognising an overarching Sri Lankan national identity at the state level as well as 
the Sinhala and Tamil nations at sub-state level, together with the non-national 
diversity represented by the smaller ethnic and religious minorities. Moreover, such a 
statal nation, which is necessarily to be conceived mainly in civic-societal and 
constitutional terms rather than ethnic-communal and ascriptive terms, is a valuable 
opportunity to incorporate an element of civic-constitutionalist values into a 
plurinational system that is otherwise primarily concerned with ethnic forms of the 
nation.  The  concept  of  the  ‘state-nation’  advanced  by  Alfred  Stepan,  Juan  Linz  and  
Yogendra Yadav seems to meet these requirements.149 According to these authors,  
 
“State-nation  policies  involve  crafting  a  sense  of  belonging  (or  ‘we-feeling’)  
with respect to the state-wide political community, while simultaneously 
creating institutional safeguards for respecting and protecting politically 
salient sociocultural diversities.   The   ‘we-feeling’   may   take   the   form   of   a  
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defining tradition, history, and shared culture in an inclusive manner, with 
attachment to common symbols of the state, or of inculcating some form of 
‘constitutional  patriotism.’”150 
 
The state-nation model, while permitting plurinational-type sub-state autonomy, 
provides for a robust yet non-coercive framework for the preservation of the unity of 
the whole. It does so by providing an incentive for the modernisation of the statal 
nation, not by a resumption of teleological, monistic nation-building, 151  but 
according to a specific politico-institutional  logic  that  is  meant  to  implant  (or  ‘craft’)  
a pattern of multiple but complementary collective identities across the plurinational 
polity. A central feature of a plurinational constitutional order of course is its 
facilitation of multiple national identities, but the value added by the state-nation is 
the   insistence   on   ‘complementarity.’   The   substance   of   this   complementary   and  
shared state-national identity is to be developed  as  the  new  ‘mythomoteur’152 for the 
plurinational state-nation. There are two  aspects  of  the  “nested  policy  grammar”153 of 
state-nation theory that are especially important in this regard. The first is that a 
plurinational state-nation, unlike the nation-state, eschews cultural assimilation but 
actively promotes political integration more robustly than the Western plurinational 
state, through a number of strategies including a common rights-based citizenship.154 
Secondly, by virtue of the plurinational state-nation’s   recognition   of   sub-state 
national autonomy and other practical and symbolic acknowledgements of ethno-
cultural identity, it becomes entitled to expect reciprocal loyalty not only legally to 
the state but also culturally to the state-wide polity (i.e., the state-nation).155 A Sri 
Lankan state-nation conceived in these terms, and incorporated into a putative 
plurinational constitutional settlement, would represent the most significant 
democratic-constitutional tie that binds the whole together. It would also represent a 
‘plurinationalism’   not   merely   for   historically   extant   ethnic   nations,   but   also   a  
plurinationalism of civic and ethnic conceptions of nationality that co-exists within 
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the state, providing, as I will show in Chapter 6, a more responsive and democratic 
kind of state.  
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
  
In this chapter I have established a systematic analytical foundation for 
understanding the Sri Lankan state in terms of colonial modernity and ethnocracy, 
which lays bare its fundamental unfitness of purpose in a sociologically plurinational 
polity. On this basis, I then set out, through an historically contextualised application 
of comprehensive pluralism, a coherent normative framework for addressing the 
problem of national pluralism. I also established, through the concept of the state-
nation, how the unity of the whole may be ensured, in the context of the radical 
pluralisation of the constitutional order involved in an accommodation of plural 
nations (i.e., Sinhala, Tamil and Sri Lankan) and conceptions of nationality (i.e., 
ethnic and civic) through the deployment of plurinational constitutional principles. 
From   this   emerged   the   principle   of   ‘unequal   pluralism’   as   the   central   norm   of   a  
putative pluralised normative order. It was suggested that such a normative principle 
would translate into a constitutional principle of asymmetry. The elaboration of this 
principle as a constitutional concept, and its relationship to plurinational values and 
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A notable aspect of plurinational constitutionalism is its methodological attention to 
the socio-political asymmetries brought about by national pluralism – of histories, 
territories, national identities, societal cultures, political vernaculars and institutions 
– and its substantive concern to ensure that such differences are constitutionally 
accommodated in a manner consistent with liberal democratic values. As Michael 
Keating argues, 
 
“If  nationality  is  interpreted  in  a  political  mode  as  carrying  the  implication  of  
a right to self-government of some sort, then the multinational state can 
resolve the issue through federalism, and the multiethnic state through 
consociationalism. The plurinational state, however, will be driven in the 
direction  of  more  complex  and  asymmetrical  arrangements.”1 
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Accordingly, a significant part of its reform agenda involves amendatory and 
interpretational critiques of existing institutions and conceptual assumptions, so that 
both normatively and structurally, the governing arrangements of the plurinational 
state have a greater capacity to respect and fully reflect major asymmetries within its 
constitutional framework. The plurinational state is therefore not only a model of 
constitutional pluralism, but also usually one of asymmetrical constitutionalism.2 
This latter field is of course both older and much broader than plurinational 
constitutionalism. From tentative and originally rather sceptical explorations in the 
study of federalism and federations,3 asymmetrical arrangements and practices in 
diverse societies have today become a major scholarly concern among political 
scientists and constitutional lawyers, 4  and it is now a widely deployed strategy 
among constitution-makers dealing with ethnic conflict management, federalism, and 
other forms of territorial autonomy in deeply divided societies.5  
 
There is therefore a rich seam of knowledge and comparative practice that can 
potentially inform constitution-making in Sri Lanka in addressing the asymmetrical 
demands of national pluralism. If such constitutional borrowing is to evade the trap 
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of the cherry-picking comparativism that has doomed many previous attempts at 
liberal constitutional reform,6 however, it is necessary to establish the theoretical 
case as to why constitutional asymmetry is in the Sri Lankan case not merely useful, 
but also required by its circumstances. The central analytical argument of this thesis 
from the outset was the characterisation of the island as a multinational polity rather 
than one of mere ethnic and religious pluralism, and further, that a serious 
commitment to the central democratic norm of pluralism in such a context requires 
fundamental changes in both the conceptual underpinnings as well as the 
constitutional architecture of the Sri Lankan state. To this end, an historical argument 
by reference to the devolutionary antecedents in the pre-colonial state tradition was 
set out in Chapter 2, and a meta-constitutional normative foundation – in the form of 
the   principle   of   ‘unequal   pluralism’   – was established in Chapter 5. This chapter 
continues those discussions to a conclusion in presenting a theoretical framework for 
the consequential institutional reforms.  
 
The presence of the Tamil sub-state national challenge, together with the absence of 
any sustained nationality claims among other minority groups, makes Sri Lanka an 
ethnically bi-national polity, the constitutional accommodation of which would 
require asymmetrical arrangements for the north and east of the island in which the 
territory claimed by the Tamil nation is situated. The asymmetry contemplated here 
is not merely in the recognition of a distinctive Tamil territorial nationality in 
symbolic or sociological terms. The normative and substantive demands that flow 
from that recognition require institutional arrangements for Tamil self-government 
and representation at the centre that would be different from sub-state arrangements 
in the rest of the island, making the constitutional architecture of the state inevitably 
asymmetrical.  
 
While this constitutes the principal challenge, the need for asymmetrical 
arrangements does not end there. It was mentioned in passing in Chapter 2 that the 
initial constitutional demand for a proto-plurinational federation was made before the 
Donoughmore Commission not by Tamils but by a section of the Sinhalese, the 
                                                 




Kandyans, who felt that their cultural distinctiveness, articulated in the form of a 
nationality claim, from the low-country Sinhalese required preservation through 
federal autonomy. Likewise, it was a Sinhalese politician, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 
who first proposed the idea of federalism within Ceylon (as well as federation with 
India) even earlier in 1926.7 In the post-colonial era, however, these memories of 
Kandyan and other regional distinctions have faded away, and the rise of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism – and its control of the state and conflation of its own identity 
with   that   of   the   ‘Sri   Lankan’   nation   as   whole   – has homogenised the Sinhalese 
identity to an extent that it is now very unlikely that similar claims would arise in the 
future.  
 
Yet at the same time there is evidence of a desire for devolution even in Sinhala-
majority provinces, or at least for the retention of the Provincial Councils system 
introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution.8 For example, in May 
2008,  at  a  ‘National  Conference  on  Strengthening  the  Provincial  Council  System’,  a  
statement endorsed by all Provincial Councils reaffirmed not only the current scheme 
of devolution, but also the need to go beyond the framework of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in devolving more powers to the Provincial Councils. Among a wide set 
of agreed recommendations, they requested the central government: (a) to transfer 
and fully implement powers devolved on the Provincial Councils by the Thirteenth 
Amendment; (b) to undertake further constitutional and statutory reforms to enhance 
devolution; and (c) to abolish central ministries which replicated devolved 
functions.9 Thus as Ranjith Amarasinghe has observed:  
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Thirteenth Amendment and Public Perceptions, 2008-2010 (Colombo: CPA); Edrisinha et al (2008): 
Ch.17. 
9 Centre for Policy Alternatives (2008) Strengthening the Provincial Council System (Colombo: 




“It  is  indisputable  that  after  two  decades  of  operation  the  Provincial  Councils  
have earned a niche in the political system of Sri Lanka. This system of 
political power centred in the provincial capitals, where the players engage in 
intense competition at the periodic elections has been accepted by the people 
as legitimate, even if it is yet to earn their respect as an efficient system of 
administration.”10  
 
These devolution needs in Sinhala-majority areas are exceedingly modest compared 
to the Tamil-majority areas, and of course they are pleas for regionalism that are 
conceptually distinct from the Tamil national claim. But even these are constantly 
overridden by the centralising tendencies of the unitary state, ethnocratic practices, 
and the leader-centric structure of political parties. 11  The resulting tensions are 
however relatively easily managed within the greater unity cohering in the Sinhala-
Buddhist identity (which also denotes an overall adherence to the unitary state) or by 
means of party political management and patronage, and increasingly, by the fear of 
repercussions from an authoritarian central government. 12 Nonetheless, this 
demonstrates that in a more democratic constitutional environment, even the Sinhala-
majority provinces may desire some form of devolution, and further, that these 
demands may vary from province to province.13  
 
The situation is different in the two provinces in which the population consists of a 
Tamil-speaking majority (and especially the Northern Province where ethnic Tamils 
are an overwhelming majority), because this is where territorial institutions meet the 
ethnonational divide within the island as between the majority and minority ethnic 
nations. But the constitutional issues in this region are also distinctive from a more 
‘internal’   point   of   view.   Tamil   nationalists   have   used   the   term   ‘Tamil-speaking 
peoples’   from   the   inception   to   encompass   within   the   Tamil   nation   the   Tamil-
speaking Muslims, who constitute the second major community within the Eastern 
                                                 
10 R.  Amarasinghe,  ‘Provincial Councils under the 13th Amendment – Centres of Power or Agencies of 
the Centre?’  in  L. Marasinghe & J. Wickramaratne (Eds.) (2010) 13th Amendment: Essays on 
Practice (Colombo: ICS): Ch.4 at p.131. 
11 Ibid: pp.131-2. 
12 See for the experience of the ethnically mixed Eastern Province: Centre for Policy Alternatives 
(2010). 




Province and in a small southern region of that province even constitutes a 
demographic majority. 14  The territorial claim to a Tamil majority homeland as 
encapsulating both the Northern and Eastern Provinces relies to a significant extent 
therefore on the acquiescence of the Muslims with the Tamil national claim.15  
 
This has however always been a contentious matter between the two communities 
with the Muslims asserting a separate identity based on their Islamic culture and 
Arab heritage.16 They have been concerned not only about the prospects of becoming 
a minority within a minority in a Tamil autonomous region, but also, given the 
dispersion of Muslims in the Sinhala majority areas, that their constitutional 
requirements are fundamentally different to that of the territorially concentrated 
Tamils of the north and east.17 It is important also to recall that during the peace 
process of 2001-4 when extensive federal autonomy based on the right of internal 
self-determination   of   ‘Tamil-speaking   peoples’   in   the   north   and   east   was   on   the  
constitutional reform agenda, the Muslims proposed elaborate institutional 
arrangements to address their own aspirations separately from the Tamils,18 and on 
one occasion even sought to make a distinctive nationality claim.19 These were, 
however, claims made in the specific context of that peace process, whereas Muslim 
political relations with the majority nation and the state have more typically centred 
on  what  Farzana  Haniffa  has  described  as  the  practice  of  ‘goodwill  politics.’20 
 
                                                 
14 For  critiques  of  the  ‘Tamil-speaking  peoples’  formulation,  see  H.L. de Silva (2008) Sri Lanka A 
Nation in Conflict: Threats to Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Democratic Governance and 
Peace (Colombo: Visidunu Prakashakayo): pp.331-334; E. Hobsbawm (1990) Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: CUP): pp.6-7. 
15 In addition to the persistent and serious doubts about the historical claim to the east as part of the 
‘Tamil  traditional  homeland’  raised  by  some  historians  and  geographers,  see  K.M.  de  Silva  (1995)  
Separatist Ideology in Sri Lanka: A Historical Appraisal Rev. 2nd Ed. (Kandy: ICES); G.H. Peiris 
(1991)  ‘An Appraisal of the Concept of a Traditional Homeland in Sri Lanka’,  Ethnic Studies Report, 
Vol. IX, No.1.  
16 A.R.M.  Imtiyaz  &  S.R.H.  Hoole  (2011)  ‘Some Critical Notes on the Non-Tamil Identity of the 
Muslims of Sri Lanka, and on Tamil–Muslim Relations’,  South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 
34(2):208;;  D.B.  McGilvray  &  M.  Raheem  (2007)  ‘Muslims Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict’,  
Policy Studies 41 (Washington: East-West Centre); D.B. McGilvray (2008) Crucible of Conflict: 
Tamil and Muslim Society in the East Coast of Sri Lanka (Durham, NC: Duke UP). 
17 F.  Haniffa,  ‘Conflicted Solidarities? Muslims and the Constitution-making Process of 1970-72’  in  
A. Welikala (Ed.) (2012) The Sri Lankan Republic at 40: Reflections on Constitutional History, 
Theory and Practice (Colombo: CPA): Ch.5. 
18 Edrisinha et al (2008): Chs.32,33. 
19 Ibid: Ch.31. 




In addition to this, there is the issue of the Indian Tamils dispersed across several of 
the Sinhala-majority provinces.21 There is a limited territorial dimension to Indian 
Tamil claims to accommodation in relation to local government in the plantation 
districts of several of the central provinces, but in the main, their focus, like the 
Muslims, has been on more traditional practices of minority politics, especially the 
clientelist practice of securing executive office (and the attendant resources for 
patronage allocation) in exchange for communal vote blocs.22  
 
Thus while my concern in this thesis is primarily with the Tamil national claim, even 
this brief survey of the broader context of communal pluralism and regional 
differences in Sri Lanka serves to illustrate the point that any comprehensive 
constitutional response to these conditions would necessarily have to employ a wide 
array of group-differentiated arrangements at state, sub-state, provincial and local 
government levels. The constitutional problems demanding attention are not 
restricted to the accommodation of the sub-state Tamil nation, and Tamil national 
autonomy entails significant implications for other communities, which in turn 
demand complex and asymmetrical solutions. Moreover, such arrangements would 
be asymmetrical not only because of the different types and extents of territorial 
autonomy required in different parts of the island, but also asymmetrical by virtue of 
the combination of territorial and non-territorial mechanisms that would have to be 
used in response to diverse claims made by plural nations and communities.23  
 
In other words, a constitutional order premised on the normative value of respecting 
multiple   ‘contexts   of   choice’ 24  cannot be built on the assumptions of either the 
monistic demos thesis or the atomised individual traditionally associated with the 
nation-state, nor on the exclusivist basis of ethno-cultural collectivities, but on an 
institutional complex of territorial and non-territorial institutions required by the 
                                                 
21 A. Lawrence (2011) Malayaha Tamils: Power Sharing and Local Democracy in Sri Lanka 
(Colombo: SSA). 
22 P.P.  Devaraj,  ‘Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka – Identity Stabilisation and Inter-ethnic Interaction’  in  
Social  Scientists’  Association  (1979)  Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka (Colombo: SSA): 
pp.146-65. 
23 K.  Bryan,  ‘Non-Territorial Federalism: A Panacea For Our Times?’  in  R.  Edrisinha  &  A.  Welikala  
(Eds.) (2008) Essays on Federalism in Sri Lanka (Colombo: CPA): Ch.XI. 




multifaceted plurinational constitutional order combining both ethnic and civic 
elements that I have outlined in Chapter 5. The design of such a complex system 
requires the close empirical consideration of the sociological reality of communal 
diversity, understood as distinct but overlapping ‘deliberative   communities’ 25 
represented by the two ethnic nations, by the other communities, and by the 
overarching civic Sri Lankan nation. Thus for example, the autonomy of the two 
ethnic nations require to be balanced by the demands of dispersed minorities located 
within their territorial boundaries, in the normative context of the fundamental Sri 
Lankan  constitutional  order.  I  am  guided  in  this  approach  by  Kyle  Scott’s  direction  
that,  “…increasing  empathy  and  trust  among  citizens  is  not  outside  the  purview  of  a  
constitution’s  powers. A constitution that requires the collaboration and deliberation 
from   all   sides   is   one   that  will   temper   extremism  and  discrimination.”26 And if this 
entails a measure of constitutional and political complexity in devising governing 
arrangements, then that seems a price worth paying in securing a just and democratic 
constitutional  order  for  Sri  Lanka’s  plural  polity.  For  all  these  reasons  then,  it  is  clear  
that asymmetrical arrangements can be regarded as not only useful, but also 
necessary and unavoidable in any pluralist constitutional reform of the Sri Lankan 
state. That general hypothesis should be kept in mind in turning to the specific issues 
arising from national pluralism.  
 
In Section 2 below, I set out a brief conceptual outline of constitutional asymmetry 
drawing from the explanatory and normative literature, as a starting point to the more 
context-specific discussion to follow. Section 3 contains the substance of the 
argument about how constitutional asymmetry can be used in accommodating 
national pluralism according to a specifically plurinational logic in Sri Lanka. The 
overarching argument that this section of the discussion seeks to establish is the point 
mentioned in various places in the preceding chapters, and especially towards the 
end of Chapter 5, that, departing from the Western model of the plurinational state, a 
norm of unequal pluralism (or   ‘asymmetrical   pluralism’)   rather than a norm of 
constitutional equality provides the more viable meta-constitutional basis upon 
                                                 
25 D. Miller (2000) Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
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which the sub-state national challenge can be met in Sri Lanka. This argument can be 
sustained across three sites of theoretical enquiry.  
 
Firstly, the historical dimension of asymmetry concerns the way in which past 
experience – the  ‘usable  past’ – can be used to defend asymmetrical institutions in 
the present. In Western plurinational constitutionalism, historiographical arguments 
reinterpreting  the  plurinational  state  as  a  ‘union  state’  seek  to  establish  the  equality 
of  the  union’s  constituent  nations.  In Sri Lanka by contrast, it has been suggested that 
the pursuit of equality would be difficult and potentially self-defeating given the 
particularities of political history and the nature of nationalisms involved. 27  In 
Chapter 2, I explored the pre-colonial antecedents of pluralism, which, while 
providing an important corrective to contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist   nationalists’  
version of state history, nonetheless supports an hierarchical conception of multiple 
national spaces within the polity, rather than one grounded on equality. Building on 
this further in Chapter 5, through the use of the concepts of comprehensive and 
limited pluralism, I set out an alternative normative basis to political liberalism and 
liberal nationalism that could anchor the constitutional accommodation of national 
pluralism in Sri Lanka, but which would not guarantee equality between such 
nations. I bring all these contentions together here to suggest that a constitutional 
principle of unequal pluralism would be best served by a structure of asymmetrical 
institutions. This argument represents a substantial departure from Western 
plurinational constitutionalism, inasmuch as constitutional asymmetry is here 
normatively defended by reference to pluralism rather than equality. 
 
Secondly, asymmetry is not merely a descriptive concept but also reflects an 
important normative dimension in plurinational contexts in respect of the issue of 
sovereignty. A genuinely plurinational constitutional order is founded on a plurality 
of constituent powers and continuing sovereignties, not on a monistic (and hence 
majoritarian) conception of sovereignty. Moreover, contrary to the traditional theory 
of the unitary nation-state in which the state assumes sovereignty once constituted, in 
                                                 
27 D.  Jayatilleka,  ‘From Necessary War to Sustainable Peace in Sri Lanka’  Groundviews, 27th May 
2010; M.  Roberts,  ‘Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Perceptions: Barriers to 




plurinational   constitutionalism   sovereignty   is   understood   in   ‘relational’   terms,  
requiring the state to respect the democratic wishes of the multiple deliberative 
communities that are its constituent peoples on a continuing basis. This pluralised 
and relational conception of sovereignty, with implications for both constituent 
power and constituted authority, is therefore a crucial asymmetrical aspect of a 
plurinational constitutional order.  
 
With regard to Sri Lanka, this argument must be made in a regional context that is 
fundamentally   different   from   especially   the   ‘late-sovereign’ 28  plurinational states 
within the European Union, in which sub-state nations pursue their constitutional 
agendas for autonomy, recognition and representation on multiple sites of 
constitutional and normative order: below the state, at the level of the state, and 
beyond the state. In the Sri Lankan and South Asian context, no comparable erosion 
of the traditional sovereignty claims of the nation-state has taken place at the supra-
state level. If anything, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the post-war political realignment 
of the Sri Lankan state is tending towards the trend that has been described as the 
‘Eastphalian’  global  order,  in  which  traditional  doctrines  of  the  Westphalian  system,  
chief among them state sovereignty, are being further reified and entrenched.  
 
The reconfiguration of sovereignty involved in the accommodation of plural nations 
within the state therefore must contend with a much stronger sense of external and 
internal state sovereignty, and the absence of any meaningful institutional-normative 
order above the state.29 The pluralisation of sovereignty is also, in the context of Sri 
Lanka’s   narrow   positivist   and   ideologically   centralist   legal culture outlined in 
Chapter 3, a highly radical and to some an incomprehensible or even subversive 
proposition. Finally, the orthodox rendition of sovereignty as a concept inseparable 
from the state has been perpetuated by separatist Tamil nationalists themselves, for 
whom the ultimate goal is the creation of a separate nation-state, not accommodation 
                                                 
28 See  N.  Walker,  ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’  in  N.  Walker  (Ed.)  (2003)  Sovereignty in 
Transition (Oxford: Hart): pp.3-32. See also Tierney (2006): p. 88, fn.37 and p.83, fn.10. 
29 Except in  the  amorphous  sense  of  the  existence  of  an  ‘international  community’  that  may  
sometimes exert pressure for reform, but which acts within the traditional doctrines, practices and 




within the Sri Lankan state.30 For all these reasons, stalking the re-conceptualisation 
of sovereignty in the manner contemplated here is the major issue of secession, the 
threats and fears induced by which must be adequately addressed if plurinational 
reforms are to succeed.   
 
Thirdly, the institutional dimension of asymmetry concerns the guiding principles of 
autonomy, recognition, representation and reciprocity that form the basis for concrete 
design choices in building a multi-level constitutional system. It is not the intention 
here to make recommendations with regard to the distribution of specific powers, 
functions and obligations, or how particular institutions should be designed; partly 
because that would presume to do what a formal constitution drafting process ought 
to undertake, and partly because the actual drafting of a constitution is a secondary 
matter at this stage. Indeed the design of such a process is a separate exercise in 
itself, requiring close consideration of matters such as participation, representation, 
decision-making procedures, validation mechanisms, and other aspects of the 
relationship between the process of constitution-making and the substance of the 
eventual constitution,31 all of which are rendered more complex, at least from the 
perspective of orthodox monistic assumptions about the demos, popular sovereignty 
and constituent power, by the fact in multinational contexts that more than one nation 
is a stakeholder in the process.32 I do not deal with these process issues here. Rather, 
the aim is to help define, structure and discipline the substantive parameters of such a 
process,   or   at   least   a   broader   ‘constitutional   conversation’ 33  with regard to the 
accommodation of plural nations, by elaborating the content of the guiding principles 
mentioned above. As noted, institutional design in the Sri Lankan context defies 
symmetrical and generic solutions if competing group-differentiated claims are to be 
addressed in a manner that respects democratic pluralism.  
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Amarasingham & D. Bass (Eds.) (forthcoming, 2014) Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects 
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31 H. Lerner (2011) Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge: CUP); M. 
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But how do the plurinational constitutional design principles mentioned above, 
which have been developed in the political, historical and legal context of Western 
liberal democratic states, work in the different context of Sri Lanka? My purpose in 
this chapter is to clarify and articulate these three dimensions of asymmetry so that a 
coherent and comprehensive theoretical basis is laid out for the construction of a 
plurinational constitution.  
 
 
2. The Idea of Constitutional Asymmetry: A Short Conceptual 
Outline 
 
Despite   the   daily   observable   evidence   of   ‘deep   diversity’ 34  and asymmetries of 
ethnic relations, both unitarists and federalists in Sri Lanka engage in constitutional 
discourse as if the rectilinear and orderly concepts of the Westphalian nation-state 
are a reality. As Keating   rightly   remarked,   “Asymmetry   is   untidy   and   irrational   to  
those whose frame of reference is the nation-state. They may also see it as an affront 
to the equality of citizenship rights, giving undue privileges to one part of the state or 
one   group   of   citizens.” 35  Confronted with the reality of the multinational and 
ethnically plural polity, however, this approach is not only unnecessarily rigid and 
exclusionary, but also analytically misleading in material ways. Western 
plurinational constitutionalism seeks to overcome the artificiality of the approach by 
highlighting existing asymmetric features such as the preservation of historic rights 
of sub-state nations at the establishment of the union state. In the absence of 
comparable historical resources, this exercise has to be conceived differently in Sri 
Lanka, and the purpose of the following discussion is to set out the conceptual and 
methodological basis with which to approach asymmetrical constitutional design.   
 
The scholarly literature on asymmetrical features and practices in multi-level systems 
is dominated by comparative federalism studies. Nevertheless, this work provides a 
number of useful insights for our purposes, in both conceptual and methodological 
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terms. Conceptually, it draws attention to key distinctions and categories that inform 
much of the discussion to follow below, and methodologically, it shows us how to 
approach asymmetrical multi-level systems as a separate category of polity 
notwithstanding wide divergences between individual cases and experiences. One of 
the first and most important issues here is the well-established conceptual distinction 
between  ‘federations’  and  ‘federalism’.36 The former denotes a particular category of 
state, whereas the latter is a much broader concept that captures a wider variety of 
multi-level systems that may not formally be classified as federal. 37  Thus for 
example, Neil MacCormick has observed that even before devolution, the United 
Kingdom has historically displayed “…a   federalism   of   political   management   and  
judicial separation rather than a federalism   of   constitutional   form,” 38  and Luis 
Moreno has noted in the Estado de las Autonomías in   Spain   a   “plural   and  
asymmetrical  reality”  that  could  be  seen  as  reflecting  a  “federalising  philosophy.”39 
Consequently, we can make use of analyses of federal-type asymmetrical practices in 
outlining a concept of constitutional asymmetry in the Sri Lankan case, without 
necessarily pre-committing to federation as a constitutional form in giving 
expression to plurinational principles.  
 
Conceptual treatments of asymmetry focus on descriptive analyses that identify 
certain preconditions for its occurrence, as well as asymmetrical outcomes of 
particular institutional arrangements. They also include normative arguments for 
asymmetrical arrangements, which are mostly concerned with multinational 
federations. According to Michael Burgess, federalism is likely to be advocated in 
polities  which  share  certain  ‘preconditions’.  These  include  the  existence  of  political  
cultures and traditions that advocate federalism in social, philosophical and 
constitutional discourses; social cleavages like religious, linguistic and 
ethnonationalist pluralism, especially if sub-state national or regional mobilisation is 
territorially based; and from a political economy perspective, the socio-economic 
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configuration of the polity and its demographic patterns. 40 With regard to 
asymmetrical outcomes in the operation of federal-type systems, Burgess makes 
several general observations that have importance for us.  
 
“First,   it   is   necessary   to   acknowledge   different   kinds   of   asymmetrical  
relations and different degrees of asymmetrical outcomes. Second, it is 
important to distinguish between two types of asymmetry that occur in 
federal systems, namely de facto and de jure. The former refers to 
asymmetrical practice or relationships which result from the impact of the 
socio-economic and cultural-ideological   preconditions  …  while   the   latter   is  
formally entrenched in constitutional and legal processes so that constituent 
state  units  are  treated  differently  under  the  law.”41  
 
He also notes that the empirical focus in analysing the types of asymmetry identified 
above   is   on   ‘horizontal’   asymmetry,   that   is,   the   differential   relationships   between  
constituent units, and between constituent units and the central government.42 I have 
already noted the different kinds and degrees of asymmetry that arise in the Sri 
Lankan case. The distinction between de facto and de jure asymmetry is particularly 
relevant for us, as this defines the very purpose of plurinational constitutionalism: it 
seeks to provide the constitutional resources (analytical, normative and structural) in 
building the most appropriate de jure model for the de facto reality of national 
pluralism. And in considering asymmetry in this discussion, we are concerned with 
its horizontal aspect as defined by Burgess. 
 
For plurinational constitutionalists, the normative foundations of asymmetrical 
arrangements are particularly important because these are the arguments which 
provide a deeper foundation of political morality to constitutionalising asymmetry 
beyond purely instrumental or practical rationales. As Alain Gagnon and Charles 
Gibbs have suggested, there are three types of normative argument that are generally 
presented in defence of asymmetry, all of which resonate closely with plurinational 
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constitutionalism. In this typology, the communitarian principle evokes the 
importance of communities in social life in similar ways to plurinational 
constitutionalism’s   arguments   about   the   sub-state   nation   as   a   ‘deliberative  
community’   that  must   receive   constitutional   recognition.43 The functional principle 
relates to the necessity of asymmetries in multi-level arrangements in addressing the 
needs of a diverse and multinational polity.44 The democratic principle, which is 
defined in terms similar to the way plurinationalism locates itself within broader 
debates in liberal democratic theory, is particularly important to us. As Gagnon and 
Gibbs argue, asymmetric federalism in multinational polities, 
 
“…has   been   credited   with   enhancing   the   liberty   of   individuals   within   a  
society, encouraging public participation in the decision-making process, 
establishing legitimacy in segmented states, and promoting the equality of 
citizens.”45        
 
These then are the basic conceptual tools which help design and justify constitutional 




3. The Meta-Constitutional Foundations of a Plurinational Sri Lanka: 
Asymmetrical Pluralism v. Constitutional Equality  
 
The following discussion addresses the idea of asymmetry in three key areas of 
constitutional concern in the accommodation of national pluralism in Sri Lanka. 
These are the issues arising from asymmetries of multiple national histories and their 
relationship to contemporary constitutional form, the issues arising from 
reconceiving sovereignty in plural and relational terms (and the related but 
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conceptually distinct issue of secession), and finally, the heuristic principles of 
constitutional organisation that ought to inform the design of a plurinational 
constitution. The discussion engages several of the general concepts that underlie all 
constitutions and the discipline of constitutional law more broadly, such as political 
community, sovereignty, legitimacy, democracy and so on, but its purpose is to 
clarify these general concepts as they relate to the specific circumstances of a 
multinational polity. From this emerges a series of propositions that form what might 
be   called   the   ‘meta-constitutional   foundations’   of   a   plurinational   Sri   Lankan  
constitutional order, which describe those foundational concepts and superior values 
(some of which may possibly remain unwritten) that inform the making, 
interpretation and implementation of such a constitution.46  
 
     
3.1 Asymmetrical National Histories, Democracy and Contemporary 
Constitutional Form 
 
In Western plurinational constitutionalism, underpinning arguments for asymmetrical 
institutional structures is a deeper normative claim to the constitutional equality of 
the constitutive nations of the plurinational state. As Stephen Tierney maintains, if 
“…plurinational   states   […]   share   one   generic   feature   in   terms   of   constitutional  
identity, it is that these states are founded upon the principle of a union of free and 
equal   nations…”47 Even   as   citizens   subscribe   to   ‘hierarchies   of   belonging’   at   the  
level of personal loyalty to and identification with sub-state and statal nations,48 
constitutionally the  “…nations  within  the  state  relate  to  one  another  égal à égal…”49 
                                                 
46 This  exercise  is  distinct  from  Neil  Walker’s  idea  of  ‘metaconstitutionalism’,  which  he  has  proposed  
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(Eds.) (2000a) The State of Scots Law (Edinburgh: T & T Clark): pp.112-3;;  N.  Walker,  ‘Flexibility 
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47 Tierney (2007): p. 234. 
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The aim here is not merely to uncover the mono-national pretensions of the host state 
in favour of a plural conception of national identities, but also to establish that, 
consistent with liberal democracy, plural nations in a multinational polity should 
enjoy equal politico-legal status in terms of recognition as well as autonomy and 
representation. As Ferran Requejo and Miquel Caminal argue,  
 
“…   the  key  question   for   a  plurinational  democracy   is   to   establish,  not   how  
the demos can become a cratos – that would be the traditional view of 
democracy – but how different demoi (majorities and minorities) that co-exist 
within the same democracy can be politically and constitutionally recognised 
and  accommodated  on  equal  terms.”50 
 
As I have outlined in Chapter 3, this claim to equality is substantiated in 
constitutional theory in two steps. Firstly, with historiographical arguments that 
critique the monistic demos thesis as well as the functionalist equation of nation and 
state that have taken root in Western nation-states in the modern era, and reinstating 
original constitutional self-understandings of the state as a union of constitutive 
nations. 51  This historical reimagining is reinforced, secondly, with normative 
arguments  for  a  “...more  refined  interpretation  of  the  most  basic  values  of  the  liberal  
and democratic tradition (liberty, equality, pluralism, and justice) than that offered by 
traditional   constitutionalism.”52 Thus the host state must constitutionally reflect its 
plurinational character not only if it is to remain true to its historical origins, but also 
because,   as   a   liberal   democracy,   it   must   normatively   respect   the   ‘variations in 
empirical  reality’53 of the coexistence of multiple nations rather than a single demos 
within the state.54 
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A central normative aim of plurinational scholars in this exercise is thus to extend the 
norm of equality (including the ancillary principle that equal respect might require 
differential treatment), which is well established in relation to the equal treatment of 
individuals within fully modern nation-states, to the multiple nations as well. In the 
Western context, therefore, these debates take place within liberal political 
philosophy about how best to realise the uncontested ultimate good of equality, and 
in  democratic  politics  within  a  shared  subscription  to  “general notions of prudence – 
that is, understanding, deliberation,   and   accommodation.” 55  Asymmetrical 
institutions are in this sense justified because they redress historic, economic, 
democratic, or other disparities of power and symbolic recognition, with a view to 
ensuring equality between intra-state nations consistent with the plurinational 
reinterpretation   of   constitutional   history   and   liberal   justice.   In   other   words,   “If  
national communities are asymmetrical, then asymmetrical constitutions can be 
defended  on  liberal  and  democratic  grounds”56 because asymmetrical institutions are 
part of the constitutional package that delivers recognition on a footing of equality 
for hitherto submerged nations.  
 
While it seems more than possible to make a theoretical case for present-day 
plurinationalism purely on liberal normativism, it is significant that theorists of 
plurinational constitutionalism rely so substantially on history. This is partly because 
the early modern histories of state-formation in so many of the contemporary 
plurinational states are susceptible to persuasive plurinational and pactist readings,57 
and partly because the re-emergence of sub-state nationalisms has belied the 
historical determinism of the classical modernist accounts of both nations and 
states.58 The historical turn in constitutional theory, however, is also important for 
contextualising otherwise purely abstract normative arguments within a concrete 
political imaginary. This is an exercise (to reframe it in   Anthony   D.   Smith’s  
terminology) in deconstructing what was in the post-industrial modern era the 
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dominant   ‘mythomoteur’   of   the   monistic   demos,   and   rearticulating   it   so   as   to  
accommodate  a  plurinational  ‘myth-symbol  complex’  for  the  state.59  
 
It is in this latter sense that the historical focus of plurinational constitutionalism is 
most germane to the Sri Lankan case, inasmuch as the cogency of arguments for the 
pluralisation of the constitutional order can be amplified if they can be historically 
and culturally contextualised. This is highlighted by the experience of recent failures 
of federalist constitutional reform efforts in Sri Lanka, which were affected by three 
types of errors. Firstly, federalism was advocated by reference to ideologically 
liberal values and concepts, and the experience of (mostly) Western federations, 
rather than indigenous historical experience and intellectual resources. It could thus 
be rejected as a foreign constitutional model, based on Western political ideals, with 
no resonance in local traditions. Secondly, federalism was heavily associated with 
Tamil nationalism, including (if falsely) its secessionist and terrorist manifestations. 
It could thus be rejected as a capitulation to an overweening minority that could 
potentially use federal autonomy to break up the state. Thirdly, federalist critiques of 
majoritarian nationalism and its constitutional claims to the state have been etic 
rather than emic, i.e., from the extraneous normative perspective of (Western) 
liberalism rather than from within the world of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. There 
were several political consequences to this strategy, including the alienation of 
ordinary Sinhala-Buddhists from federalist arguments. But the least appreciated, and 
for constitutional theory, the most important consequence was that it took Sinhala-
Buddhist  nationalists’  rhetoric  at  face  value,  with  the  result  that  especially  the  merits 
of  the  latter’s  historiographical arguments with regard to unitary constitutional form 
and order largely escaped critical scrutiny. The foregoing discussion in this thesis has 
tried to avoid these pitfalls in a number of ways, but specifically by following 
plurinational  constitutionalism’s  methodological  attention  to  history,  and  by  mooring  
normative arguments for accommodating national pluralism to that history. 
 
Thus, in Chapter 4, the conceptual distinction between nations and nationalisms was 
drawn upon in order to separate the hyperbolic historiographical claims of 
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contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism from the history of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nation. This built on the historical exploration of the island’s   state   tradition   in  
Chapter 2, which yielded two main insights. Firstly, that the historiographical 
arguments of post-colonial ethnocrats in support of their ideological commitment to 
the centralised unitary state are mostly self-serving fallacies (indeed, as should be 
obvious, the unitary state is a constitutional concept that is very much a part of the 
colonial inheritance, which is otherwise anathema to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists). 
In contrast, the centre-periphery relations in the galactic state form that characterised 
the pre-British kingdoms were pulsating, devolutionary and asymmetrical, allowing 
substantial practical autonomy at the periphery including in Tamil chieftaincies in 
the Vanni. Secondly, notwithstanding this, it was established that in the absence of a 
strong concept of territoriality in the galactic model, cohesion was maintained by the 
principles of hierarchy and encompassment, that is, by the administrative practices of 
tributary overlordship and the hierarchical inclusion of all including Tamils within 
the kingly domain. This revealed a spatiotemporal picture of the island in which the 
Sinhala-Buddhists could certainly claim a dominant position, but the Tamils likewise 
could claim significant autonomy at the periphery. Accordingly, in Chapter 5, using 
the concepts of comprehensive and limited pluralism, a systematic normative 
foundation was laid out for the accommodation of plural but historically unequally 
placed nations in the modern constitutional order.  
 
As noted in those discussions, these enquiries necessitate two departures from 
Western plurinational constitutionalism. Firstly, the historical enquiry did not 
provide any evidence with which to reconceive the Sri Lankan state as a union state, 
and consequently, to reconceptualise the majority and minority nations on terms of 
constitutional equality. However, it did provide evidence of a highly pluralistic Asian 
state form that can be used to contextualise the constitutional accommodation of 
ethnonational pluralism in the present, in part by demonstrating how incongruous the 
contemporary ethnocratic state is with the Sinhala-Buddhist national past. Secondly, 
the normative enquiry established that, not only are there more appropriate 
philosophical alternatives to political liberalism for purposes of constitutional theory 




enquiry, it is more useful to foreground asymmetrical pluralism, rather than a 
dogmatic adherence to equality, in constitutional approaches to the claims of 
competing nations.   
  
What then would be the character of a plurinational constitution informed by these 
perspectives? At the heart of such a constitutional order would be a balance between 
two competing dynamics – the autonomy of the sub-state Tamil nation, and the 
hierarchy of status dictated by the historical predominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nation – both of which demand an asymmetrical institutional structure.60 On the one 
hand, it would recognise the fact of two ethnic nations (together with all the other 
types of pluralism) as the socio-political foundation of the constitutional state, and it 
would affirm the protection and promotion of national, communal and individual 
pluralism as one of the cardinal normative values of the state. It would therefore 
reject the mono-national thesis, and acknowledge the scope for multiple national 
identities to which an individual can give allegiance (e.g., Tamil as well as Sri 
Lankan, not one or the other). Throughout the constitutional order, the nation and the 
state would be treated as discrete concepts, influencing the way in which the state’s  
symbols, social foundations and sources of democratic authority (sovereignties) are 
articulated, and structurally,   how   the   state’s governing institutions are constructed. 
This would not be inconsistent with a commitment to a common citizenship and the 
fundamental rights of citizenship, including the equal legal treatment of individuals 
state-wide, notwithstanding asymmetrical territorial jurisdictions. Moreover, a 
plurinational constitution would reflect a commitment to an overarching Sri Lankan 
‘state-nation’  (as  distinct  from  ‘nation-state’61), because such a state-national identity 
would be predicated upon the full recognition of sub-state national and other 
communal identities, rather than their exclusion from the constitutional domain.  
 
While Western plurinational constitutionalism fully acknowledges that citizens 
belonging to sub-state nations would likely also entertain simultaneous attachments 
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to the overarching statal nation – or   ‘compound   demos’   in   Tierney’s   term62 – our 
conceptualisation of plurinationalism nonetheless underscores another instance of 
departure from the Western model. A plurinational constitution in the Sri Lankan 
case would not only be plurinational in terms of recognising multiple nations 
(minority, majority and statal nations), but also be plurinational in respect of the 
civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation. Whereas in the Western context both state 
and sub-state nations are civic-societal entities, in the Sri Lankan case, 
plurinationalism involves a combination of ethnic conceptions of the nation at sub-
state level and a civic conception of the nation at the state level. This too is an 
asymmetrical feature, which would maximise the democratic space – or widen the 
‘contexts  of  choice’  – for individual self-expression. For those to whom the ethnic 
nation (or other ascriptive collective identity) is a central element of their individual 
identity, sub-state national autonomy would allow full scope for the expression of 
that identity, while assuring the civic rights of citizenship through membership in the 
state-nation. For others to whom ethnicity may be irrelevant or relatively 
unimportant, the state-nation would continue to perform those functional and 
identificatory roles they expect of citizenship in a modern state.    
 
On the other hand, the constitution would have to recognise the historic 
predominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation and its cultural heritage within the 
island. Many of these would be symbolic in nature, while important other elements 
such   as   the   ‘foremost’   status   of  Buddhism  may   have substantive implications.63 In 
plurinational constitutionalism, symbolism has a special significance. As Keating 
noted,  “To  the  outsider,  the  issues  in  contention  here  can  often  look  merely  trivial  or  
‘symbolic’  yet   the  symbolism  takes  us   to   the  heart  of  political   legitimacy and self-
determination.”64 The reference here is to sub-state nations, but in the Sri Lankan 
case, it would also be of central importance to the majority nation that their historic 
status is constitutionally recognised. Within a plurinational framework, therefore, the 
Sinhala-Buddhist identity would be treated as a kind of national primus inter pares, 
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but only as a first order norm that is consistent with the second order norm of 
pluralism. That is, the application of the dialectic of comprehensive and limited 
pluralism would ensure that such symbolic acknowledgements of primacy do not 
entail a devaluation of pluralism to the material disadvantage of the minority nation 
and minority communities. It would certainly eliminate the now prevalent 
ethnocratic type of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism – which   demands   ‘authoritarian  
loyalty’65 from   ethnic   and   ideological   ‘others’   and   is   therefore  wholly   inconsistent  
with any form of pluralism – from the new constitutional order altogether. 66  I 
reiterate that this strong normative foundation of pluralism would adequately 
counteract any potential for dominance and hegemony in this historically informed 
scheme of unequal or asymmetrical pluralism, taken together with the significant 
scope for symbolic recognition and the real and meaningful structural autonomy that 
it affords the sub-state Tamil nation (and other minority groups as appropriate), 
whereas neither the status quo nor orthodox federalist reforms would provide a 
comparable level of accommodation.  
 
 
3.2 Plural Nations, Asymmetrical and Relational Sovereignties 
 
The recognition of the sociological reality of the existence of multiple nations within 
the state carries with it the normative implication that the constitutional order of such 
states is, or ought to be, derived from and constantly renegotiated on the basis of 
these multiple sources of democratic authority. In other words, in these contexts the 
concept of sovereignty itself requires to be understood in plural terms, and it is as 
outlined in Chapter 3, an issue that has been extensively theorised in plurinational 
constitutionalism. 67  In drawing on this work, however, it is again necessary to 
identify those aspects which do not apply to the Sri Lankan case. In this regard, 
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firstly, for reasons already mentioned, the arguments for pluralistic sovereignties that 
are derived from the retreat of the European nation-state from a number of sites of 
formerly exclusive authority,68 but especially in the context of the unique supra-state 
constitutional order of the European Union, have no application in the Sri Lankan 
context. 
 
Secondly, the arguments for a plural understanding of sovereignty that are grounded 
on an historical founding moment and resultant union state also have no application, 
again for reasons already discussed. Consequently, these arguments in the Sri 
Lankan case have to be grounded on the present-day exigency of reforming the 
anomaly of a unitary constitutional order – introduced at first instance for colonial 
administrative purposes but subsequently appropriated by the majority nation for 
ethnocratic ends – in the light of national pluralism. Here we might benefit from the 
contribution of Alfred Stepan to the theoretical link between the strategy of 
federalisation and the broader agenda of democratisation, in which he identified two 
models of state-formation, viz.,   ‘coming-together’   and   ‘holding-together’  
federations.69 The union state model associated with plurinational constitutionalism 
is similar to the former category, whereby the state is created as “…the   result  of  a  
bargain whereby previously sovereign polities agree to give up part of their 
sovereignty in order to pool their resources to increase their collective security and to 
achieve other goals, including economic ones.”70 The states in the second,   ‘holding  
together’   category,   were   all   previously   “…political   systems   with   strong   unitary  
features. Nevertheless, political  leaders  in  these  …  multicultural polities came to the 
decision that the best way – indeed, the only way – to hold their countries together in 
a democracy would be to devolve power constitutionally and turn their threatened 
polities  into  federations.”71  
Whether or not a Sri Lankan plurinational order ultimately adopts a federal form – 
                                                 
68 Tierney (2006): pp.82-9. 
69 A.  Stepan,  ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’  (1999)  Journal of Democracy 
10(4): pp.19-34.  
70 Ibid: p.21. 
71 Ibid: p.22.  Although  Stepan  uses  the  term  ‘multicultural’  in  this  passage,  he  has  multinational  
polities in contemplation in the article and clearly defines Sri Lanka as a multinational polity in 




and from a plurinational point of view, formal classifications are not the most 
important factor – it is clear that this is the model of state-formation, or more 
precisely, state-reformation, that engages the deeper constitutional changes 
advocated in this thesis. The examples   in   Stepan’s   ‘holding-together’   model  
demonstrate that this can not only be a successful strategy where circumstances 
demand it, but also a normatively valid procedure for reforming existing state 
constitutions in addressing the challenge of national pluralism consistent with 
democracy.   In   other   words,   a   ‘coming-together’   or   union-creating event at the 
moment of plurinational state-formation is entirely a contingency of particular 
historical circumstances; it need not be treated as a condition precedent to the 
establishment or operation of a plurinational constitution in all cases. It shows also 
that there are no inherent reasons why a conception of sovereignty previously 
defined in strongly unitary terms cannot be radically pluralised in line with the 
institutional changes accompanying ‘holding-together’   reforms  that  grant  autonomy  
to sub-state nations.  
Plurinational constitutionalism’s  approach  to  the  issue  of  sovereignty  has  drawn  from  
recent developments in legal and political theory in two key respects. Firstly, it 
embraces the expansion of the understanding of sovereignty to include its legal as 
well as political dimensions, encapsulated in the concepts of not only legal 
‘competence’   but   also   political ‘capacity.’ 72  This holistic conceptualisation of 
sovereignty is crucial for the plurinational reform agenda in displacing the legal 
formalism that   characterises   traditional   constitutionalism’s   understanding   of  
sovereignty,   which   has   long   held   that   sovereignty   “…can   be   understood 
hermeneutically or immanently in a Kelsenian sense; in other words, it is a vision of 
legal power operating in a conceptually separate   space   from   the   political.” 73 
Plurinationalists argue that this approach cannot account for the complex ways in 
which the legal and political conceptions of sovereignty interact within plurinational 
constitutional systems, rendering the concept devoid of ontological meaning.74  
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In Chapter 3 I noted the dominance of legal formalism within the Sri Lankan 
constitutional law tradition, and the disingenuous ways in which opponents of Tamil 
nationalism have deployed it in dismissing sub-state claims to even shared 
sovereignty implied in demands for federalism, let alone divided or separate 
sovereignties. I noted in particular the susceptibility of legal formalism to be used as 
a seemingly politically neutral discourse against sub-state nationalism, while 
concealing all manner of ideological projects including majoritarian nationalism 
and/or legal centralism. This highlights the problematic nature of the orthodox 
legalistic account of sovereignty in the multinational context – indeed much more 
starkly than in the Western liberal democracies – and it strengthens the call for the 
alternative, holistic approach. In doing so, pre-colonial history is again helpful. Part 
of the reason the pre-colonial monarchical state countenanced autonomy at the 
periphery was because it was based, not on a territorial, but on a performative 
conception  of  ‘ritual  sovereignty.’75 So long as peripheral feudatories fulfilled certain 
ritualistic (and often materially not very exacting) obligations of tribute in the form 
of the rites of dakum, then the synecdochical expectations of the centre were satisfied 
and the periphery was by and large left to its own devices. And, crucially, this was 
not merely a function of pre-modern infrastructural conditions, but an integral 
philosophical feature of the galactic form of state as influenced by Buddhist 
cosmology.76 Of course such a system of tributary sovereignty cannot be replicated 
in toto in a modern republican state, or reinterpreted for contemporary relevance in 
similar ways to Western sub-state historico-constitutional claims to ancient rights 
(e.g., the sub-state fueros of Spain77). However, it does suggest strongly once again 
that the Sinhala-Buddhist nation is clearly possessed of a pluralistic constitutional 
heritage with regard to sovereignty that stands in stark contrast to the ethnocratic 
notion of sovereignty espoused by contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, on 
the basis of a selective reliance on the ideologically ethnonationalist vamsa tradition 
of historiography and a highly literalist appropriation of the modern nation-state’s  
unitary concept of sovereignty.  
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The second major way in which plurinational constitutionalism places reliance on 
broader contemporary theoretical developments concerning sovereignty is the way in 
which it adopts, with certain caveats, the relational understanding of sovereignty. As 
Martin   Loughlin   puts   it,   sovereignty   is   “…generated   as   a   product   of   the   political  
relationship   between   the   people   and   the   state.” 78  Loughlin however not only 
conceives   ‘the   people’   in   this   equation   in   unitary   terms,   but   also   holds   that  
sovereignty is indivisible, both of which plurinational constitutionalists reject in 
adapting relational sovereignty to the multinational context. As Tierney explains, for 
plurinationalists,  
 
“…sovereignty  has  a   relational  essence,  but   they  demand  that  when  used   to  
describe a plurinational democracy the relationship metaphor be made more 
complex  in  order  to  encapsulate  the  idea  of  ‘the  people’  in  a  pluralistic  way;;  
sovereignty within a plurinational state cannot be posited merely as the 
‘relationship   between   the   people   and   the   state’,   rather   it   must   be   a  
relationship between the peoples who together compose the state, and the 
state  itself.”79  
 
These sentiments pervade Tamil nationalist rhetoric, albeit entirely implicitly, in the 
sense that nowhere has this notion of sub-state national sovereignty been proposed as 
even  a  partially  theorised  concept   in  Tamil  nationalism’s  constitutional  demands.   It  
is, rather, implicit in various proposals for institutional reforms, such as for example 
in federal autonomy proposals, 80  or for confederation, 81  or in proposals for the 
institutionalisation of de facto sovereignty of rebel-controlled territories.82 It was 
perhaps most clearly stated in the submissions by M. Tiruchelvam, Q.C., in the 
Amirthalingam Trial-at-Bar case (1976). 83  These submissions were part of the 
defence of prominent Tamil nationalist Members of Parliament who were indicted in 
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this case for a number of offences under Emergency Regulations for distributing the 
‘Vaddukoddai  Resolution’,  which  called  for  a  separate  state  of  Tamil  Eelam.84 The 
first republican constitution in 1972 had been enacted through a legal revolution, i.e., 
by deliberately affecting a break in legal continuity from the independence 
constitution by not following the constitutional amendment procedure of the latter.85 
Moreover, upon complete rejection of their proposals for a federal constitution early 
in the process, Tamil nationalist representatives in the Constituent Assembly had 
walked out of the constitution-making body, and had neither taken any further part in 
its proceedings, nor voted for or against the new constitution within this process.86 In 
the light of these circumstances, in this case Tiruchelvam challenged the legality of 
the 1972 Constitution itself, and went on to aver: 
 
“…once   there   is   a   break   in   legal   continuity   the   sovereignties   of   the  
inhabitants of the Island then under eclipse, so to speak, appear once again. 
Hence the sovereignty of the Tamil Nation which was ethnically, 
geographically and linguistically separately identifiable and distinct, revived 
…   Therefore   if   an   autochthonous   Constitution   is   to   be   promulgated   the  
consensus of the majority of the Tamil nation should be unequivocally 
obtained.”87    
 
In these submissions we can clearly detect elements of the plurinational, holistic and 
relational conception of sovereignty reflected in a number of assertions: the 
descriptive claim to distinctive nationhood; the normative claim to a separate 
sovereignty; the re-emergence of this political sovereignty once the legal compact of 
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the independence constitution has been broken; and the requirement of the consent of 
the sub-state nation to any new constitutional framework, without which, further, 
there can be no valid exercise of constituent power (autochthony88) in a multinational 
polity. If it is to move towards an accommodation of these claims under a 
plurinational   dispensation,   the   conception   of   sovereignty   that   informs   Sri   Lanka’s  
constitutional order must be plural, relational, and asymmetrical, rather than the 
majoritarian and unitary conception that has underpinned its republican 
constitutional order since 1972.89 Eschewing enforced uniformity, this conception of 
sovereignty  “…must be one which is flexible enough to accommodate a plurality of 
peoples or demoi, each of which might bring with it a differing and variegated set of 
claims  concerning  where  sovereignty  lies  within  the  state.”90 
 
The foregoing discussion on sovereignty is unproblematic insofar as it is merely the 
application of the requirements of a theoretical model to the pluralistic circumstances 
of the case study. It would be far from complete, however, if it does not address the 
spectre of secession that frequently complicates arguments in favour of plural 
sovereignties. Even in Western contexts, where host states may be more willing to 
countenance democratically expressed desires to secede by sub-state nations, or there 
are supra-state institutional sites within which to pursue other types of claims to 
recognition, plurinational theorists expend considerable efforts to establish the point 
that demands for plurinational accommodation should not be treated as synonymous 
with separatist models of sub-state nationalism. 91  The extensive autonomy 
contemplated by the plurinational state, it is argued, obviates the need in many cases 
for sub-state nations to seek a separate nation-state for their constitutional self-
fulfilment.92 In the Sri Lankan case, however, even far less radical measures of 
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devolution in response to Tamil claims continue to be resisted because of the fear 
that the dilution of centralised authority is only a slippery slope towards secession. 
Such fears, it needs be added, are not merely the exaggerated claims of paranoid 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists who are ideologically opposed to devolution and 
accommodation, but held at a much more general level among the ordinary Sinhalese 
citizenry. These fears have been exacerbated by the experience of Tamil secessionist 
terrorism, and hence the reason ethnocratic strategies and the unitary state enjoy 
much electoral support within the majority nation. Notwithstanding occasional 
separatist rhetoric, the evidence that the main goal of the parliamentary strain of 
Tamil nationalism has been federal autonomy within a united Sri Lanka and not 
secession seems to do little to allay these fears.93  
 
The argument that decentralisation encourages rather than placates fissiparous sub-
state movements needs to be seen in the light of a multiplicity of other competing 
issues, and both empirically and normatively, it is not a proposition that can be 
asserted as a general truth in all cases.94 In the Sri Lankan case, two preliminary 
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responses to this argument are particularly important. Firstly, most instances of 
successful secession across the world are explained by particular political and 
historical circumstances, none of which apply to the Sri Lankan context (see below). 
Secondly, the alternative to a principled constitutional settlement of the issue of 
national pluralism is the ethnocratic dystopia that I have lengthily described in 
Chapter 5. The premise of this thesis throughout has been that this is not a type of 
politico-constitutional response to pluralism that is stable, democratic, or just, and 
thus decentralisation is a necessity, not an option. 
 
My concern in the present discussion is not about how to overcome this challenge 
politically, but rather to present a principled perspective on how to address the issue 
of secession in a potential plurinational constitution in Sri Lanka. I argue for a clear 
presumption against an express or implied right to secede for the Tamils in such a 
constitution, except under extraordinary conditions of oppression (in which the 
plurinational settlement has been decisively repudiated by the state). I justify this on 
three grounds: the postulates of plurinational constitutionalism itself; on the 
functional constraints imposed by the practical political realities within Sri Lanka as 
well as its geopolitical location; and finally on general normative considerations 
upon which a presumption against constitutionalising a right to secession can be 
defended  (relying  in  a  substantial  but  qualified  way  on  Allen  Buchanan’s  account  of  
secession as a ‘remedial  right  only’95). I will now elaborate on these three arguments.  
 
It needs to be reemphasised that as a constitutional model, the central aim of 
plurinationalism is in fact to preserve the unity of the state consistently with the 
democratic accommodation of sub-state nations, rather than to facilitate secession. Its 
very purpose is to articulate a model of state that can accommodate multiple 
nationality claims without creating new nation-states. Moreover, the plurinational 
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state is a model of accommodation in constitutional law, whereas secession is a 
definably separate category of legal response to sub-state nationalism, which both 
disrupts and simultaneously reaffirms the Westphalian global order of nation-states. 
That is, secession contemplates the territorial division of existing states in order to 
meet sub-state nationality claims, which also means that it regenerates the traditional 
nation-state as the sole model of addressing nationality claims, unlike the 
plurinational state which fundamentally questions the organisational principles and 
normative precepts of the nation-state while endeavouring to address nationality 
claims within the overall unity of existing states. This is why it has been noted that 
the plurinational state presents more fundamental and radical challenges to the 
nation-state than secession.  
 
Only few constitutions recognise a right to secede and where they do, or as in the 
case of the old socialist constitutions that did, they are in practice very difficult or 
impossible to exercise (e.g., Ethiopia96). And while the question of whether or not to 
constitutionalise a right to secession is certainly the subject of debate among 
constitutional theorists and political philosophers, even those who argue in favour of 
an express recognition of such a right presuppose an actual or potential failure of 
internal constitutional accommodation, or slightly differently, a right to secession as 
an additional guarantee to ensure the implementation of internal autonomy 
arrangements.97 For these reasons, it can be argued as a matter of constitutional 
principle that a presumption against secession is consistent with the plurinational 
model. Among the Western plurinational states, the United Kingdom is unusual in its 
openness to the prospect of Scottish independence if a referendum so decides, and in 
the case of Northern Ireland it has provided a statutory process for a future 
determination of the matter. 98  More typically perhaps, in Spain, secession is 
expressly prohibited by the constitution,99 and in Canada, a constitutional silence on 
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the issue did not mean that the Supreme Court recognised a unilateral right to secede 
by Quebec.100 
 
It is in this context that we have to consider a presumption against secession in the 
Sri Lankan case, without which it may be impossible to overcome Sinhalese fears of 
plurinational autonomy. There is no possibility whatsoever that the majority nation 
would countenance a constitutionalised right to secession, and indeed they may insist 
on not merely a presumption against, but an express prohibition of, secession. There 
is   therefore   no   question   of   ‘consensual   secession’   in   the   Sri   Lankan   case. 101  
Moreover, as the geopolitical dynamics that contributed to the defeat of Tamil 
separatism in the Sri Lankan civil war demonstrated, it does not seem likely that 
regional powers in South Asia or Asia more broadly would welcome the precedent of 
secession as a method of resolving sub-state national claims.102 Countries like India 
and China with their own intra-state nationalisms are not likely to regard the breakup 
of an existing state with equanimity. On the other hand, this may not prove to be too 
strenuous a commitment for the Tamil nation to undertake, in exchange for the level 
of recognition, representation and autonomy it will obtain within a plurinational 
dispensation.  
 
Furthermore, even within liberal political philosophy and constitutional theory, the 
question of secession is not settled, with strong arguments being made against the 
express recognition of such a right, or to recognise an implied right only in highly 
exceptional circumstances, from unequivocally liberal normative standpoints.103 On 
the other hand, many of the normative theories in favour of the express recognition 
of the right are based on ideologically liberal conceptions of the good, and for 
reasons set out in Chapter 3, I have tried to avoid political liberalism as a normative 
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foundation for constitutional theory in the Sri Lankan case. Yet the theoretical 
literature is not without relevance in formulating a normatively principled position 
on the issue of secession, and here the work of Allen Buchanan is especially useful. 
A  qualification   in   relying   on  Buchanan’s   theory   of   secession,   however,   is   that   his  
overarching concern is to articulate a general theory for regulating secession at 
international law, whereas my concerns are with constitutional law and more 
contextually  particular.  Buchanan’s  major  contribution  has  been  to  critique  ‘primary  
right’  theories  of  secession  (both  ‘ascriptivist’  and  ‘plebiscitary’),  and  to  propose the 
alternative  ‘remedial   right  only’  account  as   the  more  defensible  basis  on  which   the  
disruptive potential of secession can be balanced with the requirement of justice for 
oppressed groups within states.104 His presumption in favour of intra-state autonomy 
and against secession (except in grave circumstances of oppression) is not merely 
consistent with the plurinational state, but strongly supportive of the plurinational 
logic. The essence of his position as it relates to the present discussion is embodied 
in the following passage:   
 
“First,  uncoupling  the  right  to  secede  from  the  legitimate  interests  that  groups  
may have in various forms of intrastate autonomy is liberating; it allows 
groups to get what they need without the risks involved in secession. Second, 
states will be more receptive to legitimate claims for autonomy if they are 
assured that they can respond to these without implicitly recognizing the 
group’s  right  to  secede.  Third,  the  justice-based account of the unilateral right 
to secede focuses attention where it belongs: on the need to provide better 
protection for human rights. States can avoid secession or at least avoid 
international legal support for secession if they do a creditable job of 
respecting the basic human rights of all their  citizens.”105  
 
Here therefore we have a principled framework that meets the challenge of national 
pluralism by a careful balance of the competing pulls of sub-state national autonomy 
and  the  unity  of  the  plurinational  state.  Buchanan’s  approach  ensures  stability by the 
presumption against secession, and it guarantees justice by allowing the possibility of 
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unilateral secession if the state does not meet its rights obligations, including by 
serious and persistent violations of the plurinational autonomy settlement.106  
 
For all the three sets of reasons discussed above, therefore, it can be concluded that 
the outer limit of the extensive pluralisation of sovereignty involved in introducing a 
plurinational constitution will be defined by the guarantee of the unity and territorial 
integrity of the Sri Lankan state, as reflected in a constitutional presumption against, 
if not an express prohibition on, secession. 
 
 
3.3 Institutional Asymmetry: Guiding Principles  
 
Building upon the preceding theoretical discussion, we are now in a position to 
enunciate more prescriptively the contours of the major principles that should inform 
the design of a plurinational constitutional system. As noted at the outset, these will 
deliberately be set down in broad and general terms, so that they articulate the 
substantive core of a plurinational system, but without overly constraining design 
options within that framework. The precise institutional specifics of each of these 
principles are left for some future constitution-making process to articulate. I rely 
here   substantially   on  Stephen  Tierney’s  work,107 while adapting these principles to 
the Sri Lankan context. While these guiding principles promote national pluralism 
and therefore asymmetric institutional pluralism, some of them are also specifically 
aimed at preventing certain dangers of authoritarianism and ethnic nationalism that 
were not in contemplation in the Western experience. In addition to the requirements 
of plurinational constitutional theory, therefore, they must be framed within the 
additional concerns that Will Kymlicka identified in applying models developed in 
Western  conditions  to  contexts  elsewhere:  “The  institutionalisation  of  ethno-national 
identities is not, in and of itself, either good or bad. What matters is that this process 
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of institutionalisation is done in a peaceful and democratic way, consistent with 
human  rights…”108    
 
Accordingly, the first principle is the principle of autonomy. This principle involves 
the right of each sub-state nation within the plurinational state to determine its own 
path of political and cultural self-development. It ensures that the sub-state  nations’ 
‘national’ rather   than   ‘minority’   status is reflected in appropriate autonomy 
arrangements within the constitutional structure of the plurinational state. In the 
Western context, Tierney observes that this principle accords with Neil 
MacCormick’s  notion  of  ‘self-rule’  in  which,  “the members of a nation are as such in 
principle entitled to effective organs of political self-government within the world 
order of sovereign or post-sovereign states; but these need not provide for self-
government   in   the   form   of   a   sovereign   state.” 109 In the Sri Lankan context, the 
principle of autonomy would be limited by an a priori commitment to the unity of 
the plurinational state; i.e., there would be no express constitutional right to 
secession and there would be a constitutional presumption against an implied right, 
which would be rebuttable only in extremely grave circumstances. However, the 
level of autonomy contemplated here is extensive, and would enable the sub-state 
nations to not merely govern themselves in most areas of day-to-day policy, but also 
ensure they have the full constitutional capacity to protect and preserve their 
respective ethnic identities, including languages, religions and cultures, consistent 
with the democratic values of choice, tolerance and pluralism that are integral to the 
plurinational constitution. The principle of autonomy   therefore   translates   as   ‘self-
determination’ for sub-state nations, albeit as of a tenet of political morality, rather 
than the rule in international law. The principle applies not only to a sub-state nation 
seeking specific legal recognition, but also to the plurinational state to respect the 
aspirations to recognition of such claims.  
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Secondly, the principle of representation derives from the understanding that the 
‘primary  agenda’  of  sub-state nations is not secession but full and fair representation 
in the constitutional and political processes of the host state. This involves power-
sharing and representation in central government, particularly the legislature and the 
judiciary, and also critically, in procedures for constitutional change. The principle of 
representation ensures the active involvement of sub-state national governments in 
all aspects of the governance of the plurinational state, and not merely exceptional 
situations like constitutional amendment. Beyond the powers and institutions of the 
state, this principle demands conformity from state-wide political parties to devise 
their internal structures consistently with its dictates, so that political participation in 
central processes do not exclude citizens within sub-state nations. This principle 
reflects the interdependent and co-operative nature of the plurinational state, which 
not only recognises national pluralism in the self-rule dimension, but also the shared-
rule dimension in the governance of the whole.  
 
Thirdly, the principle of recognition has both a symbolic and practical character, and 
in both dimensions it has special significance for a plurinational constitutional 
culture. The recognition of the plurinational character of the state in symbolic 
commitments and institutions is  not  in  fact  merely  ‘symbolic’  but  crucially important 
in identifying the plural ethno-social foundations of the state and thereby the plural 
sources of its legitimacy. These symbols have a significant practical effect in that 
they  “set the tone for the way in which the constitution is in general interpreted and 
applied, and will determine whether a vision of a plurality of nations, interacting 
equal   to   equal,   is   in   fact   a   constitutional   reality.”110 In the Sri Lankan case, the 
constitutional interaction of the plurality of nations would be recognised as being 
based, not on equality, but on pluralism, and the resurrection of a more tolerant 
history of mutual co-existence. The principle of recognition, however, does more that 
recognise ethnonational and other forms of diversity; it is also the basis on which the 
re-articulation of the new mythomoteur of the plurinational state-nation would be 
undertaken. In this unifying function, recognition would be given to the submerged 
but resilient traditions of goodwill and co-operation as well as shared historical 
                                                 




achievements, which will provide the new myth symbol complex for the united 
plurinational future.   
 
Fourthly, the principle of reciprocity stresses the tenet of political morality that in 
plurinational states in which sub-state nations enjoy the recognition, representation 
and autonomy ensured by the first three principles, the latter in turn owe certain 
obligations to the host state. Tierney identifies three such duties; viz., to reciprocally 
recognise   the   ‘national   status’   of   other   entities within   the   state,   to   work   in   “good 
faith to consolidate the state as a common polity,”111 and to respect the rights and 
interests of all citizens arising out of the common citizenship of the state as a whole. 
There is an important caveat attached to this principle:  “nationalist movements with 
an  overtly   ‘separatist’  programme  may  not  accept   these  responsibilities,  but   in   turn  
they must accept that the normative force of any claims they might make of the host 
state in terms of representation and recognition may, accordingly, be substantially 
weakened.”112 In the light of preceding discussions in this thesis, the importance of 
this principle in the Sri Lankan case is self-evident. 
 
Fifthly, the principle of democracy has two dimensions in the Sri Lankan context. 
Firstly, it relates to the situation of the individual within a sub-state nation, in which 
an overriding concern is to ensure that its individual members in the exercise of their 
democratic rights determine the collective political direction of the group, and not 
the converse. This underscores the fact that the sub-state nation in the plurinational 
scheme is not only an ethno-cultural entity but also a territorial unit of government. It 
must therefore respect the democratically expressed wishes of resident citizens and 
not only the interests of members of the ethnic nation. Moreover, the sub-state level 
must respect the principle that individuals in the plurinational state have the capacity 
and the constitutional opportunity to subscribe to multiple national identities, and 
that this involves respect for the loyalty that a member of the sub-state nation may 
owe to the state national society. Secondly, the principle of democracy echoes a 
much older rationale for dividing and decentralising political power and legal 
authority in terms of the democratic aim of preventing authoritarianism. The 
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centralising legal discourses of colonial modernity and the unitary state, a 
monarchical form of presidentialism (since the second republican constitution of 
1978), monistic political discourses of ethnocratic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, and 
the normalisation of exceptional powers during a long period of ethnic conflict, have 
all contributed to institutionalising a post-colonial culture of highly authoritarian 
government. The radical decentralisation involved in plurinational reforms therefore 
helps to address this broader reform consideration as well.     
 
Sixthly, the principle of asymmetrical pluralism informs both institutional design and 
the ethos of the new constitutional culture. This norm of pluralism, as elaborated in 
Chapter 5, is the mainstay of the constitutional system, and this involves the 
constitutionalisation of asymmetries in a variety of ways, as discussed above. 
Pluralism and asymmetry will therefore not only describe but also normatively 
influence: textual choices in constitution-drafting, including preambular or other 
declaratory sections; the design of governmental institutions at every level of the 
state; constitutional implementation and constitutional adjudication; official language 
policies; the fiscal and financial framework; and how non-state democratic 
institutions such as the public service media, political parties, the public education 
system,  and  the  ‘legal  complex’113 are restructured.    
 
Finally, the principle of human rights protection, which is implicit throughout the 
preceding discussion in this thesis, but which must constitute an unambiguous 
principle of the plurinational constitutional order. In a historical context in which 
human rights have been widely and casually traduced by both the state as well as 
ethnonationalist actors, especially as a result of violent conflict arising from national 
pluralism, the express incorporation of such a principle assumes pivotal importance 
in representing a fundamental commitment to acknowledging the abuses of the past, 
to redressing those wrongs, and to ensuring that they are not repeated in the future. 
The respect for universal human rights standards required by this principle also 
implies that neither the state nor sub-state authorities may defend non-compliance by 
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recourse to ethnic, religious or cultural particularities. As I have shown in Chapter 2, 
if we discount the self-serving practices of contemporary ethnonationalisms, there is 
nothing about any of the ethnicities in Sri Lanka that is necessarily inconsistent with 
such universal standards, and in that sense the cultural context is fundamentally 
different from, for example, certain Islamic societies in which religiously-mandated 
norms are held to supersede human rights norms. This does not mean that the 
principles of autonomy, national (or communal) pluralism and asymmetry are 
displaced if they are in potential conflict with human rights norms, thereby 
recentralising power (on the assumption that the state is better placed to protect them 
than sub-state governments). Rather, its presence compels a deliberative process 
through which those principles can be interpreted consistently with human rights 
standards, and therefore its purpose is to guard against any tendency for asymmetry 
to be interpreted as justifying ethnonationalist recidivism within territorial enclaves 
protected by plurinational autonomy.  
 
The scheme articulated in these seven principles taken together outlines the 
substantive parameters of a plurinational constitution for Sri Lanka. They are 
prescriptive but not exhaustive, and hence constitutional designers would have to 
refine, expand and add to them if this scheme is adopted as the basis of a future 
constitution-making process.  
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The foregoing portrayal of a plurinational constitutional order is likely to perplex Sri 
Lankan constitutional lawyers (including Tamil nationalists among them) steeped in 
the legal positivist tradition of Austin, Dicey and Wheare, and for those to whom 
constitutional systems may only make sense if defined in terms of the formalistic 
epistemology of the unitary / federal classification or through the doctrines 
associated with the Westphalian nation-state. 114  However, it is precisely these 
limitations of political and legal imagination that the Sri Lankan constitutional 
                                                 




tradition needs to overcome if it is to successfully address the challenge of national 
pluralism. If nothing else, Western plurinational constitutionalism has shown us that 
the onus is on constitutional lawyers and political theorists to develop creative 
responses to the demands of deeply complex and diverse societies. The alternative – 
that plural societies are reengineered to fit within neat monistic conceptual categories 
or within a unitary ideological framework – is not only profoundly undemocratic, but 
also as the post-colonial history of Sri Lanka has shown, invites authoritarianism and 










When the seeds of this project were germinating in my mind in 2006, Sri Lanka was 
a   different   place,   indeed   a   ‘foreign   country’   in   the   Nietzschean   sense.1 While the 
high hopes of the peace process that began with the ceasefire of December 2001 had 
already frayed beyond recovery, very few would have predicted then that the war, 
long regarded as unwinnable by either the Sri Lankan state or the Tamil separatists, 
would be over by May 2009. The end was marked by both the horrific brutality and 
the macabre romanticism that is unfortunately so typical of ethnonationalist conflict. 
More predictable has been the post-war direction of the Sri Lankan state. For the 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, the victory was not merely a contemporary question of 
overcoming the threat of Tamil separatist terrorism, but a historically ordained 
triumph of their claim to the ownership of the island as a Sinhala and Buddhist 
country. The military success, in this view, had now to be followed up with the 
pervasive entrenchment of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation not only in the architecture of 
the post-war state, but also in the more informal structures of politics, society, and 
culture, so as to irreversibly consolidate   the   ‘Dhammadipa-cum-Sihaladipa’2 par 
excellence. Combining tradition and modernity, this ethnocratic project finds 
validation in the vamsa historiographies, democratic legitimation in ethnicised 
majoritarianism, and its technological resources in the authoritarian potential of the 
modern state. A magnanimous post-war constitutional settlement that could reinforce 
recovery and reconciliation, therefore, is firmly outwith the ontological horizons of 
the Sri Lankan regime. 
 
Meanwhile, despite the complete physical decimation of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s   leadership, the Tamil people of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces have voted overwhelmingly for the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in all 
                                                 
1 See  E.  Scheiffele,  ‘Questioning  One’s  ‘Own’  from  the  Perspective  of  the  Foreign’  in  G.  Parkes  (Ed.)  
(1991) Nietzsche and Asian Thought (Chicago: Chicago UP): Ch.3 at p.34. 
2 M. Roberts (2004a) Sinhala Consciousness in the Kandyan Period: 1590s to 1815 (Colombo: 




of the post-war elections: the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2010, the 
local government elections of 2011, and the provincial elections of 2012 and 2013. 
In each of these elections, the TNA manifestoes have reiterated Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalism’s   three   cardinal   precepts:   that   they   are   a   nation,   with   a   traditional  
homeland, entitled to the right to self-determination. Acknowledging perhaps the 
extent of the altered reality reflected in the total defeat of the Tigers, the TNA has 
also asserted that they seek accommodation of these claims within a united (but not 
unitary) Sri Lankan state.  
 
In terms of the deep constitutional challenges of ethnic and national pluralism that 
have afflicted the state of Ceylon and Sri Lanka from the early twentieth century, 
therefore, the end of the war is merely yet another case of plus  ça  change,  plus  c’est  
la même chose. The persistence of the constitutional crisis created by these 
incommensurable nationalist self-perceptions, alongside the conviction that it needs 
to be addressed by constitutional means rather than militarised authoritarianism, 
formed the point of entry in this thesis for the exploration of the plurinational state as 
a more stable and just constitutional model for Sri Lanka. In applying the theory and 
practice of the model to the Sri Lankan case, three major empirical differences 
between the Western plurinational states and Sri Lanka had to be taken into account. 
Articulated as ideal-types, these were identified as the differences between civic-
societal and ethnic-communal nationalism, Western and colonial modernity, and 
liberal and illiberal democracy. By giving careful regard to these differences, and 
reformulating its normative foundations and structural principles in alternative ways, 
I   have  argued   in   this   thesis   that   the  plurinational   state   is   capable  of   ‘migration’   to  
non-Western contexts, or at least to those that are comparable to the Sri Lankan case 
such as Burma and Thailand. These Asian states with predominant Theravada 
Buddhist societies, and therefore a shared pre-European  ‘galactic’  state  tradition,  all  
experience serious constitutionally unresolved problems of national pluralism and 
face similar contemporary challenges of uneven political development and fragile 





By way of conclusions drawn from the discussions in preceding chapters, I make the 
following descriptive and normative propositions in relation to Sri Lanka and more 
generally the concept of the plurinational state. Key concepts and terms are 
highlighted and referenced to the sections of the relevant chapters where they have 




Descriptive and Analytical Insights 
 
x Sociologically, the Sri Lankan polity is characterised not merely by ethnic and 
religious pluralism but also by national pluralism. 3  More precisely, it is 
ethnically a bi-national polity 4  in which two groups, the majority Sinhala-
Buddhists and the minority Sri Lankan Tamils, claim to be nations based on 
distinctive cultures, histories and   territories.  Sri  Lanka’s communal pluralism5 
extends to caste divisions among the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and other discrete 
minority groups, such as the Muslims and the Indian Tamils (and even smaller 
groups such as the Veddas, Malays, Burghers, Colombo Chetties, Barathas, 
Bohras, Parsees, Chinese, and Kafirs) as well as cross-cutting minorities such as 
the Christians (divided further into denominational groups such as the Roman 
Catholic, Anglican, Dutch Reformed, Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, and 
various evangelical groups).  
 
x However, it is the Tamil sub-state nationality claim6 that constitutes the most 
fundamental challenge for the Sri Lankan state, the unresolved nature of which 
has questioned the unity, legitimacy and viability of the Sri Lankan state. This 
must clearly be understood analytically as a problem of national pluralism and 
not a question of minority rights. As the central concern of this thesis, Sri Lanka 
                                                 
3 Chapter 1, Sections 1.1 and 1.2; Chapter 2. 
4 Chapter 6, Section 1. 
5 Ibid. 




is therefore a case of national pluralism-as-fact 7  but with an incongruous 
constitutional order that does not reflect national pluralism-as-norm.8 
 
x Despite   its   frequent   invocation   in  performances  of   ‘banal  nationalism’   (such  as  
cross-communal support for the Sri Lankan cricket team) and as an inarticulate 
assumption   in   mainstream   ‘moderate’   scholarly   and   policy debates, the 
inclusionary and unifying potential of the civic  modernist  ‘Sri  Lankan’  nation9 
has been frustrated by the post-colonial, and now post-war, ethnocratic state.10 
There is little point in adhering to this model, because it has been undermined by 
the persistent Tamil nationality claim and has been superseded by the emergence 
of better models such as the plurinational state, 11  a   ‘discrete   category   of  
multilevel   polity’   that   in   theory   and   practice   transcends   orthodox,   formalistic  
constitutional classifications.  
 
x Contemporary Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 12  instrumentally utilises both 
traditionalist and modernist discourses in its claims to constitutional primacy. 
From pre-British history, it focuses on the encompassing and hierarchical aspects 
of the Sinhala-Buddhist monarchical state, and the concept of the unitary state13 
is its chief derivation from modern (colonial) constitutionalism. However, it 
rejects  modernity’s   values   of   secularism,   diversity,   tolerance   and   equality,   and  
ignores the devolutionary and asymmetric potential of the pre-colonial state.14 
 
x Through democratic majoritarianism 15  Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has 
appropriated the post-colonial state and engaged in a performance of top-down 
                                                 
7 Chapter 5, Section 3.1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Chapter 2, Section 3; Chapter 5, Sections 2.1 and 3.2. 
10 Chapter 5, Section 2.2. 
11 Chapter 3, Section 2. 
12 Chapter 2, Section 2.1; Chapter 4, Section 3.1. 
13 Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
14 Ibid. 




nationalism16 in instantiating a Sinhala-Buddhist ethnocracy. This has generated 
a bottom-up ‘We  are  a Nation’  performance17 from the Tamils.  
 
x The conceptual distinction between nation and nationalism 18  is crucial 
especially in regard to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, because it highlights the 
dissonance between the pluralist potential of the pre-colonial state and the 
centralised ethnocracy of the present, as well as dissonance between the 
homogenising and hegemonic modern Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and the 
pluralistic character of the pre-British collective consciousness of Sinhalē.19 
 
x Newer explanatory accounts of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that emphasise its 
simultaneously traditional and modern character are to be preferred to the older 
post-orientalist20 and ethnicist21 accounts, although the latter continue to inform 
practical constitutional discourse in Sri Lanka.  
  
x Unitary constitutional order is supported on arguments other than Sinhala-
Buddhist chauvinism, of which there are two: the discourse of classical 
modernist post-colonial nation-building;22 and the positivistic tradition23 of 
constitutional law that buttresses an ideology of legal centralism.24   
 
x The Sri Lankan conception of the unitary state is a clear product of colonial 
modernity, 25  which also implies two other features of the Sri Lankan state 
tradition: the law of exception26 and the rule of difference.27 In addition, the 
post-colonial state has demonstrated highly literalist and rigid (or Eastphalian28) 
                                                 
16 Chapter 4, Section 4. 
17 Chapter 4, Section 4. 
18 Chapter 4, Section 2. 
19 Chapter 4, Section 3.1. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3.2. 
23 Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Chapter 5, Sections 1 and 2.1. 
26 Chapter 5, Section 2.1. 
27 Ibid. 




understandings of Westphalian doctrines such as sovereignty, 29  territorial 
integrity, and non-interference,   rendering   it   a   ‘hard  state’  unlike   the   ‘soft’   late-
sovereign Western plurinational states30 in confronting the issues of national 
pluralism.  
 
x Centralising and monistic conceptualisations of the nation, the state, and 
constitutional law have been unintentionally assisted by methodological and 
substantive weaknesses of both liberal-federalist reformism31 as well as Tamil 
nationalism. 32  In particular, these pluralist discourses have suffered from an 
absence of theory (both descriptive and normative) and have insufficiently 
questioned the received categories of classical modernism as well as legal 
formalism (especially the unitary/federal dichotomy). There is a need for these 
traditions to better theorise their constitutional arguments, and in this they need 
to pay adequate attention to both functions and norms (functional 
normativity33), so that they ensure to neither analytically mischaracterise the 
nature  of  Sri  Lanka’s  sociological  pluralism,  nor  inadvertently  reinforce  monism.   
 
 
Normative and Structural Propositions 
 
x Once the character of the Sri Lankan polity is more accurately understood as 
outlined above, and in particular the implications of national pluralism are better 
appreciated, it follows that the monistic Westphalian nation-state34 cannot be 
regarded as an appropriate type of state for Sri Lanka. If the traditional nation-
state is rejected as a model, then so must be the modes of constitutional thinking 
associated with the discourse of classical modernist post-colonial nation-
building. The first constitutional proposition that follows from the adoption of the 
plurinational logic as a means of organising the state is the disaggregation of 
                                                 
29 Ibid; Chapter 6, Section 3.2. 
30 Chapter 3, Section 3. 
31 Chapter 2, Section 3.2; Chapter 3, Section 3.1. 
32 Chapter 2, Section 3.1; Chapter 4, Section 3.2. 
33 Chapter 1, Section 3. 




nation and state,35 which enables not only the possibility of accommodating 
more than one nation within the state, but also the consequential pluralisation of 
key doctrines like sovereignty.  
 
x While empirically the nature of the island is that of an ethnically bi-national 
polity, normatively a plurinational dispensation would reflect three nations, i.e., 
the Sinhala-Buddhist, Tamil, and Sri Lankan nations, together with other 
minority communities, consistent with the democratic norms of choice, tolerance 
and pluralism. This follows from the acceptance of nations and communities as 
‘deliberative  communities’  and  ‘contexts  of  choice’  for  the  exercise  of  individual  
freedoms as citizenship rights, and it meets the requirements of those to whom 
the ethnic nation or community is central to individual identity as well as those to 
whom ascriptive identities are unimportant or irrelevant. This is in turn based on 
the recognition that citizens in a plurinational state must be afforded the space to 
cultivate multiple identities,36 and that this involves provision for ethnic nations 
and communities as well as an overarching civic national identity. Sri Lankan 
plurinationalism therefore reflects both civic and ethnic conceptions of the 
nation and nationalism.37  
 
x The   ‘Sri   Lankan’   nation   under   a plurinational constitution means neither the 
hollow and meaningless identity that obtains under the ethnocratic state, nor the 
teleological monism denoted by the nation-building discourse. It is rather a civic 
and rights-based collective identity that gives substance and form to the unity of 
the plurinational state, and it is conceived as a state-nation38 rather than a nation-
state. Its unifying content will be derived from a new mythomoteur39 drawing 
upon shared bonds that have survived protracted conflict, and the goodwill that 
will accompany the radical pluralisation of the Sri Lankan state.    
 
                                                 
35 Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
36 Chapter 5, Section 3.2; Chapter 6, Section 3.3. 
37 Chapter 5, Section 3.2; Chapter 6, Section 3. 
38 Chapter 5, Section 3.2. 




x For mainly instrumental reasons, the ideologically liberal political theory and 
philosophy upon which the Western plurinational state is constructed, is 
inappropriate as a basis for articulating the normative foundations of a Sri 
Lankan conception of plurinationalism. A more appropriate source of normative 
theory is the idea of comprehensive pluralism,40 a ‘counterfactual ideal’.   The  
theory of comprehensive pluralism provides a principled framework for 
determining the validity of plural conceptions of the good and their admittance 
into the plurinational constitutional order. The application of the related idea of 
limited pluralism41 allows practical concessions to be made to political and 
historical context, including symbolic acknowledgements of the Sinhala-
Buddhist  nation’s  preeminent  historic  status,  while  excluding  intolerant  monistic  
conceptions such as Sinhala-Buddhist ethnocracy that are inconsistent with the 
fundamental value of pluralism.  
 
x This in turn leads to a spatiotemporal conceptualisation of the plurinational 
constitutional order that is based on the principle of unequal pluralism.42 In this 
view, a certain primacy is afforded to the Sinhala-Buddhist nation, albeit in a 
way that is consistent with the fullest possible autonomy for the sub-state Tamil 
nation and respect for other minority communities within the framework of a 
united state.  
 
x The principle of unequal pluralism demands the wholesale adoption of 
asymmetrical constitutionalism43 in a plurinational system. Normatively the 
most important implication of this approach is the pluralisation of the sources 
of sovereignty44 (as both constituent and constituted power). However, this stops 
short of a right to sub-state secession, which is justified on practical constraints 
as well as the ‘remedial right only’ theory of secession.45  
 
                                                 
40 Chapter 5, Section 3.1. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid; Chapter 6, Section 3. 
43 Chapter 6, Section 1. 





x Constitutional asymmetry is most visible in the seven principles of institutional 
design. 46  They are the principles of: autonomy, representation, recognition, 
reciprocity, democracy, asymmetrical pluralism, and human rights protection. 
These are articulated in broad and heuristic terms so as to guide the drafting of a 




The Plurinational State 
 
Descriptive and Analytical Insights 
 
x The plurinational state can be made applicable to ethnic-communal models of the 
nation and nationalism. While taxonomically useful, the civic-ethnic 
dichotomy 47  has limited use for a deeper understanding of the provenance, 
nature and function of ethnicity and nationalism in the contemporary world. New 
arguments from liberal political theory and nationalism theory, in particular the 
insights offered by the ethno-symbolic48 view, demonstrate the limitations of the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy. Similarly to the critique by liberal nationalism of 
traditional liberalism, it is necessary therefore to adopt more contextualised and 
hermeneutic approaches to ethnic nationalism,49 which, as demonstrated by 
the Sri Lankan example, yields a more nuanced picture of these entities. In 
uncovering traditions of pluralism and tolerance against the hyperbolic rhetoric 
of ethnonationalist political entrepreneurs, these accounts enable us to 
contextualise plurinational values and structures for societies where ethnic 
nationalism is the dominant form of collective consciousness and identity.   
 
x Beyond interpretative theory, performative theories of nationalism and state-
formation are also useful in understanding why groups engage in ‘We   are   a  
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47 Chapter 4, Section 2. 
48 Ibid; Chapter 5, Section 3.2. 




Nation’   performances 50  in multinational contexts. This work provides 
potentially a general framework for re-theorising the plurinational state for global 
application.  
 
x It is also not necessary for multinational polities to have reached a fully modern 
state51 of political development in order for plurinational ideas to be applicable. 
In non-Western post-colonial contexts, the evolution of the nation-state has more 
often than not never reached full maturity, and conflict among plural ethnic 
nations has also often been the result of the failure of modernist nation-building. 
The pressing need to resolve these conflicts (with serious political, social and 
economic costs in societies that can ill-afford them), and the new understandings 
of the severe limitations of the Westphalian nation-state model addressing in this 
specific type of pluralism that arise from plurinational   constitutionalism’s  
critiques of traditional democratic constitutionalism, 52  are both good 
rationales for introducing plurinational constitutionalism into these non-Western 
contexts. 
 
x Plurinational constitutionalism need not be restricted in application to Western 
liberal democracies, and can be extended to non-liberal democracies. What is key 
is that there is a commitment to some form of procedural democracy. This is 
important in including sociologically multinational countries that are 
transitioning to democracy within the scope of application for plurinational ideas. 
Accordingly, the normative foundations of the plurinational state need not be 
articulated exclusively within political liberalism and liberal constitutionalism, 
although where applicable and uncontroversial, these lessons can usefully be 
extended. In this thesis, the idea of comprehensive pluralism53 has been relied 
upon to provide normative theory for the Sri Lankan case, but it can be assumed 
that there are many other ways within the theory of democracy, republicanism, 
federalism, consociationalism and other traditions of politico-constitutional 
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organisation, and even international rights frameworks concerning national 
minorities or indigenous and tribal peoples,54 from which normative arguments 
for plurinational-type accommodation may be constructed.   
 
 
Normative and Structural Propositions  
 
x While the post-sovereign or late-sovereign55 nature of especially the European 
plurinational states have no doubt contributed to the pluralisation of their internal 
constitutional arrangements, the supra-state constitutional order that is the 
European Union is unique to Europe. This experience therefore must not be 
projected as having general application to the world beyond the EU. It follows 
that late-sovereignty should not be treated as a condition precedent to a 
plurinational constitution, which is, subject to political will, wholly possible in 
more conventionally Westphalian states.   
 
x Depending on the context, especially historical considerations, it may be more 
useful to foreground the norms of pluralism and asymmetry rather than the 
norm of equality56 in framing the relationship between majority and minority 
nations within non-Western plurinational states. It would be unwise to make a 
general proposition on the basis of the Sri Lankan case alone, and even there the 
notion of unequal pluralism might be contentious with Tamil nationalists. This is 
a matter in which the competing claims and positions of multiple national groups 
would have to be negotiated in each case with careful attention to specific aspects 
of history, geography, and even raw power balances. However, what this thesis 
has shown is that even where strict equality might not be possible, or must give 
way to strategic considerations, then there are alternative foundations of 
normative principle that may be deployed in securing plurinational autonomy for 
sub-state nations.   
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55 Chapter 3, Section 3. 




x The radical structural autonomy and normative pluralisation contemplated in a 
plurinational constitution could give rise to (legitimate) fears for the unity of the 
state. Even in Western plurinational states, consensual secession is the exception 
rather than the norm, as a comparison of recent events in UK/Scotland and 
Spain/Catalonia demonstrates. While of course plurinational constitutionalism is 
essentially a model of intra-state accommodation, it may be necessary to provide 
the additional guarantee of a presumption against unilateral secession57  to 
countervail the centrifugal forces unleashed by plurinational autonomy, including 
sub-state nationalists who may use that autonomy instrumentally to fulfil latent 
ambitions of independence. While there are sound reasons of principle as to why 
secession should be regarded as a remedial right only,58 in most post-colonial 
contexts it would be also strategically necessary to provide reassurance that the 
breakup of the state is not in contemplation, which in turn would facilitate 
broader support for plurinational reforms. A presumption against secession (that 
can be displaced in circumstances of extreme oppression) is not inconsistent with 
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